Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Jitendra vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:10957) on 20 February, 2025

Author: Farjand Ali

Bench: Farjand Ali

[2025:RJ-JD:10957]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1731/2024

Neeraj Purbia S/o Shri Prem Chand Purbia, Aged About 50 Years,
R/o 263, Saheli Nagar Udaipur, At Present 154 Building, Salmiya,
Kuwait.
                                                                     ----Petitioner
                                     Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Chief Secretary, Government
         Of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.       Principal Secretary, Home Secretariat, Jaipur.
3.       Principal Secretary, Department Of Personnel, Secretariat,
         Jaipur.
4.       Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur.
5.       Shree Jitendra Anchliya Jain S/o Bherulal Jain, Aged
         About 50 Years, R/o 73 Hiran Magri Sector No. 4, Udaipur,
         Raj.
6.       Shree Kailash Singh Sandoo, Deputy Superintendent Of
         Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Chittorgarh.
7.       Shree Rajendra Prasad Goyal, Deputy Inspector General
         Of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur.
8.       Central Bureau Of Investigation, New Delhi.
                                                                  ----Respondents
                               Connected With
                 S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 1279/2023
1.       Luvleena W/o Late Shri Nilesh Purbia, Aged About 37
         Years, R/o 263, Saheli Nagar, Udaipur.
2.       Ankit Mewara S/o Shyam Lal Mewara, Aged About 35
         Years, R/o Sardargarh, Tehsil Amet, District Rajsamand.
                                                                    ----Petitioners
                                     Versus
1.       State, Through Pp
2.       Neeraj Purbia S/o Prem Chand Purbia, R/o Plot No.
         262/20, Saheli Nagar, Udaipur.
                                                                  ----Respondents
                 S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 2526/2023



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Nikhil Porwal S/o Basant Porwal, Aged About 37 Years, R/o 3-B-
Ii, Hajareshwar Colony, Udaipur.
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                     Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2.       Neeraj Purbia S/o Prem Chand Purbia, R/o Plot No.
         262/20, Saheli Nagar, Udaipur.
                                                                    ----Respondents
                S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 3387/2023
Jitendra S/o Sh. Bherulal, Aged About 50 Years, B/c Jain R/o 73
Hiran Magri Sector No. 4 Udaipur Raj.
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                     Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2.       Neeraj S/o Sh. Premchand, B/c Purbia R/o 263/20 Saheli
         Nagar Ps Sukher Udaipur Raj.
                                                                    ----Respondents
                S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 5259/2023
Rajesh Kothari S/o Sh. Prakash Chand, Aged About 40 Years,
190, Lal Bazaar, Nathdwara, Dist. Rajsamand.
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                     Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2.       Neeraj Purbia S/o Prem Chand Purbia, Plot No. 262/20,
         Saheli Nagar, Udaipur.
                                                                    ----Respondents
                 S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 905/2024
Manoj Shrimali S/o Jagneshwar Singh Mali, Aged About 43 Years,
R/o    Plot   No.    113,    Technocret          Society,         Bedla    Road,    P.s.
Ambamata, Dist. Udaipur.
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                     Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2.       Neeraj S/o Sh. Premchand, B/c Purbia, R/o 263/20,




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 [2025:RJ-JD:10957]                  (3 of 32)                      [CRLW-1731/2024]


         Saheli Nagar, P.s. Sukher, Udaipur (Raj.).
                                                                 ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. Rishab Handa
                                Mr. V. Jain , Sr. Advocate assisted by
                                Mr. Harshwardhan Singh Rathore
                                Mr. Rajesh Joshi , Sr. Advocate
                                assisted by Mr. Vivek Shrimali,
                                Ms. Kamini Joshi
                                Mr. Dungar Dan Charan
                                Mr. M.S. Rajpurohit
                                Mr. Deepak Mnaria
                                Mr. Sanjay Mathur
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. N.K. Gurjar GA-cum-AAG with
                                Mr. Yogendra Charan
                                Mr. Harishchandra , ACB , DIG office ,
                                Udaipur
                                Dr. Ravi Prakash Meharda, DG, ACB,
                                Jaipur


                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

REPORTABLE 20/02/2025

1. By way of filing this instant petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, the petitioner, a permanent resident of

Udaipur, seeks redress from this Court for the unlawful and

arbitrary acts committed by the accused, including the

extortion of a sum of Rs. 1.83 crores by Dy. S.P. Jitendra

Achaliya and his associates. The petitioner contends that the

actions of the accused have violated several fundamental

rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 300A of the

Constitution of India. Furthermore, the petitioner seeks

appropriate directions for the investigation and transfer of

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (4 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

the same to an impartial agency, such as the Central Bureau

of Investigation (CBI), contending that the state police and

other authorities have failed to ensure a fair and unbiased

investigation, thereby shielding the accused from

accountability.

2. The petitioner, a computer software developer, has been

residing in Kuwait since 1993, where he has established a

successful business, Pegasus Turn Solution Pvt Ltd, which

operates in Kuwait, Dubai, and India. The petitioner has

been sending money for his family's livelihood in India since

then. In 2007, the petitioner transferred funds to his brother,

Neelesh Purbia, for the purchase of property in India, but his

brother fraudulently inserted his name also in the purchase

deed without contributing financially. Following the untimely

death of his brother on 06.11.2019, the petitioner, on

13.02.2022, was approached by his sister-in-law, Loveleena,

to sell the property at a price of five crores and to procure

new property for him. However, Loveleena, in collusion with

the police, staged a scenario that led to the petitioner's

arrest under fabricated charges on 17.02.2022. A

subsequent FIR was lodged against him under sections 457,

380, and 120B of the IPC, which the petitioner vehemently

disputes.

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (5 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

3. On 18.02.2022, police personnel led by SI Roshanlal and

others visited the petitioner's office and arrested an

accountant and a security guard, further implicating the

petitioner in the case. The petitioner approached the office of

the Additional SP, Udaipur, where he was informed that the

police had no right to intervene in a property dispute and

that only proceedings under section 145 of the CrPC would

apply. However, the petitioner was subsequently coerced by

Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and his associates into signing an

agreement under duress, threatening him with imprisonment

and the confiscation of his passport if he refused to comply.

The petitioner, fearing wrongful detention, was compelled to

pay a sum of Rs. 1.83 crores over a period of time to secure

the withdrawal of the fabricated FIRs and regain control of

his property. The entire sequence of events was documented

through handwritten agreements, video footage, and

remittance receipts. However, the situation worsened as the

petitioner was continuously threatened and harassed by the

accused, including demands for additional sums to resolve

the matter.

4. The petitioner asserts that the acts committed by Dy. S.P.

Jitendra Achaliya and his associates, including threats,

extortion, and wrongful confinement, amount to gross

violations of the petitioner's fundamental rights, particularly

under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (6 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

petitioner highlights that despite the filing of an FIR and

subsequent charge sheet by the Anti Corruption Bureau

(ACB), the state authorities, including ACB officials and the

Department of Personnel (DOP), have failed to take

appropriate action against the accused, allowing them to

operate with impunity. The petitioner further points out that

the suspension of Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya was unlawfully

stayed, and the accused has been reinstated despite his

involvement in serious criminal activities. The petitioner

contends that this constitutes an attempt by the state

machinery to shield the accused from the consequences of

his actions, thereby obstructing justice.

5. Moreover, the petitioner asserts that the investigation into

the extortion and corruption case has been tainted by the

involvement of biased authorities. Despite the clear evidence

of the accused's involvement in multiple cases of extortion

and corruption, the investigation has been transferred to

officials with known connections to the accused, including

Dy. S.P. Kailash Singh Sandoo, who previously granted a

clean chit to Achaliya in 2016. The petitioner strongly

believes that the reinvestigation is nothing more than an

attempt to subvert the ongoing proceedings and protect the

accused from legal repercussions. Given the gravity of the

situation, the petitioner requests that this Court take

cognizance of the systemic corruption within the state

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (7 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

machinery and transfer the case to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI) or any other independent agency to

ensure a fair and impartial investigation.

6. The petitioner further contends that the actions of the

respondent authorities, including the delay in granting

prosecution sanction against Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya, are in

direct violation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court regarding the timely grant of prosecution sanction in

corruption cases. The petitioner asserts that the continued

delay and the shifting of the investigation to a biased officer

are deliberate attempts to derail the legal process and

protect the accused from facing trial. The petitioner,

therefore, prays for this Court to intervene and ensure that

the investigation and trial proceed in an impartial and

transparent manner, in accordance with the law.

7. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone

through the materials available on record.

8. The petitioner's apprehension regarding the fairness of the

investigation is acknowledged; however, it is imperative to

note that the case has been repeatedly examined by higher

ranking officers. The record demonstrates that the

investigation has undergone multiple layers of scrutiny at

various hierarchical levels, thereby eliminating any prima

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (8 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

facie suspicion of arbitrariness or procedural impropriety.

This Court has minutely analyzed the reports of both

investigating officers involved in the first and second

investigations, particularly noting the divergence in their

opinions. Recognizing the gravity of the matter, this Court, in

its endeavor to ensure absolute fairness and transparency,

directed the Director General of the Anti-Corruption Bureau

(DG-ACB) to join the proceedings through video

conferencing. During the session, the DG-ACB was subjected

to pointed queries by this Court to dispel any lingering

doubts regarding the investigation's integrity and

methodology. The Court meticulously examined the

responses, cross-verifying them with the official records, in

order to ascertain whether any procedural lapses or

investigative discrepancies existed.

9. After a comprehensive evaluation, this Court is convinced

that all aspects of the investigation have been thoroughly

addressed by the concerned agency, leaving no scope for

doubt. The exhaustive review conducted by the DG-ACB and

his team further reinforces the conclusion that due process

has been followed diligently. The discrepancies noted in the

initial stages of investigation were duly reconciled with a

logical and legally sound rationale, and no manifest error,

procedural infirmity, or mala fide intent has been detected

that would warrant judicial interference.

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (9 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

10. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) is a specialized

investigative agency operating under the State Police,

endowed with the requisite legal authority and expertise to

probe matters of corruption and misconduct by public

officials. The case at hand has been subjected to a rigorous

inquiry by the ACB, under the supervision of its senior

officers. The investigative findings, as presented before this

Court, do not reflect any irregularity that would warrant the

assumption of inherent bias or mala fides on the part of the

investigating officers. Mere dissatisfaction with the

investigative outcomes does not provide a sufficient legal

basis to demand a transfer of the probe to another agency.

Judicial interference in the investigative process must be

predicated on compelling reasons and clear indications of

bias or miscarriage of justice, which are absent in the

present case. Frequent transfers would undermine public

confidence in the regular legal process and diminish the

significance of exceptional circumstances that justify the

exercise of investigative transfer powers.

11. The jurisprudence surrounding the transfer of

investigations from the State Police to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI) has been well settled by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. The Court may exercise its constitutional

authority to transfer an investigation under the following

circumstances:

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (10 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

1. When high-ranking officials of the State authorities

are involved;

2. When the accusation pertains to senior officials

within the investigating agency itself; or

3. When the investigation is prima facie found to be

tainted or biased.

12. However, in the present case, none of these conditions

are satisfied. There exists no cogent evidence on record to

suggest that high-ranking officials have influenced the

investigation in a manner that compromises its integrity.

Moreover, the accusations against Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya

and others have already been scrutinized by senior officers,

and appropriate legal proceedings have been initiated where

necessary. The argument that the investigation has been

conducted with bias remains unsubstantiated by any material

proof that would necessitate interference by this Court.

13. This Court, having meticulously examined the

investigation's trajectory, finds no demonstrable signs of

partiality, undue influence, or deliberate suppression of

material facts. The petitioner's contention that the

investigative process has been manipulated lacks evidentiary

backing. A mere perception of injustice cannot form the

foundation for judicial interference unless substantiated by

concrete proof indicating a manifest failure of justice. Since

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (11 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

no such evidence has been presented, the plea for

transferring the investigation stands unmerited.

14. Given the aforementioned considerations, this Court

finds no compelling ground to interfere with the ongoing

investigation or to transfer the matter to the CBI or any

other independent agency. The petitioner's grievances,

though serious, have been duly addressed by the designated

authorities within the framework of law. There is no

demonstrable miscarriage of justice or procedural infirmity

warranting judicial intervention.

15. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed as being devoid

of merit.

16. The stay petition is disposed of.

CRLMP No. 1279/2023 (Luvleena), 2526/2023 (Nikhil

Porwal), 5259/2023 (Rajesh kothari)

1. By way of filing these instant petitions under Section 482

Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 507/2022

registered at Police Station Anti-Corruption (Special Unit),

Jaipur, on 30.12.2022 for offences under Sections 7 and 7A

of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120-B

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (12 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

of the IPC, along with all consequential proceedings

emanating therefrom.

2. The petitioner, Neeraj Purbia, had a property dispute with his

deceased brother's wife, Lovleena Purbia, leading to FIR No.

91/2022, lodged by Lovleena at Police Station Sukher on

18.02.2022. Following a settlement between the parties, a

final report was submitted to the court on 16.11.2022.

Meanwhile, Neeraj Purbia submitted an application to the

ACB Headquarters on 07.11.2022, resulting in the

registration of ACB Case No. 507/2022 on 30.12.2022

against Sub-Inspector Roshan Lal. The investigation by

Additional Superintendent of Police Pushpendra Singh found

prima facie evidence against Roshan Lal, DySP Jitendra

Kumar Anchaliya, and private individuals Manoj Shrimali and

Ramesh Rathore under Sections 7, 7A, 12 of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Sections

384, 120B IPC. However, further investigation under Section

173(8) CrPC was kept pending against Lovleena Purbia, Ankit

Mewada, Nikhil Porwal, and Rajesh Kothari due to a stay

order on their arrest by this Court.

3. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone

through the materials available on record.

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (13 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

4. A perusal of the case record reflects that the investigation

under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. was kept pending against

certain individuals, including Lovleena Purbia, Ankit Mewada,

Nikhil Porwal, and Rajesh Kothari, due to an interim order

restraining their arrest or possibly for want of further

evidence. Notably, the case stemmed from a long-standing

property dispute between the petitioner, Neeraj Purbia, and

his deceased brother's wife, Lovleena Purbia. In this regard,

FIR No. 91/2022 was lodged by Lovleena against Neeraj at

Police Station Sukher, which was later settled, resulting in a

final report submitted to the court. During the course of

these proceedings, Neeraj Purbia submitted an application to

the ACB Headquarters, leading to the registration of ACB

Case No. 507/2022. The subsequent investigation initially

found prima facie evidence against certain accused persons;

however, the further inquiry by the investigating agency,

based on witness statements, documentary evidence, and

technical analysis, led to a determination that no offence was

made out against Lovleena Purbia, Nikhil Porwal, Rajesh

Kothari, and others.

5. Upon a meticulous and exhaustive inquiry, including a

comprehensive review by high-ranking officers, as recorded

in CRLMP No. 1731/2024, this Court finds the investigative

process to be thorough and convincing. Furthermore, the

investigative report now presented before this Court, after

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (14 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

due deliberation with the Director General, appears to be

satisfactory. A rigorous examination of the entire evidentiary

material, including verification of transcripts, analysis of Call

Detail Records (CDRs), and assessment of independent

evidence, has led to the conclusion that no offence is

established against the individuals concerned. The closure

report, having been duly submitted before this Court, is

taken on record. Given that the allegations were found

unsubstantiated, and a negative final report is set to be filed,

no further deliberation is warranted.

6. As a measure of caution, it is directed that since the

investigating agency, after conducting a full-fledged inquiry,

has not found the petitioners culpable, no coercive measures

shall be taken against them at any subsequent stage without

a specific order of the trial court in this regard. The closure

report concerning the three petitioners shall be submitted

before the trial court within 60 days from the date of this

order. The trial court may, if necessary, consider

supplementary report along with annexed materials and

make the same part of the judicial record.

7. In view of the above, the instant petitions stand finally

disposed of.

8. The stay petition stands disposed of.

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (15 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

CRLMP No. 3387/2023 (Jitendra), 905/2024 (Manoj

Shrimali)

1. By way of filing these instant petitions under Section 482

Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 507/2022,

registered on 30.12.2022 at Police Station CPS ACB Outpost,

Jaipur, as well as Charge Sheet No. 83/2023 dated

06.04.2023, wherein the petitioners have been implicated

for the alleged offences under Sections 7, 7A, and 12 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Sections 384 and

120B of the IPC.

2. The dispute pertains to the complainant, Neeraj Purbia, and

his deceased brother's wife, Lovlina Purbia, over a property.

Due to this dispute, Lovlina Purbia lodged FIR No. 91/2022

at Police Station Sukher on 18.02.2022, which was

eventually closed through a compromise and a final report

was submitted to the court on 16.11.2022. Subsequently,

the complainant submitted an application at the ACB

Headquarters on 07.11.2022, leading to the registration of

ACB Case No. 507/2022 against Inspector Roshanlal on

30.12.2022. Upon investigation, an FIR was filed under the

Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC Sections 384 and 120B

against Inspector Roshanlal, Deputy Superintendent of Police

Jitendra Kumar Anchalia, and private individuals Manoj

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (16 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

Shrimali and Ramesh Rathore. However, further investigation

under Section 173(8) CrPC was kept pending against Lovlina

Purbia and others due to a stay order by this Court. The

subsequent investigation found no incriminating evidence

against Jitendra Kumar Anchalia, Manoj Shrimali, Ramesh

Rathore, or other accused persons. It also highlighted

contradictions in the complainant's statements and a lack of

independent evidence to establish coercion or bribery. The

complainant's allegations were deemed unreliable, and it was

observed that the dispute primarily stemmed from a family

property matter. The case file and evidentiary findings did

not support the charges against the petitioners, leading to

the conclusion that they were not involved in any criminal

act.

3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone

through the materials available on record.

4. The Court has meticulously examined the entire investigative

trajectory undertaken by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB)

in the instant matter, encompassing the primary charge

sheet and the subsequent investigative reports furnished

under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. It is a settled proposition of law

that a supplementary report filed in furtherance of an

investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is not an

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (17 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

independent document but is considered an extension of the

original charge sheet.

5. The supplementary report and final investigative findings

conclusively establish that from the inception to the

culmination of the investigation, all material evidence was

scrupulously scrutinized. A thorough assessment of the

factual matrix unequivocally reveals that there was neither a

demand for illegal gratification nor any act of acceptance or

an attempt thereof. Furthermore, at the relevant point of

time, no official work was pending before Jitendra Kumar

Anchalia that could have given rise to a demand for illegal

gratification. The sine qua non for the offence under Section

7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is the demonstrable

demand and acceptance of bribe, whether directly or

indirectly. However, the investigative material, when

examined with utmost diligence and legal scrutiny, does not

indicate any such culpability on the part of the petitioners.

6. It is not uncommon for public servants, in certain cases, to

direct complainants or witnesses to liaise with third parties,

rather than seeking bribes directly. However, the present

matter does not fall within such a category. The call data

records of Roshanlal were minutely scrutinized, and nowhere

do they reflect any communication indicating an assurance

that he would 'speak to his superior' to facilitate any

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (18 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

unlawful demand or arrangement. At the bare minimum,

such corroborative evidence is essential before imputing

criminal liability to a public servant. The mere oral assertions

of an individual, unsupported by independent,

unimpeachable evidence, cannot be the basis for

jeopardizing the career and liberty of a public servant. The

initiation or continuation of prosecution against a public

servant on the strength of vague, unsubstantiated, and

unverified allegations would not amount to prosecution but

persecution, which the criminal justice system cannot

countenance.

7. Initially, on a prima facie evaluation of the allegations, it

appeared that the conduct of the petitioner, being a Circle

Officer, was questionable to some extent. However, upon a

deeper scrutiny of the records, it becomes evident that his

actions do not fall within the contours of 'misconduct' as

statutorily defined. The notion that he played a role or

intervened in a private dispute does not ipso facto render his

conduct illegal or unlawful.

8. This Court also sought a clarification from the Director

General (DG) regarding the official role and conduct of the

petitioner. The DG opined that in his capacity as a Circle

Officer, if he sought to mediate a family dispute at any given

point, such an act cannot be deemed illegal or beyond the

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (19 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

scope of his assigned duties, as maintaining peace and law

and order within his jurisdictional domain falls squarely

within his official mandate.

9. The initial Investigating Officer, upon a limited assessment,

inferred the commission of the alleged offences and

proceeded to file a charge sheet. However, the investigation

remained incomplete. The right of the investigating agency

to conduct further inquiry under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is

indefeasible and well within the contours of lawful

investigative procedure. The agency possesses the legitimate

prerogative to gather additional material and submit a

supplementary report, which was duly exercised in the

present case. There exists no legal impediment to such a

course of action.

10. The agency, after analyzing both the first and second

Investigating Officers' reports, has found that the

contradictory conclusions therein cannot be ignored. It is

evident that the complainant, Neeraj Purbia, delayed filing

his complaint with the ACB headquarters by nine months

without any justified reason, nor did he approach any other

authority during this period. Additionally, by June 2022,

Jitendra Kumar Anchalia had already been transferred from

his post as Circle Officer, and no official work related to the

complainant was pending before him. The property dispute

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (20 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

in question, which was settled amicably in his presence, did

not involve any coercion or undue influence from him or any

other accused. The complainant's statements under Section

164 Cr.P.C. contain inconsistencies regarding the alleged

bribe demand, and no corroborative evidence--whether oral,

documentary, or technical--substantiates the accusations

against Anchalia or the other accused. Even the call data

records and recorded conversations fail to indicate any

demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. These crucial

aspects further reinforce the conclusion that the allegations

lack the necessary evidentiary foundation.

11. Before proceeding further, it is imperative to examine

the legal principles governing supplementary reports under

Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Vinay

Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors., (decided on 13

December 2012), has elaborately discussed the concepts

of fresh investigation, re-investigation, de novo investigation,

and the powers of the Court and the Magistrate in such

scenarios. The pertinent issue that arises is the legal

standing of a supplementary report when it negates the

findings, observations, and opinions recorded in the primary

charge sheet filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.

The question, therefore, is whether a supplementary charge

sheet can override or render the primary charge sheet

ineffective upon being submitted before the Court. The

[2025:RJ-JD:10957] (21 of 32) [CRLW-1731/2024]

answer is unequivocally in the negative. Once an

investigative report has been submitted before a Court of

competent jurisdiction in accordance with law, the

investigating agency lacks the authority to unilaterally cancel

or nullify the earlier report. In such situations, two

contrasting investigative reports exist. The approach to be

adopted by the Court in dealing with such reports is not a

matter of juristic discretion but a legal necessity.

If the subsequent report is also placed before the Court and

the issue of framing of charges has not yet been determined,

the Trial Court is required to meticulously assess both

reports. The Court must then decide whether reasonable

grounds exist to presume the accused's guilt, necessitating a

trial, or whether the accused should be discharged. This legal

position has been extensively discussed in the judgment

cited above. The relevant paragraphs addressing these

issues are reproduced hereinbelow:

"31. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kind of reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The first and the foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is the First Information Report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police are required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case of the prosecution before the Court. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the

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Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the magistrate to direct 'further investigation' is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code.

32. Both these reports have to be read conjointly and it is the cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto to which the Court would be expected to apply its mind to determine whether there exist grounds to presume that the accused has committed the offence. If the answer is in the negative, on the basis of these reports, the Court shall discharge an accused in compliance with the provisions of Section 227 of the Code.

33. At this stage, we may also state another well-settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct 'further investigation', 'fresh' or 'de novo' and even 'reinvestigation'. 'Fresh', 'de novo', and 'reinvestigation' are synonymous expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection.

34. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code do not control or limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge sheet has been submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen the investigation, especially

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by entrusting the same to a specialised agency. It can safely be stated and concluded that in an appropriate case, when the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and that in order to do complete justice and where the facts of the case demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the investigation to a specialised agency. These principles have been reiterated with approval in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2011) 13 SCC 337]. Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.[(1998) 1 SCC 226], Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar Modi & Ors. [1996 (6) SCC 500] and Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2010) 2 SCC 200].

35. The power to order/direct 'reinvestigation' or 'de novo' investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct 'further investigation', or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused.

36. The Code does not contain any provision which deals with the court competent to direct 'fresh investigation', the situation in which such investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the manner in which the report so obtained shall be dealt with. The superior courts can direct conduct of a 'fresh'/'de novo' investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to be part of the record. Once it is part of the record, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from the record of the case. In other words, but for a specific order by the superior court, the reports, whether a primary report or a report upon 'further investigation' or a report upon 'fresh investigation', shall have to be construed and read conjointly. Where there is a specific order made by the court for reasons like the investigation

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being entirely unfair, tainted, undesirable or being based upon no truth, the court would have to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand cancelled and will not form part of the record for consideration by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

37. The scheme of Section 173 of the Code even deals with the scheme of exclusion of documents or statements submitted to the Court. In this regard, one can make a reference to the provisions of Section 173(6) of the Code, which empowers the investigating agency to make a request to the Court to exclude that part of the statement or record and from providing the copies thereof to the accused, which are not essential in the interest of justice, and where it will be inexpedient in the public interest to furnish such statement. The framers of the law, in their wisdom, have specifically provided a limited mode of exclusion, the criteria being no injustice to be caused to the accused and greater public interest being served. This itself is indicative of the need for a fair and proper investigation by the concerned agency. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression 'fair and proper investigation' in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose. Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law. Secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of investigative canons.

38. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct 'further investigation' or file supplementary report with the leave of

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the Court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct 'further investigation' and file 'supplementary report' with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the Court to conduct 'further investigation' and/or to file a 'supplementary report' will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process.

39. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view. Firstly, through the doctrine of precedence, as afore- noticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be good practice and such interpretation would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio. Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused.

40. We have already noticed that there is no specific embargo upon the power of the learned Magistrate to direct 'further investigation' on presentation of a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Any other approach or interpretation would be in contradiction to the very language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving precedence to proper administration of criminal justice. The settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would support such approach, particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is the competent authority to take cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate who has to decide whether on the basis of the record and documents produced, an offence is made out or not, and if made out, what course of law should be adopted in relation to committal of the case to the court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial conscience of the Magistrate

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which has to be satisfied with reference to the record and the documents placed before him by the investigating agency, in coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance with the principles of law. It will be a travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct 'further investigation' to clear its doubt and to order the investigating agency to further substantiate its charge sheet. The satisfaction of the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement of further proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct 'further investigation' or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct 'further investigation' or 'reinvestigation' as the case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further, re-investigation or even investigation de novo depending on the facts of a given case. It will be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of investigation. In this regard, we may refer to the observations made by this court in the case of Sivanmoorthy and Others v. State represented by Inspector of Police [(2010) 12 SCC 29]. In light of the above discussion, we answer the questions formulated at the opening of this judgment as follows: The court of competent jurisdiction is duty bound to consider all reports, entire records and documents submitted therewith by the Investigating Agency as its report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. This Rule is subject to only the following exceptions; a) Where a specific order has been passed by the learned Magistrate at the request of the prosecution limited to exclude any document or statement or any part thereof; b) Where an order is passed by the higher courts in exercise of its extraordinary or inherent jurisdiction directing that any of the reports i.e. primary report, supplementary report or the report submitted on 'fresh investigation' or 're-investigation' or any part of it be excluded, struck off the court record and be treated as non est. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a 'fresh', 'de novo' or 're-investigation' in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is only upon the orders of the higher courts empowered to pass such orders that

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aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the court of the learned magistrate.

41. Having answered the questions of law as afore-stated, we revert to the facts of the case in hand. As already noticed, the petitioner had filed the writ petition before the High Court that the investigation of FIR No. 10/2006 dated 9th February, 2006 be transferred to CBI or any other independent investigating agency providing protection to the petitioners, directing initiation of appropriate action against the erring police officers who have registered the case against the petitioner and such other orders that the court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. This petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code on 25th February, 2006. The High Court granted no order either staying the further investigation by the agency, or the proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. The Delhi Police itself filed a status report before the High Court on 4th April, 2006 and the Special Cell of Delhi Police filed the charge sheet before the trial court on 6th May, 2006. After perusing the status report submitted to the High Court, the High Court vide its Order dated 9th May, 2006 had noticed that the circumstances of the case had cast a suspicion on the case of the prosecution, in regard to the manner in which the accused were apprehended and recoveries alleged to have been made from them of articles like explosives and detonators. After noticing this, the Court directed that without commenting on the merits of the matter, it was of the opinion that this was a case where inquiry by some independent agency is called for, and directed the CBI to undertake an inquiry into the matter and submit its report within four weeks. Obviously, it would have been brought to the notice of the High Court that the Delhi Police had filed a report before the trial court. The status report had also been placed before the High Court itself. Still, the High Court, in its wisdom, did not consider it appropriate to pass any directions staying proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Despite pendency before the High Court for a substantial period of time, the CBI took considerable time to conduct its preliminary inquiry and it is

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only on 4th July, 2007 that the CBI submitted its preliminary inquiry report before the court. After perusing the report, the Court directed, as per the request of the CBI, to conduct in depth investigation of the case.

42. In the order dated 24th October, 2007, the High Court noticed that despite the fact that the CBI had taken considerable time for completing its investigation, it had still not done so. Noticing that the investigation was handed over to the CBI on 9th May, 2006 and despite extensions it had not submitted its report the Court granted to the CBI four weeks' time from the date of the order to submit its findings in respect of the allegations made by the accused in the complaint and directed the matter to come up on 28th November, 2007. The significant aspect which needs to be noticed is that the Court specifically noticed in this order that 'the trial of the case is not proceeding, further hoping that CBI shall file supplementary report or supplementary material before the trial court and the accused gets an opportunity of case being formally investigated. However, the pace at which the investigation is done by the CBI shows that CBI may take years together for getting the records....'

43. This order clearly shows that the High Court contemplated submission of a supplementary report, which means report in continuation to the report already submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code by the Delhi Police.

44. On 28th November, 2007, the case came up for hearing before the High Court. Then CBI filed its closure report making a request that both the accused be discharged. The case came up for hearing before the High Court on 4th August, 2008, when the Court noticed that CBI had filed a report in the sealed cover and the Court had perused it. Herein, the Court noticed the entire facts in great detail. The High Court disposed of the writ petition and while noticing the earlier order dated 4th July, 2007 wherein the accused persons had assured the court that they would not move bail application before the trial court, till CBI investigation was completed, permitted the applicants to move bail applications as well.

45. The application for discharge filed by the accused persons on the strength of the closure report filed by the CBI was rejected by the trial court vide its order dated 13th February,

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2009 on the ground that it had to examine the entire record including the report filed by the Delhi Police under Section 173(2) of the Code. The High Court, however, took the contrary view and stated that it was only the closure report filed by the CBI which could be taken into consideration, and then the matter shall proceed in accordance with law. In this manner, the writ petition was finally disposed of, directing the parties to appear before the trial court on 14th September, 2009. The High Court had relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others (supra) to say that once investigation stands transferred to CBI, it is that agency only which has to proceed with the investigation and not the Special Cell of the Delhi Police.

46. We are unable to accord approval to the view taken by the High Court. The judgment in the case of K. Chandrasekhar (supra), firstly does not state any proposition of law. It is a judgment on peculiar facts of that case. Secondly, it has no application to the present case. In that case, the investigation by the police was pending when the investigation was ordered to be transferred to the CBI. There the Court had directed that further investigation had to be continued by the CBI and not the Special Cell of the Delhi Police.

47. In the present case, report in terms of Section 173(2) had already been filed by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police even before the investigation was handed over to CBI to conduct preliminary inquiry. Furthermore, the final investigation on the basis of the preliminary report submitted by the CBI had also not been handed over to CBI at that stage.

48. Once a Report under Section 173(2) of the Code has been filed, it can only be cancelled, proceeded further or case closed by the court of competent jurisdiction and that too in accordance with law. Neither the Police nor a specialised investigating agency has any right to cancel the said Report.

Furthermore, in the present case, the High Court had passed no order or direction staying further investigation by the Delhi Police or proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction.

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49. On the contrary, the court had noticed explicitly in its order that it was a case of supplementary or further investigation and filing of a 'supplementary report'.

50. Once the Court has taken this view, there is no question of treating the first report as being withdrawn, cancelled or capable of being excluded from the records by the implication. In fact, except by a specific order of a higher court competent to make said orders, the previous as well as supplementary report shall form part of the record which the trial court is expected to consider for arriving at any appropriate conclusion, in accordance with law. It is also interesting to note that the CBI itself understood the order of the court and conducted only 'further investigation' as is evident from the status report filed by the CBI before the High Court on 28th November, 2007.

51. In our considered view, the trial court has to consider the entire record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the Closure Report filed by the CBI and the documents filed along with these reports.

52. It appears, the trial court may have three options, firstly, it may accept the application of accused for discharge. Secondly, it may direct that the trial may proceed further in accordance with law and thirdly, if it is dissatisfied on any important aspect of investigation already conducted and in its considered opinion, it is just, proper and necessary in the interest of justice to direct 'further investigation', it may do so. "

12. A supplementary report filed under Section 173(8)

Cr.P.C. forms an integral part of the initial investigative

report, and both must be assessed holistically by the Trial

Court while considering the question of discharge. The

prosecution must present a legally sustainable case before

subjecting an accused to the ordeal of a criminal trial,

ensuring that the proceedings do not degenerate into an

instrument of harassment or abuse of process.

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13. When hearing on charge-framing the principles

governing charge, mandate that a Judge is not a mere

conduit for prosecutorial claims but must exercise judicial

discretion in determining whether the evidence on record

creates a strong suspicion warranting the continuation of

proceedings. In the absence of substantive material pointing

towards the culpability of the petitioners, forcing them to

undergo the rigors of trial would be antithetical to the

foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence. The mere

lodging of an FIR, devoid of substantial and credible material

evidence, cannot serve as a ground to initiate or perpetuate

criminal proceedings against an accused.

14. In light of the foregoing, while this Court refrains from

exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR No. 507/2022, registered on

30.12.2022 at Police Station CPS ACB Outpost, Jaipur, as

well as Charge Sheet No. 83/2023 dated 06.04.2023, it

directs the Trial Court to assess the entirety of the

investigative material, including both the initial and

supplementary reports, with due application of judicial mind.

The Trial Court shall ensure that the petitioners are not

subjected to a trial unless a prima facie case is established

against them, and the order of charge framing or discharge

shall be passed in strict accordance with the settled

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principles of law. Consequently, the Trial Court, while

deliberating upon the framing of charges or considering

discharge, is duty-bound to scrutinize the entirety of the

material placed on record, including both the initial charge

sheet and the subsequent investigative findings, in

conformity with the judicial mandate enunciated under

Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C.

15. Considering the observations recorded hereinabove,

these petitions are disposed of. However, the petitioners are

granted liberty to agitate all permissible legal and factual

contentions before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage.

The Trial Court is expected to pass a reasoned order in light

of the material on record and judicial precedents governing

the subject matter. The trial court shall also consider

supplementary report along with annexed materials and

make the same part of the judicial record besides the record

available with it.