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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Harsimarpreet Singh Bajwa vs State Of Punjab And Anr on 10 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
106 CRM-M-49657-2024
Harsimarpreet Singh Bajwa ....Petitioner
V/s
State of Punjab and another ....Respondents
Date of decision:10.03.2026
Date of Uploading : 11.03.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. H.S. Mander, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Adhiraj Singh Thind, AAG Punjab.
Mr. Veer Vikram Singh Mann, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)
1. Present petition has been filed under Section 528 read with
Section 483(3) of BNSS, 2023, seeking cancellation of regular bail granted
to respondent No.2vide order 17.02.2024 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, SAS Nagar (Mohali),in FIR No.147 dated 30.12.2023
registered for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420and 120-B of IPC
at Police Station Mullanpur, SAS Nagar (Mohali).
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question reflects that the same has
been registered on the basis of a complaint made by the complainant--
Harsimarpreet Singh Bajwa (petitioner herein), who is running company
namely SVAS Residency, against respondent No.2 namely Talwinder Singh
Kahlon and other accused persons namely Dr. Kawanljit Singh, Ajit Vatas,
Charanjit Singh, Ramesh Kumar, Surinder Lala, Ranjit Singh and Gurmit
Singh. In his complaint made to the police, the complainant has stated that
his firm is involved in sale and purchase of property and wanted to start a
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project in New Chandigarh. The accused Ajit Vatas alongwith his
companions assured the complainant firm to get the property and made him
introduce to other accused Talwinder Singh Kahlon (respondent No.2
herein), Dr. Kanwaljit Singh, Ranjit Singh and Gurmit Singh. A
memorandum of understanding dated 21.06.2023 was executed between the
parties, according to which the accused persons were to collect/provide 52
acres of land to the complainant firm. The memorandum was not signed by
Dr. Kanwaljit Singh being government official and with an intention to
cheat the complainant. Respondent No.2-Talwinder Singh Kahlon alongwith
his companions introduced the complainant with Sarpanch Charanjit Singh
at his house and they received Rs.21 lacs as token money in writing on the
pretext of deal of 6½ acres land of Charanjit Singh and his family.
Thereafter, on 12.07.2023 Talwinder Singh Kahlon (respondent No.2
herein), Charanjit Singh sarpanch, RajpalKaur, Surinder Lala, Ramesh
Kumar, Ajit Vatas received Rs.1,05,00,000/and Dr. Kanwaljit Singh
received Rs.85 lacs in cash on 15.07.2023. Subsequently, respondent No.2-
Talwinder Singh Kahlon alongwith others assured the complainant to get
the sale deed of the land. The complainant had transferred Rs.39 lacs in the
account of Charanjit Singh and Rs.29 lacs in the account of Rajpal Kaur
through RTGS. After completion of payment, the complainant demanded
consent letter from Talwinder Singh Kahlon (respondent No.2 herein),
however he assured him to get the sale deed of 3-4 acre of land. Then on
18.07.2023 on the asking of Talwinder Singh Kahlon, complainant paid
Rs.1 Crore more to Charanjit Singh and Rajpal Kaur and writing was also
done in this regard, which was witnessed by Talwinder Singh Kahlon
(respondent No.2 herein), Dr. Kanwaljit Singh, Ramesh Kumar and
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Surinder Lala. On 21.07.2023 they also executed another memorandum and
received Rs.10 lacs and Rs.20 lacs was transferred in the account of
company of M/s Solitare Estate Developers through RTGS. Despite
receiving huge amount from the complainant applicant and his companions
have not arranged any land to the complainant for execution of sale deed
and cheated him for crores of rupees.On these set of allegations, the instant
FIR came to be registered and investigation ensued.
3. Vide order dated 17.02.2024 passed by the concerned trial
Court, respondent No.2 has been granted the concession of regular bail. The
relevant of the said order reads thus:
"10. The allegations and counter assertions made by the applicant are
matter of evidence. Without commenting further on merits of the case, the
applicant is in custody since 20.01.2024 while co-accused have already
been granted anticipatory bail by the Hon'ble High Court. The
presentation of challan and conclusion of the trial will take long time and
no useful purpose would be served by keeping the accused is in custody.
In view of my above discussion, applicant Talwinder Singh is ordered to
be released on bail subject to his furnishing personal bonds in the sum of
Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of
learned Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate subject to the following
conditions. (i) That accused/applicant shall not directly or indirectly
make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with
the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to
the Court or to any police officer.
(ii) That accused/applicant shall not leave the country without prior
permission of the court.
(iii) That accused/applicant shall appear in the Court on each and every
date of hearing.
File be consigned to the Record Room."
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner (FIR-complainant) has
iterated that the regular bail granted to respondent No.2 deserves to be
cancelled as the said respondent has grossly misused the concession of bail
granted to him. Learned counsel has further contended that the order passed
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by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is contrary to the facts and
circumstances of the present case and suffers from patent illegality. It is
submitted that respondent No.2 is the main accused and the principal
architect of the alleged fraud, who has cheated the petitioner (FIR-
complainant) to the tune of approximately Rs.4,09,00,000/-. Learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner has further argued that respondent No.2
has been granted the concession of regular bail by the concerned trial Court
primarily on the premise that certain co-accused of respondent No.2 had
earlier been granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Court. It is
contended that the said circumstance has been erroneously relied upon by
the learned Court below, as the case of respondent No.2 stands on a
completely different footing, being the main accused and the principal
beneficiary of the alleged fraudulent transaction, whereas the other accused
persons have been attributed a comparatively lesser or peripheral role.
Therefore, parity with the co-accused, in the present circumstances, could
not have been invoked by the learned Court below while granting bail to
respondent No.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted
that the instant FIR came to be registered only after a detailed and thorough
inquiry conducted by the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police
(Investigation), SAS Nagar, Mohali, which prima facie revealed the
involvement of respondent No.2 along with the other accused persons in the
commission of the alleged offence. It has been further contended that
respondent No.2, in connivance with the other accused persons, hatched a
well-planned conspiracy and dishonestly induced the petitioner to part with
a huge amount exceeding Rs.4 crores, thereby causing grave financial loss
to the petitioner. It has also been vehemently argued that the magnitude of
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the fraud, the active role attributed to respondent No.2 and the serious
nature of the allegations clearly disentitle him from the concession of bail,
and the learned Court below failed to appreciate these material aspects while
granting bail. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel
has prayed that the regular bail granted to respondent No.2 be set aside and
the said respondent be taken into custody in accordance with law.
5. Learned State counsel has submitted that the concession of
regular bail has been granted to respondent No.2 by the concerned trial
Court after due consideration of the nature and gravity of the allegations, the
stage of investigation, and the overall facts and circumstances of the case.
Learned State counsel has further contended that the learned trial Court also
took into account the fact that a compromise had been entered into between
the parties, which was duly placed on record before the Court. According to
learned State counsel, no material has been brought on record by the
petitioner to demonstrate that respondent No.2 has, at any point of time,
attempted to tamper with the prosecution evidence, influence or intimidate
the witnesses, threaten the complainant, evade the process of law, or
otherwise misuse the concession of bail granted to him. It has further been
submitted that the parameters governing cancellation of bail are distinct and
much stricter than those applicable for grant of bail, and in the absence of
any supervening circumstances or misuse of the concession of bail, the
order granting bail ought not to be interfered with. It has also been
submitted that the investigation in the present case has been carried out in
accordance with law, and the final report under Section 193 of the BNSS
already stands presented before the Court of competent jurisdiction.
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6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 has iterated
that the present petition is misconceived and an abuse of the process of law.
Learned counsel has further iterated that the parameters for grant of bail and
cancellation of bail are entirely distinct and unless there is cogent material
to show misuse of liberty, interference with investigation, tampering with
evidence, influencing of witnesses or likelihood of absconding, the bail once
granted ought not to be cancelled. It has been further contended that the
respondent No.2 has fully cooperated with the investigation and there is no
allegation, much less any material, to suggest that respondent No.2 has
attempted to threaten the complainant, influence witnesses or hamper the
trial in any manner. Furthermore, the disputes between the parties are
essentially civil in nature arising out of alleged co-ownership and sale of
joint land and the criminal proceedings have been initiated to give a colour
of criminality to what is essentially a property dispute. Learned counsel has
emphasized that the seriousness of the allegations has already been
considered by this Court at the time of grant of bail and the same cannot be
re-agitated at the stage of cancellation. Moreover, once the regular bail has
been granted by the Court, the same will only be cancelled upon showing
cogent and overwhelming circumstances. Thus, dismissal of the instant
petition is entreated for.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the available records of the case.
8. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
this Court titledas Dinesh Madan vs. State of Haryana and another in
CRM-M-9029-2023, decided on 17.05.2024; relevant whereof reads as
under:-
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"12. The concept of "cancellation of bail" is statutorily manifested in
terms of Section 439 (2) of 1973 Code. This concept was embodied in the
earlier statute i.e. 1898 Code as well albeit with difference(s). The ratio
decidendi of judgment in case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) makes it clear
that, in the 1898 Code, the bail granted by the High Court could be cancelled
only by it & bail granted by a Sessions Court could be cancelled by such
Sessions Court only. However, Section 439(2) of 1973 Code has vested
power to cancel bail which has been granted "under this chapter" upon both
the High Court as also the Sessions Court. The words "under this Chapter"
relates to Chapter XXXIII of Cr.P.C. of 1973 & hence the unequivocal result
thereof is that the High Court as also the Sessions Court have requisite
powers to cancel "any bail" granted by "any Court" by way of powers
vested under this Chapter. In other words; the High Court is well
empowered to cancel a bail granted by itself or by a Sessions Court or by the
Court of a Magistrate while the Sessions Court is empowered to cancel a bail
granted by High Court or by itself or by a Magistrate. However, a Sessions
Court can cancel bail granted by High Court only on account of
supervening/new circumstances or on account of misconduct of such accused
or on account of violation of any condition(s) imposed by the High Court
while granting bail. The Magistrate can, of course, cancel bail granted by
him but he cannot cancel a bail granted by High Court or Sessions Court
except when such accused has violated/contravened any condition(s)
imposed upon by such High Court or Sessions Court while granting bail to
such accused. This position, is indubitable, as a Magistrate has been vested
with powers for cancellation of bail only in terms of Section 437(5) of 1973
Code whereas the High Court and Sessions Court have been vested with
powers under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., of 1973 to cancel "any bail granted
under Chapter XXXIII of 1973 Code".
12.1 Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 deals with "any person who has
been released on bail under this Chapter" i.e. Chapter XXXIII of 1973 Code,
which engirths in itself, Section 438 of the Code (provision envisaging
anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail) as well. Hence such power operates in
realm of all kinds of bails, whether regular bail or anticipatory bail. Ergo,
there is no conceptual difference between cancellation of regular bail and
cancellation of anticipatory bail except that a Magistrate will not have
statutory power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted by High Court or
Sessions Court.
12.2. At this juncture, it would be profitable to consider an issue often
springing up before Courts. Petition(s) labelled as plea(s) for "cancellation
of bail" are filed in Court(s), more often than not, whether such applicant is
actually seeking "cancellation of bail" on account of the accused misusing
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the grant of bail or on account of any supervening developments disentitling
such accused to remain on bail OR where the plea raised is that, the bail
ought not to have been granted at all vide the impugned order, in the factual
conspectus of such case. The 1973 Code neither stipulates the words
"cancellation of bail" nor "setting-aside of a bail order" but only stipulates
the words "any person who has been released on bail be arrested and
committed to custody". There is no gainsaying that there is a foundational
difference between "cancellation of bail" and "setting-aside of a bail
order"; a difference which, by way of simile, can be said to be as stark as
between chalk and cheese. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Ranjit
Singh (supra)and Neeru Yadav (supra) has incontestably articulated that
"cancellation of bail"is sought for on account of supervening
circumstances/subsequent developments/misconduct of accused etc. whereas
"setting-aside of a bail order" is sought for by laying challenge to the said
bail order on ground of it being perverse or based on irrelevant material(s).
The parameters for consideration of the two are, accordingly, different and
contrastive.
13. The next aspect that craves attention is as to what are the factors
relevant for considering of a plea for "cancellation of bail" or "setting-aside
of a bail order."At the very outset; it deserves to be noted that, it is too far
well settled a principle to be ratiocinated upon, that consideration(s) for
grant of bail vis.-a-vis. cancellation/setting-aside thereof are entirely
different.
14. In a plea seeking "cancellation of bail"; such applicant ought to
show, primarily, subsequent supervening circumstances such as accused
having endeavored to influence/intimidate witness(s) or accused having
violated bail condition(s) or accused having committed another offence(s) or
accused having secured bail by misrepresenting/concealing material fact(s)
or bail having been granted in ignorance/violation of statutory provisions
and factors of akin nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Himanshu Sharma (supra) has delineated the nature and kind of such
factors as have been stated by this Court hereinabove.
14.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Gandhi
(supra) has enounced regarding the nature and degree of burden upon the
applicant (seeking cancellation of bail). The plea of such an applicant has to
be tested on the anvil of preponderance of probabilities& such an applicant
is not required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the facts pleaded by him
in support of such a plea.
15. In a plea seeking "setting-aside of a bail order"; the factors
required to be considered are as to whether bail has been granted on
relevant consideration(s); grounds required to be evaluated for grant of bail
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have been duly factored into the order granting bail and other factors of akin
nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra) has
held that the High Court or Sessions Court can set-aside an order granting
bail passed by an inferior Court if such order is based on irrelevant
considerations, order granting bail has resulted in miscarriage of justice etc.
It goes without saying that the High Court or Sessions Court; while dealing a
plea for setting-aside a bail order; sits in a jurisdiction, which is akin to
appellate jurisdiction & hence it can look into the veracity and propriety of
the order (granting bail) from all the perspectives. However, a Court while
dealing with such a plea, ought not to substitute its own opinion with the one
expressed in the impugned order.
16. It would not be pragmatic to even attempt to lay-down exhaustive
parameters in this regard as every case, especially a criminal case, is sui
generis. Such a quixotic attempt ought to be avoided as no inexorable
formulae can be laid down in this regard.
17. As an epilogue to above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
I. (i) There is a conceptual distinction, between "cancellation of bail"&
"setting-aside of a bail order". In a plea seeking "cancellation of bail";
the factors required to be considered are akin to supervening
circumstances/events or mis-conduct of accused whereas in a plea
seeking"setting-aside of a bail order"; the factors required to be
considered are akin to the order in question being unjustified or illegal or
not based on relevant consideration(s). In other words, a plea seeking
"setting aside of a bail order" is more in the nature of laying challenge to an
order granting bail before a superior Court upon merits thereof.
(ii) It would be pragmatic as also desirable, for the cause of ease and
clarity, that a plea filed under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., 1973 clearly states as
to whether the plea is for"cancellation of bail" or for "setting aside of a bail
order." or on both accounts.
II. Plea seeking cancellation of Regular Bail.
(i) A High Court has power to cancel regular bail granted by itself or
by a Sessions Court or by a Magistrate's Court.
(ii) A Sessions Court has a power to cancel regular bail granted by
High Court or by itself or by a Magistrate's Court. However, the Sessions
Court can cancel regular bail granted by High Court only where the accused
has violated any condition(s) imposed by the High Court (while granting
bail) or on account of such accused having misused liberty granted to him by
trying to influence witness(s) or having tried to delay trial by absenting
himself or having committed another offence(s) while on bail and other
factors of akin nature. In other words, a Sessions Court can cancel bail
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granted to an accused by High Court only on account of such like
supervening/subsequent events but cannot adjudicate upon veracity of the
High Court order (whereby bail was granted to such accused.)
(iii) A Magistrate does have the power to cancel a regular bail granted
by him in terms of Section 437(5) of Cr.P.C. 1973. However, a Magistrate
does not have the power to cancel regular bail granted by the High Court or
Sessions Court except in a situation wherein the accused has violated any
condition(s) imposed upon him when granted such bail by the High Court or
the Sessions Court.
(iv) In case cancellation of a regular bail granted by the Sessions
Court is sought for; such plea ought to be ordinarily filed before the Sessions
Court itself. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High
Court as also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973, the
filing of such a plea straight away before the High Court is not ipso facto
barred. At the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (filed
straight away before the High Court) must show cogent reason(s) for not
approaching the Sessions Court in the first instance.
(v) The factors for consideration in a plea for cancellation of a regular bail
are whether the accused has misused liberty granted to him by trying to
influence witness(s) or has tried to delay trial or has committed another
offence(s) while on bail, whether the accused has flouted the cancellation of
bail, whether bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud or concealing
relevant material and similar factors of akin nature. There is no gainsaying
that above factors are only illustrative in nature as it is not axiomatic to
exhaustively enumerate them.
(vi) Where such plea raises ground(s) that bail has been granted on
account of misrepresentation of facts or a fraud having been played on Court
which has granted bail or concealment of material/relevant facts; it would be
expedient that such plea be filed, in the first instance itself, before the Court
which had granted bail in question.
(vii) The degree and nature of proof required to be shown by an applicant
(seeking cancellation of regular bail) is that of preponderance of
probabilities and not one of being beyond reasonable doubt.
III. Plea seeking setting-aside of regular bail order.
(i) A plea seeking"setting-aside of a bail order" has to be
essentially filed in the Court, superior to the one which has granted bail.
(ii) In case setting-aside of a bail order granted by the Magistrate's
Court is sought for, such plea ought to be ordinarily filed before the Sessions
Court. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court as
also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973, the filing of
such a plea straight away before the High Court is not ipso facto barred. At
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the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (filed straight away
before the High Court) must show cogent reason(s) for not approaching the
Sessions Court in the first instance.
(iii) For setting-aside a bail order passed by a Sessions Court; such
plea, but of-course, will have to be filed before the High Court.
IV. Plea seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail/pre-arrest order
(i) A High Court has power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted by
it or by a Sessions Court.
(ii) A Sessions Court has power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted
by High Court or earlier granted by it. However, the Sessions Court can
cancel anticipatory bail granted by High Court only where the accused has
violated any condition(s) imposed by the High Court (while granting such
bail) or on account of such accused having misused liberty granted to him by
trying to influence witness(s) or having tried to delay trial by absenting
himself or having committed another offence(s) while on bail and other
factors of akin nature. In other words, a Sessions Court can cancel
anticipatory bail granted to an accused by High Court only on account of
such likes supervening/subsequent events but cannot adjudicate upon
veracity of the High Court order (whereby such bail was granted to such
accused.)
(iii) In case cancellation of an anticipatory bail granted by Sessions
Court is sought for; such plea ought to be filed ordinarily before Sessions
Court itself. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High
Court as also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. of 1973,
the filing of such a plea straight away before the High Court is not barred.
At the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (straight away filed
before High Court) must show cogent reasons for not approaching the
Sessions Court in first instance.
(iv) The factors for consideration in a plea for cancellation of an
anticipatory bail are whether the accused has misused liberty granted to him
by trying to influence witness(s) or has tried to delay trial or has committed
another offence(s) while on bail, whether accused has flouted the
cancellation of bail, whether bail was procured by misrepresentation or
fraud or concealing relevant material, and similar factors of akin nature.
There is no gainsaying that above factors are only illustrative in nature as it
is not axiomatic to exhaustively enumerate them.
(v) Where such plea raises ground(s) that bail has been granted on
account of misrepresentation of facts or a fraud having been played on Court
which has granted bail or concealment of material/relevant facts; it would be
expedient that such plea be filed, in the first instance itself, before the Court
which had granted bail in question.
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(vi) The degree and nature of proof required to be shown by an
applicant (seeking cancellation of an anticipatory bail) is that of
preponderance of probabilities and not one of being beyond reasonable
doubt.
V. Plea seeking setting aside of an anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail order
(i) A plea seeking setting aside of an anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail
order by a Sessions Court has to be essentially filed before High Court.
(ii) The factor, required to be considered in a plea seeking setting
aside of an anticipatory/pre-arrest bail order; is as to whether the impugned
order (granting anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail) has objectively dealt with
nature and gravity of allegations against accused, role of accused in the
crime(s) alleged, need for custodial interrogation, likelihood of accused
influencing the investigation/witnesses, likelihood of the accused absconding
from process of justice etc.
VI. Where a plea made under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973
raises grounds regarding "cancellation of bail" as also for "setting aside of
bail order", such plea has to be essentially made before the superior Court.
9. The factual matrix, as emerging from the record, is that the FIR
in question has been registered at the instance of the petitioner, who claims
to be running a residency/real estate firm. The petitioner firm (FIR-
complainant) intended to start a real estate project in New Chandigarh. It is
alleged that accused Ajit Vatas, along with his companions, approached the
complainant and assured him that they would arrange suitable land for the
said project. In this regard, the complainant was introduced to Talwinder
Singh Kahlon (respondent No.2 herein), Dr. Kanwaljit Singh, Ranjit Singh
and Gurmit Singh. It has been alleged that a Memorandum of
Understanding dated 21.06.2023 was executed between the parties, whereby
the accused persons undertook to arrange/collect approximately 52 acres of
land for the complainant firm. However, the said Memorandum of
Understanding was allegedly not signed by Dr. Kanwaljit Singh, who is
stated to be a government official, allegedly with an intention to conceal his
involvement and to facilitate the alleged fraudulent transaction. It is further
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alleged that respondent No.2 Talwinder Singh Kahlon, along with his
associates, introduced the complainant to one Charanjit Singh, Sarpanch, at
his residence, whereupon an amount of Rs.21,00,000/- was allegedly
received as token money, with respect to a proposed transaction concerning
6½ acres of land belonging to Charanjit Singh and his family members.
Thereafter, on 12.07.2023, it is alleged that Talwinder Singh Kahlon
(respondent No.2 herein), Charanjit Singh (Sarpanch), Rajpal Kaur,
Surinder Lala, Ramesh Kumar and Ajit Vatas collectively received an
amount of Rs.1,05,00,000/- from the complainant. It has further been
alleged that Dr. Kanwaljit Singh received an additional amount of
Rs.85,00,000/- in cash on 15.07.2023. Subsequently, respondent No.2
Talwinder Singh Kahlon, along with the other accused persons, continued to
assure the complainant that the sale deed of the land would shortly be
executed in his favour. In furtherance of the said assurances, the
complainant transferred Rs.39,00,000/- to the bank account of Charanjit
Singh and Rs.29,00,000/- to the account of Rajpal Kaur through RTGS
transactions. It is further alleged that after making the aforesaid payments,
the complainant demanded a consent letter from respondent No.2 Talwinder
Singh Kahlon, however, the latter continued to assure the complainant that
the sale deed with respect to 3-4 acres of land would soon be executed.
Thereafter, on 18.07.2023, on the asking of Talwinder Singh Kahlon
(respondent No.2 herein), the complainant allegedly paid an additional
amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- to Charanjit Singh and Rajpal Kaur, for which a
written acknowledgment was also executed, and the said document was
witnessed by Talwinder Singh Kahlon (respondent No.2 herein), Dr.
Kanwaljit Singh, Ramesh Kumar and Surinder Lala. It is further the case of
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the prosecution that on 21.07.2023, another memorandum/document was
executed between the parties, pursuant to which an amount of
Rs.10,00,000/- was paid in cash, while a further sum of Rs.20,00,000/- was
transferred through RTGS to the account of M/s Solitaire Estate Developers.
Despite receiving huge amounts of money from the complainant, running
into several crores of rupees, the accused persons allegedly failed to arrange
the land or execute the sale deed in favour of the complainant, thereby
cheating the complainant and causing him substantial financial loss.
9.1. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner has not
been able to point out any material on record to demonstrate that respondent
No.2-accused, after being granted the concession of bail, has misused the
said liberty by tampering with the prosecution evidence, influencing or
intimidating witnesses, evading the process of law, or otherwise interfering
with the course of investigation or trial. It is pertinent to note that it is
neither the stand of the State nor that of the petitioner herein that respondent
No.2 has misused the concession of regular bail by threatening or
intimidating the witnesses or by attempting to influence the investigation or
the pending trial. It is well settled that the parameters governing cancellation
of bail are distinct and far more stringent than those applicable at the stage
of grant of bail. Cancellation of bail is not to be ordered merely because the
complainant or the prosecution is dissatisfied with the order granting bail,
but only when there are supervening circumstances indicating misuse of the
liberty granted to the accused. In the present case, no material has been
placed on record which may prima facie establish that respondent No.2 has
influenced any witness, tampered with the prosecution evidence, or
otherwise obstructed the course of justice in the pending trial. In the absence
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of any clear, cogent and convincing material demonstrating violation of the
conditions of bail or misuse of the liberty so granted, this Court does not
find any justifiable ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction for
cancellation of bail. Moreover, there is nothing on record to suggest that
respondent No.2 has, in any manner, abused the concession of bail granted
to him. It is trite law that bail once granted cannot be cancelled merely on
re-appreciation of the facts and circumstances which were already
considered at the time of grant of bail, unless there is a clear case of abuse
of liberty or violation of the conditions imposed by the Court.
11. In the absence of any cogent material to show that respondent
No.2 has misused the concession of regular bail, no case is made for
cancellation of regular bail. The order passed by this Court is a well-
reasoned speaking order and cannot be said to be suffering from vice of
non-application of judicial mind. This Court, keeping in view the entirety of
the facts and circumstances of the case(s) in hand, does not find any good
ground to hold that this Court, while passing the impugned order has
overstepped its jurisdiction or has not exercised the same in right
perspective. Therefore, the petition in hand deserves rejection.
12. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of
the case in hand, no ground is made out to set-aside the regular bail earlier
granted to respondent No.2 vide the impugned order. Therefore, the petition
in hand deserves rejection.
13. As a sequel to the above discussion, the present petition,
seeking cancellation of regular bail passed by this Court, is dismissed.
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14. It, indubitably, goes without saying that nothing said
hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of
the case.
15. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
March 10, 2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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