Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Rameshwar Lal vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:24934) on 22 May, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:24934]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1291/2007
Rameshwar Lal S/o Shri Kisana Ram, By caste Jat, resident of
Kanwarpura, District Sikar (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
The State of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. VS Choudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Rathore, Dy.G.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
REPORTABLE
22/05/2025
1. By way of filing the instant revision petition, a challenge has
been made to the judgment dated 14.11.2006 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class No.2, Sujangarh, Churu
whereby the petitioner was convicted for committing offences
under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC as well as against the
judgment dated 16.11.2007 whereby the learned appellate Court
dismissed the appeal.
2. Succinctly stated the facts of the case are that an accident
took place on 19.10.2000, in which, a Jeep hit a 7-8 year-old boy
on the road, as a consequence of which, he received injuries and
then died. The petitioner was charge-sheeted and after rigorous
trial, convicted as mentioned above.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner - Shri
V.S. Choudhary and the learned Dy.G.A. as well as gone through
the record of the case.
[2025:RJ-JD:24934] (2 of 5) [CRLR-1291/2007]
4. To bring home the guilt under Sections 279 and 304-A of
IPC, it is imperative for the prosecution to adduce cogent, reliable
and trustworthy evidence to substantiate the charge that at the
relevant point of time, the accused was driving the vehicle and
that too either rashly or negligently, however, in the case at hand,
the prosecution has miserably failed to prove or to establish the
above fact. A total number of ten witnesses were produced by the
prosecution, out of which, P.W.-10 is a Medical Officer, P.W.-9 Rich
Pal Singh is a witness to the memos, P.W.-7 Jagdish Prasad is a
Police Officer, P.W.-6 Dr. Shyam Sunder prepared the postmortem
report, P.W-5 Babu Lal is produced to say issuance of a notice
under Section 133 of the MV Act and P.W-4 Girdhari Lal is a Police
Constable who examined the vehicle. All the witnesses mentioned
above know nothing about the manner of accident or who was
driving the vehicle, therefore, there is no need to make discussion
of their statements. The prosecution mainly relies upon the
testimony of P.W-1 Jai Kishan who gave the eye witness account
of the incident. As per him, a Jeep coming in fast speed hit a boy,
upon which, he took the injured to the hospital. In his
examination-in-chief, he stated that he identified the accused by
his face, however, the learned trial Court or the prosecutor did not
bother to make him to identify the petitioner as an accused. The
important question of law would be that the name of the petitioner
does not find place either in the FIR or in the statement of this
witness. He was not knowing as to who was the accused and if he
could be able to identify the accused, then the identification
parade must be conducted so as to ascertain the fact that who
[2025:RJ-JD:24934] (3 of 5) [CRLR-1291/2007]
was driving the vehicle. P.W.-2 Mst. Bhanwari also did not know
the name of the petitioner. She identified the petitioner as a
person who was driving the Jeep at the relevant point of time,
based on her memory that after the accident, the jeep driver
peeked through the window of the jeep and then ran away and,
therefore, she had an occasion to see him. During investigation,
no identification parade was held to ascertain whether the
petitioner was the same person or not who was driving the
vehicle.
5. This Court observed that the accused was not previously
known to the witness. The incident occurred suddenly while she
was passing along the road and she might had an occasion to
have a glance on the jeep from a distance and according to the
prosecution, the jeep involved in the accident did not stop at the
scene. She was examined in the Court on 23.08.2001, and at no
point before or during the intervening period between the accident
and her deposition did she have an opportunity to see the
accused. In such circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend how
she could retain a precise memory sufficient to identify the person
standing in the courtroom as the one who was allegedly driving
the vehicle on the day of the accident, especially when she only
caught a glimpse of the driver from a distance as the jeep was
moving at high speed and did not stop at the scene. It is pertinent
to note that when the accused is the sole individual standing in
the dock, and the witness is asked for the first time in court
whether he is the person who was driving the jeep, such an
identification becomes inherently doubtful. When a person is not
[2025:RJ-JD:24934] (4 of 5) [CRLR-1291/2007]
previously acquainted with the accused and claims to identify him/
her after merely a fleeting glance on the day of the incident
coupled with a significant passage of time and no prior
identification process, such identification, made for the first time
in court, carries no evidentiary value and cannot be relied upon.
6. P.W.-3 Bhanwar Lal categorically stated that he did not
identify the Jeep driver at the relevant point of time. Suffice it
would be to say that when an offence is committed by person not
known to the witness then as a measure of caution and prudence,
an identification parade ought to have been conducted so as to
give a clear direction to the investigation ensuring they are
proceeding against a right person. Through a plethora of judicial
pronouncements, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has reiterated the
principle of law that the first time identification in the Court
without holding a previous identification parade during the course
of investigation bears no evidentiary value. Here in this case,
though P.W.-1 claimed that he saw the person who was driving the
vehicle but to the utter dismay, no identification was made either
by the prosecutor or by the Court during investigation or during
trial.
7. I am of the view that, in such circumstances, the learned
trial Court was supposed to intervene at that juncture by
exercising the authority vested in it under Section 165 of the
Indian Evidence Act. The testimony of P.W.-2 Bhanwari does not
help the case of the prosecution because of the manner in which
she claimed to have identified the petitioner and, on the second
count, that she had not been given an opportunity to identify the
[2025:RJ-JD:24934] (5 of 5) [CRLR-1291/2007]
accused before booking him into this case. It is very easy in a
court proceeding when the accused is in the dock, to ask a witness
whether that person was driving the vehicle; in my humble view,
there would be no other option left for the witness except to say
yes. I am sure that such kind of evidence is not sufficient enough
to bring home the guilt of the accused. In any case, the
prosecution cannot shirk from its responsibility to substantiate the
charge by producing cogent and reliable evidence to establish that
a particular person was driving the vehicle and that he was
properly identified. Both the Courts below have utterly failed to
notice the above discussed legal aspects of the matter and,
therefore, their conclusion is faulty and is not sustainable in the
eye of the law.
8. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed. The
order dated 14.11.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate,
First Class No.2, Sujangarh, Churu in Criminal Original Case
No.379/2001 and the order dated 16.11.2007 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sujangarh, District Churu in
Criminal Appeal No.37/2007 are quashed and set aside.
9. The petitioner is acquitted from the charges. His bail bonds
are discharged. He need not to surrender.
10. Record be sent back.
(FARJAND ALI),J
6-divya/-
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