Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Abhishek Vishnoi vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:51421) on 27 November, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:51421]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19331/2023
Abhishek Vishnoi S/o Shri Dalpat Singh, Aged About 32 Years,
R/o 134, Khawa Ka Mohalla, Guda Vishnoiyahn, District Jodhpur
(Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of
Home, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. The Director General Of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
3. The Additional Director General Of Police (Recruitment
And Promotion Board), Rajasthan, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Jayram Saran
Mr. Bharat Singh Rathore
Mr. Anurag Jyani
Mr. Nikhil Bishnoi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sandeep Soni for
Mr. B.L. Bhati, AAG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
Order
27/11/2025
1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the
decision of the Committee dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2),
whereby the petitioner's appointment as a Sub-Inspector of Police
was withheld for a period of three years on account of the
pendency of a criminal case relating to matrimonial offences and
other IPC offences.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner applied
for the post of Sub-Inspector, and at the time of making the
application, no FIR had been lodged against him. During the
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pendency of the selection process, the wife of the petitioner
lodged a police complaint against him, and an FIR was registered
by the Mahila Police Thana, Jodhpur, bearing FIR No. 71/2022
dated 20.03.2022 (Annex. 12), for offences under Sections 498-A,
406, and 323 IPC. After conducting investigation, the police filed a
charge-sheet dated 06.06.2022. The trial is pending before the
competent Court.
3. The limited grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner's
appointment cannot be delayed on account of an FIR arising out of
a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife and
such an FIR cannot be considered a finding or decision of guilty; it
is only an allegation. It is also the case of the petitioner that the
said FIR has nothing to do with the discharge of duties of the
petitioner, and such offences cannot even amount to moral
turpitude so as to deny his appointment. It is further the case of
the petitioner that in a similar set of circumstances, a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan &
Ors., reported in 2016 (3) WLC 345, held that on account of
pendency of a criminal case, the petitioner cannot be denied
appointment. The relevant paragraphs of the Mukesh Kumar's
case (supra) read as follows:
"15. Viewed in light of the above factual scenario, it is
evident that the Rules not post any hurdle against the
petitioner's right to be appointed in the police services. At
best, a rider can be imposed in the petitioner's
appointment order that in the event of conviction in the
above criminal case, he may be liable to be terminated
from service without holding any enquiry and an
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undertaking in this regard can be procured from him in
this regard.
16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition
deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The respondents
are directed to offer appointment to the petitioner on the
post of Sub Inspector of Police in the questioned selection
process ignoring the pendency of the above criminal case
against the petitioner. However, the appointment order
shall bear a condition that the petitioner's services may be
terminated in the event of his conviction and he shall also
submit an undertaking to this effect before joining to the
post. Since the petitioner was gainfully employed as a
Teacher during the intervening period, he is not entitled to
any consequential benefits. However, the respondents
shall grant him all notional services benefits from the date
of the order Annex.6 dated 22.12.2009."
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further
relied upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Neeraj Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. : S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 9517/2024. The relevant paragraphs of the
Neeraj Kanwar's case (supra) read as follows:
"20. Perusal of circular dated 04.12.2019 (Annexure R-1)
shows that the same is in the nature of the Government's
administrative guidelines to its functionaries and the
ultimate decision-whether or not to appoint a candidate is
to be taken by the appointing authority taking into
consideration the facts and circumstances of each case,
the nature of work and status of the post on merits and
that in each case, while deciding on the suitability or
unsuitability of a candidate, the appointing authority
should assess his (candidate's) character by taking into
consideration the circumstances of the offence.
......
20.4. The Circular ibid, relied upon by the respondents,
no doubt stipulates that candidates against whom cases
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under Chapters XVI and XVII of the IPC are pending
investigation or trial, or who have been convicted, should
be deemed ineligible for appointment. However, this
blanket disqualification must be read in harmony with the
nuanced principles laid down by the three-judge bench of
the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India,
which emphasize that the appointing authority must
assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature
of the offence, its relevance to the post, and whether it
involves moral turpitude, rather than mechanically
denying appointment due to the mere pendency of a
case. The judgments cited by the respondents, such as
Union of India v. Methu Meda and Bhinya Ram Jajra v.
State of Rajasthan, no doubt, underscore the employer's
discretion to evaluate antecedents, but they do not
override the Avtar Singh's framework, which permits
flexibility in cases of trivial offences or those not involving
moral turpitude. In the petitioner's case, the offences
under Sections 452, 341, 323, and 143 IPC, arising from
a matrimonial dispute, do not prima facie reflect a
character flaw that would render her unfit for the RAS
post, warranting such a contextual evaluation as to
attract a rigid application of the Circular.
20.5. The judgment in Avtar Singh's case explicitly
cautions against arbitrary denials of appointment, and
requires a proportionate response after considering the
factual matrix, including the absence of any suppression
by the petitioner and if offences are not multiple or
heinous. This approach is also reflected in and the intent
of the Circular ibid. As already observed, the appointing
authority should weigh merits and demerits specific to
each case, rather than applying a blanket bar.
Consequently, the High Court and Supreme Court
judgments cited by the respondents, while affirming
employer discretion, must yield to the broader,
reformative perspective of Avtar Singh, ensuring that the
petitioner's appointment is not unjustly withheld based
solely on the pendency of a criminal case like the one in
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hand arising out of matrimonial discord and not involving
any heinous offence or moral turpitude."
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also
relied upon the order dated 11.11.2025 passed by this Court in
Pankaj Vishnoi vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 21673/2025. The relevant paragraphs of the order
dated 11.11.2025 (supra) read as follows:
"From a close reading of the above judgment relied
upon by the petitioner, it is clear that it is the appointing
authority who has to assess the suitability of a candidate
based on the nature of offence, its relevancy to the post
and whether it involves moral turpitude. This means that
the employer has to apply his mind to the facts of each
case and take a decision thereon and there cannot be any
blanket denial of appointment merely on the ground that
an FIR has been lodged. Each case must be assessed in
the context of its own facts.
5. In the present case, there is no such occasion for
the appointing authority to assess the nature of offence,
relevancy of such allegation to the post to be appointed
and whether such allegation amounts to any moral
turpitude. Issuing any directions to appoint the petitioner
would amount to supplementing the decision to be taken
by the appointing authority. Therefore, this Court is not
inclined to pass any directions. However, this Court is
inclined to direct respondent No. 2 - Directorate, Medical,
Health And Family Welfare Services (SIHEW), Govt. Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur to assess the suitability of the petitioner
basing on the parameters referred hereinabove. Such
decision shall be taken within a period of one month from
the date of receipt of this order. If any adverse orders are
passed by the respondent authorities in this regard, liberty
is given to the petitioner to challenge the same.
6. With the above directions, the writ petition is
disposed of."
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6. From a combined reading of the above decisions of the Co-
ordinate Benches and the view of this Court, it is clear that the
appointing authority has to examine the suitability of the
candidate based on the nature of the offences, their relevancy to
the post, whether they involve moral turpitude and then take a
decision whether to grant appointment, considering the facts and
circumstances of each case.
7. Looking at the decision of the Committee which is assailed in
the present writ petition, it is evident that the Committee has not
applied its mind to the nature of the offences, their relevancy to
the post, or whether such offences are heinous or involve moral
turpitude. The offences for which the petitioner is facing trial arise
out of a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife,
and they cannot be said to be grave offences. Such offences
cannot have any impact on the discharge of duties of the post for
which the petitioner was selected, nor can they be regarded as
heinous offence or involving moral turpitude. These aspects were
not considered by the Committee while postponing the petitioner's
appointment for a period of three years. Therefore, the impugned
order dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2) passed by the Committee is
liable to be set aside.
8. In the result, the present writ petition is allowed, and the
impugned order dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2) i.e. the
Committee report is set aside. The respondents are directed to
offer appointment to the petitioner, subject to the condition that
the petitioner shall give an undertaking to the appointing
authority, prior to the appointment order, to forgo the
appointment in the event he is convicted for the offences. The
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appointment order shall also indicate such condition and the
appointing authority shall be entitled to cancel the petitioner's
appointment without any further inquiry if the petitioner is
convicted for the offences.
9. The said exercise shall be completed within a period of one
month from the date of receipt of this order.
10. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J
190s-PoonamS/-
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