Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 9051 Raj
Judgement Date : 17 October, 2024
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 55/1995
State Of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Hanuman Singh & Ors.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sameer Pareek, Additional
Government Advocate
Mr. Jagmal Singh Choudhary, Senior
Advocate assisted by Ms. Sumitra
Choudhary
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Yogita Mohanani
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
Judgment
Reserved on 09/09/2024 Pronounced on 17/10/2024
Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. By way of the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State
laid a challenge to the judgment dated 28.06.1993 passed by the
learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur ('Trial
Court'), in Sessions Case No.16/1991 (State of Rajasthan vs.
Hanuman Singh & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents herein
have been acquitted of the charges against them under Sections
147, 148, 302, 302/34, 323/149 & 447 IPC.
2. The matter pertains to an incident which occurred in the year
1991 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
1995.
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (2 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
3. At the outset, attention of this Court has been drawn to the
order dated 03.11.2020 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Hon'ble Court, wherein it was recorded on the basis of a death
certificate so produced, that accused-respondent Mohan Singh had
passed away on 09.02.2018, and thus, vide the said order, the
instant appeal qua the said accused-respondent Mohan Singh
stood abated and dismissed as such. In this view of the matter,
the present appeal is surviving only qua accused-respondents
(surviving), namely, Hanuman Singh, Mangilal @ Mangoo Singh,
Bajrang Singh, Takhat Singh, Bhanwar Singh, Tej Singh, Shankar
Singh, Gaje Singh and Madan Singh, and the present adjudication
is being made accordingly.
4. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by
Mr.Sameer Pareek, learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant-State; Mr. Jagmal Singh
Choudhary, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Sumitra
Choudhary, appearing for the complainant side, are that on
06.01.1991 at around 4:30 p.m., one Bheem Singh (complainant/
PW-3) submitted a Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-5/30.09.1991) before the
Police Station, Jhanwar, wherein it was stated that on the
preceding night, he was in the fields at Gogaar, and as usual, his
brother, namely, Kishore Singh was at Laata in his fields at
Dhoorinadi.
4.1. It was further stated that on 06.01.1991, at around 9:00
a.m., when the complainant arrived at his house, his brother-
Kishore Singh's wife asked the complainant to reach at Laata in
the field, to enquiry as to why so many persons were gathering
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (3 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
thereat, whereupon the complainant did so. When the complainant
reached the said field, he saw that his brother-Kishore Singh was
standing near Jhoopi, and at a short distance, one Rana Singh s/o
Ram Singh was being tied, and one Loon Singh and Gopal Singh,
were asking as to why Rana Singh has been tied, and the same
query was put by the complainant himself and asked his brother
Kishore Singh to set the said Rana Singh free. Thereupon, Kishore
Singh replied that the said Rana Singh in the night tried to set the
Jhoopdi at fire, and therefore, after beating him, Kishore Singh
tied Rana Singh, and asked that he would be set free only in the
event of arrival of two Mukhiyaas of the Village, at the relevant
time.
4.2. In such circumstances, as stated, the complainant went to
the Village, narrated the whole incident to one Likham Singh s/o
Khet Singh, and asked him to reach the aforesaid field, while
telling him that in the meanwhile, the complainant would reach
the said field alongwith the Sarpanchas, namely, Mohan Singh and
Ratan Singh. Before the complainant and the said Likham Singh
could do so, certain persons armed with weapons and lathis
rushed towards the field of Kishore Singh with an intention to
attack him. Thereupon, the complainant alongwith Likham Singh
followed the above-said persons and reached the field, and saw
that accused persons, namely, Bhanwar Singh, Tej Singh,
Mangilal, Bajrang Singh, Shankar Singh, Mohan Singh, Gaje
Singh, Takhat Singh, Hanuman Singh and Madan Singh reached
the field prior to arrival of the complainant and Likham Singh, and
gave beatings to the complainant's brother Kishore Singh.
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (4 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
4.3. It was also stated that at the relevant time, accused persons
namely, Bhanwar Singh and Tej Singh were armed with guns,
Mangilal, Shankar Singh, Takhat Singh, Hanuman Singh and
Madan Singh with lathis, Bajrang Singh with a sword, Mohan
Singh with Hockey stick and Gaje Singh with Dhariya. At the time,
when the complainant's brother Kishore Singh was beaten up by
the said accused persons, one Bhoora Ram Lohar tried to save
Kishore Singh, whereupon the said Bhoora Ram was also beaten
up by the accused persons; as a consequence whereof, one Loon
Singh and Gopal Singh, who were standing near Kishore Singh,
ran away in fear; the complainant also kept hidden himself due to
fear; Likham Singh, who was the relatives of the accused persons,
left the place of incident at the relevant time. It was thus stated
that the said accused-persons, including accused-respondents
(surviving) and the accused-respondent Mohan Singh (since
expired), committed the murder of the complainant brother
Kishore Singh (deceased).
4.4. On the basis of the aforesaid Parcha Bayan, the police
conducted usual investigation and on finding the prima facie case
to be made out against the accused-respondents, and submitted a
charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 302, 302/149, 323/149 &
447 IPC before the concerned Magistrate, wherefrom the case
upon committal was received in the learned Trial Court for the
necessary trial and adjudication.
4.5. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused-
respondents under the provisions of the IPC; the charges were
read over to the accused-respondents, which they denied and
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (5 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
claimed to stand due trial and the trial accordingly commenced
thereafter.
4.6. During the course of trial, the prosecution produced
witnesses (PW-1 to PW-17) and got exhibited documents (Ex.P-1
to Ex.P-44); in defence, witness (DW-1 to DW-4) was produced
and the documents (Ex.D-1 & Ex.D-11A) were exhibited,
whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and their
false implication in the criminal case in question.
4.7. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties
as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record,
the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents, as
above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 28.06.1993
against which the present appeal has been preferred by the
appellant-State.
5. Learned Additional Government Advocate and the learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses
to the incident in question did not suffer from any contradiction,
and clearly pointed towards the fact that the accused-respondents
have committed the crime in question, but while ignoring the said
vital aspect of the matter, the learned Trial Court had passed the
impugned judgment of acquittal, which is not justified in law.
5.1. It was further submitted that the eyewitnesses namely PW.1-
Jankidas, PW.2- Gopaldas, PW.3-Bhim Singh and PW.5-Loon
Singh, stated that the accused-respondents were surrounding the
deceased at the relevant time, and started beating him, and the
same, when seen in conjunction with the other material and
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (6 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
evidence on record clearly proves the case of the prosecution
against the accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubts.
5.2. It was further submitted that cause of the death in question
was the head injury and as per the information given by the
accused-respondents, the lathis and hockey stick were recovered,
in the presence of recovery witness (Motbir) PW.14- Bhanwar
Singh, who has clearly supported the prosecution story without
any element of contradiction in his testimony before the learned
Trial Court.
5.3. It was also submitted that the learned Trial Court in the
impugned judgment relied upon the theory of self defence (private
defence) but the same was not reliable because there was no
sufficient apprehension to caused the death of the deceased and
therefore, the impugned judgment suffers from ambiguity and
liable to reversed, while convicting the accused-respondents for
commission of the crime in question.
5.4. It was further submitted that a total of 10 accused-
respondents were involved in commission of the crime in question,
but the manner in which the investigation was conducted clearly
shows bias on the part of the concerned investigating officer,
thereby rendering the investigation as unfair, improper and partial.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-
respondents, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on
behalf of the appellant-State and the complainant side, submitted
that Rana Singh was tied and subjected to beatings by the
deceased, at the relevant time, whereafter, the family members of
the said Rana Singh came to his rescue and in course of which and
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (7 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
during the exercise of right of private defence by the accused-
respondents, the deceased sustained injuries, and therefore, the
entire case falls within the parameters of right of self defence.
6.1. It was further submitted that at the relevant time, the
deceased caused the injuries to Rana Singh which was admitted
by the prosecution witnesses PW.3-Dr. V.K. Malhotra and DW.4- Dr.
Harbans Singh. It was also submitted that in connection with the
beatings given to Rana Singh, a case was also registered against
the Kishore Singh (deceased), and therefore it is clear case of
exercise of right of private defence under Sections 97 (1) & 100
(6) IPC.
6.2. It was further submitted that as per the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/
5), the accused-respondents alleged to have been carrying pistol,
sword, lathis, hockey and dhariya, but no such weapon etc., were
recovered from them during the course of investigation, and
therefore, the material and evidence produced against the
accused-respondents by the prosecution suffered from grave
contradictions. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in law in
passing the impugned judgment of acquittal, which does not
warrant any interference in the instant appeal.
6.3. In support of such submissions, reliance has been placed
upon the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of State of U.P. Vs. Niyamat & Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 434
and Kishore Shambhudatta Mishra & Ors. Vs. State of
Maharastra AIR 1989 SC 1173.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar.
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (8 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
8. This Court observes that the allegation against the accused-
respondents is that they caused murder of Kishore Singh
(deceased), however, the learned Trial Court vide the impugned
judgment acquitted the accused-respondents of the charges
against them, which is subject matter of challenge in the instant
appeal preferred by the appellant-State.
9. This Court further observes that the eyewitnesses namely
PW.1-Jankidas, PW.2- Gopal Singh, PW.3-Bhim Singh and PW.5-
Loon Singh, as produced by the prosecution before the learned
Trial Court, stated that the accused-respondents caused the death
of Kishore Singh (deceased), but the said eyewitnesses did not
depose anything specific which could show that the accused-
respondents caused the injuries to the deceased, which had
resulted into the death in question, and therefore, the allegation
borne out from the testimonies of the said eyewitnesses, is
omnibus and not sufficient attribute any specific role to the
accused-respondents in connection with the crime in question.
10. This Court also observes that the acquittal of the accused-
respondents vide the impugned judgment was ordered, mainly on
the basis of plea of private defence, and therefore, this Court
considers it appropriate to have a look at the precedent law,
pertaining to right of private defence, as laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in case of Darshan Singh Vs. State of Punjab &
Another (Criminal Appeal No. 1057 of 2002, decided on
15.01.2010), relevant portion whereof is reproduced as
hereunder:
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (9 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
"58. The following principles emerge on scrutiny of the
following judgments:
(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly recognized by the criminal jurisprudence of all civilized countries. All free, democratic and civilized countries recognize the right of private defence within certain reasonable limits.
(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-creation.
(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.
(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminus with the duration of such apprehension.
(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.
(vi) In private defence the force used by the accused ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary for protection of the person or property
(vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on record.
(viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt.
(ix) The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.
(x) A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self defence inflict any harm even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened."
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (10 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
11. This Court further observes that it is an admitted position
that the deceased tied Rana Singh and subjected him to beating,
and as a condition of release of Rana Singh, the deceased
demanded, at the relevant time, the arrival of two head persons of
the Village; thereafter, the family members of Rana Singh
(accused-respondents) came to his rescue, as a result whereof the
entire incident had happened. The said incident with regard to
beatings given to Rana Singh by Kishore Singh (deceased) was
reported to the police, whereupon the case (Ex.D/5) was
registered under Sections 323, 324, and 342 IPC, in which it was
mentioned that Kishore Singh (deceased) caused injuries to Rana
Singh by a sharp-edged weapon; the said injuries were also
recorded in Injury Reports Ex.P/10 & Ex.P/11, and the same was
supported by DW.3-Dr. V.K. Malhotra and DW.4-Dr. Harbans Singh.
12. This Court also observes that Rana Singh was tied down, and
the said information was given by PW.3-Bhim Singh, whereupon
the accused-respondents rushed to the place of incident to rescue
Rana Singh, whereupon it was found that Kishore Singh
(deceased), who was armed with weapons, had already caused
injuries to Rana Singh, and therefore, it is an admitted position
that Rana Singh's life was under immense danger warranting his
release from the hands of Kishore Singh (deceased), and that, the
concerned police station was 40 kms. away from the place of such
incident. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the right of
private defence under Sections 96 & 100 (6) IPC was
appropriately exercised by the accused-respondents. This Court
also observes that there was no prior enmity between the
deceased and accused-respondents.
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (11 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (12 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (13 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
14. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal in favour of the
accused-respondents under Sections 302/34 IPC which in the
given circumstances, was justified in law, as per the settled
principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the
Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it
demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in
arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial
Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each
and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed
and examined the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus,
the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law
or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the
instant appeal.
14.1. This Court also observes that looking into the overall record,
material available on record as well as the precedent law
pertaining to the right of private defence, it is clear Rana Singh
was tied down and beaten by Kishore Singh (deceased) by the
sharp weapon, resulting into injuries to him, and thus, at the
relevant time, his life was under immense danger, and that, the
concerned police station was also 40 kms. away from the place of
incident. At the relevant time, the accused-respondents came to
rescue Rana Singh from the hands of the deceased, which resulted
into the incident in question; however, there was no prior enmity
between the deceased and accused-respondents. Therefore, it is
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (14 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
apparent on the face of the record that the entire case is based on
the exercise of the right of private defence.
15. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
16. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court.
17. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
17.1. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal
bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- each and a surety bond in the like
amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made
effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for
grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice
thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as and
when called upon to do so.
[2024:RJ-JD:39502-DB] (15 of 15) [CRLA-55/1995]
17.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J (DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
SKant/-
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