Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Smt Chothi Devi vs State And Anr on 27 February, 2023

Bench: Kuldeep Mathur

[2023/RJJD/005929]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 619/2016

Smt Chothi Devi, aged about 56 years, W/o Sh. Hari Lal, B/c Harijan, R/o Kalu Ji Ki Bagechi, Mandiya Road, Pali, Tehsil and District Pali (Raj.).

----Petitioner Versus

1. The State of Rajasthan through the Public Prosecutor.

2. Janardhan Sharma, Commissioner, Municipal Council Pali, (Raj.).

                                                                    ----Respondent


For Petitioner(s)            :     Mr. Narpat Singh
                                   Mr. Om Singh Chouhan
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Salim Khan, P.P.



            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP MATHUR

                                        Order

27/02/2023

By way of filing present criminal miscellaneous petition under

Section 482, Cr.P.C., the petitioner has prayed that F.I.R.

No.12/2016 lodged at P.S. Kotwali, District Pali against present

petitioner and investigation initiated pursuant thereto may be

quashed and set aside.

Briefly stated facts of the case are that the present petitioner

entered into the services of Municipal Council, Pali against the post

of Sweeper (Safai Karamchari) after following due process of law

in the year 1978. The petitioner from the date of initial

appointment has been rendering her services with Municipal

Council, Pali without any interruption. The son of the petitioner

named Jagaram came to be appointed as Sweeper (Safai

Karamchari) with Municipal Council, Pali in the year 1988. One

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Dwarka Prasad Jawa made a complaint to the District Collector

and Secretary, District Redressal of Public Grievances (RPG)

Committee on 26.08.2015 and 31.08.2015 respectively stating

inter alia that the petitioner obtained appointment in the Municipal

Council, Pali on the basis of forged horoscope showing her date of

birth as 05.12.1959. As per the complaint, the date of the birth of

the petitioner's son mentioned in the transfer certificate issued by

the school is 12.11.1968 which indicates that the age difference

between petitioner and her son is close to 9 years only.

The allegation levelled in the F.I.R. is thus that the petitioner

has submitted forged horoscope at the time of seeking

appointment to show her date of birth as 05.12.1959. Therefore,

she has committed an offence of cheating punishable under

Section 420 IPC.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from the

perusal of the F.I.R., which is solely based on the complaint dated

31.08.2015 submitted by Dwarka Prasad Jawa to Secretary,

District Redressal of Public Grevances Committte, it would reveal

that the allegation of cheating has been levelled against her only

due to difference of age between petitioner and her son namely

Jagaram. Learned counsel submitted that an F.I.R. ought not to

have been lodged against petitioner only on the ground of her

becoming mother at an early age. Learned counsel further

submitted that only on the basis of age difference between

petitioner and her son and in the absence of any allegation of

dishonest inducement by petitioner, it cannot be said that she has

committed an offence under Section 420 of IPC. On the strength

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of these submissions, it was thus prayed that the instant criminal

miscellaneous petition deserves to be allowed.

Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed

the criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioner.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

The complaint on which FIR was registered against the

petitioner is reproduced hereunder:-

"Øekad i10 ¼[email protected]@15½702 fnukad 7-12-15

Jheku Fkkukf/kdkjh] iqfyl Fkkuk dksrokyh fo'k; %& eqdnek ntZ dj dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djus ckcr~A izlax %& vkidk i= Øekad [email protected]@15-7-2015 ds lUnHkZ esaA izklafxd i= ds }kjk vkius Jhefr pkSFkh [email protected] tkrh gjhtu fuoklh dkyqth cxsph ekf.M;k jksM+ ikyh dh tUe rkjh[k tks mlus ukSdjh esa yxus ds le; xyr crkbZ Fkh ls lEcfU/kr jsdMZ ekaxs x;s tks bl dk;kZy; ds i= Øekad i10¼[email protected]@15½571 blh ekeys ls lEcfU/kr Jh }kjdkizlkn tkok fuoklh dkyqth cxsph okfYedh cLrh& ekf.M;k jksM+] ikyh }kjk ifjokn Jheku lfpo ftyk tu vfHk;ksx ,oa lrdZrk lfefrA vfr- ftyk eftŒ ikyh esa izLrqr djus ij fnŒ 31-08-2015 dks izdj.k la[;k [email protected] ntZdj bl dk;kZy; dks lgk;d funsZ"kd vfHk;kstu ikyh ls dkuwuh jk;

izkIr dj eqdnek ntZ djus ds funsZ"k fn;s x;sA tSlk fd Jh }kjdkizlkn tkok }kjk iwoZ esa Fkkus esa ifjokn ntZ djok;k tk pqdk gS ,oa blh :i esa dk;kZy; }kjk lwpuk Hksth tk pqdh gSA vkSj fd bl dk;kZy; }kjk fjdkMZ ijh{k.k djus ls izrhr gksrk gS fd Jherh pkSFkh nsoh }kjk rF; Nqik;k x;k gS] vr% Jh }kjdkizlkn tkok ds ifjokj ds flyflys esa bl dk;kZy; dh fjiksVZ Hkh ntZ dj vko";d dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djkosaA [email protected]& tuknZu vk;qDr uxj ifj'kn] ikyh P.S. dksrokyh ikyh rkŒ 06&1&16 oDr 2-30 PM %& ;g VkbZi"kqnk fjiksVZ Jheku tuknZu "kekZ uxj ifj'kn vk;qDr ikyh us tfj;s Mkd Fkkuk gktk ij fHktokbZ tks izkIr gqbZA dk;Zokgh&iqfyl etewu fjiksVZ ls ekeyk tqeZ /kkjk 420 IPC dk ?kfVr

gksuk ik;k tkrk gSA vr% eqŒuŒ 12 rkŒ bejkstk tqeZ mijksDr esa

[2023/RJJD/005929] (4 of 7) [CRLMP-619/2016]

ntZ dj rQrh"k Jh mÙkeflag A.S.I. ds gokys dh x;hA FIR

izrh;k fu;ekuqlkj tkjh dh x;hA"

Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:-

"420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Archana Rana vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2021) 3 SCC 757, held as

under:-

"As observed and held by this Court in the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy (supra), the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows:

i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and

ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to

a) deliver property to any person; or

b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. Thus, cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. Cheating is defined under Section 415 of the IPC. The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows:

i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him:

The person who was induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or the person who was induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived.

Thus, a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 415 IPC. A person

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who dishonestly induced any person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating.

6. Now, keeping in mind the relevant ingredients for the offences under Sections 419 & 420 IPC, as noted hereinabove, it is required to be considered whether the averments in the complaint taken on their face do constitute the ingredients necessary for the offences under Sections 419 & 420 IPC, as alleged."

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana

& Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported 1992 Supp (SC) 335,

issued certain guidelines for exercising inherent powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. The various principles laid down in the case of

Bhajan Lal (supra) have been consistently followed by this Court

and Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India. The relevant portion of

the judgment is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-

"108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

[2023/RJJD/005929] (6 of 7) [CRLMP-619/2016]

2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or

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inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice."

In the considered opinion of this Court, the present case

clearly falls in category (1) as delineated in the case of Bhajan

Lal (supra). The only allegation against the petitioner is that in

the year 1978, she secured appointment on the post of Sweeper

(Safai Karamchari) in the Municipal Council, Pali by submitting

forged document/horoscope as a proof of her date of birth. The

allegation has been sought to be substantiated solely on the basis

of age difference between petitioner and her biological son.

Therefore, considering the allegation as they are in the FIR, this

Court does not find the allegation of dishonest inducement by the