State Of Rajasthan vs Dinesh Singh Bithu
2021 Latest Caselaw 6913 Raj

                  HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                                   JODHPUR
                                D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 20/2020

             1.      State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department
                     Of Home (Group I), Secretariat, Jaipur.
             2.      Director General Of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
             3.      District Superintendent Of Police, Bikaner.
                                                                               ----Appellants
                                                 Versus
             Dinesh Singh Bithu S/o Shri Sawai Singh Bithu, Aged About 26
             Years, By Caste Charan, R/o Ward No. 10, Hamiron Ka Bas,
             Village Sheethal, Napasar, Bikaner.
                                                                              ----Respondent


             For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. Sandeep Shah, Additional
                                             Advocate General with Ms.Pratyushi
                                             Mehta
             For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Ganga Ram Bhari



                        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANGEET LODHA
                       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR VYAS

                                              Judgment

             10th March, 2021

Reportable    Per Hon'ble Mr. Sangeet Lodha,J.

1. This intra-Court appeal is directed against order dated

22.4.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court,

whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent, challenging

the action of the appellants herein in rejecting his candidature for

appointment to the post of Constable, has been allowed.

2. The appeal is reported to be barred by limitation for 122

days. It is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of

Limitation Act.

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The application seeking condonation of delay is not opposed

by the counsel appearing for the respondent. Accordingly, the

application is allowed. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned.

3. The facts relevant are that Director General of Police,

Rajasthan issued an advertisement dated 25.05.2018 inviting

applications for recruitment to the posts of Constable in different

categories. The respondent applied for appointment on the post of

Constable (General). Having cleared the written examination, the

respondent was called for Physical Suitability Test/Physical

Efficiency Test (PST/PET). Though, selected, the respondent was

denied appointment inasmuch as, he was involved in a criminal

case wherein he was acquitted but his acquittal was not

considered honourable acquittal.

4. Challenging the action of the appellants in rejecting his

candidature, the respondent preferred a writ petition before this

Court, which has been allowed by the learned Single Judge

following a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in S.B.C.Writ

Petition No.19166/18 :Kuldeep Bhakar vs. State of Rajasthan &

Ors. and accordingly, the appellants have been directed to accord

appointment to the respondent pursuant to the selection, if

otherwise eligible. Hence, this appeal.

5. Learned AAG appearing for the State contended that the

learned Single Judge has seriously erred in allowing the writ

petition in light of Kuldeep Bhakar's case (supra). Learned AAG

submitted that the respondent was acquitted in the criminal case

for offences punishable under Sections 323, 336, 427, 452/34 IPC

by the trial Court giving benefit of doubt due to lack of evidence

and thus, he was not entitled for appointment. Learned AAG

submitted that learned Single Judge has not considered the law

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laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union

of India: 2016 (8) SCC, 471. That apart, the circular dated

28.03.2017 issued by the State Government issuing guidelines

regarding appointment of the candidates involved in criminal

cases, has also not been examined by the learned Single Judge.

Drawing the attention of the Court to the decision of the Apex

Court in Avtar Singh's case (supra), learned AAG submitted that in

a case involving moral turpitude if on technical ground giving

benefit of doubt, an accused is acquitted of the charges, the

employer has right to deny the appointment taking into

consideration the antecedent of the candidate and other facts

available. Learned AAG submitted that in the first instance, in the

application form, provided for giving details about the FIR being

lodged, the respondent has specifically mentioned 'No' and thus,

the factum of involvement in criminal case was concealed,

however, in the verification roll, the respondent had disclosed that

he was an accused in a criminal case but he was acquitted.

Learned AAG submitted that admittedly, the respondent was an

accused in a criminal case involving moral turpitude wherein he

has not been honourably acquitted and thus, the denial of

appointment to him cannot be faulted with. Relying upon decision

of the Supreme Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh

Administration & Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr.: (2018) 1 SCC

797, learned AAG submitted that acquittal in a criminal case is not

conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in the post and on

that account, he does not automatically become entitled for

appointment to the post. Learned AAG submitted that a candidate

to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable

character and integrity. Learned AAG submitted that where a

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person is to be appointed to a post in a police force, nature of

offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourable

acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt because of

witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution, are the

relevant aspects need to be examined by the Appointing Authority.

Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the

respondent who was not honourably acquitted, has rightly not

been offered appointment and therefore, the impugned order

passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside.

6. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the respondent

contended that the lapse of the respondent in not disclosing the

involvement in a criminal case in the first instance, while

submitting the application form, was absolutely bona fide

inasmuch as, at the time of verification, the respondent has

clearly mentioned the factum of his involvement in a criminal case

and acquittal therein. Learned counsel submitted that the

respondent was acquitted of the charges not on account of

extending the benefits of doubt rather, he was acquitted inasmuch

as, there was not even an iota of evidence against him and thus,

by all means, the acquittal of the respondent in a criminal case

was honourable acquittal. Thus, keeping in view the circular dated

28.03.2017 issued by the State Government, the decision of the

Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case (supra) and various Bench

decisions of this Court, the respondent is entitled for appointment

on the post of Constable pursuant to the selection in question.

Learned counsel submitted that the contention sought to be raised

by the appellants regarding the respondent's acquittal being not

honourable acquittal, is factually incorrect.

(5 of 8) [SAW-20/2020]

7. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the

material on record.

8. Indisputably, the respondent was involved in a criminal case

wherein he was tried for offences under Sections 323, 336, 427,

452/34 IPC. It is true that in the application initially filed, the

respondent has not disclosed his involvement in criminal case, but

then, the fact remains that before appointment being accorded, in

the verification roll, the factum of his being tried by the Criminal

Court of competent jurisdiction was disclosed and it was

specifically mentioned that he was acquitted of the charges and

thus, the allegation that the respondent had not disclosed the

relevant facts regarding his involvement in the criminal case and

the fate thereof, is not correct. Moreover, a perusal of the order

impugned in the writ petition reveals that the respondent has

been denied appointment not for the reason that he had

suppressed/ concealed his criminal antecedents, rather, he has

been denied appointment solely for the reason that the offences

for which, the respondent was tried were not trivial in nature and

he was acquitted of the charges for want of evidence.

9. It is not disputed that the State Government has laid down

guidelines vide circular dated 28.3.2017, wherein, it is specifically

provided that if the criminal antecedents are disclosed by the

candidate in application form or the verification roll (either of

these two) and he has been acquitted of the charges, he will be

considered for appointment. It is further mentioned that where

the candidates who are under trial or held guilty of the charges of

the offences of moral turpitude or punished therefor, shall not be

entitled to be considered for appointment.

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10. In Pradeep Kumar's case (supra) relied upon by the learned

AAG, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying upon decisions in

Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Mehar Singh: (2013) 7 SCC

685, Inspector General of Police vs. S.Samuthiram: (2013) 1 SCC

598 and Avtar Singh's case (supra), held:

"13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character.

14......

15. From the above details, we find that the Screening Committee examined each and every case of the respondents and reasonings for their acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking the decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post. As pointed out earlier, the Screening Committee examined each and every case and reasonings for their acquittal and took decision that the respondents are not suitable for the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The procedure followed is as per guideline 2(A)(b) and object of such screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enters police force. While so, the court cannot substitute its views for the decision of the Screening Committee.

16. On behalf of the respondents, much reliance was placed upon Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Others (2015) 2 SCC 377. In the said case, the appellant thereon was charged under Sections 148, 149, 323, 325 and 307 IPC but acquitted by the trial court holding that the

(7 of 8) [SAW-20/2020]

prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against him since complainant as well as injured eye witnesses failed to identify the assailants and the complainant had stated that his signature was obtained on a blank sheet by the Investigating Officer. The case involved was a family dispute. In such facts and circumstances, this Court held that acquittal of appellant Joginder Singh was an honourable acquittal and hence, he should not be denied appointment to the post in question. The decision in Joginder Singh case does not advance the case of the respondents herein.

17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasized. As held in Mehar Singh case, the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointed to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside."

11. As laid down by the Supreme Court, acquittal in a criminal

case does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to

the post and the employer has right to consider the antecedents of

the candidate and decide whether he is suitable for appointment

to the post. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that

the acquittal or discharge by itself cannot lead to presumption that

a person has been honourably acquitted/ completely exonerated.

But, at the same time, if a person is acquitted of the charges for

want of evidence, it would not necessarily lead to inference that

the acquittal of the person by the Criminal Court of competent

jurisdiction is not honourable.

12. Adverting to the facts of the present case, a bare perusal of

the order of acquittal placed on record reveals that inter alia the

respondent herein was acquitted of the charges for offences under

Sections 452, 323, 427, 336/34 IPC by the Court observing that

there is not even an iota of evidence against him and the

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prosecution miserably failed to prove the charges beyond

reasonable doubt. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of

the case, in no manner, it could be said that the acquittal of the

respondent of the charges was not honourable acquittal.

13. In view of the discussion above, the order impugned in the

writ petition passed by the appellant-employer denying

appointment to the respondent on the premise that the

respondent was tried for offences which are not trivial in nature,

was not sustainable in the eyes of law and, thus, the learned

Single Judge has committed no error in allowing the writ petition

so as to warrant interference by us in exercise of intra-Court

appeal jurisdiction.

14. The special appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to

costs.

                                   (RAMESHWAR VYAS),J                                              (SANGEET LODHA),J

                                    Aditya/-









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