Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Kalu Khan And Ors vs State on 27 November, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:51128]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 224/1995
1. Kalu Khan S/o Mammu Khan R/o Chota, Selarpura,
Pratapgarh;
2. Rustam Khan S/o Mammu Khan R/o Chota, Selarpura,
Pratapgarh;
3. Wahid Khan S/o Mammu Khan R/o Chota, Selarpura,
Pratapgarh;
----Appellant
Versus
The State Of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Anil Mehta
For Respondent(s) : Mr. N.S. Chandawat, AGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Judgment
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON ::: 27/11/2025
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON ::: 16/09/2025
REPORTABLE
BY THE COURT:-
1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been instituted by the
appellants under Section 374 Cr.P.C. assailing the judgment
dated 29.04.1995 rendered in Criminal Case No.71/1992
(4/1992) by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act Cases, Pratapgarh. By the said judgment, the
appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 323 IPC
yet concurrently convicted and sentenced as under:
Name of the Offence for Substantive Fine and default
accused which convicted sentence sentence
1. Kalu Khan Section 447 IPC One month -
2. Rustam Khan
Section 3 (2) (V) Six Months Fine of Rs.100/- and
3. Whaid Khan of the SC/ST Act in default in payment
of fine to further
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undergo 15 days SI
2. The prosecution narrative, as unfurled through the FIR
lodged by the complainant Smt. Radhi (PW-1), alleges that the
appellants trespassed upon her land and assaulted her, thereby
inflicting bodily injuries. Following the usual investigative
process, the police opined that prima facie offences under
Sections 447, 323, and 34 IPC and Section 3(v) of the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 stood established. A charge-
sheet was consequently filed, and the matter was committed for
trial. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses and exhibited
eleven documents in support of its case. The accused, in their
statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the allegations and
produce DW1 in their defence evidence.
2.1. Upon completion of trial, the learned Court convicted the
accused for the offence above and sentenced them as aforesaid.
Aggrieved by the judgment aforesaid, the appellants have
preferred the instant appeal.
3. I have meticulously heard learned counsel for both sides
and perused the impugned judgment as well as the entire
evidentiary corpus. Before embarking upon an appraisal of the
merits of the appeal, it is apposite, indeed imperative, to
examine whether the conviction under the SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act meets the statutory contours and evidentiary
standards mandated by law.
3.1. The prosecution relies upon the Jama-Bandhi (Exhibit P-7)
and the Trace Map (Exhibit P-8) to demonstrate that Khasra
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No.201 stands in the name of the complainant's husband. PW-10
Labhchand, the Area Patwari, has duly authenticated these
records. The complainant's possession, therefore, stands
incontrovertibly established.
3.2. However, mere ownership of the land does not, in and of
itself, trigger the application of the stringent provisions of the SC/
ST Act. What is indispensable is a judicial determination
regarding the mens rea of the accused namely, whether the
alleged trespass was actuated by animus based on the
complainant's caste identity.
3.3. The evidence on record, both oral and documentary, clearly
reflects that the parties have adjoining agricultural fields. It has
emerged from cross-examination of several prosecution
witnesses that the appellants had been using a narrow footpath
(pugdandi) passing through the complainant's land for many
years to access their fields. This long-standing practice has been
specifically asserted by the appellants in their statements under
Section 313 CrPC.
3.4. The presence of a visible footpath and signs of regular usage
demonstrate that the dispute between the parties was not
sudden but was the continuation of a long-standing conflict over
the right of way. PW-10 Labhchand Area Patwari candidly
admitted that he had not inspected the site at the time of the
incident and therefore could not state whether a traditional
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passage existed through the said land. This admission weakens
the prosecution's claim of deliberate and forcible trespass.
3.5. The FIR (Exhibit P-1), which constitutes the earliest and
most spontaneous version of the incident, itself records that the
quarrel arose because the complainant attempted to obstruct the
path customarily used by the appellants. Thus, the genesis of the
dispute lies in the obstruction of access rather than any caste-
based motive.
3.6. In light of the above, this Court finds that the appellants'
entry upon the complainant's land was driven by a bona fide
belief in their continued right of passage. Even though they had
no enforceable legal right to traverse the complainant's field,
their conduct does not suggest any intention to dispossess or
humiliate the complainant on account of her caste identity.
4. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the
conviction of the appellants under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act was legally sustainable in the facts
and circumstances of the present case. Since the correctness of
the conviction hinges entirely upon the applicability of this
provision, it becomes necessary to examine the scope,
ingredients, and legislative intent underlying Section 3(2)(v) in
some detail. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as
under:
"(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
against a person or property knowing that such
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person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to
such member, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for life and with fine."
A plain and grammatical reading of the above provision
leaves no room for ambiguity. The Legislature has imposed two
mandatory preconditions for invoking the aggravated penal
consequences under Section 3(2)(v): first, the offence committed
must be one under the Indian Penal Code which is punishable
with imprisonment of ten years or more; second, such offence
must have been committed because the victim belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, and the offender must
have knowledge of such membership. Both these requirements
must coexist; the absence of either condition renders the
provision wholly inapplicable.
4.1. The legislative intent underlying Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Act is unambiguous. The provision aims to impose
enhanced punishment for grave and heinous offences which, but
for the caste identity of the victim, may not have been
committed. Its object is to deter offences where caste prejudice
is the motivating force, and where the substantive offence under
the IPC is of serious magnitude, carrying a punishment of ten
years or more. Thus, the provision is not intended to encompass
ordinary property disputes, minor scuffles, or trivial infractions
unless they satisfy the dual statutory prerequisites. Every offence
committed by any person under IPC provisions carrying a
punishment of less than ten years; even if the accused knew the
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victim belonged to an SC/ST community and the property in
question belonged to that victim, would not fall within the ambit
of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
4.2. Judicial interpretation of Section 3(2)(v) has consistently
reiterated that its application requires a direct nexus between the
offence and the caste identity of the victim. Courts have held that
merely establishing that the victim belongs to an SC/ST
community does not suffice. The prosecution must demonstrate
that the offence was committed on the ground of such caste
identity. Simultaneously, the underlying IPC offence must be one
punishable with imprisonment of not less than ten years,
indicating the gravity contemplated by the legislature. The
provision, therefore, cannot be invoked mechanically, nor can it
be applied in a routine or perfunctory manner.
4.3. Evaluating the facts of the present case in light of the
statutory mandate, it is clear that the offences alleged and
proved against the appellants fall under Sections 447 IPC only.
Section 447 IPC prescribes a maximum punishment of three
months' simple imprisonment or a fine of ₹500/- or both. In this
context, one cannot overlook that the learned trial Court
proceeded to frame charges under Section 3(2)(v) without
satisfying the foundational requirements of the provision. I would
not hesitate to observe that the learned Sessions Judge failed to
apply judicial mind before framing charges, as the provision is
ex-facie inapplicable. Since the alleged offence does not
approach the mandatory minimum punishment of ten years, the
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very basis for invoking Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is
conspicuously absent and in my humble view, has been invoked
by the learned Judge on an erroneous assumption.
4.4. Further, there is no material on record to suggest that the
appellants acted with any caste-related motive. The consistent
evidence, including the FIR, points to a dispute arising from
obstruction of a long-used passage through the complainant's
field. The quarrel thus stemmed from an agrarian right-of-way
dispute, and not from any intention to target the complainant on
account of her caste. The essential ingredient of caste-based
animus is therefore not established. The record suggest that the
parties were neighbours and must have doing their agricultural
work since long back.
4.5. In these circumstances, both statutory elements namely, a
qualifying IPC offence punishable with ten years or more, and the
commission of such offence on account of the complainant's
caste stand completely unfulfilled. Consequently, the conviction
under Section 3(2)(v) cannot be sustained. The learned Special
Judge erred in applying the provision to a case where the
statutory prerequisites were apparently absent. Thus, the
conviction under Section 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST Act is
unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
4.6. In any event, it stands beyond the pale of contestation that
the appellants were bereft of any legal, proprietary, or
possessory entitlement to intrude upon the land of the
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complainant. The factual matrix, as crystallised through
unimpeached evidence, unmistakably establishes that on the
date in question the appellants transgressed the lawful
boundaries of the complainant's property and thereby rendered
themselves culpable of the offence of simple trespass, punishable
under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. For this
transgression, they were visited with a sentence of one month's
simple imprisonment. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in
the conviction recorded under Section 447 IPC and accordingly
upholds the same, while simultaneously setting aside their
conviction under the penal provisions of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which is
found unsustainable in law.
4.7. The more intricate question that now arises pertains to the
propriety of enforcing the sentence after an extraordinary lapse
of three decades. Compelling the appellants who, it must be
noted, reside as neighbours of the complainant, to undergo
incarceration at this far-removed juncture would neither subserve
the ends of justice nor comport with the principles of
proportionality and fairness that animate criminal jurisprudence.
Rather, such a direction would risk rekindling dormant hostilities,
disturbing whatever tenuous harmony time may have fostered
between the parties, and thereby result in avoidable social
disquiet.
4.8. Ordinarily, an offence of this relatively minor nature might
well have fallen within the compassionate ambit of probationary
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relief. However, the trial court, for reasons not apparent on the
record, refrained from invoking the ameliorative provisions of the
Probation of Offenders Act. To impose at this late hour a
probationary condition, such as requiring the appellants to
maintain peace and good behaviour for a prescribed period,
would verge on the theatrical and would be bereft of pragmatic
relevance. Indeed, such a stipulation, after a lapse of thirty
years, would be more symbolic than substantive and would
border on the nonsensical.
4.9. In view of the totality of circumstances, the overarching
considerations of equity, justice, and societal harmony impel this
Court to hold that the period of incarceration already undergone
by the appellants constitutes adequate punishment. No
penological purpose would be served by requiring them to suffer
any further deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, the sentence
already undergone is deemed sufficient to meet the ends of
justice.
4.10. It is also pertinent to note that the appellants had already
undergone incarceration in May 1991 in connection with the
present incident. The offence under Section 447 IPC relates only
to a simple trespass, and in view of the trivial nature of the
incident, coupled with the lapse of more than three decades, no
useful purpose would be served by maintaining the conviction at
this stage.
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4.11. The appellants are now advanced in age, and the dispute
arose out of a long-standing disagreement regarding right of
way. In such circumstances, the ends of justice would be better
served by obliterating the conviction rather than perpetuating
further penal consequences.
5. In light of the foregoing analysis, the appeal is partly allowed.
The judgment dated 29.04.1995 rendered in Criminal Case No.
71/1992 (4/1992) by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (PA) Act
Cases, Pratapgarh, is hereby quashed and set aside to the extent
indicated. The conviction of the appellants under Section 3(2)(v)
of the SC/ST Act is annulled, and they are accordingly acquitted
of the said charge.
5.1. Their conviction under Section 447 IPC is, however,
affirmed. Nonetheless, the sentence imposed for this offence
stands modified, and it is directed that the period of incarceration
already undergone by the appellants shall be treated as sufficient
to satisfy the ends of justice. Consequently, their bail bonds
stand discharged.
(FARJAND ALI),J
2-Mamta/-
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