Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Bhagwati Prasad vs Amrit Lal on 6 October, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:43437]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 96/1997
Bhagwati Prasad s/o Shri Khem Raj
age 42 years, by caste Brahmin,
R/o Ladani, Tehsil Mavli,
district Udaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
Amrit Lal s/o Shobha Lal
by caste Suthar R/o Ladani,
Tehsil Mavli, district Udaipur.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Piyush Sharma for
Ms. Akshiti Singhvi
For Respondent(s) : None present
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Reserved on :: 23/09/2025
Pronounced on :: 06/10/2025
1. The present second appeal has been filed against the
judgment and decree dated 27.03.1997 whereby the appeal filed
by the present-respondent was allowed after setting aside the
judgment and decree dated 30.05.1992 and the suit was decreed
for Rs.3,000/- along with interest of Rs.1,035/- total Rs.4035/-
with interest @12% per annum from the date of filing of the suit.
2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a summary suit for recovery of
Rs.4,035/- against the defendant-appellant contending therein
that the defendant had taken a loan on 22.03.1984 for the
purchase of land. A pronote Exhibit-1 and receipt Exhibit-2 were
executed on the same date. The agreed rate of interest was
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Rs.1.50 per Rs.100/- per month. However, neither the principal
amount nor the interest was paid as per the terms of the pronote.
Therefore, the plaintiff claimed the principal amount of Rs.3,000/-
and interest of Rs.1,035/-, totaling Rs.4,035/-.
3. The defendant, after appearing in the suit, filed an
application seeking leave to defend, which was granted.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a reply denying the averments
made in the plaint and contended that no loan amount was taken
by him. It was further asserted that the pronote and the receipt
did not bear his signatures. Since the plaintiff was having enmity
with the defendant, therefore a forged document was prepared
either by putting the signature by the plaintiff himself or by any
other person and therefore, it was prayed by him that the suit be
rejected.
4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues
were framed by the learned trial Court:-
1- ^^ vk;k oknh us izfroknh dks :- 3000@& fn- 22-3-84 dks tehu [kjhnus
ckcr] jksdM+h fn;s] mlh fnu izfroknh us oknh ds i{k esa izksehtjh uksV fy[k
gLrk{kj dj fn;sA mlesa C;kt dh "krZ 1-50 iS- izfr"kr izfr lSdM+k izfrekg
Fkh tks oknh izfroknh ls izkIr djus dk gdnkj gSA
-----oknh
2- nknjlh ^^
5. The Trial Court decided issue No.1 against the plaintiff, and
under issue No.2, based on the finding on Issue No.1, the suit was
dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 30.05.1992. Aggrieved
by the said judgment, the plaintiff-respondent preferred first
appeal which came to be allowed by reversing the finding on issue
No.1 by the first appellate Court and the suit was decreed for
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Rs.4035/- along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of
filing of the suit.
6. Assailing the judgment and decree dated 27.03.1997, the
defendant-appellant preferred this second appeal in which the
following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court
on 14.07.1997:-
"(i) WHETHER first appellate court has reversed the
judgment and decree passed by learned trial court
without meeting the cogent and convincing reasons
given by the learned trial court ?
(ii) WHETHER the learned trial court was legally
justified to compare the disputed signatures on the
pro-note Ex.1 and receipt Ex.2 with admitted
signatures of the defendant-appellant on his written
statement, on his Vakalatnama and on his deposition
within the meaning of Sec.73 of the Indian Evidence
Act, if so its effect?
(iii) WHETHER the finding recorded by the learned
trial court about the forged signatures of the
defendant-appellant on the pro-note Ex.1 and receipt
Ex.2 after comparing the same with his admitted
signatures on his written statement, on his
Vakalatnama and on his deposition, which has not
been reversed by the learned first appellate court
shall be deemed to be affirmed, if so its effect?
(iv) WHETHER if the defendant-appellant has denied
his signatures on the pro-note Ex.1 and receipt Ex.2,
then it was incumbent upon the plaintiff-respondent
to have examined an expert witness to prove the
same and in event of his failure to do so, an adverse
inference is to be drawn against him ?"
7. The present appeal is pending since 1997. Counsel for the
appellant made his submissions, however no one was present on
behalf of the respondents to oppose the submissions made on
behalf of the appellant.
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8. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned first
appellate Court committed illegality by reversing the finding of the
learned trial Court. The trial Court categorically on the comparison
of the defendant's signature on the alleged pronote and receipt
with his admitted signatures on the written statement,
Vakalatnama, and depositions concluded issue No.1 against the
plaintiff. The appellant contended that the reasoning based on
comparison of signature adopted by the trial Court was not set
aside by the first Appellate Court. Therefore, the judgment passed
by the learned first appellate Court is contrary to the provisions of
law.
9. It was also argued by counsel for the appellant that the
burden of proving the signatures as those of the defendant was on
the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff had utterly failed to prove the
defendant's signatures on the pronote, even from the oral
evidence. Therefore, the learned first appellate Court committed
illegality in reversing the finding of the trial Court.
10. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that once the
defendant had categorically denied the signatures on the alleged
pronote and receipt, it was the duty of the plaintiff to prove the
defendant's signatures on these documents by leading expert
evidence. In the absence of such expert evidence, the learned first
appellate Court wrongly reversed the finding on issue No.1. Lastly,
he prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the judgment and
decree dated 27.03.1997 be set aside, and the judgment and
decree dated 30.05.1992 be restored and suit of the plaintiff be
dismissed.
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11. Having heard the counsel for the appellant, this Court finds
that the learned trial Court, based on the material evidence on
record as well as the oral evidence, categorically recorded a
finding that the plaintiff had utterly failed to prove the execution
of the pronote and receipt by the defendant. Since the execution
of the pronote was not proved by the plaintiff, the suit was rightly
dismissed. While recording finding, the learned trial Court
considered the contradictions in the evidence of the plaintiff and
his witnesses. The plaintiff stated that an amount of Rs.3,000/-
was given to the defendant outside the Tehsil Office Mawli, under
the Neem tree. The plaintiff stated that the money was paid in the
presence of Chunni Lal and Pema, and that this payment was
made prior to the execution of the registry of the land for which
the alleged loan was said to have been given. He stated ignorance
regarding the differences in the signatures of the defendant on
Exhibits 1 and 2. The other witness i.e. PW-2 stated that the
amount of Rs.3,000/- was given to the defendant in his presence,
but he did not recognize the defendant's signatures. Furthermore,
he was unaware of the fact that who had signed Exhibits 1 and 2
after the documents were written. In his cross-examination, he
admitted that no amount was paid in his presence.
12. Another witness, PW-3 Amrit Lal son of Roop Lal, who is the
writer of Exhibits 1 and 2, stated that these documents were
executed after the registry (contrary to the plaintiff's statement).
The Court found that PW-2 denied that the amount of Rs.3,000/-
was given in his presence, whereas the plaintiff had stated that
the amount was paid in the presence of PW-2, Pema. Further, DW-
2, Chunni Lal, who is alleged by the plaintiff to have put
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signatures on Exhibits 1 and 2, stated in his evidence that his
signatures were obtained on these documents. He also made a
statement that the plaintiff had asked him to sign the name
"Bhagwati Prasad" on the documents, and therefore he had put
the name of Bhagwati Prasad. This indicates that the documents
were not actually signed by Bhagwati Prasad, but were either
signed by Chunni Lal or someone else.
13. The learned trial Court, exercising its powers under Section
73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Act of 1872'), compared the signatures of the defendant on
Exhibits 1 and 2 with those on various documents before the
Court, including the written statement, Vakalatnama, and
depositions. The Court found that not a single alphabet in Exhibits
1 and 2 matched the admitted signatures of the defendant. In
light of above, the learned trial Court rightly rejected the suit.
14. The Appellate Court, merely on the ground that one of the
witnesses, DW-2 Chunni Lal, admitted to have put his signatures
on Exhibits 1 and 2, reversed the finding on issue No.1. However,
there was a complete lack of proof regarding the defendant's
signatures on the alleged pronote and receipt. In the absence of
any cogent evidence proving that the defendant's signatures were
on Exhibits 1 and 2, the reversal of the finding of the trial Court
was incorrect. Since this Court has found that the learned first
appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the
trial Court without addressing the cogent and convincing reasons
given by the trial Court, as discussed above, this Court answers
Question No.1 in the affirmative and holds that the learned first
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appellate Court has wrongly reversed the finding without cogent
and convincing reasons given by the trial Court.
15. Question No.2,3 and 4 particularly depends on the powers of
the trial Court as available under Section 73 of the Indian
Evidence Act. Section 73 of the Act is reproduced as under:-
"73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal
with others admitted or proved.-
In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or
seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have
been written or made, any signature, writing or seal
admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to
have been written or made by that person may be
compared with the one which is to be proved,
although that signature, writing or seal has not been
produced or proved for any other purpose.The Court
may direct any person present in Court to write any
words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court
to compare the words or figures so written with any
words or figures alleged to have been written by such
person."
16. Section 73 of the Act clearly provides that a signature can be
compared by the Court. The learned first appellate Court did not
set aside the reason recorded by the learned trial Court that not a
single alphabet matched. This Court has also examined the
signatures on the alleged pronote and finds that not a single
alphabet of the defendant's signatures on the pronote and receipt
matches with the admitted signatures of the defendant on the
written statement, Vakalatnama, and depositions. The learned first
appellate Court, upon a mere visual examination, could have
easily concluded that the signatures of the defendant on the
alleged pronote and receipt do not, in any manner, match the
signatures on the Vakalatnama, written statement, and other
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documents submitted by the defendant. The learned first appellate
Court did not take pain either to conduct a comparison itself or to
record a finding contrary to that of the trial Court. This Court finds
that the learned first appellate Court committed an illegality in
reversing the finding on issue No. 1 without addressing or
reversing the reasoning given by the learned trial Court regarding
the comparison of signatures and conclusion there on.
17. Thus Questions No. 2, 3, and 4 are answered in the
affirmative. It is held that the learned trial Court was correct in
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 73 of the Evidence Act by
comparing the signatures of the defendant on the alleged pronote
and receipt with the admitted signatures. Furthermore, the
learned first appellate Court did not counter the reasoning given
by the trial Court and failed to address it in its judgment, this
Court finds that the appellate Court was unable to invalidate the
said reasoning. Consequently, once that reasoning is found to be
not set aside, this Court answers Questions No. 2 and 3
accordingly and affirms the finding recorded by the learned trial
Court on Issue No. 1, and sets aside the contrary finding recorded
by the first appellate Court.
18. Since this Court has already decided Questions No. 1, 2, and
3 in the affirmative and in favour of the defendant, there is no
necessity to decide Question No. 4 regarding the burden of proof
or the requirement of expert evidence.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present second
appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 27.03.1997
passed by the first appellate Court is hereby set aside, and the
judgment and decree dated 30.05.1992 passed by the trial Court
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is restored. Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent
stands dismissed.
20. Stay petition and pending applications, if any, stand disposed
of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
32-praveen/-
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