[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Mohan Singh And Ors vs State on 12 March, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:11328]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 253/1994
1. Mohan Singh S/o Kalyan Singh
2. Guman Singh S/o Hari Singh
3. Ganpat Singh S/o Hari Singh
4. Narain Singh S/o Hari Ram All R/o Modikalan, PS Thawala
Distt. Nagaur
5. Shanker S/o Chandra Ram R/o Lavadar, PS Degana, Distt.
Nagaur.
----Appellant
Versus
State Of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ranjeet Joshi
MR. Abhijeet Joshi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Surendra Bishnoi, AGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Judgment
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS 29/01/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED 29/01/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 12/03/2026
BY THE COURT:-
1. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the
appellants assailing the judgment dated 09.05.1994 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nimbahera in Sessions Case
No.90/1992, whereby the appellant Shankar was convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 366 of the IPC and sentenced to
undergo one year's simple imprisonment along with a fine of
Rs.250/-, with a default stipulation of further imprisonment. The
remaining appellants, namely Narain Singh, Ganpat Singh, Mohan
Singh and Guman Singh, were convicted for the offence
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punishable under Section 376 IPC and were sentenced to undergo
seven years' simple imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.500/-
each, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one
year's simple imprisonment.
1.1. Being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment
of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants have preferred
the present appeal seeking reversal of the impugned judgment.
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case originates from a
complaint lodged on 05.06.1982 by Onkar Lal, son of Easta Ji,
resident of Ishakpura, before the learned Munsif and Judicial
Magistrate, Nimbahera. In the complaint, it was alleged that his
younger sister Mst. Hudi, aged about 16-17 years, was residing at
Ishakpura along with the family. The appellant Shankar Lal, who
was residing in the neighbourhood of the complainant, was
employed in J.K. Cement Factory, while the other accused persons
namely Narain Singh, Ganpat Singh, Mohan Singh and Guman
Singh, along with their family members, were residents of the
nearby village Modi Kalan and were also working in the said
cement factory.
2.1. It was alleged that on 31.05.1982, the accused persons
arrived at Ishakpura and stayed in the house of Narain Singh. It
was further alleged that appellant Shankar Lal collected his
household belongings from his rented accommodation and, at
about 11:00 p.m., one Jhankari Bai called the prosecutrix Hudi to
her house. Thereafter, the prosecutrix allegedly left her parental
home and departed during the night by train along with Shankar
Lal and the other accused persons.
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2.2. Upon receipt of the complaint on 05.06.1982, the learned
Magistrate forwarded the same to the concerned police station for
investigation. Consequently, a criminal case came to be registered
on 10.06.1982 for offences under Sections 363 and 376 IPC. After
completion of investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet
under Sections 366 and 376 IPC against the accused persons.
During trial, one of the co-accused Hanuman Singh came to be
acquitted, whereas the present appellants were convicted and
sentenced as mentioned hereinabove. Aggrieved by the judgment
rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nimbahera,
the appellants have preferred the present appeal.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length
and have carefully perused the impugned judgment as well as the
entire record of the case.
4. Upon an exhaustive and conscientious appraisal of the entire
evidentiary record placed before this Court, it becomes manifest
that the edifice of the prosecution case rests substantially upon
the testimony of the prosecutrix, examined as PW-1. It is a well-
settled proposition of criminal jurisprudence that the statement of
a prosecutrix, if found to be wholly trustworthy, cogent and free
from blemish, may in itself constitute a sufficient foundation for
recording a conviction. Nevertheless, such testimony must inspire
unqualified confidence and must be of sterling quality, capable of
withstanding careful judicial scrutiny.
4.1. In the present case, however, the testimony of the
prosecutrix does not exhibit the degree of consistency and
reliability which would ordinarily warrant implicit reliance. A
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careful juxtaposition of her deposition before the Court with the
statement previously recorded during the course of investigation
(Exhibit-D1) reveals conspicuous deviations and material
embellishments. Certain assertions introduced during the course
of her testimony before the Court find no reflection whatsoever in
her earlier version furnished to the investigating agency. Such
improvements are not merely peripheral or trivial in nature but
touch upon substantive aspects of the prosecution narrative.
These inconsistencies inevitably cast a shadow upon the veracity
of the prosecutrix and render the prosecution version susceptible
to serious doubt.
4.2. The contradictions emerging between Exhibits D-1 and D-2
further aggravate the uncertainty surrounding the prosecution
case. These discrepancies, when viewed collectively, erode the
probative value of the testimony relied upon by the prosecution
and diminish its capacity to inspire judicial confidence. In criminal
trials, where the liberty and reputation of individuals are at stake,
the Court is enjoined to exercise the utmost circumspection before
placing reliance upon testimony that suffers from such infirmities.
4.3. Equally significant is the absence of any independent or
corroborative evidence capable of lending assurance to the
allegations advanced by the prosecution. The record is
conspicuously devoid of any supporting ocular testimony from
disinterested witnesses, nor has the prosecution adduced any
medical or scientific evidence that might fortify its case. While
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corroboration is not invariably indispensable in prosecutions of this
nature, the absence of such corroborative material assumes
pronounced importance when the primary testimony itself is
marred by inconsistencies and lacks intrinsic reliability.
4.4. The evidence of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-11 namely Hazari,
Munna and Daulat Ram, when examined with due care and in
proper perspective, does not advance the prosecution case in any
substantial manner. On the contrary, their testimonies, when read
harmoniously, tend to indicate circumstances suggestive of
voluntary conduct on the part of the prosecutrix. The surrounding
facts and attendant circumstances emerging from the record
create a reasonable inference that the prosecutrix had
accompanied the appellants of her own volition and without any
discernible coercion, compulsion or inducement.
4.5. Another aspect of considerable legal significance pertains to
the determination of the prosecutrix's age at the relevant point of
time. According to the testimony of PW-8, Dr. Rajendra Gupta, the
medical opinion suggests that the prosecutrix could have been
approximately eighteen years of age, or even older, at the time of
the alleged occurrence. It bears emphasis that under the legal
framework prevailing prior to the statutory amendment of the year
2013, the age of consent for sexual intercourse under the Indian
Penal Code was sixteen years. The prosecution has failed to
establish, through cogent and reliable evidence, that the
prosecutrix was below the age of sixteen years at the material
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time. In the absence of conclusive proof regarding minority, the
possibility that the prosecutrix was above the legally prescribed
age of consent cannot be ruled out.
4.6. The testimony of PW-12 Dhoolchand, who is stated to be the
husband of the prosecutrix, also assumes noteworthy relevance in
the overall factual matrix. His deposition indicates that the
matrimonial relationship between him and the prosecutrix had
been solemnized several years prior to the incident and that she
had departed from his company without any prior intimation. This
circumstance lends additional plausibility to the defence version
that the prosecutrix had voluntarily left the matrimonial home and
subsequently associated herself with the appellants of her own
free will.
4.7. When the entirety of the evidence is assessed cumulatively
and in its proper perspective, the prosecution case appears to be
beset with multiple infirmities. The narrative advanced by the
prosecution suffers from material contradictions, absence of
corroborative support and uncertainties regarding crucial factual
elements. The testimony of the prosecutrix, which constitutes the
central pillar of the prosecution case, does not attain the threshold
of credibility required to sustain a conviction in a criminal trial.
4.8. It is a cardinal principle of criminal law that the guilt of an
accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt through
clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Where the evidentiary
record gives rise to reasonable doubt regarding the veracity of the
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prosecution case, such doubt must inevitably operate to the
benefit of the accused. The standard of proof required in criminal
adjudication admits of no dilution, and conjectures or suspicions,
however strong, cannot substitute for proof of guilt.
4.9. In light of the foregoing analysis and upon a comprehensive
evaluation of the evidence available on record, this Court is
constrained to hold that the prosecution has failed to discharge
the onerous burden cast upon it by law. The evidence adduced
does not satisfactorily establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
the realm of reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by the
learned trial court appear to have been arrived at without a
sufficiently critical appreciation of the material contradictions and
evidentiary deficiencies that permeate the prosecution case.
4.10.Consequently, the judgment of conviction and the order of
sentence rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Nimbahera in Sessions Case No.90/1992 cannot be permitted to
stand. The impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmities in
the appreciation of evidence and is therefore liable to be interfered
with in appellate jurisdiction.
5. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby
allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
09.05.1994 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Nimbahera is quashed and set aside. The appellants stand
acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Since the
appellants are presently on bail, they are not required to
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surrender before the Court. Their bail bonds stand discharged and
cancelled.
6. The record of the learned trial court shall be transmitted
back forthwith along with a copy of this judgment for necessary
compliance.
(FARJAND ALI),J
3-Mamta/-
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