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Hem Prasad Subedi vs Deo Narayan Dahal And Anr
2021 Latest Caselaw 44 Sikkim

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 44 Sikkim
Judgement Date : 18 August, 2021

Sikkim High Court
Hem Prasad Subedi vs Deo Narayan Dahal And Anr on 18 August, 2021
Bench: Bhaskar Raj Pradhan
            THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
                  (Civil Revisional Jurisdiction)
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SINGLE BENCH: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
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                                 C.R.P. No.01 of 2020

         Hem Prasad Subedi,
         S/o Shri Deo Narayan Subedi,
         R/o Rawtey Rumtek,
         P.O. Sajong and P.S. Ranipool,
         East Sikkim.
                                  ..... Petitioner/Revisionist

                                               Versus

1.       Deo Narayan Dahal,
         S/o late Manohar Dahal,
         R/o Upper Tarku,
         P.O. Tarku and P.S. Temi,
         South Sikkim-737134.

2.       State of Sikkim,
         Through the Chief Secretary,
         Manan Kendra, Gangtok,
         East Sikkim-737101.

                                                                  .....Respondents

Revision petition under Section 115 read with Section
      151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
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Appearance:
                   Mr. Zangpo Sherpa, Advocate and Mr. Jushan
                   Lepcha, Advocate for the Petitioner.

                   Mr. N. B. Khatiwada, Senior Advocate with Ms
                   Gita Bista and Ms. Pratikcha Gurung,
                   Advocates for Respondent No.1

                   Ms. Pema Bhutia, Assistant                                       Government
                   Advocate for Respondent No.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 2

                           C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020
               Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.




                J U D G M E N T (ORAL)

( 18.08.2021 )

Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J.

1. A revision petition under Section 115 read with

Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has

been filed by the petitioner/defendant no.1 (the petitioner).

It is against the impugned order dated 18.12.2019 passed

by the learned District Judge, South Sikkim at Namchi

(the learned District Judge). The impugned order rejected

the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC filed by

the petitioner. The petitioner had sought for rejection of

the suit filed by the respondent no.1/plaintiff for failure to

disclose a cause of action and for being barred by law.

2. The suit was filed by the respondent no.1 against the

petitioner for recovery of money for malicious prosecution

and other reliefs. In the plaint it was averred that the

petitioner was a teacher by profession and the defendant

no.2 (the respondent no.2 herein) was the State of Sikkim

who had prosecuted the respondent based on false First

Information Report (FIR) lodged by the petitioner. The

plaint categorically states that the respondent no.1 is not

seeking any reliefs against the respondent no.2. 3

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

3. As per the narration in the plaint an FIR was lodged

on 14.07.2016 by the petitioner before the Temi police

station alleging that the respondent no.1 had committed

sexual assault on the victim who was residing with the

petitioner and his wife. Consequently, a warrant was

issued for the arrest of the respondent no.1, and he was

arrested and kept in the lockup from 14.07.2016 to

15.05.2017 for almost 10 months. It is alleged that based

on the false FIR, Temi police station Case No.17/2016

dated 14.07.2016 under Section 376 of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC) read with Section 4 and 8 of the Protection of

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) was

registered against the respondent no.1. On completion of

investigation charge sheet was submitted under Section

376(1)/341 IPC read with Section 4 and 8 of the POCSO

Act and cognizance taken by the learned Trial Court. The

plaint further narrates that the learned Trial Court heard

the parties and charges were framed against respondent

no.1 under Section 5(j)(ii), 5(l) of the POCSO Act and under

Section 376 (2) (i), (n) and 354-B IPC.

4. It is stated in the plaint that the prosecution

examined 12 witnesses and after a protracted trial the

respondent no.1 was acquitted on 21.03.2018. It is 4

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

averred that the petitioner had lodged the false FIR against

the respondent no.1 without a reasonable or probable

cause which is evident from the evidence recorded during

the trial. Various portions of the evidence in the criminal

trial have been highlighted in paragraph 11 of the plaint. It

is stated that the respondent no.1 and his family members

had suffered physical and mental pain; and they have

been lowered in the estimation of their friends, relatives,

and society.

5. In paragraph 14 of the plaint, it is stated that to

prove malicious prosecution the respondent no.1 was

required to prove the following ingredients:

"a. That the plaintiff was prosecuted on the complaint lodged by the defendant.

b. The proceeding complained was terminated in favour of the present plaintiff.

c. That the prosecution was instituted against the plaintiff without any just or reasonable cause.

d. That the prosecution was instituted with a malicious intention, that is not with the mere intention of getting the law into effect, but with an intention which was wrongful in fact.

e. That the plaintiff suffered damage to his reputation."

6. It is averred that the cause of action first arose on

21.03.2018 from the date of the judgment of acquittal 5

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

passed by the learned Trial Court and continued

thereafter.

7. On such pleadings the respondent no.1 sought for

expenses and financial losses incurred for engaging

counsel in the criminal case, damaging reputation, mental

and physical agony, and interest pendente lite and future.

8. On 21.02.2019 the learned District Judge issued

summons to the petitioner and respondent no.2.

9. On 23.03.2019 the petitioner filed an application

under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC (the

application). In the application it was averred that the

plaint was not maintainable and barred by the provisions

of Order 11(a) and (d) of the CPC. The respondent no.1

filed his objections.

10. On 27.11.2019 the learned District Judge heard the

learned counsel for the parties and on 18.12.2019 passed

the impugned order rejecting the application. The

petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order.

11. Heard Mr. Zangpo Sherpa, learned counsel for the

petitioner. It is contended that a reading of the plaint

would show that the suit was barred by law i.e. Section

19(7) of the POCSO Act. It is his contention that under 6

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

Section 19 (1) of the POCSO Act there is an obligation cast

upon any person having knowledge about sexual assault

on a child victim to report the same and failure to do so is

punishable under Section 21 thereof. It is pointed out

that Section 19(7) provides immunity to the informant

against both civil and criminal liability for giving such

information in good faith. The learned counsel also draws

the attention of this court to the impugned judgment

which reflects that this fact was pointed out to the learned

District Judge who, however, did not examine it. It is

argued, while taking this court through the impugned

judgment, that the acquittal was not an acquittal on a

conclusion that the FIR was false, but by giving benefit of

doubt to the respondent no.1. The learned counsel

referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in SR.

Tessy Jose v. State of Kerala1 which held on examination

of Section 19 of the POCSO Act that a person who had an

apprehension that such an offence may be committed or

knowledge that it has been committed would be required

to provide such information to the relevant authority.

12. Ms. Gita Bista, learned counsel for the respondent

no.1, vehemently opposes grant of any prayer in favour of

1 (2018) 18 SCC 292 7

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

the petitioner. While taking this court through the

evidence in the criminal trial filed by the respondent no.1

along with the plaint it is submitted that the respondent

no.1 had clearly laid out the cause of action in the plaint

and shown that it was not barred by limitation. It is

contended that neither the petitioner (P.W.2) nor the

victim (P.W.1) in the criminal trial had deposed that the

victim informed the petitioner that it was the respondent

no.1 who was responsible for her pregnancy. It is

contended that as such the FIR lodged by the petitioner

was evidently false and malicious against the respondent

no.1. The learned counsel also drew the attention of this

court to the admission made by the victim in her cross-

examination where she admitted that "it is true that I was

told by Sir and Madam to depose before the court about the

incident without fear. It is true that I was told to depose

before the court saying that I had gone to the house of the

accused on the relevant day. It is not a fact that I was told

by Sir and Madam to depose saying that I never stayed

overnight in any other person's house." It is thus,

submitted by the learned counsel that this would clearly

reflect that the victim was tutored by the petitioner for

lodging a false FIR. The learned counsel also argued that 8

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

the burden was on the petitioner to prove the criminal

case against the respondent no.1 and having failed to do

so it does not lie upon the petitioner to seek rejection of

the plaint for malicious prosecution against him.

13. Ms. Pema Bhutia learned Assistant Government

Advocate for the respondent no.2 submits that the dispute

is between the petitioner and the respondent no.1 and as

the respondent no.1 has chosen not to seek any relief

against the respondent no.2, she has nothing to submit.

14. This court has considered the submission made by

the learned counsel, examined the plaint and the

documents sought to be relied upon therein; the

application filed by the petitioner as well as the reply of

the respondent no.1.

15. Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC reads as

under:

"11. Rejection of plaint. - the plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

.....................................................................

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

...................................................................."

16. A reading of Order VII Rule 11 clearly reflects that

the plaint could be rejected in any of the grounds 9

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

enumerated in sub-clause (a) to (f). Whereas under sub-

clause (a) plaint could be rejected for non-disclosure of

cause of action, sub-clause (d) mandates that the plaint

shall be rejected where the suit appears from the

statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.

17. In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)

dead2 the Supreme Court held that under Order 7 Rule

11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the

plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the

averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the

documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by

law.

18. In the plaint the respondent no.1 has categorically

averred that the FIR was lodged by the petitioner stating

that the victim who was staying with him since childhood

had fallen sick and so they had taken her to Gangtok

hospital for medical treatment after which the doctor told

them that the victim was 28 weeks pregnant. It also avers

that it was alleged that the victim was sexually assaulted

by the respondent no.1. The plaint avers that after the

FIR, a criminal investigation was started by the police who

2 (2020) 7 SCC 366 10

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

filed the charge sheet against the respondent no.1 under

Section 376 (1)/341 of the IPC read with Section 4 and 8

of the POCSO Act. The respondent no.1 also clearly avers

that the learned Trial Court framed charges against the

respondent no.1 under Section 5 (j) (ii), 5(1) of the POCSO

Act and under Section 376 (2) (i), (n) and 354-B of the IPC.

Thereafter, the trial is referred to and the ultimate

acquittal which, according to the respondent no.1, gave

the cause of action to file the suit.

19. It is clear from reading of the plaint itself that it was

not only the petitioner who had complained to the police

about the commission of the offence against the

respondent no.1, but also that the police had investigated

the case and concluded by filing a charge sheet that the

allegation made by the complainant was prima facie true.

It is also clear from the reading of the statements in the

plaint that the criminal trial pertained to allegations

against the respondent No.1 under the POCSO Act.

20. Sections 19, 21 and 22 of the POCSO Act would be

relevant at this juncture and quoted herein below.

"19. Reporting of offences.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is 11

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to,-

(a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or

(b) the local police.

(2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be-

(a) scribed an entry number and recorded in writing;

(b) be read over to the informant;

(c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit.

(3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-section (2) in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded.

(4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same.

(5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection (including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital) within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed.

(6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or 12

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard.

(7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section (1)."

........................................................................

"21. Punishment for failure to report or record a case.- (1) Any person, who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub- section (1) of section 19 or section 20 or who fails to record such offence under sub-section (2) of section 19 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.

(2) Any person, being in-charge of any company or an institution (by whatever name called) who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-

section (1) of section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a child under this Act.

22. Punishment for false complaint or false information.- (1) Any person, who makes false complaint or provides false information against any person, in respect of an offence committed under sections 3, 5, 7 and section 9, solely with the intention to humiliate, extort or threaten or defame him, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.

(2) Where a false complaint has been made or false information has been provided by a child, no punishment shall be imposed on such child.

13

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

(3) Whoever, not being a child, makes a false complaint or provides false information against a child, knowing it to be false, thereby victimizing such child in any of the offences under this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine or with both."

21. Section 19 (1) of the POCSO Act mandates that any

person who has apprehension that an offence under the

Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such

an offence has been committed shall provide such

information to the special juvenile police or the local

police. Section 19(7) provides that no person shall incur

any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the

information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section

(1).

22. The Supreme Court in SR. Tessy (supra) has clearly

held that there is a legal obligation on a person to inform

the relevant authorities if he had knowledge about

commission of such an offence. It was held that the

expression "knowledge" means that some information was

received by such a person giving him/her knowledge about

the commission of the offence. It was held that a person is

supposed to know only where there is direct appeal to his

senses.

14

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

23. Under Section 21 of the POCSO Act any person, who

fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-

section (1) of Section 19 shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description which may extend to

six months or with fine or with both. The POCSO Act

therefore, clearly ensure that no sexual offence against a

child goes unreported and for that matter further assures

that the informant would also be protected if such

information is in good faith. If the information provided

was not in good faith and if false complaint was lodged,

Section 22 provides that any person, who makes false

complaint or provides false information against any

person, in respect of an offence committed under Sections

3, 5, 7 and Section 9, only with the intention to humiliate,

extort or threaten or defame him, shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months

or with fine or with both.

24. The protection provided under Section 19(7) of the

POCSO Act against civil or criminal liability would be for

giving information only in good faith and not for providing

or giving false information.

25. A reading of the statements in the plaint makes it

clear that the plaint was barred by section 19(7) of the 15

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

POCSO Act. Ms. Gita Bista, however, seeks to rely upon

the documents filed with the plaint as well. The

respondent no.1 along with the plaint filed a list of

documents consisting of:

(1) Certified copy of the FIR lodged by the petitioner;

(2) Certified copy of the judgment of acquittal;

          (3)     Certified copy of the deposition of
                  prosecution     witnesses     and                  defence
                  witnesses;

          (4)     Certified copy of CFSL report pertaining to

the DNA test of the respondent no.1 and

(5) Original challan.

26. As contended by Ms. Gita Bista, it is correct that

during the cross-examination of the victim (P.W.1) in the

criminal trial, she had admitted that she was told to

depose before the court saying that she had gone to the

house of the respondent no.1 on the relevant day.

However, the cross-examination stopped there. It was not

put to the victim that what she alleged in her deposition

was not true. Thus, there is no evidence of tutoring as

sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the

respondent no.1. The learned Trial Court examined the

evidence of the victim, the petitioner, his wife (P.W.3) and

Dr. Salina Tamang (P.W.5) to hold that the victim was 16

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. The learned Trial

Judge, thereafter, examined as to whether the respondent

no.1 was responsible for the same. Considering the DNA

report the learned Trial Judge opined that the prosecution

had failed to prove his case against the respondent no.1 by

giving him the benefit of doubt.

27. The learned Trial Court has not held that the FIR was

false or fabricated. What was narrated by the petitioner in

the criminal trial about the fact that it was the respondent

no.1 who had committed the offence of sexual assault

upon the victim was not narrated by him alone but also by

the victim which is clearly reflected in the judgment. The

learned counsel for the respondent no.1 took this court

through the deposition of the victim as well as deposition

of the petitioner. These depositions also do not reflect any

material that the petitioner had lodged a false FIR. A

person guilty of malicious prosecution is punishable under

Section 211 IPC. Instead, the respondent no.1 has sought

for monetary damages under the civil law for malicious

prosecution.

28. Section 19(7) clearly protects the informant who in

good faith gives information about his knowledge of sexual

assault on a child victim against both civil as well as 17

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

criminal liability. In the criminal trial the petitioner

deposed that he and his wife had taken the minor victim

to Ashirbad clinic at Gangtok where after examining her,

the doctor told them that the minor victim was 28 weeks

pregnant pursuant to which they lodged the FIR. In re-

examination the petitioner deposed that after the test

when she came out of the clinic, he asked the minor victim

how she got pregnant, but she told him that nothing had

happened to her. He further deposed that during the third

week of January 2016 the victim was left to stay in

respondent No.1's house. The petitioner's wife (P.W.3)

however deposed that in the chamber of the doctor who

conducted the ultrasound at Ashirbad clinic the victim

disclosed that it was "antaray hajurbah" who had made

her pregnant. She further deposed that back at Temi the

victim disclosed how respondent No.1 had committed

penetrative sexual assault upon her twice after which they

lodged the FIR. Evidently the petitioner had knowledge

about the commission of the offence. Although the FIR was

lodged by the petitioner, neither the investigating authority

nor the learned Trial Court concluded that the FIR lodged

by the petitioner was false. There is no material

whatsoever in the plaint, or the documents sought to be 18

C.R.P. No. 01 of 2020 Hem Prasad Subedi Vs. Deo Narayan Dahal & Anr.

relied upon, to establish even prima facie that the

petitioner had lodged a false FIR.

29. Section 19(7) of the POCSO Act is a central

legislation and the law of the land. It would squarely fall

within the meaning of law as contemplated in Order 7 Rule

11 CPC. The protection under Section 19(7) is

unequivocal. The plaint was clearly barred under the

provision as the FIR was lodged by the petitioner in good

faith. If the plaint is allowed to continue the purpose of

Section 19 of the POCSO Act would be lost and people

would fear to lodge genuine complaints of sexual assault

upon a child.

30. This court is thus of the view, that the impugned

order passed by the learned District Judge must be set

aside and the application filed by the petitioner be allowed.

It is accordingly so ordered. No order as to costs.

31. In view of the final disposal, the interim applications

are rendered infructuous and accordingly disposed.

(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan) Judge

to Approved for reporting: yes Internet: yes

 
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