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Punjab-Haryana High Court

Yuvraj vs State Of Haryana on 6 March, 2026

CRM-M--39873-2025                                                          1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH

101-7                                              CRM-M-39873-2025


Yuvraj
                                                          ....Petitioner
                                          V/s
State of Haryana
                                                          ....Respondent
Date of decision: 06.03.2026
Date of Uploading : 09.03.2026
                    0

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:    Mr. Sandeep Singh Jattan, Advocate for the petitioner.
            Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
                                         *****
SUMEET GOEL,
       GOEL J. (Oral)

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 4439 of the Cr.P.C.

for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. No.387 387 dated

10.11.2023, registered for the offences punishable under Section 10.11.2023, Sectionss 328, 302,

120-B, B, 201 of IPC and Section 72-A 72 A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (as

amended by the Haryana Amendment Bill, 2020) and subsequently deleted

Section 304 of IPC and Sections 120-B/302/201/307 120 B/302/201/307 of IPC have been

added) at Police Station Chhapar, District trict Yamunanagar, Haryana.

2. The gravamen of the FIR reflects that on 09.11.2023, 09.11.2023

information was received at Police Station Chhapar, District Yamunanagar

regarding the death of one Jagmal,, who allegedly died after consuming

intoxicating/spurious country-made count made liquor upon receipt of the said

information. The police reached Civil Hospital, Yamunanagar, where the information.

deceased had been brought. On the following day, i.e., 10.11.2023,, the

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statement of Mohit, son of the deceased deceased,, was recorded by the police, police

wherein ein he alleged that his father, who worked as a labourer, had consumed

country-made made liquor allegedly purchased from certain individuals, namely

Raj Kumar @ Babli, Naresh Kumar @ Khuba, Rajesh Kumar and Radhey.

Radhey

It was alleged that the said liquor was poison poisonous ous in nature and resulted in

the death of the deceased. On the basis of the said statement, FIR in

question was registered and investigation was set into motion. During the

course of investigation, several accused persons were arrested and their

disclosuree statements were recorded, pursuant to which the investigating

agency claimed to have unearthed a larger network allegedly involved in the

manufacture, supply and distribution of illicit and spurious liquor.

liquor

Subsequently, upon further investigation and in view of the material

collected by the investigating agency, Section 302 IPC was added while

Section 304 IPC was deleted at the stage of framing of charge. During the

course of further investigation, three more persons namely Anil Kumar,

Paramjeet and Sushil Sushil were also stated to have died after allegedly

consuming the spurious liquor.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the

petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question question.. Learned

counsel has further iterated that the petitioner petitioner has not been named in the FIR

at the time of its registration and nor any prosecution witness or arrested

accused initially disclose any role attributed to the petitioner. It has been

further submitted that even the main accused namely Ankit @ Mogli,, who is

alleged to have manufactured and supplied the spurious liquor, did not

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attribute any role to the petitioner in his disclosure statement which itself

reflects that there has been no material evidence pointing towards the

involvement of the petitioner petiti in the alleged offense. According to learned

counsel, despite the absence of any incriminating material, the petitioner has

been arrested on 14.02.2025,, i.e. after more than 15 months of the incident, incident

which itself casts serious doubt on the prosecutio prosecution case. It has been further

urged that the prosecution has failed to collect any independent or

corroborative evidence linking the petitioner with the alleged crime. It has

been further contended that the petitioner was not aware that any spurious

liquor has been manufactured at the said premises. It has been further

submitted that the petitioner has been nominated in the present case only on

the basis of the disclosure/confessional statement of a co co-accused accused person

and there is no independent or direct evidence evidence to connect the petitioner with

the alleged offence. Learned counsel has emphasized that such disclosure

statement has limited evidentiary value and cannot by itself form the basis

for continued incarceration of the petitioner. It has been further contended tended

that neither any recovery whatsoever has been effected from the petitioner

nor there is any documentary evidence against him him. According to learned

counsel, the entire prosecution case against the petitioner rests solely upon

custodial disclosure statements sta which by themselves cannot constitute

legally admissible evidence in view of the settled position of law. Learned

counsel has further submitted that the petitioner has been in custody since

14.02.2025 and the investigation qua him stands concluded. Furthermore,

the he challan and supplementary challan have already been presented before

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the competent Court of jurisdiction. Learned counsel has asserted that out of

107 prosecution witnesses cited not even a single witness has been

examined so far and the trial is likely to take a considerable period of time

to conclude. It It has been further submitted that the continued incarceration of

the petitioner, in the absence of any substantive evidence, would serve no

purpose. The petitioner shall undertake to abide by all conditions that may

be imposed by this Court, including not tampering with the prosecution

evidence or influencing witnesses and not leaving the country without prior

permission of the Court. On the strength of aforesaid submissions, the grant

of petition etition in hand is entreated for.

4. Per contra, learned earned State counsel has vehemently opposed the

grant of bail to the petitioner by arguing that the allegations are grave and

serious in nature as the case pertains to the manufacture and supply of

illicit/spurious liquor which ultimately resulted in the death of certain

persons. Learned State counsel has iterated that during the course of

investigation a larger conspiracy involving several persons engaged in the investigation,

manufacture and distribution of poisonous poisonous liquor has been unearthed.

According to learned State counsel, during uring the course of investigation the

name of the petitioner has surfaced and he has been nominated on the basis

of material collected by the investigating agency, including disclosure

statements of co-accused co persons.

It is further contended that merely because the petitioner was not initially

named in the FIR or that he was arrested at a later stage does not ipso facto

absolve him from liability when his involvement has surfaced during further

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investigation. Learned State counsel submits that keeping in view the investigation.

seriousness of the offence and the larger public interest involved, the

petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail. Considering the

gravity of the offence and the th specific role attributed to the petitioner,

learned State counsel has prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the available record.

6. The grant of bail falls within the discretionary domain of the

court; however, such discretion must be exercised in a judicious and

principled manner, ensuring it aligns with established legal precedents and

the interests of justice. While considering a bail application, the Court ourt must

evaluate luate factors such as the existence of prima facie evidence implicating

the accused, the nature and gravity of the alleged offence and the severity of

the likely sentence upon conviction. The Court ourt must also assess the

likelihood of the accused absconding or evading the due process of law, the

probability of the offence being repeated and any reasonable apprehension

of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

Additionally, the character, antecedents, financial means, societal standing,

and overall conduct of the accused play a crucial role. Furthermore, the

Court ourt must weigh the potential danger of bail undermining the

administration of justice or thwarting its due course. A profitable reference

in this regard is made to the judgment pass passed ed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

titled as State through C.B.I. vs. Amaramani Tripathi Tripathi,, 2005 AIR Supreme

Court 3490, relevant whereof reads as under:

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"14. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted bygrant oof bail (see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 377 (SC) :2001(4) SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179).

). While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnessess may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 254 (SC) :2004(7) SCC 528 :"The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very w well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be b undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non non-application pplication of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

a. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension ofthreat to the complainant. c. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (see Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, 2002(2) R RCR CR (Criminal) 250 (SC) : 2002(3) SCC 598 andPuran v. Ram Bilas, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 801 (SC) : 2001(6) SCC 338.

338."

This Court also in specific terms held that :

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"the the condition laid down under section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under er section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years ars in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail."

In Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 319 : 2005(1) (1) RCR(Criminal) 712 (SC) : 2005(3) SCC 143, this Court observed :

"The The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail orderr from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime..... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the cclutches lutches of the same indulge in various activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation.

situation."

7. Indubitably, the he allegations against the petit petitioner are grave in

nature. The material which has come on record, at this stage, prima facie

suggests that the petitioner specially attributed an active role in the alleged

incident. The gravamen of the allegations in the FIR discloses that the

deceased Jagmal has allegedly consumed illicit and poisonous liquor,, which

resulted in his death. On the basis of the statement of the complainant, the

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FIR was registered against certain persons who were allegedly involved in

the sale of such liquor.

liquor. During the course of investigation, several accused

persons were arrested and disclosure statements were recorded, which led

the investigating agency to unravel an alleged network engaged in the

manufacture and distribution of spurious liquor liquor. As per the case of the

prosecution, the name of the present petitioner has surfaced during the

course of further investigation through disclosure statements of certain co-

accused. On the basis of the said statements and the alleged role attributed

to him in the supply supply chain, the petitioner has been subsequently arrested on

29.02.2024 and was arrayed as an accused in the supplementary challan. It

is not in dispute that the petitioner has not been named initially and his

implication is based upon the material coll collected ected during the course of

investigation. It is also a matter of record that the investigation has

culminated in the filing of the main challan as well as a supplementary

challan and charges have been framed by the Court below against the

petitioner and certain ce other co-accused accused for offences under Sections 302, 328

and 120-B B IPC along with Section 72-A 72 A of the Punjab Excise Act. The

record further reflects that the prosecution has cited a large number of

witnesses and the trial is presently at the stage of re recording evidence.

8. The he allegations in the present case pertain to an incident

involving the manufacture and circulation of illicit liquor leading to loss of

human life which is a matter of serious concern. The prosecution case, at

this stage, prima facie indicates the existence of a conspiracy involving

multiple persons engaged in the supply and use of alcohol for the

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preparation of spurious liquor.

liquor The contention of learned counsel that the

name of the petitioner does not figure in the initial FIR and he has been

subsequently nominated does not, not by itself itself,, create a ground for grant of

regular bail, as it is well settled that an accused can be arrayed during the

course of investigation if sufficient material surfaces against him. Moreover,

such uch submissions submissi would require deeper appreciation of evidence evidence,, which

cannot appropriately be undertaken at the stage of consideration of a bail

petition. It is apt to mention herein that the petitioner has a long criminal

history involving a large number of cases reg registered against him.. Though in

some of the cases he has been released on bail but the nature of the cases

cannot be ignored while considering the plea for grant of regular bail bail. The

criminal riminal antecedents of an accused are a relevant factor while considering

the prayer for bail, particularly where there is a reasonable apprehension

that the accused, if released, may indulge in similar activities or may

attempt to influence witnesses. Furthermore, the petitioner is alleged to be

merely working as a labourer at the premises and the he allegations relate to the

manufacturing of spurious liquor, which is a serious offence affecting public

health and safety. At this stage, it cannot be said that the role attributed to

the petitioner is insignificant. The prosecution ccase ase specifically alleges that

the involvement of the petitioner surfaced during investigation on the basis

of material collected subsequently.

9. Furthermore, it is true that the petitioner has been languishing

in custody for a considerable period but thee seriousness of the allegations

and his criminal antecedents weigh heavily against him. The material which

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has been placed on record does not show that the delay in trial is solely

attributable to the prosecution. In such circumstances, long custody custody, by

itself, cannot be treated as a ground for grant of bail. Att this stage, no

accentuating circumstances have been made which may prima facie

constitute a compelling ground for the grant of regular bail to the petitioner,

especially in light of the gravity of the allegations and the evidence on

record. It is also to be borne in mind that offences of this nature strike at the

very root of public order and societal conscience.

10. Considering the gravity of the offence, the stage of the trial and

the overall facts facts and circumstances emerging from the record, this Court

finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of

regular bail in the factual milieu of the case iin hand.

11. There is yet another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which

craves the attention of this Court.

11.1 There is no gainsaying that the powers of the High Court under

Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 are powers which are unbridled, unfettered and

plenary in nature aimed at securing the ends of justice. The inherent powers

of a High Court are powers which are incid incidental ental replete powers, which if

did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the

process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In

other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-

life

blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a

High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of

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a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible

amplitude. These inherent powers powers are in consonance with the nature of a

High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s)

to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being

obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws

attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of

circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make

it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which

in fact arises. A High Court which which exists for the furtherance of justice in an

indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal

with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to

be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the pr process ocess of law and

Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact

the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect

and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance

with law, aw, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words;

Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court

may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in

particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent

vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the

parties and to secure the ends of justice.

11.2. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay

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Dubey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2023 AIR Supreme

Court 3263, 3263 relevant whereof reads thus:

"10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtful consideration, though the appellant may have a point that, str stricto icto sensu, in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court ought not to travel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grant bail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of that the Court concerned herein erein was not a 'Court of Session' but the High Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh, established under Article 214 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution").

11. This singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads us to decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for different reasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgment been rendered by a Court of Session, the factors that would have weighed with us would be starkly different.

12. A little digression is necessitated. The High Court is a Constitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The High Court has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the High Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest of justice. Recently, in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India,, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold as under:

"50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy injustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is only self-

self imposed. Gainful refer- ence can be made to, amongst others, A V Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani Wadhwani, (1962) 1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon,, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts, under the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the ability to issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For ex ex- actly this reason, this Court has never laid down any strait strait-jacket jacket principles that can be said to have "cribbed, cabined and confined" [to borrow the term employed by the Hon. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] the extraordinary powers vested under Articles 226

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or 227 of the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court to have examined the matter thre threadbare, adbare, more so, when it did not involve navigating a factual minefield.")

13. Returning to the present case, though usually the proper course of action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to the acceptance/rejection of the prayer for ba bail il made by the accused under Section 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied that there were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justice delivery system, could not have simply shut its eyes."

11.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as The

Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali,

2025 INSC 1155 has held as under:

"35. The practice of conducting trials on a day to dday ay basis more particularly in important or sensitive cases as was the tradition about thirty years ago has been given a complete go go-by.

by. We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice. For the purpose of reverting to the old ld practice, it is necessary to understand the current social, political and administrative scenario including the way the Police are functioning. All the High Courts need to constitute a Committee to discuss this issue very seriously for the benefit of th their eir respective district judiciaries."

11.4 The chronic protraction of criminal proceedings serves as a

systemic blight that transcends the individual interest of the accused,

inflicting a highly deleterious impact upon the collective conscience of the

society.

iety. While legal discourse frequently centers on the hardship of the

incarcerated, it is a grave juridical error to overlook the active suffering and

anguish visited upon the victim. For the aggrieved; an interminable trial is

not merely a procedural delay delay but a form of secondary victimization leading

to a state of perpetual emotional purgatory where the wounds of offense are

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kept raw by the lack of finality. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Rattiram and Others Vs. State of M.P. through

Inspector of Police; 2012 AIR Supreme Court 1485 while appreciating the

observation in Mangal Singh and Another Vs. Kishan Singh and Others;

2009 AIR Supreme Court 1535; observed as under:

"47. While delineating on thee facets of speedy trial, it cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused. The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v. Kishan Singh and ors., AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1535 wherein it has been observed thus :-

:

"Any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has highly deleterious effect on the society generally and particularly on the two sides of the case. But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in trial does not cause acute sufferin suffering g and anguish to the victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer even more than the accused. There is, therefore no reason to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial to the accused and to completely deny all justice to the victim tim of the offence."

The fundamental principle of an ever ever-evolving evolving liberty

jurisprudence dictates that prolonged incarceration, absent any realistic

prospect of a near-term near term conclusion of trial, renders continued pre pre-conviction conviction

detention constitutionally impermissible. Under the umbrella of Article 21

of the Constitution, the right to a speedy trial is recognized as an

indispensable facet of the guarantee of life and personal liberty. The pre-

pre

trial incarceration must not, by mere flux of time, be permitted to assume

the character of punishment, as the state cannot be allowed to achieve

through procedural delay what it has not yet achieved through a verdict of

guilt. However, this Constitutional promise is not an absolute or unregulated

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license, rather it ensures ensures that deprivations of liberty are neither arbitrary,

unconscionable nor unfair.

11.5 Where relief is being sought, solely upon the ground of

procedural delay, the court must adopt a golden mean approach, where the

rights of the accused/incarcerated person are protected without reducing the

criminal justice system to a state of toothlessness. Ergo, the Constitutional

inquiry into delay must be a contextual assessment of whether the continued

detention remains constitutionally permissible under the spe specific cific penumbra

of the case. Unless the delay is so inordinate that it shocks the judicial

conscience, it cannot be treated as a solitary determinant for enlargement. A

plea of delay cannot be examined in a legal vacuum or an abstraction;

instead it must be weighed against the gravamen of allegations; specific role

attributed to the applicant; trajectory of the trial; risks involved in

enlargement of the applicant on bail, etc. A profitable reference in this

regard can be made to the dicta passed by the Hon' Hon'ble ble Supreme Court in

Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of Delhi), SLP (Crl.) No.13988 No.13988-2025, 2025,

relevant whereof reads thus:

"26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the plea of delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the cours coursee of submissions and rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the nature of the allegations, the statutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. This was not a departure from the original submission, but a reflection of tthe he legal reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum. xxx xxx.

30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation must conform to procedure established by law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre pre-trial trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment.

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31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operating in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair. The expression "procedure established by law" reflects that balance. xxx xxx."

A justice delivery system rests on a simple promise; fairness

delivered in reasonable time. Any procedural protraction does not merely

delay the verdict; it actively erodes the edifice of public confidence in the

judiciary. When a trial is allowed to lan languish, guish, it transcends the aphorism

that 'justice delayed is justice denied' and enters the more perilous territory

of 'justice justice doubted'.

doubted . In the constitutional scheme of Article 21, the Right to

a Speedy trial is not a unilateral concession to the accused, bbut ut a collective

entitlement shared by the victim & the State, ensuring that S Scales cales of justice

do not rust through inaction.

11.6 Ergo, in cases where, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the

Court in its judicious wisdom finds that other factors preclude grant of bail,

a proactive approach to prevent travesty of justice must be adopted. In such

cases, the refusal to grant on bail must be coupled with a peremptory

mandate of expeditious conclusion of trial (or in appropriate cases a time-

time

bound conclusion of trial). A profitable reference in this regard can be made

to the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tarun Kumar Vs.

Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement; SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of

2023, relevant whereof reads thus:

"23. xxxx xxxx xxxx When the detention of the accused is continued by the Court, the courts are also expected to conclude the trials within a reasonable time, further ensuring the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution."

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11.7. Ergo; in the factual milieu of the case in hand which tends to reflect that trial is procrastinating and witness(s) are not being examined for one cause or the other; it is a fit case which warrants direction(s) from this Court for expeditious/time-bound expeditious/time trial.

12. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

(i) The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.

(ii) The Court below is directed to make an earnest endeavour to expedite the trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, possible preferably within a period of one year,, in accordance with law. If need be, the learned trial Court is at liberty to adopt the procedure of day day-to-day day trial as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali case (supra).

(iii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with w this order.