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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Indra Devi vs State Of Punjab And Others on 23 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
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141 CWP-4453-2026
Date of Decision: 23.03.2026
INDRA DEVI ...Petitioner
Vs.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER ...Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present:- Ms. Kavita, Advocate for petitioner
Mr. Kanav Singla, AAG, Punjab
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JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of award
dated 27.07.2016 to the extent Victim Compensation Committee, Fazilka
(for short 'Committee') has awarded compensation of Rs.50,000/-.
2. The petitioner's son who was 21 years old passed away in
road accident on 21.03.2016. An FIR No.25 dated 10.03.2014 was
registered under Sections 304-A, 279, 337 & 427 of IPC at Police Station
City-1, Abohar, District Fazilka. The petitioner did not file any case in
any Court of law seeking compensation for the death of her son. She filed
application dated 21.03.2016 before the Committee. The said application
was allowed and Committee vide award dated 27.07.2016 awarded
compensation of Rs.50,000/-. The petitioner claims that as per Punjab
Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017, she is entitled to higher amount of
compensation.
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3. On being asked reason of inordinate delay, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that it is a beneficial legislation and its benefit
was not granted to the petitioner, thus, petition is maintainable.
4. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High
Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who
moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.
Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that
the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be
condoned. Where illegality is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole
ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to
be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-
deliberate delay.
5. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in 'Mrinmoy
Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others' 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has
held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and
laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who
approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his
rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary
relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court may refuse to
invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of applicant has allowed
the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the
lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of
action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised
and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present
case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner
ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ
petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of
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delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches
the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his
rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up
from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the
extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time
and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or
latches is one of the factors which should be born in
mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the
applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of
action to drift away and attempts are made
subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be
with care and caution. If the delay which has
occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained
which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in
such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
contesting party that for all times to come the delay is
not to be condoned. There may be myriad
circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the
extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts
and circumstances of each case, same cannot be
described in a straight jacket formula with
mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be
exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that
it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have
travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no
doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed.
However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether
within a reasonable time same has been invoked and
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even submitting of memorials would not revive the
dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action
which has had a natural death. In such circumstances
on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal
ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be
non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is
guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to
dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as
much as the writ courts are not to indulge in
permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of
his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any
waiver of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High
Court will have to necessarily take into consideration
the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court."
6. The impugned order was passed on 27.07.2016. The
petitioner is relying upon policy of 2017. A period of almost 10 years
from the date of impugned order has passed away. There is no
explanation of inordinate delay.
7. In the wake of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court and
considering inordinate delay on the part of petitioner, this Court does not
find it appropriate to invoke its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. The
petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed.
8. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
March 23, 2026
SDK
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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