Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5488 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 4 August, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 60/2010
Chaturbhuj S/o Shri Chandrabhan Brahmin, aged 70 years, r/o
Nyotha, Teh. Nadbai, Distt. Bharatpur
----Plaintiff-Appellant
Versus
1. Bhoodev Prasad S/o Shri Ramjilal, Nyotha, Teh. Nadbai,
Distt. Bharatpur
2. Sunil Kumar S/o Shri Bhoodev Prasad, Nyotha, Teh.
Nadbai, Distt. Bharatpur
----Defendants-Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. J.P. Goyal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Abhi Goyal For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Shubham Kumar Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
Judgment 04/08/2022
1. Appellant-plaintiff has preferred this second appeal under
Section 100 CPC assailing the judgment and decree dated
11.01.2010 passed in Civil First Appeal No.57/2000 by the Court
of Additional District Judge No.1, Bharatpur whereby and
whereunder, while allowing the appeal, plaintiff's suit for
permanent injunction has been dismissed and the judgment and
decree dated 09.05.2000 passed in Civil Suit No.05/1998 by the
Court of Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.3, Bharatpur
whereby and whereunder plaintiff's suit was decreed, has been set
aside and further though the first appellate court dismissed the
plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction, however, recorded a
finding that disputed wall would remain common between both
(2 of 5) [CSA-60/2010]
parties and respondents-defendants have been allowed to put
their roof/load over the common wall.
2. Heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the
record.
3. The relevant facts as culled out from the record are that both
parties are neighbors and the dispute is in relation to a middle
wall having width of 14 inch. Appellant-plaintiff instituted a civil
suit claiming his sole ownership over the wall in question, sought a
decree for permanent injunction against defendants to restrain
them not to put any roof/load over the wall in question and not to
open any window, allas etc. Respondents-defendants submitted
written statements and denied plaintiff's claim alleging that the
wall in question is not of sole ownership of plaintiff but is for
common use by both parties as well as is in joint ownership of
both parties. Both parties adduced their oral and documentary
evidence in support of their respective contentions.
4. Learned trial court, vide judgment dated 09.05.2000,
decreed plaintiff's suit and issued a decree for permanent
injunction against defendants that defendants will not put any
roof/load of their building over the wall in question, marked as A
to B in the map appended with the plaint and further will not open
any window, almirah, allas etc. in the disputed wall.
5. Defendants challenged the judgment and decree dated
09.05.2000, by way of filing first appeal. Before the first appellate
court, admitted factual position between both parties came on
record that defendants have already constructed their own
separate wall adjoining to the disputed wall and further have put
their roof/load of building on their own constructed adjoining wall.
In such admitted factual situation, it was urged from the side of
(3 of 5) [CSA-60/2010]
plaintiff that once defendants have already constructed their own
separate wall, the decree impugned need not to be disturbed and
now no dispute remains between parties, however, the first
appellate court proceeded to decide the first appeal on merits
taking a note that the dispute in the present suit is as to whether
the wall in question is in sole ownership of plaintiff or common
between parties, therefore, this dispute requires to be
adjudicated.
6. The first appellate court, on the basis of documents Ex.A1
and Ex.A2, observed that in the wall in question, one almirah has
already been constructed having opening towards defendants'
house and four iron nails are installed, which seems to be for
affixing the gate on the almirah. The first appellate court observed
that when an almirah is already constructed and having its
opening towards defendants' house, in such factual matrix this
wall is obviously a wall for common use and cannot be treated as
wall of having exclusive ownership of plaintiff. With such fact
finding, the first appellate court quashed and set aside the
judgment and decree of trial court dated 09.05.2000 and
dismissed the plaintiff's suit vide judgment dated 11.01.2010. But
thereafter, the first appellate court has further observed and
recorded an additional finding by its own that the wall in question
shall remain joint and common between both parties and
defendants are permitted to put load/roof of their building using
this common wall.
7. Learned counsel for both parties are ad idem and do not
dispute that defendants have already constructed their own
separate wall adjoining to the wall in question and have already
put roof/load of their building on their own constructed wall,
(4 of 5) [CSA-60/2010]
therefore, now with this subsequent change in circumstances, it is
not required for defendants to put any roof/load over the wall in
question. In that view of matter, it was not required for the
appellate court to record such finding and grant the permission by
its own to respondents-defendants to use this common wall, more
so, when there was no such prayer from the side of defendants.
Obviously, when plaintiff's suit has been dismissed by the first
appellate court, such further findings/observations passed in the
impugned judgment dated 11.01.2010 by the first appellate court,
are unwarranted and beyond the scope of prayer of plaint, hence
the same can be said to be without jurisdiction.
8. As far as the judgment dated 11.01.2010 passed by the first
appellate court to the extent of setting aside the decree dated
09.05.2000, passed by the trial court and dismissing the plaintiff's
suit, is concerned, the same is based on proper appreciation of the
undisputed factual aspect, hence need not to be interfered with
within the scope of Section 100 CPC in second appeal.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of C.Doddanarayana
Reddy Vs. C.Jayarama Reddy [(2020) 4 SCC 659], while
considering the scope of High Court under Section 100 CPC, to
interfere with fact finding, has observed as under:-
"Para 26. In a judgment in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled
(5 of 5) [CSA-60/2010]
position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under:
"It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were errorneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence."
10. Therefore, with the aforesaid clarification/observation, this
second appeal is disposed of and the impugned decree dated
11.01.2010 is affirmed to the extent of dismissing the plaintiff's
suit. There is no order as to cost.
11. All other pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
12. Record of courts below be sent back.
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
SACHIN /115
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