Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6917 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 1 November, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 199/1999
Dr. Narain Das (deceased represented through legal
representatives)
1/1. Sh. Radha Mohan S/o Late Dr. Narain Das
1/2. Sh. Bhagwan Das S/o Late Dr. Narain Das
1/3. Sh. Prem Kant S/o Late Dr. Narain Das
1/4. Sh. Krishna Kant S/o Late Dr. Narain Das
All Residents of House No.314, Lal Ji Sand Ka Rasta, Chora
Rasta, Modi Khana, Jaipur.
1/5. Sh. Smt. Mohini Devi W/o Sh. Kailash Chand Badaya, R/o
Govident Nagar, Amer Road, Jaipur
1/6. Smt. Chitralekha W/o Sh. Hanuman Prasad Dusad, R/o
Vidhyadhar Nagar, Sector 9, Jaipur.
1/7. Smt. Prem Lata W/o Murli Manohar Badaya, R/o Baba
Harish Chand Marg, Chanpole Bazar, Jaipur.
1/8. Smt. Chandrakanta W/o Dr. B.L. Gupta, R/o Malviya Nagar,
Sector-7, Jaipur.
----Appellant-Plaintiffs
Versus
Ram Manohar adopted son of Nand Kishore (Since deceased)
now being represented through following legal representatives:-
1/1. Shakuntala Devi Khandelwal W/o Ram Manohar
Khandelwal, R/o Vidhyadhar Ka Rasta, Kagaji Bhawan, Jaipur
1/2. Mehul Khandelwal S/o Late Avdesh Khandelwal, grand son
of late Shri Ram Manohar Khandelwal, R/o Vidhyadhar Ka Rasta,
Kagaji Bhawan, Jaipur
----Respondent-Defendants
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Abhay Kumar Bhandari, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Vaibhav Bhargava & Mr. Vikram Singh For Respondent(s) : None present
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Judgment JUDGMENT RESERVED ON:- October 21st ,2022
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON:- November 1st,2022 REPORTABLE
1. The instant civil second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C.
has been preferred by and on behalf of plaintiff-landlord-appellant
assailing the judgment and decree dated 26.02.1999 passed in
(2 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
Civil First No.24/1995 by the court of Additional District Judge
No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur whereby and whereunder while allowing
the appeal, filed by respondent-tenant, the first appellate court
has set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.03.1995 passed
in Civil Suit No.6/1970 (22/1994) by the court of Additional Civil
Judge (Jr. Division) No.1, Jaipur City, Jaipur decreeing the
plaintiff's suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide and
reasonable necessity of the rented shop for his son, after
comparing comparative hardships between the landlord and the
tenant and consequently, the civil suit for eviction has been
dismissed.
2. Heard learned counsel for appellant at length, perused the
judgments and record.
3. It appears from perusal of record that initially notices of this
second appeal were issued to the respondent-defendant-tenant
vide order dated 13.05.1999. Respondent-Defendant-Ram
Manohar put in appearance through advocate. Thereafter, having
heard learned counsel for both parties, Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court vide order dated 1st September, 2006 admitted this appeal
for consideration on the following substantial question of law:-
"Whether, the mere fact that the landlord who wanted a commercial premises for starting his own business can be said to have lost his necessity if after remaining unemployed for very long time say 11 years during the pendency of the suit joined service for his livelihood and in due course is confirmed in the service?"
4. Appellant-plaintiff Dr. Narain Das passed away during
pendency of second appeal, hence his legal representatives came
(3 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
on record and pursued this appeal. Thereafter, sole respondent-
defendant-tenant Ram Manohar passed away on 28.06.2012.
From the side of appellant, application was filed that deceased
respondent Ram Manohar is survived by legal representatives of
his wife Shakuntala Devi and grand son Mehul Khandelwal who
may be substituted as his legal representatives in this second
appeal to pursue proceedings of the appeal but it was averred that
wife and grand son of deceased respondent never carrying on any
business in the rented shop during the life time or up to death of
respondent Ram Manohar and therefore, tenancy rights do not
devolve upon the surviving legal heirs. Notices of the application
to surviving legal representatives of deceased respondent were
issued.
As per office report, notices were duly served but no one
appeared on their behalf. Application for taking legal
representatives of deceased respondent Ram Manohar was
allowed vide order dated 07.09.2016 and respondent No.1/1 and
1/2 were substituted in his place. Again notices were issued to the
substituted respondent No.1/1 and 1/2, which were served as per
office report. Order dated 14.11.2017 goes to show that advocate
who appeared for respondent-defendant Ram Manohar, put in
appearance for his legal representatives as well and on the joint
request of learned counsel for both parties, the matter was sent
before the Mediation Center to explore possibility of amicable
settlement through Mediator. Thereafter on 13.12.2017, learned
counsel for respondents again sought time to explore possibility of
amicable settlement but mediation proceedings remained
unsuccessful. Thereafter, vide order dated 06.09.2018, in the
(4 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
presence of learned counsel for both parties, application for early
hearing of second appeal was allowed. On next date i.e.
08.10.2018, counsel appearing for respondents No.1/1 and 1/2
pleaded no instructions and thereafter, the court notices were
ordered to be issued to respondents. As per office report, on
31.10.2018 notices served yet no one appeared on behalf of
respondents.
5. It has also revealed from the record that during pendency of
this second appeal during life time of original respondent-Ram
Manohar, appellant filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27
CPC to take on record a copy of the order dated 26 th of August,
2003. This application was allowed after haring learned counsel for
both parties vide order dated 21.12.2006 and the order in respect
of taking voluntary retirement by the appellant No.1/1 Radha
Mohan, for whom necessity, the present suit for eviction was filed,
was taken on record. Respondent was given opportunity to file any
document in rebuttal but no document is filed by the respondent
to refute such subsequent fact.
6. Since no one is appearing for and on behalf of LRs of
deceased respondent to contest this appeal, this Court, vide order
dated 11.04.2022 asked the appellant to submit an affidavit
furnishing the factual details about the present status and position
of the rented shop as also about the rent paid in respect of rented
shop. In compliance thereof, appellant Radha Mohan has
submitted an additional affidavit dated 18.04.2022 on record. In
the affidavit, it is stated that the rented shop was earlier been
used by respondent-Ram Manohar but after his death, no legal
representatives were seen doing any business, since his son
(5 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
Avdesh Khandelwal pre-deceased to respondent. The shop
remained closed for many years. Recently, it has been seen that
occasionally some unknown persons used to do business of
stationery and toys in the shop. It has been stated in the
additional affidavit that respondents have not paid any rent of the
rented shop since October, 2005.
7. Keeping in mind all afore-stated unrebutted facts available
on record, in order to deal with the substantial question of law,
which falls for consideration in the instant second appeal, following
facts of the case as culled out from the record are need to be
taken into consideration.
8. On 20.12.1969, the plaintiff-Dr. Narain Das filed a civil suit
for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against two defendants
namely, Nand Kishore and smt. Suraj Devi. The civil suit was
instituted under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of
Rent and Eviction), Act of 1950 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act
of 1950') on the ground of default, bona fide and reasonable
necessity and subletting. It is stated in the suit that the shop in
question bearing Municipal No.656 situated in Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur
was taken on rent by defendant Nand Kishore and his brother Ram
Kishore @Rs.35/- per month and rent note dated 16.10.1956 was
executed in favour of plaintiff. It is stated that the tenant
committed default in payment of rent, therefore, a suit for
ejectment and rent was filed on 13.11.1961 but tenant deposited
arrears of rent with interest therefore, the suit was dismissed. It is
stated that tenant again committed default in payment of rent.
Meanwhile, Ram Kishore died and defendant No.1 Nand Kishore
alone continued to carry on business in the rented shop. In
(6 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
respect of default, plaintiff pleaded that rent of the shop in
question has not been paid since 05.03.1968. In respect of bona
fide necessity, plaintiff pleaded that one of his son namely Radha
Mohan has left his studies and is an unemployed, who wants to
start his business of general merchandise and therefore, the
plaintiff is in bona fide and reasonable required of the rented shop
for his son. In respect of subletting, it was pleaded that the
defendant No.1 part with possess the shop in question with one
Ram Manohar. The plaintiff prayed for decree of ejectment and
arrears of rent on all these grounds.
9. Defendants No.1 and 2 filed their separate written
statements and denied pleadings in respect of default, bona fide
and reasonable necessity and subletting. It was contended that
Ram Manohar is adopted son of defendant No.1 Nand Kishore and
he is not sub-tenant. Defendant also made an attempt to show
that the shop was taken on rent for a partnership firm Shivnarain
Rampratap but since rent note is in the personal names of
defendant No.1 Nand Kishre and his brother Ram Kishore,
therefore, such plea was later on found of no credence. During the
course of trial, defendant No.1 Nand Kishore passed away,
therefore, his wife was substituted as defendant No.1/1 but since
his wife also died, thereafter, his adopted son Ram Manohar was
substituted as defendant No.1/1/1 (respondent No.1 herein) who
died during the second appeal and represented through
respondents No.1/1 and 1/2. Later on defendant No.2 Smt. Suraj
Devi too passed away and her name was deleted. Defendant
No.1/1/1 Ram Manohar filed his own written statement and
contested the eviction suit. Default in payment of rent was denied.
(7 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
Necessity of rented shop to plaintiff's son Radha Mohan was also
denied. Subsequently, defendant got amended his written
statement and stated that plaintiff's son Radha Mohan for whom
the rented shop has been alleged to be bona fidely required, has
got employment in Upbhokta Bhandar Co-operative Department
and thus, he does not require the shop for his business.
10. The Trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of both parties,
framed necessary issues and allowed both parties to adduce in
support of their respective claims. Issue No.2 is of default, issue
No.5, 6 and 8 are in respect of bona fide necessity, comparative
hardships and partial eviction and issue No.7 is in respect of
subletting.
Plaintiff produced himself as PW-1, Radha Mohan as PW-2
and other witness PW3 and PW-4 and also produced documents
(Ex.1 to Ex.17) including documents to show that plaintiff's son
Radha Mohan only got a temporary job in Upbhokta Bhandar Co-
operative Department during the course of trial of eviction suit. In
Rebuttal, defendant produced DW-1 to DW-7 and exhibited
documents (Ex.A/1 to Ex./5).
11. The Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No.1, Jaipur City,
Jaipur vide its judgment dated 30.03.1995 decreed the plaintiff's
suit and passed decree for eviction against the defendant-tenant
on the ground of bona fide and reasonable necessity of the rented
shop to the plaintiff-landlord for business of his son. The
defendant-tenant was also held defaulter in payment of rent, but
benefit of first default was extended. The issue of subletting was
held against the plaintiff since the alleged sublettee Ram Manohar
is none else but is proved to be an adopted son of original tenant
(8 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
defendant No.1 Nand Kishore and who was also impleaded as
defendant No.1/1/1 after death of original defendant-tenant and
has been treated as tenant in rented shop.
The Trial Court dealt with the subsequent event of joining the
job by the plaintiff's son Radha Mohan during the pendency of suit
and observed that at the time of institution of the present civil suit
on 20.12.1969 Radha Mohan was unemployed but he joined
temporary service on Ad hoc basis initially for 80 days in Upbhokta
Bhandar Co-operative Department on 14.12.1981 and his Ad hoc
period was later on continued. The Trial Court, after appreciation
of some of the judicial precedents, observed that the necessity of
rented shop for plaintiff's son Radha Mohan does not come to an
end or seized only due to joining a temporary job by him during
pendency of suit. It was observed that the plaintiff's son Radha
Mohan himself has deposed that he is interested in doing business
only and he deposed that even at Upbhokta Bhandar, where he is
doing temporary job, he has also got an experience in the
business of general merchandise and his need of rented shop for
doing business is persisting. The Trial Court categorically observed
that considering the long drawn process of eviction proceedings,
which has continued for about 25 years in the present suit, it may
not be expected from the plaintiff's son to sit idle and not to do
any work for his livelihood. Therefore, taking into account the
respective evidence of both parties and the subsequent event, the
Trial Court clearly observed that the necessity of rented shop to
plaintiff's son Radha Mohan to start business of general
merchandise does not come to an end, merely by joining a
temporary job or even may be permanent during pendency of the
(9 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
eviction proceedings and necessity was held to be bona fide and
reasonable. The Trial Court, after deciding the issue of
comparative hardships and partial eviction, decreed the suit for
eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity vide judgment dated
30.03.1995.
12. Being aggrieved by the decree for eviction dated 30.03.1995
and findings of default, respondent-defendant Ram Manohar
preferred first appeal their against. Before the First Appellate
Court, plaintiff's son Radha Mohan deposed his undertaking on
affidavit that he will resign from his job as soon as he will get the
vacant possession of the rented shop and thus pursued his
necessity of rented shop. However, the First Appellate Court,
reversed the decree for eviction only for the reason that plaintiff's
son Radha Mohan has joined services in Upbhokta Bhandar Co-
operative Department and there he is in employment since last 18
years by the time of deciding the first appeal, therefore it cannot
be said that he has a reasonable and bona fide necessity of the
rented shop. The First Appellate Court also reversed findings of
default and finally, vide judgment impugned dated 26.02.1999,
set aside the decree for eviction and dismissed the plaintiff's suit
for eviction.
13. In this second appeal, this Court is dealing with the
substantial question of law related to the reversal of the decree for
eviction by the First Appellate Court, passed by the Trial Court, on
the ground of bona fide necessity, therefore, this Court is
considering findings of the First Appellate Court in respect of issue
No.5, 6 and 8, as whether they are perverse, contrary to settled
proposition of law and are liable to be sustained or not?
(10 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
14. At the outset, it may be noticed that it is undisputed fact that
the present suit for eviction in respect of the rented shop was
instituted on 20.12.1969 for necessity of plaintiff's son Radha
Mohan who at that point of time was not in any job but was said
to be unemployed and he joined the job temporarily in Upbhokta
Bhandar on 14.12.1981 during the course of trial of eviction suit.
It has come on record in the evidence of parties that initially he
was appointed on Ad hoc and temporary basis for 80 days and
later on his Ad hoc period of service was extended time to time
(Ex.7 to Ex.11). He himself deposed evidence as (PW-2) that he is
in need of the rented shop to start business of grocery
merchandise and he wants to do business only. It was stated that
he joined the service temporarily for livelihood of his family and
the salary amount falls short for his livelihood. There is evidence
on record that any other vacant shop is available to plaintiff for
business of his son Radha Mohan and as proceedings of eviction to
get vacate the rented shop prolonged for years, he had to join job
in the meanwhile. It is after 12 years of filing of the eviction suit,
Radha Mohan joined service on 14.12.1981. Taking into
consideration of such evidence and subsequent facts on record,
the trial court passed decree for eviction on the ground of bona
fide and reasonable necessity holding that joining temporary job
during the course of trial, his necessity to the rented shop does
not extinguish. Even it was observed that if due to continuation in
service, he got the benefit of confirmation, this sole fact cannot
mitigate his necessity of the rented shop. He has deposed
evidence that he has liking for business and wants to increase his
income as much as has also gained more experience of doing
(11 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
business of general merchandise while doing his job at Upbhokta
Bhandar.
15. The First Appellate Court has given weigh to the additional
evidence that though Radha Mohan deposed his evidence that he
has joined the service temporarily and he cannot sit idle during
the course of proceedings of eviction but has to join the job for his
livelihood, yet he has also admitted in cross-examination on the
additional affidavit filed during the course of first appeal to the
effect that now he is regular grade employee and his basic pay is
Rs.4,700/- per month other than Dearness Allowance (DA) and
House Rent Allowance (HRA). The First Appellate Court observed
that Radha Mohan admitted in cross-examination that he is doing
service in Upbhokta Bhandar since 25 years. Thus, the First
Appellate Court, swayed away by this long period of service and
brushed aside the other part of evidence and findings of the trial
court to the effect that Radha Mohan has already stated on oath
that he wants to do business only and would leave/resign from the
job as soon as he will get the rented shop vacated for his
business. The First Appellate Court, by its own treated the stand
of Radha Mohan giving an undertaking to leave the job, a planned
trick to seek eviction of the defendant from the rented shop. The
First Appellate Court by its own assume that once the service of
Radha Mohan has been permanent, his need to do job may not be
held to be bona fide and reasonable. The First Appellate Court has
erred in not pondering over to the evidence and fact that Radha
Mohan joined service after remaining unemployed for 11 years
even after filing of the suit. Further it is the sole decision of the
landlord which would prevail in respect of choosing his livelihood.
(12 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
When Radha Mohan has deposed that he wants to do business
only and has joined the job temporarily just to earn his livelihood
and would leave the job after getting vacation of the vacant shop
and start his business, the First Appellate Court should not have
throbbed its own decision over the decision/desire of the landlord
to do the business. It is trite law that landlord is the best judge of
his need. The First Appellate Court has also erred in not taking
into consideration the evidence on record that Radha Mohan
(PW-2) opened a shop of general merchandise in Maniharo Ka
Rasta and carried on business therein for six months, later on he
could not run that shop and joined the service. This
evidence/finding is rather in favour of the plaintiff to prove his
intention to do the business. The First Appellate Court has
misconstrued the true purported of the evidence and recorded
perverse finding assuming that Radha Mohan has no intention to
do business. Such finding of First Appellate Court is contrary to
the evidence on record and are based on surmises and
conjectures by drawing an assumption of its own. During the
course of this second appeal, it has come on record that Radha
Mohan has availed Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) on
31.08.2003 and order to this effect dated 26.08.2003, accepting
his VRS has already been taken on record which is marked as
(Annexure-A/1). This additional evidence was taken on record,
vide order dated 21.12.2006, after hearing learned counsel for
respondent-tenant and opportunity to the tenant was also
accorded by this Court to produce any evidence/document in
rebuttal but no evidence in rebuttal to deny/dispute the factum of
taking the VRS by Radha Mohan has been placed on record. This
(13 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
Court is not oblivious to the fact that the plaintiff Dr. Narain Das
had filed his affidavit dated 30.07.1998, later on Dr. Narain Das as
well as Radha Mohan both furnished undertaking on 12.02.1999
before the First Appellate Court showing intention to resign from
service as soon as they will get the possession of rented shop. It
has also been held as per evidence on record that the landlord did
not want to enhance the rent and there is no oblique motive of the
landlord to file eviction suit. By the Additional evidence, the need
and intention of the plaintiff's son to do business in the rented
shop rather stands strengthen. It is no more res integra that the
landlord is the best judge of his need and neither the tenant nor
the Court may/should dictate the landlord or force to landlord to
adjust or compromise with his need. It has also come on record
that the landlord has no alternative shop. It is clear position as
emerges in the present suit that though the plaintiff's son Radha
Mohan was unemployed at the time of institution of suit and his
need for the rented shop was bona fide and reasonable at that
point of time. The eviction proceedings went prolonged for years
and now about 50 years have lapsed and after 11-12 years after
filing of eviction suit, if Radha Mohan joined any job in Upbhoka
Bhandar for his livelihood, his necessity for the rented shop should
not have been treated as abolished more so, when he deposed his
desire/wish to do the business and not to continue with the
service rather furnished undertaking to leave/resign from service
on vacation of the rented shop. It is not the requirement of law
that during pendency of eviction proceedings, landlord/the person
for whose necessity is alleged should not do any job/business or
employment for his livelihood in the interregnum period. Now it is
(14 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
clear that Radha Mohan has resigned from his job. It may be
noticed that the First Appellate Court too has nowhere held that
the need of the rented shop to Radha Mohan was not bona fide
and reasonable at the time of the institution of the suit but the
First Appellate Court, swayed away by the fact of joining the job
during the trial of suit and by continuation in job for 25 years and
only on such account the First Appellate Court held that the
necessity of the rented shop for Radha Mohan has come to an end
and finished. Such approach of the First Appellate Court is not
correct and is not liable to be countenanced, rather is against the
material on record as well as contrary to the proposition of law.
16. In case of Padam Chand Vs. Narbada Bai reported in
[(1986) RLR 859], plaintiff filed eviction suit in the year 1971
for bona fide and reasonable necessity of the rented shop for
carrying on business by his son but during pendency of suit,
plaintiff died and his son was employed in a cement factory, where
he was made permanent. Therefore, it was argued from the side
of tenant that only need as disclosed in the plaint having been
fulfilled and the landlord cannot be said to have any reasonable or
bona fide necessity. This Court declined to accept the contention
of tenant and observed that merely because plaintiff's son got a
job in cement factory and had joined the service, it cannot be said
that he has given up the idea of doing his business in the suit
premises. The suit had been pending since 1971 and at the time
of Judgment in 1986, about 15 years have lapsed, therefore it was
not accepted that a person who wants to start his business in the
suit premises should sit idle for all the time to come and should
not accept any job so as to meet his ends and only wait for
(15 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
ultimate result of the litigation. The ratio squarely apply to facts of
the present case.
17. In case of Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava [2001 (2)
SCC 604], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that crucial date for
deciding the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the
date of his application for eviction and the subsequent events
cannot eclipse the said bona fide requirement, unless the
subsequent event overshadows the requirement of landlord. It
was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it was
unfortunate situation that the litigation proceed in long process. In
that case, litigation proceeded 23 years and during this period, it
is not expected from the landlord or his son to remain idle without
doing any work lest, joining any new assignment or starting any
new work as that would be at the peril of fore-fitting the bona fide
requirement of the landlord. If the subsequent events are
insufficient to overshadows bona fide the need, the necessity
pleaded and proved by the landlord does not come to an end and
eclipse. It is a stark reality that longer is the life of litigation, the
more would be the number of developments sprouting up during
the long interregnum. The facts of present case are more or less
similar and need for rented shop is not overshadowed by joining
job by plaintiff's son interregnum.
18. In case of Hukum Chandra (Dead) through LRs Vs. Nemi
Chand Jain [2019(13)SCC 363], the Hon'ble Supreme Court
after considering umpteen number of previous judgments,
expounded the judicial precedent reiterating that rights of parties
stand crystallized on the date of institution of the suit. However, in
appropriate cases, court can take note of all the subsequent
(16 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
events. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court affirmed the
bona fide requirement of landlord and the event that landlord's
son for whom eviction of suit premises was sought, became
gainfully employee after filing of the suit is held to be irrelevant
factor for adjudicating the bona fide requirement of the landlord.
19. Apart from afore-referred judgments, there are umpteen
number of judgments where a proposition of law has been settled
that in the dispute between the landlord and the tenant more
particularly, on the ground of bona fide necessity, the subsequent
events unless and until do not eclipse the necessity completely,
are not required to give weigh to decline the necessity which
exists at the time of institution of the eviction suit. Reference of
some judgments in case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram
[1992 Supp (2) SCC 623], Jashwant Raj and Ors. Vs. Bata
India Limited [1997(1)RLW 322], Radhe Shyam Vs.
Kanhaiya Lal [1988(1)RLR 225], Santosh Kumar Jain Vs.
Shambhulal Krishna Kumar Suhane [AIR (1993) MP 46],
Seshambal (Dead) through LR's Vs. Chelur Corporation
Chelur Building and Ors. [2010 (3) SCC 470] may be given.
20. Having considered the proposition of law in respect of the
ground of bona fide and reasonable necessity, in the litigation
between the landlord and tenant, this Court is of unequivocal
opinion that in the case at hand, the First Appellate Court has
grossly erred in setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the
trial court on the ground of bona fide and reasonable necessity of
suit shop for plaintiff's son Radha Mohan. The subsequent event of
joining the job by Radha Mohan, after 11 years of the institution of
eviction suit, during the course of eviction proceedings that too
(17 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
only for the purpose of earning his livelihood has wrongly been
assumed as eclipse/end of his necessity for the rented shop by
overlooking to the evidence on record that he himself has led
evidence that he intends to carry on business only and has joined
the job temporarily as much as would leave the job, as soon as
would get the vacant possession of the rented shop. During the
course of second appeal, Radha Mohan has also tendered his VRS
and his VRS has been accepted. Therefore, decree for eviction
passed by trial court is required to be restored.
21. In case of Damodar lal Vs Sohan Devi and Ors. [2016
(3) SCC 78], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing a case of
eviction on the ground of material alternation in the rented
premises, observed that interference with findings of fact of the
court below by the High Court in second appeal is not permissible
unless such findings are based on no evidence or are perverse.
The criteria to determine as to whether finding(s) is concerned are
perverse or not, it was observed that the wrong finding should
stem out of a complete misreading of evidence or it should be
based only on conjectures and surmises. The safest approach on
perversity is the classic approach on reasonable man's inference
on facts. To him, if the conclusion on facts in evidence made by
the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the
finding is perverse. In recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
delivered in case of C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by LR's
and Ors. Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (dead) by LR's and Ors
[2020 (4) SCC 659], in respect of jurisdiction of High Court to
interfere with the findings of fact, while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 100 CPC, it has been held that interference in the
(18 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
fact finding by the High Court may not be said to be erred when
the finding recorded by the court below is based upon any
misreading of material evidence or is recorded against the settled
proposition of law or when any judge acting judicially and
reasonably could not have reached such a finding.
22. Appreciating the finding of fact recorded by the First
Appellate Court reversing the finding of trial court on the issue of
bona fide necessity, it can safely be held that the First Appellate
Court has not only misread/ignored the evidence on record but
has recorded a finding contrary to the settled proposition of law as
set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court in umpteen
number of cases in respect of bona fide necessity as discussed
hereinabove and overall the finding of First Appellate Court is
perverse and unsustainable in the eye of law.
23. Having discussed the factual and legal aspect, the substantial
question of law is answered affirmative in favour of appellant and
it is held that merely by joining a job by the plaintiff's son during
the course of eviction proceedings to earn his livelihood, his
necessity for the rented shop may not be held as eclipse/lost.
24. Before parting with the judgment, it may be observed that
no substantial question of law in respect of reversing the finding of
fact on the issue of default has been framed. The counsel for
appellant during course of arguments has not given much
emphasis on his application filed to the effect that after the death
of original respondent-defendant Ram Manohar, tenancy rights do
not devolve upon his surviving legal representatives, therefore,
this Court is refraining itself from passing any finding on such
issues.
(19 of 19) [CSA-199/1999]
25. As a result, the instant second appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.1999
passed in Civil First Appeal No.24/1995 by the court of Additional
District Judge No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur is hereby set aside and the
judgment and decree for eviction and arrears of rent dated
30.03.1995 passed in Civil Suit No.6/1970 (22/1994) by the court
of Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No.1, Jaipur City, Jaipur is
restored. The appellant would be entitled to execute the decree for
eviction after expiry of two months from today. No costs.
26. Record be sent back.
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
TN
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