Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Banshi Lal Meena vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:7519) on 6 February, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:7519]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3336/2025
Banshi Lal Meena S/o Bahadur Lal, Aged About 40 Years, 111,
Emli Chowk, Bhuwasiya, Ward No.7, Rathajana, Pratapgarh
(Rajasthan)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Principal Secretary Rural
Development And Panchayati Raj Department, Govt. Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad Pratapgarh.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. O.P. Kumawat.
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
Order (Oral)
06/02/2025
1. Petitioner herein, inter-alia, seeks quashing of an order
dated 20.06.2024 (Annex.4) passed by Chief Executive Officer,
Zila Parishad, Pratapgarh, vide which the he was suspended.
2. At the outset, it is submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioners that the issue raised in the present writ petition is
covered by Apex Court judgment dated 16.02.2015 rendered in
Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Civil Appeal
No.1912/2015 arising out of SLP(C) No.31761/2013). Relevant
thereof, being apposite, is reproduced herein-below :-
"13. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could
be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days,
albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973
contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the
power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused
person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to
[2025:RJ-JD:7519] (2 of 3) [CW-3336/2025]
an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a
period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other
offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the
Division Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar,(1986) 4 SCC
481, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are
spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section
167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate Suspension Orders in cases
of departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us that if
Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from
incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of
commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension
should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period
especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Charge-sheet has not
been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect
and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy
trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.
14. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order
should not extend beyond three months if within this period the
Memorandum of Charges/Charge-sheet is not served on the
delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of
Charges/Charge-sheet is served a reasoned order must be passed
for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the
Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any
Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to
sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he
may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The
Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or
handling records and documents till the stage of his having to
prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the
universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a
speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government
in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution
Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds
of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the
imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been
discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the
interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central
Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation
departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands
superseded in view of the stand adopted by us."
3. He contends that the petitioner is sanguine that in case he is
allowed to file a representation qua the grievance raised in the
present writ petition and the same is considered in light of the
aforesaid judgment on the administrative side, he will be meted
out with favorable treatment. Therefore, the competent authority
[2025:RJ-JD:7519] (3 of 3) [CW-3336/2025]
of the respondent be directed to consider the representation (to
be filed) of the petitioner and pass fresh orders keeping in mind
the judgment ibid.
4. In view of the aforesaid, without commenting on the merits
of the case, the petition filed by the petitioner is disposed of with
a direction that the competent authority shall take decision in light
of judgment rendered in Ajay Kumar Choudhary ibid after applying
its mind objectively and in case the aforesaid judgment is not
found to be applicable, specific reasons thereof be given by
passing a speaking order. Needful exercise be done within a period
of six weeks.
5. Disposed of accordingly.
6. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(ARUN MONGA),J
37-DhananjayS/Rmathur/-
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