[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sukhwinder Singh Gill vs Punjab Housing Development Board on 7 March, 2026
1
RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
Sukhwinder Singh Gill
......Appellant
Versus
Punjab Housing Development Board
......Respondent
Sr. No. Particulars Details
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 10.02.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 07.03.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 09.03.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or full judgment is pronounced
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by:: - Mr. Anil Kumar Garg, Advocate,
for the appellant.
Ms. Anu Chatrath, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. Ratik Chatrath, Advocate, and
Ms. Jyoti Pandey, Advocate,
for the respondent.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. Instant Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the
plaintiff-appellant
appellant against the judgment and decree dated 18.12.1989,
passed by the First Appellate Court, vide which the appeal filed by the
respondent--defendant
defendant against the judgment and decree dated
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
15.12.1986, passed by the trial Court, has been allowed and suit of the
appellant-plaintiff
plaintiff seeking a decree of declaration, has been dismissed.
2. Parties to the lis are being referred to as per their status
before the trial Court. The pleaded case of the plaintiff is that he was
appointed as Sectional Officer (C) by the defendant vide letter dated
12.02.1981. As per condition of the appointment letter, he was to
remain on probation for a period of two years, which could be extended
for one year more. Plaintiff joined
ined the service as Sectional Officer (C)
on 19.02.1981 by reporting at the office of the defendant at Chandigarh
and he was directed to attend his duties in the office of the Divisional
Engineer (C), Punjab Housing Development Board at Jalandhar.
Accordingly,
ngly, plaintiff reported at Jalandhar on 25.02.1981 and he was
assigned the duties as Sectional Officer (C) at Hoshiarpur Sub Division
where he joined on 26.02.1981. Two years' service of the plaintiff
completed on 24/25.02.1983 and till then no orders fo
for extension of his
probation period were passed or conveyed to him. However, vide order
dated 08.07.1983, probation period of the plaintiff was extended for
one more year. The plaintiff filed a representation before the defendant
against the order of extending
ending his probation period
period, however, he did not
receive any reply to the said representation. In the general transfers of
1982, plaintiff was transferred from Hoshiarpur to Ludhiana
Ludhiana, Division
No.1. Thereafter, vide order dated 19.01.1984
19.01.1984, passed by Housing
Commissioner services of the plaintiff were terminated on the ground
Commissioner,
that during probation period, the work and conduct of the plaintiff was
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
not satisfactory. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff filed representation
dated 01.03.1984, which was rejected
rejected vide order dated 26.03.1984 and
ultimately, on 04.04.1984 plaintiff served a notice through his counsel
as required under law, but nothing useful was done by the defendant.
Thus, plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the order
dated
d 19.01.1984, whereby services of the plaintiff were terminated
was illegal, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, mala fide, null and
void and the plaintiff be deemed to be still in service of the defendant
enjoying all the rights and privileges of his monthly salary, dearness
allowance and other allowances, including the annual grade increments
already accrued or yet to accrue in future.
3. Upon being served, defendant contested the suit by filing a
written statement taking various preliminary objectio
objections with regard to
maintainability of the suit and jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain
the suit. It was denied that the order extending the probation period of
the plaintiff was illegal, void or mala fide. It was stated that plaintiff
had earned adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports for the
years 1981-82,
1981 1982-83, which were duly conveyed to him on
10.06.1983 and 20.06.1983, respectively and his services were
terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of his
appointment as his work and conduct was found to be unsatisfactory. It
was stated that no show-cause
show cause notice was required to be served on the
plaintiff before termination of his services during probation period
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
4. Plaintiff filed replication controverting the pleas raised by
the defendant in the written statement and reiterated the averments
made in the plaint.
5. From the pleadings of the parties, trial Court vide order
dated 24.07.1985,
24.07.1985 framed following issues: -
"1. Whether the impugned order dated 19
19-1-1984/2-2-
1984 was illegal, void, malafide and without
jurisdiction? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration
prayed for? OPP
3. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purpose
of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP
4. Whether the suit is not main
maintainable in the present
form? OPD
5. Relief."
6. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence and
hearing the learned counsel for the parties, vide judgment and decree
dated 15.12.1986 decreed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the order
dated 19.01.1984, passed by the Housing Commissioner, terminating
the services
services of the plaintiff w.e.f. 27.03.1984 was illegal,
unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, mala fide, null and void and the
plaintiff shall be deemed to be in service of the defendant as Sectional
Officer enjoying all rights and privileges of his monthly ssalary,
dearness allowance and other allowances, including grade increments
already accrued or yet to accrue in future. Aggrieved against the
judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendant preferred an appeal,
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
which has been accepted by the first appellate
appellate Court vide judgment and
decree dated 18.12.1989 and suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed.
Hence, this Regular Second Appeal by the appellant
appellant-plaintiff.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the First
Appellate Court has failed to appreciate
appreciate that the probation period of the
appellant came to an end on 25.02.1983, therefore, extension of his
probation period vide order dated 08.07.1983, after about five months
of completion of two years' probation was void as, the appellant was no
longer
er a probationer and he was a confirmed employee of the
respondent--Board.
Board. He further contended that the First Appellate Court
ought to have taken into consideration that order dated 19.01.1984,
terminating the services of the appellant with effect from 27
27.03.1984
was illegal and stigmatic as the services of the appellant were
terminated even after completion of extended period of probation by
way of punishment on account of mis-conduct
mis conduct and inefficiency without
holding a regular inquiry. He contended that the judgment and decree
of the First Appellate Court is liable to be set aside and that the trial
Court to be restored.
8. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent has contended that the judgment and decree of the First
Appellate Court
Cour is legal and valid. Shee submitted that services of the
appellant were terminated during probation period as per terms and
conditions of his appointment letter inasmuch as his work and conduct
was found unsatisfactory. Shee further contended that the jud
judgment and
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
decree of the First Appellate Court is perfectly valid as expiry of
probation period does not confer automatic confirmation. Sh
She
submitted that the present appeal is liable to
to be dismissed.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and pe
perused
the record.
10. Admittedly, the appellant was appointed as Sectional
Officer (C) by the respondent vide letter dated 12.02.1981 on probation
for a period of two years, which could be extended for one year more.
Merely that appellant completed two years
years of probation on 25.02.1983
and there was no order of further extension of probation period and
mere allowing him to remain in service after expiry of two years of
probation period cannot be deemed to be confirmation. So long as the
order of confirmation
confirmation is not passed, even after expiry of probation, the
probationer may continue and remain in service but by allowing him to
remain in service it cannot be concluded that he must be deemed to
have been confirmed. The appointing authority is required to se
see the
performance of the work and conduct of the probationer. The First
Appellate Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant
could not claim automatic confirmation after period of two years had
expired.
The concept of probation is to enable the Employer to
analyse the work, conduct and behaviour of the appointee during the
period of probation to come to a conclusion whether the probationer is
suitable to be continued by confirmation in service. This power cannot
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
be taken away from the Employer on the anvil of the concept of
deemed confirmation. Deemed confirmation is a perilous concept in
service jurisprudence which has long been discarded since it erodes
into the power of the Employer to assess work, conduct and behaviour
of the probationer.
probationer. There may be occasions where the Employer being
unable to take a decision on the question of confirmation, extends the
period of probation for another one year, to give some more time to the
probationer to render services as a probationer by giving him further
opportunity to improve his lackluster performance rendered in the past.
This effort of the Employer to afford further opportunity to a
probationer may lead to cross the maximum period of probation
prescribed in the Rules. If deemed confirmation is brought into play,
notwithstanding the adverse remarks including that of 'integrity
doubtful' based on the lackluster performance, conduct and behaviour
of the employee,
employee, then, an anomalous situation would arise where the
probationer despite being unfit for confirm
confirmation, is deemed to be
confirmed, bringing into the service an employee of doubtful integrity,
whose service record is tainted with adverse remarks. This would be
deleterious to the very concept of probity on which the entire judicial
system stands.
11. The
he Hon'ble Supreme Court in Durgabai Deshmukh
Memorial Sr. Sec. School and another v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena and
another, 2019(4) SCT 346,
346, while dealing with a similar issue has held
that continuation of services beyond period of probation does not
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
amount to deemed
deemed confirmation of service unless issuance of order oof
confirmation by appointing authority. In the said judgment, it has been
held as under: -
"35. Admittedly, the appointment letter does not stipulate
that the first respondent shall be confirmed upon tthe expiry
of the probationary period. Rule 105(2) stipulates that an
order of confirmation may be issued "if the work and
conduct of an employee during the period of probation is
found to be satisfactory". Rule 105(2) lays down a condition
precedent to the issuance of an order of confirmation. It is
only if the appointing authority is satisfied with the
performance of the probationer that an order of
confirmation may be issued. Rule 105(2) contains an
explicit stipulation requiring the issuance of an order of
confirmation by the appointing authority upon its
assessment that the performance of the probationer has
been satisfactory. The mere continuation of the services of a
probationer beyond the period of probation does not lead to
a deemed confirmation in service.
service. It is only upon the
issuance of an order of confirmation by the appointing
authority that probationer is granted substantive
appointment in the post.
36. In GS Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of Police,
(1964) 6 SCR 279, a Constitution Bench of thi
this Court
considered the promotions of Sub
Sub-Inspectors of Police
under Rule 486 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual
which stipulated that all officers who are promoted will be
on probation for a period of two years and that they may be
reverted during the aforesaid period if their work and
conduct is not found satisfactory. Noting that the Rule
stipulated that "promoted officers will be confirmed at the
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
end of their probationary period if they have given
satisfaction", this Court held thus:
"8... Therefore even though a probationer may have
continued to act in the post to which he is appointed
on probation for more than the initial period of
probation, he cannot become a permane
permanent servant
merely because of efflux
lux of time, unless the Rules of
servicee which govern him specifically lay down that
the probationer will be automatically confirmed
after the initial period of probation is over...It is
true that the words used in the sentence set out
above are not that promoted officers will be eligible
or qualified
alified for promotion at the end of their
probationary period which are the words to be often
found in the Rules in such cases; even so, though
this part of Rule 486 says that "promoted of
officers
will be confirmed at the end of their probationary
period", itt is qualified by the words "if they have
given satisfaction". Clearly therefore the Rule does
not contemplate automatic confirmation after the
probationary period of two years, for a promoted
officer
icer can only be confirmed under this Rule if he
has given satisfaction.
atisfaction. This condition of giving
satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted
officer
icer can be confirmed under this Rule and this
condition obviously means that the authority
competent to confirm him
im must pass an order to the
effect that the probati
probationary officer has given
satisfaction and is therefore confirmed."
(Emphasis supplied)
In Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 21, the
appellant was appointed to a post in the Punjab Provincial
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
Service Class I. The appointment letter stipulate
stipulated that the
period of probation shall be six months. The appellant
continued on probation beyond the stipulated period of six
months and was eventually reverted back to his previous
post. He instituted proceedings challenging his order of
reversion. The appellant
appellant contended that upon the expiry of
the period of probation, he was deemed to be confirmed in
service. Rejecting this contention, a three judge Bench of
this Court held thus:
"9. ...The law on the point is now well settled.
Where a person is appointe
appointed as a probationer in
any post and a period of probation is specified, it
does not follow that at the end of the said specified
period of probation he obtains confirmation
automatically even if no order is passed in that
behalf. Unless the terms of appoint
appointment clearly
indicate that confirmation would automatically
follow at the end of the specified period, or there is
a specific service rule to that ef
effect, the expiration
of the probationary period does not necessarily lead
to confirmation. At the end of th
the period of
probation an order confirming the of
officer is
required to be passed and if no such order is passed
and he is not reverted to his substantive post, the
result merely is that he continues in his post as a
probationer... The terms of appointment do not
show that the appellant would be automatical
automatically
confirmed on the expiry of the first six months of
probation nor is any rule brought to our notice
which has the effect of confirming him in the post
after six months of probation."
(Emphasis supplied)
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
This view is also affirmed by the judgments of th
this Court in
Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra,
1991(2) S.C.T 452 : (1991) 3 SCC 325, Jai Kishan v.
Commissioner of Police, 1995(3) S.C.T 653 : 1995 Supp
(3) SCC 364, State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla,
1996(3) S.C.T 337 : (1996) 9 SCC 190 and Chief GM,
State Bank of India v. Bijoy Kumar Mishra, 1997(4) S.C.T.
383 : (1997) 7 SCC 550.
37. Recently, in Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale
v. Jayanthi Raghu, 2012(2) S.C.T. 526 : (2012) 4 SCC
793, a two judge Bench of this Court held that even where
the relevant rule prescribes a maximum period of
probation, the use of the words "if confirmed" denote a
condition precedent and that there is no deemed
confirmation of service unless a specific order of
confirmation is issued. The Court held tthus:
"38. Had the rule-making
making authority intended that
there would be automatic confirmation, Rule 4.9
would have been couched in a different language.
That being not so, the wider interpretation cannot
be placed on the Rule to infer that the probationer
gets
ets the status of a deemed confirmed employee
after expiry of three years of probationary period as
that would defeat the basic purpose and intent of the
Rule which clearly postulates "if confirmed". A
confirmation, as is demonstrable from the language
employed in the
he Rule, does not occur with eff
efflux of
time. As it is hedged by a condition, an af
affirmative
or positive act is the requisite by the employer. In
our considered opinion, an order of confirmation is
required to be passed." (Emphasis supplied)
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
38. It emerges from the consistent line of precedent of this
Court that where the relevant rule or the appointment
letter stipulates a condition precedent to the confirmation
of service, there is no deemed confirmation of service
merely because the services of a probationer are
continued beyond the period of probation. It is only upon
the issuance of an order of confirmation that the
probationer is granted substantive appointment in that
post. Rule 105(2) stipulates the satisfaction of the
appointing authority as a condition precedent to the
issuance of an order of confirmation. The argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent
that there is a deemed confirmation upon the continuation
of service beyond the expiry of the period of probation is
negatived by the express language of Rule 105(2). In this
view, the continuation of services beyond the period of
probation will not entitle the probationer to a deemed
confirmation of service. The High Court has erred in
holding that there is a deemed co
confirmation where the
services of a probationer are continued beyond the expiry
of the probationary period."
During probation period of the appellant, there were
adverse remarks on his work and conduct for the period from
27.04.1982 to 02.12.1982 and 03.12.1982
03.12.1982 to 31.03.1983 in his annual
confidential reports, which were conveyed to him vide endorsements
Ex.D4 and D6. Thus, the termination of his services, which were never
confirmed, was on account of his poor work and conduct during the
probation period.
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
12. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that
there should have been regular inquiry before termination of services of
the appellant as the order of termination was by way of punishment and
stigmatic, is not sustainable inasmuch as the services of the appellant
were terminated because of his unsatisfactory work and conduct during
the period of probation. It was a simple case of discharge from service
of a probationer at the end of probation, who was found unfit in view of
the work and conduct displayed by him during the period of probation
and cannot be said to be punitive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Director Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences
(ARIES) and another v. Devendra Joshi and others, 2018(2) SCT 382
whilee considering the similar situation has held as under: -
"13. It will be useful to refer to the relevant portion of a
judgment of this Court in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P.
State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd., 1999(1) S.C.T. 366 :
(1999) 2 SCC 21 para 33 & 34
34- Followed in Ratnesh
Kumar Choudhary v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical
Science, Patna, Bihar, 2016(1) S.C.T. 1 : (2015) 15 SCC
151, wherein it was held as follows:
151,
"33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that
the termination of the services oof a temporary
servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse
entries or on the basis of an assessment that his
work is not satisfactory will not be punitive
inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive
and not the foundation. The reason why they are the
motive is that the assessment is not done with the
object of finding out any misconduct on the part of
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
the officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in
Ram Narayan Das case. It is done only with a view
to decide whether he is to be retained or continued
in service. The position is not different even if a
preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of
a preliminary enquiry is to find out if there is prima
facie evidence or material to initiate a regular
departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in
Champaklal case. The purpose of the preliminary
enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of
the officer and if a termination follows without
giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a
case where a regular departmental enquiry is
started, a charge-memo
memo issued, reply obtained, and
an enquiry officer is appointed - if at that point of
time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of
termination is passed, the same will not be punitive
because the enquiry officer has not record
recorded
evidence nor given any findings on the charges.
That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur case and
in Benjamin case. In the latter case, the
departmental enquiry was stopped because the
employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of
the employee. In all these cases, the allegations
against the employee merely raised a cloud on his
conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in
Gujarat Steel Tubes case the employer was entitled
to say that he would not continue an employee
against whom allegations were made the truth of
which the employer was not interested to ascertain.
In fact, the employer by opting to pass a simple
order of termination as permitted by the terms of
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
appointment or as permitted by the rules was
conferring a benefit on the employee by pa
passing a
simple order of termination so that the employee
would not suffer from any stigma which would
attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other
punitive order was passed. The above are all
examples where the allegations whose truth has not
been
een found, and were merely the motive.
34. But in cases where the termination is preceded
by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings
as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived
at behind the back of the officer and where on the
basis of such a report, the termination order is
issued, such an order will be violative of the
principles of natural justice inasmuch as the
purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the
allegations with a view to punish him and not
merely to gather evide
evidence for a future regular
departmental enquiry. In such cases, the
termination is to be treated as based or founded
upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are
obviously not cases where the employer feels that
there is a mere cloud against the employee'
employee's
conduct but are cases where the employer has
virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings
of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at
behind the back of the employee - even though such
acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order
of termination.
ermination. That is why the misconduct is the
foundation and not merely the motive in such
cases."
13. No other point has been urged.
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RSA-903 of 1990 (O&M)
14. In view of the above, this Court does not find any
illegality or perversity in the judgment and decree of the First Appellate
Court, therefore, the same is upheld and the present appeal is hereby
dismissed.
15. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
07.03.2026 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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