Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6787 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 19 October, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 71/2014
Mohanlal S/o Shri Shimru, R/o Village Surawas, Teh. Tijara Distt.
Alwar
----Appellant-Defendant
Versus
Amarchand S/o Shri Shimru, R/o Village Surawas, Teh. Tijara
Distt. Alwar
----Respondent-Plaintiff
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dhruv Atri for
Mr. Harendra Singh Sinsinwar
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Anil Agarwal for
Mr. S.S. Sunda
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
Judgment
19/10/2022
1. Appellant-defendant has filed this second appeal under
Section 100 CPC, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated
05.12.2013 passed in Civil First Appeal No.12/2009 by the
Additional District Judge, Tijara, District Alwar dismissing the
appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2008
in Civil Suit No.38/2003 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Alwar
whereby and whereunder the suit for specific performance of
agreement, filed by the respondent-plaintiff, has been decreed on
merits in following terms:-
" परिणामतः वादी का ववरुद्ध प्रवतवादीगण इस आशय कआ साथ वसाथ डि डिकथ डिक्री वकया किया जाता है वक प्रवतवादी म मोहनलाल वववावदत आिाकिया जी खसिा न० 210 िकबा 1 बीघा मजकिया जा सरिावास तहसील वतकिया जािा वकिया जला अलवि क मो द मो माह कआ अन्दि वनयमानरसाि वादी क मो बयनामा किा दआवआ तथा वववावदत संपव्ति क मो वकसी दीगि वयव्यक्ति क मो िहन-बैय वव डिकय ना किआ एवं वादी कआ उपय मोग-उपभो मोग मं बाधा कारित ना किं । उपि मो्यक्ति अनरसाि पपराप वसाथ डि डिकथ डिक्री तैयाि कथ डिक्री किया जावआ ।"
(2 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
2. Heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the
material available record.
3. The relevant facts of the case, as culled out from the record,
are that plaintiff and defendant both are real brothers and plaintiff
instituted a civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement
to sell date dated 15.06.1979 executed by the defendant in
respect of land bearing Khasra No.210 measuring 1 bigha situated
at village Surawas, Tehsil Tijara, District Alwar against the sale
consideration of Rs.4,000/-.
4. Plaintiff averred that the entire sale consideration of
Rs.4,000/- was paid to the defendant and the defendant delivered
the physical possession of the land in question to plaintiff. Plaintiff
averred that after execution of agreement, time and again he
asked to execute the sale deed but defendant deferred the matter
for one or another reason, and lastly plaintiff served a legal notice
dated 28.07.2003 and thereafter instituted the present civil suit.
5. Defendant submitted his written statement and contended
that the agreement to sell dated 15.06.1979 is forged document,
which was never executed by him. The defendant did not dispute
that he is the Khatedar of the land in question bearing Khasra
No.210 measuring 1 bigha and the fact that both parties are real
brothers. Defendant raised an objection that the suit was barred
by limitation.
6. The Trial Court, on the basis of rival pleadings of both
parties, permitted both parties to adduce their evidence in
respect of their respective contentions. The plaintiff produced
agreement as well as produced himself as PW-1, Vijay Kumar
(PW-2) the scriber of agreement and Mahendra Kumar (PW-3) the
(3 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
stamp vendor of agreement. In rebuttal, the defendant did not led
any evidence.
7. The Trial Court, on appreciation of evidence on record,
concluded that the plaintiff has proved the execution of agreement
dated 15.06.1979 by his own evidence as well as by producing its
scriber and the stamp vendor from whom the stamp of agreement
was purchased. Since the defendant has taken a defence that the
agreement is forged and prepared, therefore, placing reliance on
the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Daulatram Vs.
Yog [(2005) DNJ SC 73], it was observed that the burden to
prove the agreement being forged lies upon the defendant, the
trial court held that in absence of defendant's evidence, he could
not discharge his burden. Further the trial court observed that
according to recital indicated in the agreement itself as well as
from the evidence of plaintiff, it stands established that the
plaintiff has paid entire sale consideration of Rs.4,000/- and the
defendant delivered the possession of suit land to the plaintiff.
In respect of the objection as to limitation, the trial court
observed that in the agreement dated 15.06.1979, no limitation
has been provided and only it was indicated that the sale deed
would be executed by Samvat 2037 but the time was not essence
of the contract. The trial court relied upon the provision of Section
54 of the Limitation Act to held that the limitation for the purpose
of suit for specific performance begins from the date when the
plaintiff noticed that the performance of agreement has been
refused by the defendant. Since in this case, no date of
performance was indicated in the agreement and the plaintiff
adduced the evidence that he asked the defendant to execute the
(4 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
sale deed time and again, thereafter served a legal notice and
then filed the present suit, therefore, the suit was not found to be
barred by limitation.
8. The Trial Court further opined that the plaintiff has paid
entire sale consideration as well as obtained the physical
possession of the suit land, therefore, equity lies in his favour, and
since there is no counter evidence from the side of defendant, the
trial court exercised its discretionary power to decree the suit for
specific performance in favour of plaintiff vide judgment and
decree dated 29.11.2008 in the manner as mentioned
hereinabove.
9. The defendant did not prefer the first appeal within the
prescribed limitation, however a delay of near about more than
three months. The First Appellate Court, considering legal aspects
that the first appeal is a valuable and statutory right, took a liberal
view and condoned the delay and considered the first appeal on
merits. The First Appellate Court re-considered entire material on
record. The First Appellate Court observed that the plaintiff has
concluded his evidence by 01.08.2007 and thereafter several
opportunities were accorded to the defendant to adduce his
evidence. Even opportunity on cost was also accorded, but the
defendant led any evidence, and lastly his evidence was closed
vide order dated 06.11.2008. The said order was not challenged
by way of filing writ petition nor he has assigned sufficient reason
for not adducing any evidence. The First Appellate Court, in
absence of defendant's evidence, concurred with findings of the
trial court that the agreement dated 15.06.1979 was executed by
(5 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
the defendant and the plaintiff had paid entire sale consideration
as also he received the possession of suit land.
In respect of the limitation, the First Appellate Court too
appreciated that it is true that the suit was filed after immense
delay, however it may not be treated as barred by limitation. The
First Appellate Court held that firstly, the time is not essence of
the contract and secondly, parties are real brothers and when the
plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration as well as had
obtained the possession, moreover he adduced evidence that he
was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed registered, the suit
may not be held to be barred by limitation. The First Appellate
Court placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in P. D' Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu [(2004)6 SCC 649].
The First Appellate Court also considered the article of Section 54
of the Limitation Act and concurred with fact finding and judgment
of the trial court and dismissed the first appeal on merits vide
judgment and decree dated 05.12.2013.
10. Having considered the fact finding recorded by both courts
below in respect of execution of agreement as well as to the fact
that the plaintiff has paid entire sale consideration and did receive
physical possession, which are based on evidence available on
record, this Court is not inclined to interfere with such fact finding.
It may not be said in given facts and circumstances that two
courts below have committed any jurisdictional error or exercised
their discretion arbitrarily. In totality of facts, it is a case where
the trial court exercised its discretion guided by the judicial
principles of reasonableness and equity, and such discretion has
further been affirmed by the First Appellate Court.
(6 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Zarina Siddiqui Vs.
Ramalingam @ R. Amarnathan [(2015)1 SCC 705] has held
as under:-
"33. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misleads the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ramathal Vs.
Maruthathal and Ors. [(2018)18 SCC 303] while dealing with
the scope of Section 100 CPC to interfere in fact findings of two
courts below in respect of decreeing a suit for specific
performance observed as under:-
"When the intention of the legislature is so clear the
courts have no power to enlarge the scope of Section 100
for whatsoever reasons. Justice has to be administered in
accordance with law. In the case on hand the High Court
has exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the well
considered judgment of the courts below which is based
on cogent reasoning. The learned judge ought not to have
entered the arena of re appreciation of the evidence,
hence the whole exercise done by the High Court is
beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section
100 of CPC."
13. In other cases of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Shiv Dayal
& Anr. [(2019)8 SCC 637] and C.Doddanarayana Reddy and
(7 of 7) [CSA-71/2014]
Ors. Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy and Ors. Reported in [(2020) 4
SCC 659] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that concurrent
findings of fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was
recorded de hors pleadings or it was based on no evidence or
based on misreading of the material on records and documents.
14. In view of discussion made hereinabove, no substatiial
question of law arises in the instant second appeal. In order to
exercise the scope of Section 100 of CPC, involvement/formulation
of substantial question of law is sine qua non.
15. As a result, the second appeal is bereft of merits and the
same is hereby dismissed. No costs.
16. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any,
also stand(s) disposed of.
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
TN/91
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!