[Cites 46, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Surjit Kaur vs Apjeet Singh on 17 March, 2026
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
101
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M)
Surjit Kaur (deceased) through LRS and others ...Appellant(s)
Vs.
Apjeet Singh ...Respondent(s)
The date when the judgment is reserved: 16.02.2026
The date when the judgment is pronounced: 17.03.2026
The date when the judgment is uploaded on the 18.03.2026
website:
Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or whether the full judgment is judgment
pronounced:
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIDHI GUPTA
Present:- Ms. Aashna Gill, Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. Vaibhav Sharma, Advocate for the respondent.
******
NIDHI GUPTA, J.
Defendants are in Second Appeal against the judgment of
reversal dated 21.10.1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Kurukshetra; whereby suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent under Section
77 of the Registration Act for issuance of direction to the Sub Registrar to
register sale deed, although dismissed by the learned trial court; has been
decreed by the ld. First Appellate Court "to the effect that the sale deed
shall be registered by the Sub Registrar, Pehowa within a period of 30
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -2-
days. However, the appellant would deposit balance amount with a
period of 20 days with the Sub Registrar for being paid to the respondents.
If the amount is not deposited by the appellant within that period then the
Sub Registrar would not be obliged to register the sale deed. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own
costs."
2. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff had filed the instant
suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act, 1908 challenging orders
dated 12.05.1988 (Ex. P-6; pg. 49) and 18.01.1989 (Ex. P-7; pg. 51) passed
by the Sub-Registrar, Pehowa and Registrar, Kurukshetra respectively.
Further direction was sought to the Sub-Registrar, Pehowa to register the
sale deed dated 12.02.1988 (Ex. P-1: pg.83) pertaining to suit property
measuring 15K 16M situated in V. Gumthala Garhu, Tehsil Pehowa, District
Kurukshetra.
2A. It was pleaded in the plaint by the respondent/plaintiff that
Waryam Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant/defendants
(husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendants No.2 to 4), was
owner in possession of the suit property as per Jamabandi for the year
1981-1982. Waryam Singh had executed Sale Deed dated 12.02.1988 with
regard to suit land measuring 15K 16M in favour of the
plaintiff/respondent for total sale consideration of Rs.62,000/-. The said
Sale Deed was executed on stamp paper and was duly attested by
witnesses on stamp. Of the total sale consideration of Rs.62,000/-, the
plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs. 12,000/- by way of earnest money; and
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -3-
Rs.775/- was again paid as earnest money by the plaintiff to Waryam
Singh; and only Rs.49,225/- remained to be paid as balance of sale price.
Plaintiff had further pleaded that Sale Deed was not presented before the
Sub Registrar on the same day as the Income Tax Clearance Certificate
was not produced by Waryam Singh. The said Certificate was produced
by Waryam Singh before the Sub Registrar only on the following Monday.
However, on 14.02.1988, Waryam Singh had died and registration of the
same could not be affected. Thereafter, plaintiff had approached the legal
representatives of the deceased Waryam Singh i.e. defendants/appellants
herein but they did not comply. Therefore, Sub Registrar gave notice to
them; and Defendants were directed to produce mutation of inheritance.
It was pleaded that however, on 12.05.1988 all of a sudden, Sub Registrar
rejected and refused to register the Sale Deed without granting any
opportunity to the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration. It was
the case of the plaintiff that the order of the Sub Registrar Pehowa in
refusing to register the Sale Deed is patently illegal. Plaintiff had
accordingly moved to the Registrar, Kurukshetra for registration of Sale
Deed. However, vide order dated 18.01.1989, Registrar Kurukshetra had
also refused to register the Sale Deed. It was averred that the order dated
12.05.1988 passed by the Sub Registrar Pehowa and order dated
18.01.1989 passed by Registrar Kurukshetra are illegal, null and void and
liable to be set aside because Sub Registrar was not competent to refuse
registration of Sale Deed. It was averred that plaintiff has always been
ready and willing to perform his part of contract and it was the
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -4-
defendants who are legal representatives of Waryam Singh who had
failed to perform their part of contract. It was alleged that plaintiff had
requested defendants many times to get the Sale Deed registered.
However, they had refused to do so. Accordingly, present suit was filed on
17.02.1989 under S. 77 of the Act.
3. To the contrary, the defendants/appellants while refuting the
case on merits, asserted that Waryam Singh had entered into the sale
deed dated 12.02.1988 so as to arrange money for the marriage of his
daughter which was to take place on 20.02.1988 making time the essence
of the contract. On 12.02.1988 Waryam Singh was present at the office of
Sub-Registrar, Pehowa but the Plaintiff lacked money to make payment of
the balance sale consideration and thus went away from the tehsil
compound. Due to shock, Waryam Singh died on 14.02.1988. Respondent
never approached the Appellants to get the sale deed registered. Rather
Respondent instituted various civil proceedings in a bid to delay the
matter as he lacked the funds to make payment of balance amount. Thus,
prayer was made to dismiss the civil suit.
4. Upon appraisal of the pleadings and evidence led by the
parties, the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Pehowa, had dismissed suit of
the plaintiff with costs vide judgment and decree dated 21.05.1993. Addl.
Senior Sub. Judge, Pehowa dismissed the suit while observing that the
Respondent was blowing hot and cold as to why the sale deed was not
registered on 12.02.1988. It was also found that Respondent lacked the
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -5-
funds to pay balance sale consideration and there being lapse on his part,
the suit was not maintainable.
5. However, in the Civil Appeal filed by the respondent/plaintiff,
the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra while upholding the
findings of fact against the plaintiff, had accepted the Civil Appeal vide
impugned judgment and decree dated 21.10.1994. Addl. District Judge,
Kurukshetra allowed the appeal of the respondent by relying upon Jogesh
Prasad Singh and others vs. Ramchander Prasad Singh and others, AIR
1950 Pat 370 while observing that although the sale deed could not be
registered due to non-availability of funds with Respondent at the
relevant time however the same was to be registered dehors the same.
6. It is in this background that the Appellants-Defendants have
preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 21.10.1994
of the Ld. First Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree dated
21.05.1993 passed by the Ld. Addl. Senior Sub. Judge, Pehowa.
7. It is inter alia submitted by learned counsel for the appellants
that learned First Appellate Court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff on
the basis of a judgment of Patna High Court passed in Jogesh Prasad
Supra. However, the learned Additional District Judge has erred in
applying the dictum laid down in AIR 1950 Patna 370. The law as laid
down by the Patna High Court in this authority is not applicable to the
present case, as the same differs on fact.
7A. Further, learned Additional District Judge has erred in
observing that payment of balance consideration was not a condition
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -6-
precedent for registration of the sale deed. Out of the total amount of Rs.
62,000/- only Rs. 12,775/- had been paid, and balance amount of
Rs.49,225/- was agreed to be paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of
registration of the sale deed. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be
concluded that the payment of balance amount was not a condition
precedent to the registration of sale deed. The order dated 12.5.1988
correctly shows that the sale deed had not been registered on account of
refusal/default on behalf of the plaintiff. Thus, suit of plaintiff could not
have been decreed.
7B. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellants
that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in observing that a
person cannot be expected to be carrying Rs.50,000/-with him on each
and every date of hearing. It is submitted that the said observation of the
first Appellate Court is uncalled for as plaintiff was well aware that Sale
Deed had to be registered; and should therefore have been in possession
of the balance sale consideration when he came for registration of sale
deed.
7C. Learned counsel further submits that there are concurrent
and undisputed facts on record that on 12.02.1988, respondent had paid
only an amount of Rs.12,775/- to the appellants out of total sale
consideration of Rs.62,000/-. It is also admitted fact on record that on
12.05.1988, respondent was not in possession of the balance sale
consideration of Rs.49,225/-. It is submitted that the Sub Registrar in his
order dated 12.05.1988 has recorded a categoric finding that on the said
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -7-
date, the respondent did not possess the balance sale consideration and,
therefore, Sale Deed could not be registered. This finding of fact has been
affirmed by learned First Appellate Court. In this admitted position,
learned Additional District Judge has wrongly directed registration of sale
deed.
7D. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that
Waryam Singh had sold the suit property to the respondent because he
needed money for the marriage of his daughter, which was fixed for
20.02.1888. However, Sale Deed could not be registered on 12.02.1988 as
the plaintiff failed to produce the same before the Sub Registrar. From this
shock, Waryam Singh had died on 14.02.1988, as the plaintiff had failed to
make payment of balance sale consideration; and therefore, Waryam
Singh did not have money for the marriage of his daughter. It is submitted
that even on the subsequent date fixed for registration of the Sale Deed
on 12.05.1988, plaintiff had failed to pay the remaining balance price. First
Appellate Court has upheld findings of the learned Trial Court that plaintiff
was not in possession of balance sale consideration. As such, suit of the
plaintiff was not maintainable.
7E. Further, even regarding the maintainability of the suit,
learned First Appellate Court has given no cogent reason for reversing the
well reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. However, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in 3-Judge Bench judgment in Veena Singh (Dead)
through Legal Representative vs. District Registrar/Additional Collector
(F/R) and another, (2022) 7 Supreme Court Cases 1, has held that merely
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -8-
appending signature to the document will not constitute 'execution'
thereof.
7F. It is accordingly prayed that the present Appeal be allowed;
and the impugned judgment dated 21.10.1994 passed by learned
Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra be set aside.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently
opposes submissions made on behalf of the appellant and submits that:
I. THE SCOPE OF A SUIT UNDER SECTION 77 OF THE REGISTRATION ACT IS
NARROW AND LIMITED
1. Ld. Counsel submits that Ld. Trial Court committed a manifest
error of law by examining the readiness and willingness of the respondent
to pay the balance sale consideration, a concept that is entirely alien to a
suit under Section 77 and properly belongs to the realm of suits for specific
performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A suit under Section 77 of
the Registration Act cannot be, and must not be, conflated with a suit for
specific performance or any other proceeding where the readiness and
willingness aspect is material. The District Judge rightly corrected this error.
2. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further drew the attention of
this Court to the precise statutory language employed by the legislature in
Sections 34, 35 and 60 of the Registration Act, 1908 ("the Act"), which,
when read together, lay down a mandatory and exhaustive pathway for
registration -- a pathway that the registering authority is bound to follow
and from which he has no power to deviate.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) -9-
3. The conditions prescribed by Section 34(1) are narrow and
specific:
(i) the persons executing the document, or their representatives,
assigns or agents, must appear before the registering officer; and
(ii) such appearance must be within the time prescribed under Sections
23 to 26.
4. It is argued that these, and only these, are the pre-conditions
that the legislature laid down for the registering officer to examine before
proceeding further. The section does not mention, even obliquely, the
readiness and willingness of the parties, the payment of consideration, or
any other aspect that goes to the validity or enforceability of the
underlying transaction. It is submitted that once the conditions under
Section 34 are satisfied, the statute moves to Section 35, which prescribes
the procedure to be followed by the registering officer. Section 35 creates
a binary and exhaustive scheme:
Where the executant is dead and his representative admits execution --
Section 35(1)(c):
"If the person executing the document is dead, and his
representative or assign appears before the registering officer
and admits the execution, the registering officer shall register
the document as directed in sections 58 to 61, inclusive."
5. The pathway culminates in Section 60, which provides:
"After such of the provisions of sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 as
apply to any document presented for registration have been
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 10 -
complied with, the registering officer shall endorse thereon a
certificate containing the word 'registered'..."
II. THE WORD "SHALL" IS THE KEY -- IT ADMITS OF NO DISCRETION:
6. It is contended that the legislature has, with unmistakable
deliberation, employed the word "shall" -- and not "may" -- at every
critical juncture in this statutory chain. The registering officer "shall
register" where execution is admitted; he "shall refuse" where execution is
denied; and he "shall endorse" the certificate of registration once the
provisions of Sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 are complied with. The use of the
word "shall" imposes a mandatory duty upon the registering officer. It
leaves no room for the exercise of discretion, judgment, or independent
evaluation of matters extraneous to the conditions prescribed by the
statute. It is argued that, therefore, the statutory scheme creates a closed
and self-contained code. The enquiry that the registering officer is
mandated to conduct under Sections 34 and 35 is confined to ascertaining:
a. whether the persons executing the document, or their
representatives, have appeared;
b. whether they have appeared within the prescribed time;
c. whether they are who they represent themselves to be; and
d. whether they admit or deny execution.
It is submitted that once these questions are answered, the statute itself
dictates the outcome, either registration (if execution is admitted) or
refusal (if execution is denied). There is no third category, no intermediate
step, and no residual discretion.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 11 -
III. THE REGISTRATION ACT CONTAINS NO POWER -- EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-- TO EXAMINE READINESS AND WILLINGNESS:
7. Ld. Counsel submits that the primary argument on behalf of
the respondent is that nowhere in the Registration Act, 1908 has the
legislature conferred upon the registering authority any power, jurisdiction,
or competence to enquire into the readiness and willingness of the parties
to a transaction. This power is conspicuous by its complete absence from
the Act. The respondent challenges the appellants to point to a single
provision in the Registration Act that empowers the Sub-Registrar to
examine whether the buyer was ready and willing to pay the balance
consideration, or to refuse registration on the ground of the buyer's alleged
unreadiness.
8. It is submitted that absence of such a power is not an oversight
or a lacuna. It is a deliberate legislative choice. The legislature, when it
enacted the Registration Act in 1908, was fully aware that transactions of
sale often involve questions of readiness and willingness, questions of
sufficiency of consideration, and questions of the enforceability of the
underlying contract. The legislature deliberately chose not to place the
determination of these complex questions in the hands of the Sub-
Registrar. Instead, it confined the Sub-Registrar's enquiry to the narrow
question of execution, and reserved all other questions -- validity,
consideration, readiness, willingness, title -- for the civil court. Ld. Counsel
elaborates to further submit that this legislative architecture is not
accidental. The Sub-Registrar is an administrative officer. He is not a judicial
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 12 -
officer. He does not conduct trials. He does not record evidence. He does
not frame issues. He does not hear arguments on questions of fact and law.
He is not equipped, either by training or by institutional design, to
adjudicate upon complicated questions of readiness and willingness, which
involve the evaluation of conduct over time, the assessment of financial
capacity, the interpretation of contractual terms, and the drawing of
inferences from surrounding circumstances. These are, by their very nature,
questions that demand the discipline of a judicial proceeding i.e. the
framing of issues, the recording of evidence, the cross-examination of
witnesses, and the application of rules of evidence. It is for precisely this
reason that the legislature reserved these questions for the civil court and
did not burden the Sub-Registrar with an enquiry that he is neither
competent nor equipped to undertake.
IV. THE COURT CANNOT READ INTO SECTIONS 34 AND 35 WHAT THE
LEGISLATURE CHOSE NOT TO PUT THERE:
9. Ld. Counsel further submits that if this Court were to sustain
the refusal of registration on the ground that the buyer was not ready and
willing to pay the balance consideration, it would amount to reading into
Sections 34 and 35 an obligation and a power that the legislature
deliberately chose not to confer. It would amount to adding, by judicial
pronouncement, a condition precedent to registration that the statute does
not contain. Where the legislature has said "shall register" upon admission
of execution, this Court cannot interpolate the words "shall register,
provided the buyer is ready and willing to pay the balance consideration."
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 13 -
The legislature knew how to impose conditions; it imposed the conditions it
thought fit; and the readiness and willingness of the buyer was not one of
them.
10. It is further submitted that it is a well-settled principle of
statutory interpretation that where the legislature has used clear and
unambiguous language, the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of
the words used and cannot supply omissions or read into the statute words
that are not there. The words "shall register" in Section 35(1) admit of no
ambiguity. They impose a mandatory duty that is triggered by one and only
one condition: the admission of execution. To superimpose upon this clear
statutory mandate an additional requirement of readiness and willingness
would be to rewrite the statute, a function that belongs exclusively to the
legislature.
V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXECUTION AND VALIDITY -- THE
LEGISLATURE'S CONSCIOUS DESIGN:
11. Ld. Counsel for the respondent next submits that the entire
scheme of the Registration Act rests upon a conscious and fundamental
distinction between the execution of a document and its validity. Execution
is whether the document was understood and signed by the person who
purports to have signed it. Validity encompasses everything else --
whether the transaction is enforceable, whether consideration was paid,
whether the parties were ready and willing, whether the vendor had title.
The Registration Act concerns itself exclusively with the former. The latter is
the domain of the civil court.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 14 -
12. This distinction was recognized as far back as 1924 by the
Calcutta High Court in Dwijendra Narain Roy v. Jogish Chandra Dey (AIR
1924 Cal 600), where the Court observed that in a suit under Section 77,
the court is concerned not with the validity but with the genuineness of the
document, and the question of its validity must be determined in a suit
properly framed for the purpose. The Patna High Court in Jogesh Prasad
Singh supra held at Para 8 that whether the money was paid or not was
immaterial so far as the due execution of the document was concerned.
Most recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Gopi v. The Sub-Registrar
(AIR 2025 SC 1800) held at Para 15 that the registering officer has no
adjudicatory power to decide questions beyond procedural compliance and
admission of execution, and that even if the executant has no title
whatsoever, the document must be registered if execution is admitted and
procedural requirements are met.
13. It is argued that if the registering authority cannot refuse
registration even when the vendor has no title - a circumstance that strikes
at the very root of the validity of the transfer - it is a logical impossibility
that the registering authority could refuse registration on the far less
fundamental ground that the buyer did not have balance consideration
ready on one particular date.
VI. EQUITY:
14. Ld. Counsel further submits that it is the respondent who
stands to suffer irreparable prejudice if registration is refused. Out of the
total sale consideration of Rs. 62,000/-, a sum of Rs. 12,000/- was paid as
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 15 -
earnest money and a further sum of Rs. 775/- was paid subsequently --
amounting to Rs. 12,775/- paid to the vendor at or around the time of
execution. In compliance with the judgment of the Ld. Addl. District Judge
dated 21.10.1994, the respondent deposited the entire balance amount of
Rs. 49,225/- on 02.11.1994, well within the stipulated period of 20 days.
15. It is pointed out that the respondent filed the suit within time,
pursued his appeal, and deposited the balance consideration within the
period fixed by the appellate court. To deny him the benefit of a sale deed
whose execution has never been denied and whose entire consideration of
Rs. 62,000/- stands discharged would occasion a manifest injustice to a
party who has, for nearly four decades, done nothing but seek the
enforcement of a right that the law confers upon him. It is argued that
Equity must flow both ways.
VII. THE BURDEN IS ON THE APPELLANTS TO SHOW STATUTORY
AUTHORITY FOR THE REFUSAL:
16. It is a well-established principle that where a statutory
authority exercises a power, it must point to the provision that confers that
power. The Sub-Registrar refused registration on the ground that the buyer
did not have the balance consideration ready. The respondent respectfully
submits that the burden lies squarely upon the appellants to demonstrate,
from the text of the Registration Act, the provision that empowers the Sub-
Registrar to refuse registration on this ground. The respondent submits,
that no such provision exists.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 16 -
17. The legislature, in its wisdom, understood that a Sub-Registrar
is not a civil court. It understood that complicated questions of readiness
and willingness, adequacy of consideration, and enforceability of contracts
are questions that demand judicial proceedings -- evidence, cross-
examination, and the application of rules of law. It therefore confined the
Sub-Registrar's function to the narrow, ministerial task of verifying
execution and completing procedural formalities. To enlarge this function
by judicial pronouncement -- by reading into Sections 34 and 35 powers
that the legislature did not confer -- would be to alter the legislative
scheme in a manner that is impermissible.
18. In support, learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the
following judgments: -
1. Shinhashan Devi and others vs. Anandi Jha and others
MANU/BH/0769/2016
2. Jogesh Prasad Singh and others vs. Ramchandar Prasad
Singh and others, AIR 1950 Pat 370
3. K.Gopi vs. The Sub Registrar and others, AIR 2025 SC 1800
4. Nishakar Dass vs. State of Odisha and others, Supreme
(Online) (Ori) 6148;
5. Rakhal Chandra Nayak vs. State of Odisha and others,
MANU/OR/1108/2025; and
6. Baikuntha Kumar Shil vs. Sarat Chandra Nath and others,
AIR 1925 Cal 1257.
9. It is accordingly prayed that the present Appeal be dismissed.
10. No other argument is raised on behalf of the parties. I have
heard learned counsel and perused the case file alongwith Lower Court
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 17 -
Record in minute detail. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the
rival submissions made by ld. counsel for the parties.
11. At first blush, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for
the respondent appear to be enticing and convincing. However, a deeper
enquiry into the facts of the present case reveal the same to be mere legal
semantics, rhetorical legalese, devoid of substance. The main thrust of
argument on behalf of the respondent is that as per the Registration Act,
it is not open to the Sub Registrar to conduct an enquiry into the readiness
and willingness of the buyer to perform the contract; and that the Sub
Registrar is compulsorily mandated under the Statute to register the
document once its execution is admitted. This Court may have no dispute
or issue with the said legal proposition. However, the arguments of the
respondent have to be seen in context of the facts of the present case. To
appreciate the incorrectness of the argument of the respondent, it is
necessary to briefly recapitulate the factual matrix of the case, as follows:
12.02.1988: Waryam Singh executed the Sale Deed dated 12.2.1988 (Ex. P1
@ Pg. 83 of LCR) in favour of Apjeet Singh/plaintiff. Whereby Waryam Singh
sold the suit property measuring 15K 16M to the plaintiff for total sale
consideration of ₹62,000/-; of which ₹12,775/- was received as earnest
money. Balance Sale Consideration was ₹49,225/-. It is to be noted that
Time was the essence of the contract as Waryam Singh required the funds
for the marriage of his daughter, which was scheduled for 20.2.1988. It is
accordingly, recorded in the Sale Deed that "I will take the balance amount
of ₹49,225/- before the Sub Registrar Sir Pehowa in cash for my own need."
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 18 -
Thus, time was of the essence in the contract. However, when Waryam
Singh went to get the Sale Deed registered before the Sub-Registrar on
12.2.1988, the same could not be registered as plaintiff had gone from the
Tehsil without producing the original sale deed. On the other hand,
presence of Waryam Singh in Tehsil on 12.2.1988 is proved from his
Affidavit of Attendance Ex. D2.
14.02.1988: As Waryam Singh did not receive the desired funds by due date
and for the purpose required, he died from the shock on 14.2.1988.
04.04.1988 (Ex. P2 @ Pg. 47 of LCR): It is only on 4.4.1988, that the plaintiff
produced original sale deed before the Sub Registrar; and notice was issued
to defendants to appear on 20.04.1988 for registration.
08.04.1988: However, most inexplicably, prior to 20.4.1988 itself Plaintiff
filed Civil Suit No. 154 of 1988 (Ex. D3 @ Pg. 71 of LCR), against the present
defendants for Permanent Injunction. It is very important to note that in
paras 3 and 8 of the said Suit plaintiff has taken the plea that Sale Deed
could not be registered on 12.2.1988 because:
"3. That the aforesaid Waryam Singh entered into an
agreement to sell the suit land for Rs.62,000/- to the plff. And
actually executed the sale-deed dated 12.2.1988 on a proper
stamp paper, which was duly executed and duly attested by
the witnesses. But the same could not be produced before
the Sub Registrar, Pehowa as it got very late and office hours
were also over. So it was mutually agreed to get it registered
on 15.2.1988.
XXX XXX XXX XXX
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 19 -
8. That the plff. has already, applied to Sub Registrar Pehowa
for registration of the sale dead in favour of the plaintiff and
has also tendered the sale dead. Sub Registrar has given
notice to the defendants for registration of sale deed for
20.4.1988. Certified copy of the same is attached."
Thus, plaintiff was well aware that for registration of sale deed
on 20.4.1988, balance sale consideration was to be paid on said date.
20.04.1988 (Ex. P3 @ Pg. 47 of LCR): Pursuant to the notice issued by the
Sub Registrar, Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2/Avtar Singh (for himself and on
behalf of other defendants) appeared in the Tehsil Office. However, Sub-
Registrar was on leave that day; and matter stood adjourned to 27.4.1988.
27.04.1988 (Ex. P4 @ Pg. 47 of LCR): On 27.4.1988, the defendants again
appeared before the Sub Registrar. However, the Plaintiff failed to appear.
Sub-Registrar was again on leave; and matter stood adjourned to 3.5.1988.
03.05.1988 (Ex. P5 @ Pg. 47 of LCR): On 3.5.1988, both parties appeared.
However, matter was adjourned to 12.5.1988, as mutation had not been
sanctioned in favour of the Defendants. Sub-Registrar directed sanction of
mutation first.
11.05.1988: On 11.5.1988, Mutation was sanctioned in favour of
defendants.
12.05.1988 (Ex. P6 @ Pg. 49-50 of LCR): Accordingly, Defendants produced
photostat copy of mutation and expressed readiness to get Sale Deed
registered; and further stated that they were always ready to perform their
part of the contract. However, sale deed could again not be registered on
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 20 -
12.5.1988, as plaintiff outrightly refused to get it registered as he did not
have the balance sale consideration. Consequentially, Sub Registrar
dismissed application of the plaintiff for registration of sale deed; while
categorically observing that the sale deed could not be registered on
12.5.1988, as: Relevant observation (@ Pg. 50 of LCR): "When plaintiff was
asked to get the sale deed registered in his favour, he refused to do so.
Although the application to get the sale deed registered was filed by the
plaintiff himself on 04.04.1988, he thereafter refused to get it registered;
therefore, the same could not be done."
13.07.1988. (Ex. D1 @ Pg. 61 of LCR): Plaintiff filed appeal against order
dated 12.05.1988. It is very important to note that in the Grounds of Appeal
before the Registrar, Kurukshetra, the plaintiff has pleaded as follows:
"1. That the appellant entered into an agreement to purchase the land
with one Waryam Singh, son of Meher Singh, resident of Gumthala
Garhu, Tehsil Pehowa, District Kurukshetra and accordingly a sale deed
was executed and was attested by the witnesses on 12.2.1988, but after
the execution of document said Waryam Singh refused to present
himself before the Sub Registrar and went back to his house and
thereafter he died on 14.2.1988.
2.That thereafter, the appellant approached the legal representatives of
said Waryam Singh, but since no mutation was entered in their name, so
the sale deed could not be registered.
3.That the mutation was sanction on 11.5.1988 and on 12.5.88 the Sub
Registrar, asked the appellant to get the sale deed register, but since no
proper opportunity was given, it was not possible for the appellant to
get the sale deed registered as all of sudden, the balance amount
could not be arranged. The appellant requested the learned Sub
Registrar to grant him time to get the sale deed registered, so that the
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 21 -
appellant may be able to arrange the money, but the learned Sub
Registrar refuse to provide the opportunity and instead filed the sale
deed.
4.That the order of the learned Sub Registrar is manifestly wrong and
illegal as the appellant was always ready and willing to get the sale deed
register on payment of balance amount and the sale deed could not be
registered on account of death of vendor and subsequently on account
of non-attestation of mutation, the appellant was not at fault at all. The
learned Sub Registrar was wrong and refusing the registration of the
sale deed.
5.That the learned Sub Registrar should have provide the proper
opportunity and sufficient time for getting the sale deed registered.
........."
21.07.1988: Vide judgment and decree dated 21.7.1988, Suit for Permanent
Injunction Ex.D-3 was disposed of. However, in the LCR there is no
decree/order showing the decision. Even on Court query, learned counsel
for the respondent has been unable to apprise this Court as to what
transpired in the suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff.
18.01.1989. (Ex. P7 @ Pg. 51 of LCR): Appeal filed by the plaintiff against
the order dated 12.5.1988, was dismissed by the Registrar vide order dated
18.1.1989; with the following Relevant observations (@ Pg. 57 of LCR)
"In application dated 4.4.1988, it is nowhere mentioned by the
appellant that on 12.2.1988, Waryam Singh had refused to get the
sale deed registered. Although it is now so mentioned in para 1 of the
appeal, however, this appears to be concocted. It is further
established that appellant was not willing to get the registry done
and that he had gone from the Tehsil, even though Waryam Singh
deceased was present in the Tehsil. On 12.05.1988 LRs of Waryam
Singh were present in the office of Sub-Registrar and they were ready
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 22 -
and willing to get the sale deed registered; however, plaintiff refused
to get it registered. There is no evidence on record that plaintiff
requested time to arrange balance sale consideration. In this
situation it is established that appellant deliberately did not get the
sale deed registered because he did not have the balance sale
consideration; and therefore, present appeal is baseless......"
Consequentially, the appeal filed by the plaintiff before the Registrar,
Kurukshetra, was dismissed vide the impugned order dated 18.1.1989.
17.02.1989: Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant Civil Suit CS-1301/90/89
under Section 77 of the Registration Act, seeking a direction to the Sub
Registrar to register the sale deed. In the plaint, plaintiff has now pleaded to
the contrary that sale deed could not be registered on the same
day/12.2.88 'as Waryam Singh had not got the Income Tax Clearance
Certificate.' Plaintiff has further pleaded in the plaint that 'On 12.05.1988
all of a sudden, Sub Registrar rejected and refused to register the Sale Deed
without granting any opportunity to the plaintiff to pay the balance sale
consideration.'
21.05.1993: Suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs by the ld.
Additional Senior Sub Judge, Pehowa vide judgment and dated 21.5.1993.
05.06.1994: Plaintiff filed Civil appeal against Judgment and Decree dated
21.05.1993.
21.10.1994: Vide the impugned judgment and decree of reversal dated
21.10.1994 the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, has allowed
the Civil Appeal; and decreed suit of the plaintiff. Sub-Registrar has been
directed to register Sale Deed within 30 days.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 23 -
(All Emphasis in above List of Dates are mine)
12. It is in the background of the aforesaid factual matrix that this
Court has been called upon to examine the correctness of the impugned
judgment and decree of reversal dated 21.10.1994.
13. Suit of the plaintiff has been decreed by the learned First
Appellate Court for the following reasons given in the impugned
judgment:
"8. The counsel for the appellant has assailed the findings on
issue no. 1. Mr. Sawheny has submitted that as per copy of
order placed on file 12.5.1988 was fixed for producing copy of
mutation by the respondents. That he was not aware that he
would be required to make payment there and then. He has
further submitted that even if the payment was not made the
scope of section 35 of the Registration Act is to see whether
there was execution of sale deed or not. He further admitted
that in suit under section 77 the court is only concerned with
the genuineness of the document sought to be registered,
that is, whether the document is executed by the person by
whom it is alleged to be executed and not its validity. In
support he has placed reliance upon Jogesh Prashad Singh
and others Vs. Ramchander Prasad Singh and others, AIR
(37) 1950 Patna 370. In dictum laid down in this authority
fully supports the case of the appellant. The counsel for the
respondents has referred to Banasettappa Laljicbikkanna Vs.
District Registrar and another AIR 1966 Mysore 310. In this
case the executant has denied due execution of the sale-deed.
In that authority it was held that execution does not mean
merely signing but signing by way of assent to terms
embodied in document. In the present case as per the stand
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 24 -
taken by the respondents in the trial Court as well as by
Waryam Singh in his affidavit Ex,D2 sworn in before the Sub
Registrar, the sale deed was executed by Waryam Singh and
even his heirs have not disputed the genuineness of the
execution of the sale deed. In these circumstances as per law
referred in Jogesh Prashad Singh's case (supra) the Sub
Registrar was bound to register the sale deed. The scope of
the trial court under section 77 was also to see as to whether
there was due execution or not. There was no condition
precedent for registration of the sale deed. As far as
consideration is concerned it was only mentioned that the
remaining amount will be received before the Sub Registrar.
Meaning thereby the receipt of amount was not a condition
precedent for due execution of the sale deed. In this view of
the matter although I hold that the sale deed could not be
registered due to non availability of funds with the
appellant at the relevant time yet as per law laid down in
the above authority the sale deed was to be registered by
the Sub Registrar."
(Emphasis is mine)
14. A reading of the aforesaid extract shows that findings of fact
of the Revenue Authorities as also the Trial Court to the effect that sale
deed could not be registered at the relevant time as plaintiff was not in
possession of the balance sale consideration, has been upheld. It may be
pointed out, that plaintiff has not challenged the aforesaid concurrent
findings of fact.
15. The first Appellate Court has further given the finding that
there was no condition precedent for registration of sale deed - which is
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 25 -
factually incorrect - as, a perusal of the sale deed reveals that there is a
condition precedent of payment of Rs.49,225/- by plaintiff to Waryam
Singh before the Sub-Registrar, Pehowa at the time of registration of the
sale deed which has not been met. The Sale Deed bears a clear recital
from the executant Waryam Singh to the effect that "I will take the
balance amount of ₹49,225/- before the Sub Registrar Sir Pehowa in cash
for my own need." The imperative need of the executant for getting the
sale deed registered on 12.2.1988 was because he needed the funds for
the impending marriage of his daughter on 20.2.1988. Undisputedly,
therefore, plaintiff was well aware that time was the essence of the
contract. Yet, plaintiff did not produce the original sale deed and ran away
from the Tehsil on 12.2.1988. Thus, the finding of the first Appellate Court
that there was no condition precedent for registration of sale deed, is
incorrect.
16. Yet, suit of the plaintiff has been decreed by the first
Appellate Court on the ground that as 'execution' of the document has
not been denied by the executant/Waryam Singh, therefore, in terms of
judgement of Patna High Court in Jogesh Prashad Supra, suit of the
plaintiff was to be decreed. Therefore, it is first to be seen as to what
constitutes 'executing' a document. Needless to say, mere appending of
signature on a document would not amount to its execution. Thus, the
real issues which arise for consideration do not call into question the
powers of the Registering Authority under the Registration Act, 1908; but
rather raises the question of whether, in the set of facts in the present
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 26 -
case, the sale deed can be said to have been admitted to execution?
Accordingly, the pertinent issues which require decisive adjudication in
present case are:
a. When is a sale deed said to be executed? What is the meaning
of "execution" of sale deed?
b. When the condition precedent of 'payment of sale considera-
tion before the Sub-Registrar' has not been met, can the sale
deed be deemed to be 'admitted to execution' for the purpose
of section 35 of the Registration Act, 1908?
c. Whether mere signing of the sale deed can be conflated to
mean due admission of 'execution' of the same when the in-
tent of the terms of the sale deed has not been adhered to?
d. Whether it is within the power of the registering Authority to
refuse to register a sale deed when execution, as embodied in
the said document, has not been admitted to?
e. Whether the Registering Authority can refuse to register a sale
deed when the seller refuses to give receipt of payment of sale
consideration, as was required under the terms of the sale
deed so sought to be registered?"
17. For a proper determination of the issues at hand, it is neces-
sary to consider as to what is termed as 'execution' of a document in re-
lated legislations.
18A. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882
18A-i. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as
"TPA") is a key Indian legislation regulating the transfer of both movable
and immovable property between living persons. It establishes a legal
framework for sales, mortgages, leases, exchanges, and gifts, ensuring that
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 27 -
property transfers are recognized by law. The Act, in force since July 1,
1882, requires that transactions, particularly for immovable property over
₹100, be documented and registered. It details therein the Modes of Trans-
fer of property, such as sale, mortgage, lease, gift, etc.
18A-ii. Chapter II of the TPA deals with 'Of Transfer of Property
by Act of Parties' and section 8 details as under: -
"S. 8 Operation of transfer. - Unless a different intention
is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property
passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which
the transferor is then capable of passing in the property,
and in the legal incidents thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Chapter III of the TPA deals with 'Of Sales of Immovable Property' and
"Sale" in the TPA is defined under section 54, as follows:
"S. 54. "Sale" defined. -
"Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price
paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.
Sale how made.--Such transfer, in the case of tangible
immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing,
can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value
less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made
either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place
when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs,
in possession of the property.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 28 -
Contract for sale.--A contract for the sale of immove-
able property is a contract that a sale of such property shall
take place on terms settled between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on
such property."
18B. REGISTRATION ACT, 1908
While the Registration Act, 1908 provides a comprehensive
framework for registering various documents, ranging from property trans-
actions to contractual agreements. This Act has been enacted with the
primary objective of ensuring document authenticity and legal validity, this
legislation plays a vital role in maintaining transparency and accountability
in transactions involving immovable property and other valuable assets. By
establishing a systematic registration method, the Act aims to prevent
fraud, protect the interests of the parties involved, and facilitate the
smooth functioning of property-related matters throughout the country.
18B-i. Section 17 of the Registration Act stipulates which documents
are compulsorily registrable. Among them, in clause (b), are non-testa-
mentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish a right, title or interest to or in immoveable property of a
value higher than Rs 100.
18B-ii. Section 35 of the Registration Act, 1908 reads as under:
"35. Procedure on admission and denial of execution re-
spectively.--(1) (a) If all the persons executing the docu-
ment appear personally before the registering officer
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 29 -
and are personally known to him, or if he be otherwise
satisfied that they are the persons they represent them-
selves to be, and if they all admit the execution of the
document, or
(b) if in the case of any person appearing by a represent-
ative, assign or agent, such representative, assign or
agent admits the execution, or
(c) if the person executing the document is dead, and his
representative or assign appears before the registering
officer and admits the execution, the registering officer
shall register the document as directed in Sections 58 to
61, inclusive.
(2) The registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself
that the persons appearing before him are the persons
they represent themselves to be, or for any other pur-
pose contemplated by this Act, examine any one present
in his office.
(3)(a) If any person by whom the document purports to
be executed denies its execution, or
(b) if any such person appears to the registering officer
to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or
(c) if any person by whom the document purports to be
executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies
its execution, the registering officer shall refuse to re-
gister the document as to the person so denying, ap-
pearing or dead:
Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall
follow the procedure prescribed in Part XII:
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 30 -
Provided further that the State Government may, by no-
tification in the Official Gazette, declare that any Sub-
Registrar named in the notification shall, in respect of
documents the execution of which is denied, be deemed
to be a Registrar for the purposes of this sub-section and
of Part XII."
18B-iii. The above provisions indicate that the registration of a docu-
ment by the Sub- Registrar must be preceded by:
i. Presentation of the document by a proper person within
the time allowed for presentation; and
ii. Admission of the execution of the document
Section 72 provides for an appeal to the Registrar from an order of the Sub-
Registrar refusing registration on a ground other than the denial of execu-
tion. While Section 73 provides for an application to the Registrar where
the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground of a
denial of execution.
18C. INTERPLAY BETWEEN TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 AND REGIS-
TRATION ACT, 1908
Under the TPA, a sale is deemed to be complete when
(1) the price is paid in full; or
(2) price is paid in part; or
(3) Partly paid and partly promised.
TPA provides that sale of any property valued at more than INR
100 has necessarily to be by way of a registered document. Thus, execution
of a document conveying title of a property valued at more than INR 100 is
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 31 -
governed by TPA; while the registration of the same is governed by the Re-
gistration Act, 1908.
18C-i. It is necessarily understood that it is only when once the docu-
ment comes into existence that the same can be presented for registration
before the competent authority.
18C-ii. Furthermore, under the Registration Act, the Sub-registrar is
enjoined upon a duty to register the document when it is duly presented by
the correct persons and the execution of the same stands admitted by the
said persons. In the event where execution is not admitted, the Sub-Regis-
trar is competent to refuse registration of the same. While under section
75, during enquiry, the Registrar is enjoined the dual duty to enquire:
a. Whether the document has been executed; and
b. Whether the requirements of law for the time being
in force have been complied with.
Thus, it is necessarily understood, that due execution and more import-
antly, the admission of such execution is a sin qua non for registration of
the sale deed. In the above examined position of law, the question which
arises before this Court is whether the sale deed dated 12.02.1988 can be
said to have been admitted to be executed in the given set of circum-
stances.
18D. WHAT IS 'EXECUTION' OF A SALE DEED
18D-i. The word "execution" has not been defined in the Registration
Act, 1908 however the same finds mention multiple times therein. Mulla's
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 32 -
The Registration Act notes the following in relation to the meaning of "exe-
cution" as - "Admission of Execution ...It is submitted that the mere proof or
admission that a person's signature appears on a document cannot by itself
amount to execution of the document. ......"
18D-ii. Further, S.P. Sengupta's Commentaries sets out the following
position: "A document is liable to be set aside or declared inoperative by a
civil court when it was not voluntarily executed. But that is an altogether
different consideration nor coming within the jurisdiction of Registering
Officer. The correct legal position seems to be that though the Registering
Officer cannot take any decision as to the legality and validity of an instru-
ment which has been presented for registration, there cannot be any admis-
sion of execution when the plea taken by the executant before the Register-
ing Officer, if found true, would invalidate the deed. An execution does not
mean merely signing but signing by way of assent to the terms embodied in
the document."
18D-iii. In Kuttadan Velayudhan, Muhammad, (Kerala)(DB) : Law
Finder Doc Id # 4974, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has held
that:
"9...........The intention of the person signing is important. The
person should have affixed the signature to the instrument in
token of an intention to be bound by its conditions. It has been
said that for a signing consists of both the act of writing a per-
son's name and the intention in doing this to execute, authen-
ticate or to sign as a witness. The execution of a deed or other
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 33 -
instrument includes the performance of all acts which may be
necessary to render it complete as a deed or an instrument im-
porting the intended obligation of every act required to give
the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give it the
forms required to render it valid. Thus, the signature is an ac-
knowledgement that the person signing has agreed to the
terms of the document. This can be achieved only if a person
signs after the document is prepared and the terms are known
to the person signing. In that view of the matter mere putting
of signature cannot be said to be execution of the document."
18D-iv. The Bombay High Court in Bank of Baroda v. Shree Moti In-
dustries 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 486 held, "21... The term "execution" is not
defined in any statue. It means completion i.e. the last act or acts which
complete a document. ......"
18D-v. A 3-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veena Singh
v. District Registrar/ Additional Collector (F/R) (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id
# 1985519, has held that:
"57. The "execution" of a document does not stand ad-
mitted merely because a person admits to having signed the
document. Such an interpretation accounts for circumstances
where an individual signs a blank paper and it is later conver-
ted into a different document, or when an individual is made to
sign a document without fully understanding its contents. Ad-
opting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burden
upon the person denying execution to challenge the registra-
tion before a civil court or a writ court, since registration will
have to be allowed once the signature has been admitted.
XXX XXX XXX
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 34 -
60. The Registration Act exists so that information about
documents can be put into the public domain, where it can be
accessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud,
and so that individuals can be aware of the status of proper-
ties. If the interpretation conflating signing with execution is
adopted, it would ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars
will continuously end up registering documents whose validity
will inevitably be then disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition.
While the suit or writ proceedings continue, the document
would remain on the public records as a registered instrument,
which has the potential to cause more disruption. Hence, such
an interpretation should not be adopted by this Court."
18D-vi. Thus, from a conspectus of the above referred judicial pro-
nouncements it is established that mere signing of the document cannot be
conflated to mean admission of execution of the same. For the purpose of
execution of a document, the same is to comply with the provisions of TPA;
and only thereafter the same can be presented for registration.
18E. PRINCIPLE OF INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and Anr.
(2009) 4 SCC 193 held that in order to constitute a "sale", the parties must
intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay
the price either in present, or in future. The intention is to be gathered
from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and evidence
on record.
18E-i. Recital in the sale deed
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 35 -
In the present case, as already noted above, the intention of
the executant, the purpose for which sale is executed, as also the con-
sequent recital in the sale deed (Ex. P-1) is clear beyond shadow of doubt
wherein it is stated "I will take the balance amount of Rs. 49,225/- before
the Sub-Registrar Sir Pehowa in cash for my own need.". Thus, the recital in
the sale deed was unequivocal that plaintiff was to pay the balance sale
consideration at time of registration of sale deed before the Sub Registrar
on 12.2.1988 itself, as time was of essence in the contract.
18E-ii. Conduct of the parties
The conduct of the parties has already been recounted. As
demonstrated above, the record is replete with the varied, contradictory,
and inconsistent pleas taken by the plaintiff from time to time; as also the
dilatory tactics adopted by him in refusing/ avoiding registration of the sale
deed. There are also concurrent and unrefuted findings of fact that sale
deed was not registered on 12.2.1988 as, on the said date plaintiff had
failed to produce the original sale deed and had run away from the Tehsil
office; and the sale deed was not registered on 12.5.1988 as plaintiff did
not possess the balance sale consideration. The said pleadings and findings
may briefly be re-stated here:
a) In the Civil Suit No. 154 of 1988 (Ex. D3 @ Pg. 71 of LCR), for
Permanent Injunction filed by the plaintiff against the defendants,
pleading of the plaintiff is that Sale Deed could not be registered
on 12.2.1988 because: "...the same could not be produced before
the Sub Registrar as it got very late and Office hours were also
over. So it was mutually agreed to get it registered on 15.2.1988."
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 36 -
b) The Sub Registrar in order dated 12.05.1988 (Ex. P6 @ Pg. 49-50
of LCR), has given categoric finding that Defendants had produced
photostat copy of mutation and expressed readiness to get Sale
Deed registered. However, sale deed could again not be registered
on 12.5.1988, as: "When plaintiff was asked to get the sale deed
registered in his favour, he refused to do so. Although the
application to get the sale deed registered was filed by the
plaintiff himself on 04.04.1988, he thereafter refused to get it
registered; therefore, the same could not be done."
c) In the Grounds of Appeal dated 13.07.1988. (Ex. D1 @ Pg. 61 of
LCR) filed by the plaintiff against order dated 12.05.1988 before
the Registrar, Kurukshetra, the pleading of the plaintiff is that:
i) Sale deed could not be registered on 12.2.1988 as
"after the execution of document said Waryam
Singh refused to present himself before the Sub
Registrar and went back to his house and
thereafter he died on 14.2.1988." and;
ii) Sale Deed was not registered on 3.5.1988 as the
mutation was not there in favor of the defendants.
And;
iii) After sanction of mutation on 11.5.1988, sale
deed could not be registered on 12.5.1988 as "no
proper opportunity was given, it was not possible
for the appellant to get the sale deed registered as
all of sudden, the balance amount could not be
arranged. The appellant requested the learned
Sub Registrar to grant him time to get the sale
deed registered, so that the appellant may be able
to arrange the money, but the learned Sub
Registrar refuse to provide the opportunity and
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 37 -
instead filed the sale deed." And therefore: "the
sale deed could not be registered on account of
death of vendor and subsequently on account of
non-attestation of mutation, the appellant was
not at fault at all. The learned Sub Registrar was
wrong and refusing the registration of the sale
deed."
d) The findings recorded by the Registrar, Kurukshetra in order dated
18.01.1989. (Ex. P7 @ Pg. 51 of LCR) while dismissing the above
Appeal of the plaintiff are imperative, to the effect that: "In
application dated 4.4.1988, it is nowhere mentioned by the
appellant that on 12.2.1988, Waryam Singh had refused to get the
sale deed registered. Although it is now so mentioned in para 1 of
the appeal, however, this appears to be concocted. It is further
established that appellant was not willing to get the registry done
and that he had gone from the Tehsil, even though Waryam Singh
deceased was present in the Tehsil. On 12.05.1988 LRs of Waryam
Singh were present in the office of Sub-Registrar and they were
ready and willing to get the sale deed registered; however,
plaintiff refused to get it registered. There is no evidence on record
that plaintiff requested time to arrange balance sale
consideration. In this situation it is established that appellant
deliberately did not get the sale deed registered because he did
not have the balance sale consideration; and therefore, present
appeal is baseless......"
e) Whereas, in the present Civil Suit CS-1301/90/89 dated
17.2.1989, the plaintiff has taken the pleading that Sale Deed was
not presented before the Sub Registrar on the same day i.e.
12.2.1988 "as the Income Tax Clearance Certificate was not
produced by Waryam Singh." Plaintiff has further pleaded that
sale deed was not registered on 12.05.1988 because "all of a
sudden, Sub Registrar rejected and refused to register the Sale
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 38 -
Deed without granting any opportunity to the plaintiff to pay the
balance sale consideration." 'emphasis is mine'
Thus, it is well established that the plaintiff blew hot and cold
in various proceedings as to why the sale deed could not be presented for
registration. In the suit for injunction (Ex. D-3; pg. 71) he says due to it be -
ing late in the day; while in the present suit mentions due to lack of in-
come-tax clearance certificate; while in the appeal before the Registrar al-
leges that Waryam Singh had refused to present himself. It clearly reflects
the conduct of the plaintiff that he is trying to benefit from his own lapse
and to obtain highly valuable property at 1987-88 rates. The necessity to
sell the land in dispute arose due to the marriage of the daughter of
Waryam Singh fixed for 20.02.1988 and time was of the essence of the con-
tract. Plaintiff, having full knowledge of the same, ran away from the Tehsil
premises with the signed sale deed, and failed to complete the execution of
the sale deed.
18E-iii. Evidence on record
The undisputed facts on record are that the Sale Deed was
executed by Waryam Singh, predecessor in interest of the appellants on
12.02.1988 in favour of the respondent for total sale consideration of
Rs.62,000/- out of which Rs.12,000/- plus Rs.775/- was received as
earnest money. As per the Grounds of Appeal presented by the
respondent before the Registrar, Sale Deed could not be presented on
12.02.1988 for registration as, Waryam Singh, after execution of sale deed
failed to present himself before the Sub Registrar. However, the facts in
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 39 -
evidence on record are to the contrary which reveal that on 12.02.1988,
Waryam Singh was very much present before the Sub Registrar to get the
Sale Deed registered. The defendants have duly placed on record the
Affidavit of Attendance of Waryam Singh on dated 12.02.1988 as Ex.D2. It
was the plaintiff who failed to produce the Sale Deed before the Sub
Registrar, as a result of which, same could not be registered. Subsequently
as Waryam Singh did not receive the total sale amount, which he required
for the marriage of his daughter, he expired on 14.02.1988.
19. Thereafter, it was agreed between the appellants/defendants
and the plaintiff to get the Sale Deed registered on 12.05.1988. It is the
contention of the respondent that on 12.05.1988, Sale Deed could not be
registered as the appellants failed to produce the mutation in their favour
before the Sub Registrar. However again the findings on record are to the
contrary as it is proved on record that the suit land was mutated in favour
of LRs vide mutation dated 11.05.1988; and it was the plaintiff, who was
not in possession of balance sale consideration on 12.05.1988. The said
fact i.e. lack of funds is admitted by the plaintiff in the Grounds of Appeal
filed by him before the Registrar.
20. In these peculiar facts and circumstances, respondent cannot
seek to take protection of Section 77 of the Registration Act as on both
dates, Sale Deed was not registered as there is a concurrent findings of
fact to the effect that on 12.02.1988, Sale Deed could not be registered as
the respondent had failed to produce the Sale Deed; and again on
12.05.1988, Sale Deed could not be registered as the respondent had
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 40 -
failed to make the payment of balance sale consideration. It is admitted
case between the parties and significantly a conclusive and concurrent
finding of fact that the plaintiff did not have the balance sale
consideration with him on the date fixed for payment and registration and
even thereafter. Thus, it was the Respondent who failed to complete the
execution of terms of the sale deed and tried to delay the payment of the
majority of the sale consideration.
21. A reading of the foregoing paragraphs reveals that the reason
for refusing to register the sale deed was due to incomplete execution of
the sale deed. The condition precedent therein was not fulfilled while the
Respondent tried to take benefit of his own wrong. Therefore, the ques-
tions of law raised in the present appeal are not as have been framed by
the plaintiff-respondent. Rather, the issue which is raised for consideration
before this Court is whether execution can be deemed to be complete and
thereby admitted. The interplay between the TPA and the Registration Act
as well as the definition of 'execution' read with the principle of intention
of the parties and the settled principle of interpretation that the interpreta-
tion of can statute or law cannot lead to absurdities; and therefore, in my
view, answers the question in favour of the Appellants.
22. Having answered the question of 'execution', it is next to be
seen whether the first Appellate Court has rightly placed reliance upon the
judgment of Jogesh Prasad supra in non-suiting the defendants. It is my
clear view that reliance of the first Appellate Court on the said judgment is
misplaced as the facts of Jogesh Prasad Singhs (supra) are dissimilar to the
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 41 -
present case (reference be had to paragraphs 2 and 8 of the said judgment).
In the present case, in the sale deed there is a specific recital qua payment
of balance sale consideration before the Sub-Registrar, Pehowa at the time
of registration. Whereas in the case of Jogesh supra, no balance sale con-
sideration remained to be paid by the plaintiff therein; and in the present
case, it is admitted fact on record that the plaintiff was first required to pay
amount of Rs.49,225/-. As such, facts of the said case cannot be applied to
the facts of the present case, which are distinctly different.
23. It is also to be noted that a conclusive finding of fact has been
arrived at by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court to the
effect that the Respondent was lacking the funds to pay the balance sale
consideration. The said findings have not been challenged by the
Respondent and have attained finality. Rather, it is admitted in the plaint
that sale deed could not be registered on 12.05.1988 as Respondent did
not have the balance sale consideration. Respondent's appeal before the
Registrar, Pehowa was also dismissed as balance sale consideration was
not available nor had any attempt been made by Respondent to deposit
or pay the same to the Appellants. In the face of these admissions, and
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment of
the learned First Appellate Court, cannot be sustained. In this regard,
findings of learned Trial Court in paras 13 and 16 of the judgment dated
21.05.1993 are relevant and are reproduced herein below:-
"13. There is a force in the contention of learned
counsel for the defendants. The plaintiff is blowing hot and
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 42 -
cold in the same breath. On 12.2.88 he got the sale deed
executed but failed to produce the same before the Sub-
Registrar so that the same may be got registered. He took
away the sale-deed with him and did not turn up through-out
the day. On the other hand, Sh.Waryam Singh waited for him
through-out the day and got his presence marked regarding
his readyness and willingness to perform the part of his
contract. It was the plaintiff who failed to get the sale-deed
registered on that day. The marriage of the daughter of
Sh.Waryam Singh had to take place on 20.2.88 and this was
the main reason that he had to dispose of the suit land out as
the plaintiff failed to make the payment of the remaining sale
price and Sh.Waryam Singh was not in a position to arrange
the amount regarding the performance of the marriage of his
daughter on 20.2.88, therefore, he suffered a shock and as a
result of the same he died on 14.2.88. The contention of the
learned counsel for the plaintiff that the sale-deed could not
be produced before the Sub-Registrar on 12.2.88 because
Sub-Registrar has demanded the income tax clearance
certificate from deceased Waryam Singh is without any force
because in the grounds of the appeal it was alleged by the
plaintiff that deceased Waryam Singh refused to appear
before the Sub Registrar on 12.2.88, therefore, the sale-deed
could not be registered on that day. Not only this, the plaintiff
has moved an application before the Sub-Registrar to
summon the legal heirs of said Waryam Singh so that they
may get the sale-deed registered in his favour. The Sub-
Registrar had directed the defendants to bring the mutation
of inheritance in their favour and the same was produced by
them on 12.5.88 but the plaintiff refused to get the sale-deed
registered because he was not having the remaining sale
price with him and in this way that application of the plaintiff
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 43 -
was rejected by the Sub-Registrar and the order of the Sub-
Registrar was challenged in the court of Registrar and he also
dismissed his appeal vide his order dated 18.1.89. The
authorities on which reliance is being placed by the counsel
for the plaintiff the facts of the same are not disputed but
facts of the same are not identical to the facts of the present
case. Therefore, these authorities have no help to him. In this
way this issue is decided against the plaintiff in favour of the
defendants.
XXX XXX XXX XXX
16. There is a force in the contention of learned counsel for
the defendants. The plaintiff failed to get the sale-deed
registered on 12.2.88 and thereafter on 12.5.88 it is a lapse
on his part because he was not ready with the remaining sale
price and that is the main reason he failed to get the sale-
deed registered. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff is not
maintainable in the present form. Hence, this issue is decided
in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff."
24. The aforesaid findings of fact have been duly upheld by the
learned First Appellate Court; and have not been challenged by the
plaintiff. In this regard, reference may also be made to a judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Shivali Enterprises v. Godawari
(Deceased) (SC): Law Finder Doc Id # 2034559.
25. Contention of the respondent that it was not open to the Sub
Registrar/Registrar to make a determination in respect of the readiness and
willingness of the respondent to perform the contract is misconceived as, in
the order date 12.5.1988 the Sub Registrar has clearly, categorically, and
unambiguously recorded that it is the plaintiff himself who has refused to
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 44 -
get the sale deed registered. At the risk of repetition, however, to be crystal
clear on the facts, the Sub Registrar, in order dated 12.5.1988 has recorded
that: "When plaintiff was asked to get the sale deed registered in his favour,
he refused to do so. Although the application to get the sale deed registered
was filed by the plaintiff himself on 04.04.1988, he thereafter refused to get
it registered; therefore, the same could not be done. "
26. Therefore, it is to be seen whether suit of the plaintiff is
maintainable in face of his own refusal to get the sale deed registered.
27. It is unambiguously established on record that the respondent
had time and again sought time by taking different and contradictory pleas
on different times. Clearly, there are multiple contradictions in the case set
up by the plaintiff. On the other hand, it is proved on record that on
12.02.1988 Waryam Singh was very much willing to get the Sale Deed
registered. Even LRs of Waryam Singh were ready and willing to get the Sale
Deed executed on 12.05.1988. In view of the refusal, and also mal-intent of
the plaintiff as evident from discussion above, Civil Suit of the plaintiff was
not maintainable. Sub Registrar/Registrar, learned Trial Court and First
Appellate Court, all have given concurrent findings of fact that on all dates,
plaintiff was not in possession of balance sale consideration. It is proven
fact on record that LRs of the appellant had brought mutation on
12.05.1988. However, the Sale Deed could not be registered as admittedly
respondent refuse to do so.
28. It is also to be seen that in the Grounds of Appeal filed by the
plaintiff before the Registrar, plaintiff has nowhere denied his above said
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 45 -
refusal. Rather, plaintiff has admitted that he could not get the sale deed
registered as he did not have balance sale consideration. In the said
Grounds of Appeal before the Registrar, plaintiff has further decried the
fact that he was granted no Time by the Sub Registrar to arrange the
money. However, this plea of the respondent that he did not know that he
had to bring balance sale consideration defies logic and is reflective of the
mal-intent of the plaintiff.
29. Furthermore, the stand of the Respondent that he was not
aware that he would be required to make payment on 12.05.1988 is
falsified from his stand in his own civil suit for permanent injunction filed
on 08.04.1988 (pg. no. 71) wherein it has been categorically mentioned
that the Sub-registrar had given notice to the Appellants/Defendants for
20.04.1988 for registration of the sale deed. The Respondent has even
appended a certified copy of the order of the Sub-Registrar. Thus, now it
cannot lie in the mouth of the Respondent that he was caught unawares.
Thus, in the present case, it is not as though the Sub Registrar was called
upon to determine the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff or the
other party.
30. Furthermore, this is not an Agreement to Sell. The present is a
Sale Deed, a document of sale. An unregistered sale-deed, upon
registration, would convey a completed title. Thus, prior to registration
thereof, it is to be ensured that terms and conditions as embodied in the
Sale Deed were to be complied with. Admittedly, terms and conditions as
embodied in the Sale Deed, have not been complied with. Therefore, an
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 46 -
incomplete document cannot be registered. Contention of the plaintiff that
under the Act, the Sub Registrar is bound to register the document is ill
founded. A departure from the strictest interpretation of the provision, is
indeed contemplated; and has to be determined in the facts and
circumstances of each case - as held by this Court in Jagmal Singh v. Joint
Sub Registrar, Kalayat (Punjab & Haryana) : Law Finder Doc Id # 341118
wherein Power of the Registrar has been examined and it is held that:
"A. Registration Act, 1908 Sections 34 and 35 The scope of en-
quiry by a Sub-Registrar under Sections 34 and 35 is limited only as
regards obtaining the proof of execution of the document - However,
Sub-Registrar, while holding a public office, would not merely pro-
ceed to register a document with closed eyes without taking into con-
sideration the interim orders passed by the Courts below and specific-
ally brought to his notice in respect of land which forms subject mat-
ter of the sale-deed presented before him.
B. Registration Act, 1908 - Registration of sale deed - An order
to maintain status quo regarding possession had been passed by the
competent Courts below - Joint Registrar cannot proceed to register
the sale deed and nullify the interim orders regarding status quo.
XXX XXX XXX
10. Even though, the argument raised by learned counsel for
the appellants is to be accepted that the scope of enquiry by a Sub
Registrar under Sections 34 and 35 of the 1908 Act is limited only as
regards obtaining the proof of execution of the document, still the
fact cannot be lost sight of that the Sub Registrar, while holding a
public office, would not merely proceed to register a document with
closed eyes and would ignore the interim orders passed by the Courts
below in respect of land which forms subject matter of the sale-deed
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 47 -
presented before him and such interim orders having specifically
brought to his notice."
31. The proposition on Limitations on Power of the Registrar has
been examined by the High Court of Karnataka in Smt.P.C.Padmamba v.
Channaveeramma R., (Karnataka) : Law Finder Doc Id # 1963960; and it
is held that:
"73. Admittedly, Chikkanna-the purchaser was yet to pay the
agreed balance sale consideration of Rs. 15,200/-though he claimed
that a sale deed had been executed by Rudraiah. In fact, Chikkanna
even after the registration of the sale, pursuant to the order of the
Registrar, issued a legal notice calling upon Rudraiah to receive the
balance sale consideration and hand over possession. Thus, though
the purchaser himself admitted that the sale transaction was yet to
be concluded, at least in terms of receipt of the sale consideration, by
the intervention of the order of the District Registrar, the sale
transaction has been concluded and the sale deed has been
registered.
74. This essentially means that the Registrar has enforced a
contract which had only been partly performed and some of the
admitted terms of the contract were yet to be fulfilled. Furthermore,
a sale deed executed by a person, who had no title over the property
as on the date of the presentation of the sale deed, has been ordered
to be registered, thereby purporting to convey the title to the buyer.
This is, in fact, a power which is not available or conferred on a Civil
Court even under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. This is, thus
obviously, beyond the purview of the Registration Act itself and the
resultant registration of a document would have to be necessarily a
complete nullity in the eye of law.
75. Since, the registration of the sale deed was a complete
nullity in law, the same can have no significance at all and would also
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 48 -
confer no rights. In fact, such a null and void act, even if validated by
consent of parties would not transform it into a legal act. It is settled
law that an act, which is nullity, does not have to be impugned by
way of a suit." 'emphasis is mine'
32. Thus, a contract which is a nullity in the eyes of law, even if
validated by consent of the parties, cannot be transformed into a legal act
and would confer no rights merely by registration.
33. Furthermore, the avowed objective of the Act is to maintain
the authenticity and credibility of the property transaction and to prevent
fraud. Statutory Provisions cannot be given an interpretation which is
contrary to the principal objective of the legislation. In a case such as the
present one, registration of sale deed would be otiose to the very
objective of the Act. It is my view that upholding the impugned orders
would not imply grant of or conferring the power upon the Sub Registrar
which is beyond legislative intent. Rather, to achieve the very objective of
the enactment, it necessarily implies and requires ensuring that the
written terms and conditions of the transaction are satisfied. The Object
of Registration as espoused by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajni
Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id #
200766 is as under:
"27. The object of registration is designed to guard against
fraud by obtaining a contemporaneous publication and an
unimpeachable record of each document. The instant case is one
where no allegation of fraud has been raised. In view thereof the
duty cast on the Registering Officer under Section 32 of the Act was
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 49 -
only to satisfy himself that the document was executed by the person
by whom it purports to have been signed. The Registrar upon being
so satisfied and upon being presented with a documents to be
registered had to proceed with the registration of the same."
34. Thus, prior to registration, satisfaction of the Registrar is to be
recorded. It is with a view to effectively achieve the purpose of the Act that
some States have brought in amendments in form of promulgating Section
77A and Section 22A, which envisage setting aside of sale deeds by the Re-
gistrar. This is needed to ensure that the object of the Act is achieved. In
particular, reference may be made to State of Andhra Pradesh, which has
sought to insert Section 77A by way of registration (Andhra Pradesh Amend-
ment) Bill, 2023 in the Registration Act, 1908 to provide for cancellation of
registered document in certain cases. Vide the said Amendment Bill of
2023, powers have been delegated to the Registrar as well as to the In-
spector General of Registration, for cancellation of instruments in certain
cases. The said Amendment Bill of 2023 has received assent from the Pres-
ident of India on 17.12.2023. It may also be pointed out that several States
have issued Circulars vesting power with the Registering Authority to cancel
sale deeds where execution/registration of sale deed has been obtained
fraudulently, either on orders of Inspector General of Registration or suo
moto by the Registrar. Thus, it is not as though a departure from the strict-
est interpretation of Section 77 is not envisaged or undertaken. For this
reason as well, no infirmity can be found in the impugned orders.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 50 -
35. Over and above all else, the overarching purpose and premise
of every law, statute, procedure, and all legal exercise and endeavour is to
ensure complete justice between the parties. All the Statutes in the world
shall be rendered meaningless pieces of parchment unless substantial
justice is done between the parties. The purpose of every legal exercise is to
serve the cause of Justice. A provision of law cannot be interpreted to foster
manifest injustice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the role,
scope, and purpose of procedural law in Smt. Rani Kusum v. Smt. Kanchan
Devi, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 84339; as follows:
"C. Interpretation of procedural law - A procedural law should
not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is al-
ways subservient to and is in aid to justice - Provisions of the C.P.C. or
any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a man-
ner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situ-
ations in the ends of justice - Processual law is not to be a tyrant but
a servant not an obstruction but an aid to justice.
XXX XXX XXX
11. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The
language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be lib-
eral or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing
procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system,
no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating
in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express
and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the Civil Proce-
dure Code or any other procedural enactment ought not to be con-
strued in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet ex-
traordinary situations in the ends of justice.
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 51 -
12. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a
Judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law re-
former." 'emphasis is mine'
36. Thus, to relegate the appellants at this belated stage to an-
other round of trial and another civil suit as advocated by the respondent,
will be a shameful travesty of Justice; as also contrary to the tenet pro-
pounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court viz to dissuade the scourge multi-
plicity of litigation. It may also be pointed out that all the submissions made
on behalf of the respondent as noted hereinabove, have been made by the
respondent for the first time before this Court; and have heretofore, not
been raised by the plaintiff before the Courts below.
37. Rather, it is the plaintiff himself who was required to file a suit
for specific performance. In this regard, the following observations of the
Hon'ble Supreme in respect of scope of Section 77 of the Registration Act in
case of Sita Dei v. Daitary Mohanty and others (Orissa) : Law Finder Doc Id
# 320997; are of great import:
"Execution of a deed and finding of fact regarding its execution
are not assailable in second appeal. Reliefs beyond mere
registration under Section 77 of the Registration Act can be
granted in suits that are comprehensive in nature and include
specific performance of contract.
XXX XXX XXX
B. Registration Act, 1908 Sections 77 and 49, Proviso Suit for
registration of document - Reliefs of confirmation of possession
or recovery of possession also asked for - Court allowing
specific performance of the contract contained in the sale deed
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 52 -
executed but not registered - Relief of possession held not to
come within the scope of Section 77 - Suit being
comprehensive, such relief can be granted even though no
specific prayer for specific performance was made.
XXX XXX XXX
6. The next contention that the suit is not for specific
performance of contract but one under section 77 of the
Registration Act is also not correct. On a perusal of the plaint, it
is clear that the plaintiffs have also asked for reliefs of
confirmation of possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery
of possession. The relief of possession does not come within
the scope of a suit under section 77 of the Registration Act
which is limited to a decree for directing the document to be
registered in the Sub- Registrar's office if it is duly presented for
registration within 30 days after the passing of such a decree.
There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the
frame of the suit is not one for specific performance of
contract. In fact, ad valorem court-fees have been paid which
are not necessary in a suit under section 77 of the Registration
Act.
7. The third contention deserves careful examination. Mr. Pal's
contention, in essence, amounts to that once the plaintiffs have
resorted to the machinery provided under the Indian
Registration Act, for getting the sale-deed (Ex. 3) registered,
they are precluded from seeking specific performance of
contract under the Specific Relief Act. It may be noted that Mr.
Pal does not dispute the proposition that in this suit itself the
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief under section 77 of the
Registration Act as the suit was filed within 30 days from the
date of refusal by the Registrar under section 76 of the
Registration Act. There was some conflict of authority on this
point prior to the amendment of section 49 of the Registration
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 53 -
Act. But the proviso added to it clarifies the position that an
unregistered document, affecting immoveable property and
required to be compulsorily registered either under the
Registration Act or under the Transfer of Property Act, may be
received as evidence of contract in a suit for specific
performance. This amendment was necessitated on account of
the dictum of the Privy Council taking the contrary view. The
distinction between "a contract of sale" and "a contract for
sale" is well known. The former completes the sale while the
latter necessitates a further document to be executed to
complete the sale. An unregistered sale-deed, on registration,
would convey a completed title. Before registration, therefore,
it can be used as an evidence of contract for sale in a suit for
specific performance of contract under Section 49, Proviso of
the Registration Act. Ex.3, therefore, can be used as a contract
for sale and the present suit is properly constituted as one for
specific performance of the contract. The next question arises
whether the plaintiffs are precluded from bringing such a suit
once they resorted to the machinery under sections 71 to 76 of
the Registration Act for getting the narrow relief for
registration. Despite some authority to the contrary, the
correct view would be that they are not precluded. It is
necessary to analyse the principle. A suit for specific
performance of contract is based on original cause of action
arising out of breach of contract. Subject to the limitation of
equitable reliefs, granted by the Court as a Court of equity, the
plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the terms of
the contract. The plaintiffs can, therefore, ask for execution of
a sale-deed, registration thereof, for confirmation of
possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery of possession,
and, in cases of trespass or disturbance of possession, for
damages. The suit is, therefore, one of comprehensive nature
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 54 -
and conceives of larger reliefs than the exclusive one claimed in
a suit under section 77 of Registration Act. It would be fantastic
to contend that when the cause of action for all the reliefs have
arisen, the plaintiffs could be confined to the sole relief of
getting the document registered, merely because they had
resorted to the machinery under sections 71 to 76 of the
Registration Act. So far as this Court is concerned, the matter is
concluded by a Bench decision reported in Rajan Patro v. Akur
Sahu, AIR 1959 Orissa 74. Though that is slightly
distinguishable as the plaintiff did not approach the Sub-
Registrar and there was no refusal of registration, in principle,
however it makes no difference whether there was refusal or
not. So far as the Patna Court is concerned, the matter is
concluded by Jhaman Wanton v. Amrit Mahton, AIR 1946
Patna 62. The principle has been well discussed in Nasiruddin
Midda v. Sidhoo Mia, AIR 1919 Calcutta 477 and in Bal Kishen
Das v. Bechan Pandey, AIR 1932 Allahabad 96. The result,
therefore, is that even though a party might have resorted to
the machinery under sections 71 to 76 of the Registration Act,
he is not precluded from bringing a suit for specific
performance of contract for larger reliefs not conceived within
the scope of section 77 of the Registration Act. This is, however,
subject to the limitations of a Court of Equity and the matter is
well discussed in Rameshwar Prasad v. Anandi Devi, AIR 1960
Patna 109, where their Lordships dismissed a suit for specific
performance not on the ground that such a suit did not lie but
on the ground that the equitable relief would not be exercised
in favour of the party when the party itself was responsible for
certain laches. For instance, when the plaintiff does not come
with clean hands or is responsible in causing delay in asking for
equitable reliefs. That again would vary according to the facts
RSA-2759-1994 (O&M) - 55 -
and circumstances of each case as to whether the equitable
reliefs should be granted or not." 'emphasis is mine'
38. Therefore, sale deed could not have been mechanically re-
gistered by the Revenue Authorities in oblivion to the fulfilment of the fun-
damental conditions thereof. Thus, order dated 12.05.1988 Ex.P6 passed by
Sub Registrar, and 18.01.1989 Ex.P7 passed by Registrar are in conformity
with the provision of Section 58 of the Registration Act.
39. The aforesaid judgments relied upon by learned counsel for
the plaintiff/respondent are distinguishable on facts and law and are not
applicable in the peculiar facts of the present case.
40. In view of the above discussion, the present Regular Second
Appeal is hereby allowed; and the impugned judgment and decree dated
21.10.1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra is
set aside; and the judgment and decree dated 21.05.1993 passed by the
learned Additional Senior Sub Judge, Pehowa is restored; thereby
dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent.
41. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
17.03.2026 (NIDHI GUPTA)
Divyanshi JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
