[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Baljeet Singh vs Maninder Singh And Anr on 30 January, 2026
CRM-M-43627-2023 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-43627-2023
Baljeet Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
Maninder Singh and another
...Respondents
1. Date when Order was reserved 23.12.2025
2. Date of Pronouncement of Order 30.01.2026
3. Date of uploading Order 30.01.2026
4. Whether operative part or full Order FULL
is pronounced
5. Delay, if any, in pronouncing of full NOT APPLICABLE
order, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY VASHISTH
Present: Mr. H.S. Randhawa, Advocate,
Amicus Curiae.
Mr. Jaspreet Singh Brar, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
None for respondent No. 1-complainant.
****
SANJAY VASHISTH, J.
1. Petitioner - Baljeet Singh has filed the instant petition,
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023), for setting aside
order dated 17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7), passed by the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Faridkot, in Criminal Complaint No.
NACT-787-2021 (Annexure P-3), titled as "Maninder Singh v. Baljeet
Singh", allowing the application under Section 143-A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the NI Act'), filed by respondent No.
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1/complainant, and directing the petitioner to pay interim compensation
to the tune of 20% of the cheque amount.
The petitioner has also challenged the order dated
26.07.2023 (Annexure P-9), passed by learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot,
in Criminal Revision No. 26 of 05.07.2023 (Annexure P-8), vide which
while upholding the impugned order dated 17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7)
passed by the Trial Court, revision petition filed by the petitioner was
dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the present case are that respondent No.
1/complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act alleging
that on 04.02.2019, the petitioner took a cash loan of Rs. 11,00,000/-
from him and agreed to pay interest @ 12% per annum, and also
executed a pronote in his favour. The said loan amount was to be
returned within 2 - 2½ years. Petitioner/accused also issued a cheque
No. 465230, dated 03.06.2021, amounting to Rs. 14,08,000/- from his
Account No. 02062413000137 in Punjab National Bank, Faridkot. When
the said cheque was presented to the bank, the same was returned on
15.06.2021, with endorsement "PAYMENT STOPPED BY
DRAWER".
After filing of the complaint (Annexure P-3), Trial Court
took cognizance and ordered summoning of the petitioner/accused to face
trial for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, vide
order dated 19.10.2021. During pendency of the trial, an application
under Section 143-A of the NI Act was filed by respondent No.
1/complainant seeking interim compensation, which was decided by way
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of impugned order dated 17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7), directing the
petitioner/accused to pay 20% of the cheque amount as interim
compensation to the complainant, within a period of 60 days.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred aforementioned
revision petition, which was also dismissed, vide order dated 26.07.2023
(Annexure P-9), passed by learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot. Hence, the
present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner is an agriculturist and had dealings with one commission agent,
namely, Rajesh Kumar, owner of M/s Rajesh Kumar and Company, Shop
No. 24, New Grain Market, Faridkot. Said Rajesh Kumar had taken 10
blank signed cheques from the petitioner as security towards their loans.
Petitioner was not having any financial dealing with respondent No.
1/complainant. It was said Rajesh Kumar, Commission Agent, who had
got presented the cheque in question through his good friend Maninder
Singh (respondent No. 1/complainant).
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that
after receiving summons of the complaint filed by respondent No. 1, and
apprehending misuse of other cheques, the petitioner also filed a
representation/complaint dated 03.11.2021 (Annexure P-5), to the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Faridkot, against Rajesh Kumar, Maninder
Singh and Beant Singh, with the allegation that they are misusing the
cheques which were given by the petitioner to Rajesh Kumar.
Learned counsel also argued that Section 143-A of the NI
Act is discretionary and not mandatory, as the word "may" cannot be read
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as "shall.", and the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the facts in
the right perspective and imposed the condition to deposit 20% of the
cheque amount and such a condition is illegal, arbitrary and in violation
of the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand and another, Law
Finder Doc Id # 2521128 : (2024) 4 SCC 419. Thus, prayed for setting
aside of the impugned orders dated 17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7) and
26.07.2023 (Annexure P-9).
4. This petition was filed on 28.08.2023, and from 01.09.2023
to 21.03.2024, hearing was adjourned six times on the request made on
behalf of counsel for the petitioner. On 14.05.2024, the arguments were
addressed and notice of motion was issued by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court. It was also ordered that operation of the impugned order shall
remain stayed till the next date of hearing. Thereafter from 22.08.2024 to
28.07.2025 turn of the case for hearing did not mature. On 20.11.2025,
this petition was ordered to be heard alongwith CRM-M-28757-2025,
and interim order was also continued.
Finally, on 23.12.2025 total 18 petitions came up for
consideration before this Court, of which present petition was one of
them. During course of hearing, it came to the notice of this Court that
the issue involved in the present petition pertains to Section 143-A of the
NI Act, and after hearing arguments the order was reserved on
23.12.2025.
5. It is also apposite to mention here that vide order dated
17.11.2025, passed in one of the aforementioned 18 petitions, i.e. CRM-
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M-54140-2025, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court appointed Mr. H.S.
Randhawa, Advocate (Enrl. No. P/1444/2011) as as Amicus Curiae, to
assist the Court on behalf of the respondents.
6. Assisting the Court, learned Amicus also submitted that
Section 143-A of the NI Act is discretionary and not mandatory, as the
word "may" cannot be read as "shall.", and the learned Court below
failed to appreciate the facts in the right perspective and imposed the
condition to deposit 20% of the cheque amount.
Learned Amicus, thus, submitted that the matter can be
remanded back to the learned Trial Court for decision afresh in the light
of the mandate of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra).
7. Before adjudging the sustainability of the impugned orders
dated 17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7) and 26.07.2023 (Annexure P-9), passed
by the learned Trial Court and learned Revisional Court, respectively, in
light of the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), this Court deems it appropriate
to first refer to the observations made by the respective Courts below for
reaching to the conclusion to direct the petitioner to pay interim
compensation to the tune of 20% of the cheque amount. Accordingly, the
relevant portion(s) of the aforementioned impugned orders are extracted
and reproduced as under:-
Impugned order dated 17.05.2023, by the Trial Court:
" Heard on application filed by the complainant
through his counsel to direct the accused to pay 20% of the
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cheque amount as interim compensation under section 143-
A of NI Act.
2. It has been pleaded in the application that
complainant has filed the complaint on very strong grounds.
It is further pleaded that accused may be ordered to pay
20% of the amount of the cheque in question to the
complainant as envisaged under the provisions of NI Act.
Lastly, prayer for allowing the application has been made.
3. Upon notice, reply to said application has been filed
by taking preliminary objections that from the admitted
documents as referred in the reply to the notice and other
aspects which are fully proved from the documents which
shall be filed at the time of consideration and decision of
this application, it is fully established that the accused is
under no legal liability to pay 20% of the cheque amount. It
is also established that the complainant has played a fraud
with the accused and wants to deprive him of his money by
resorting to all unfair and foul means. The amended
provisions requiring accused to deposit 20% of the cheque
amount are not mandatory. It is also submitted that the said
provisions adversely affect the rights of an accused to
defend the case free of any charges. The accused are even
entitled to get legal aid from the Legal Aid Services without
payment of any charges to the learned Advocates. The
accused are even immune from making payment of any sort
of Court fee. They have got a right to be defended from all
charges and without any costs and expenses right from the
appearance till final decision of the criminal case. Lastly,
prayer for dismissal of the application has been made.
4. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and
perused the record carefully.
5. Perusal of file reveals that the present complaint has
been filed on 06.08.2021 and accused was ordered to be
summoned on 19.10.2021. On 07.05.2022 accused was
released on bail and on 30.05.2022 after hearing on the
point of service of notice of accusation, finding a prima-
facie case being made out against the accused for
commission of offence punishable under section 138 of NI
Act 1881, notice of accusation was served upon the accused.
The contents of the notice were read over and explained to
the accused in vernacular to which the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial. However, accused was not ordered
to pay the amount of 20% of cheque amount as per latest
provisions of NI Act. To the mind of this court, the
application deserves to be allowed and as per latest
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provisions by insertion of section 143(A) of NI Act, accused
is directed to pay 20% of the cheque amount as interim
compensation to the complainant within period of 60 days.
Application stands disposed off accordingly."
Impugned order dated 26.07.2023, by the Revisional
Court:
"6. It goes without saying that trial Court has taken
cognizance under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, on the basis of cheque dated 3.6.2021, which purports
to have been issued by the accused in favour of the
complainant. Till this stage, accused has no where denied
that the cheque bears his signature. The accused had
opportunity to do so when he received the legal notice dated
6.7.2021. The accused having received the legal notice,
instead of filing reply, rather requested the complainant to
supply photographed copies of the cheque and the pronote.
No categoric stand was adopted by the accused whether the
cheque bore his signature or not. In any case all these facts
are matter of evidence yet to be established on record. The
question is whether the power of the Court under Section
143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act was justifiably
exercised by the Court by way of impugned order. It is clear
from the said provisions of Section 143-A that it is not only
the power which is granted to the court by the legislature to
direct payment of compensation not exceeding 20% of the
amount of the cheque, however, after empowering the Court
to pass an order directing to pay compensation under Sub
Section (1) of Section 43-A, thereafter Sub Section (2)
mandates that said compensation should not exceed 20%
and the period within which the interim compensation must
be paid is clearly stipulated in Sub Section (3). Sub Section
(4) deals with situation where the drawer of the cheque is
acquitted. Of course the stage at which Section 143-A of the
Negotiable Instruments Act is to be invoked is preliminary
stage, at this stage, it is not obligation of the complainant to
fully establish his case or an obligation of the Court to wait
for the accused to establish his defence. Because it is clearly
provided in Sub Section (4) of Section 143-A of the
Negotiable Instruments Act as to how the repayment of
interim compensation is to be done along with interest in
case the accused is acquitted, therefore, it cannot be said
that if the accused is made to pay the interim compensation,
he shall suffer from any irreparable loss.
7. This Court is of the confirmed and considered view
that whatsoever defence the accused is going to adopt and
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whether or not he will be able to establish his defence,
whether or not the complainant will be able to prove his
case during trial, those contingencies are not meant to
dissuade the Court in exercising power under Section 143-A
of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This Court is, thus, of the
view that the trial Court was justified in its approach when
it exercised its power under Section 143-A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act and directed the accused to pay 20% of the
cheque amount as interim compensation. No ground is made
out to interfere with the impugned order. While dismissing
the revision in hand, the impugned order is affirmed.
8. It is hereby made clear that the trial Court will afford
another period of 30 days to the accused to pay interim
compensation, failing which the trial Court will proceed
according to law. The period of 30 days shall reckon from
the date already fixed by the trial Court being the next date
of hearing."
8. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as
learned Amicus Curiae, and also gone through the material available on
record.
9. In the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), the
primary issue which came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex
Court was that whether the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 143A
of the NI Act, which provides for the grant of interim compensation, is
'directory' or 'mandatory', and if it is held to be a 'directory provision',
what are factors to be considered while exercising under sub-section (1)
of Section 143A of the NI Act.
10. After noticing factual matrix of the said case; provisions of
Section 143A of the NI Act; and rival contentions of the parties, in para
No. 19(a) of the judgment, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court
that 'exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is
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discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word
"may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall".
11. As regards the factors to be considered while exercising
'discretion', in para No. 16 of the judgment in Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava's case (supra), it has been observed as under:-
"16. When the court deals with an application under
Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima
facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the
complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the
accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1)
of Section 143A. The presumption under Section 139 of the
N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of
interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is
rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will
arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima
facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim
compensation. At this stage, the fact that the accused is in
financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if the
Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim
compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the
quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this
stage, the Court will have to consider various factors such
as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any,
between the accused and the complainant and the paying
capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is
found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may
exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim
compensation. We may note that the factors required to be
considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive.
There could be several other factors in the facts of a given
case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While
deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court
must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the
relevant factors."
12. Further, in para No. 19(b) it has been held that "while
deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record
brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors."
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13. Finally, in para No. 19(c) of the judgment, the Hon'ble Apex
Court laid down the broad parameters for exercising the discretion under
Section 143A, which are reproduced as under:-
"i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits
of the case made out by the complainant and the
merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the
reply to the application. The financial distress of the
accused can also be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be
issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima
facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima
facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in
refusing to grant interim compensation.
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to
grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply
its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be
granted. While doing so, the Court will have to
consider several factors such as the nature of the
transaction, the relationship, if any, between the
accused and the complainant, etc.
v. There could be several other relevant factors in the
peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be
exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are
not exhaustive."
14. From reading of the impugned orders dated 17.05.2023
(Annexure P-7) and 26.07.2023 (Annexure P-9), passed by both the
Courts below, it comes out that the cheque in question involved a huge
amount of Rs. 14,08,000/-, and plea of fraud has been taken by the
accused/petitioner in his reply to the application under Section 143-A of
the NI Act. The said plea has to be considered by taking into
consideration the probability of the allegations levelled in the complaint
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and also the feasibility of the payment of the said amount by the
complainant to the accused.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), this Court finds that
the pleas raised by the petitioner in reply to the application have not been
examined deeply or, if noticed, have not been appreciated by the learned
Courts below, by recording reasons. According to the judgement of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra),
while dealing with the application under Section 143-A of the NI Act, the
Court has to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case by taking note of
the version of the complainant and also the defence pleaded by the
accused in his reply to the application. While considering so,
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is of no consequence.
Furthermore, in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava
(supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has also laid down certain parameters,
which are already detailed in preceding para of this judgement. Since,
the judgement in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), has been
pronounced subsequent to the orders impugned in the present case, this
Court is of the considered view that the application under Section 143-A
of the NI Act, filed by the complainant, needs to be re-decided by the
Trial Court, because as per the information available on the web-portal of
Faridkot Sessions Division, Criminal Complaint No. NACT-787-2021,
titled as "Maninder Singh v. Baljeet Singh", is still pending at the stage
of defence evidence, and fixed for 11.02.2026, before the Trial Court.
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15. As a result of above discussion, impugned order dated
17.05.2023 (Annexure P-7), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist
Class, Faridkot, in Criminal Complaint No. NACT-787-2021, and the
order dated 26.07.2023 (Annexure P-9), passed by learned Sessions
Judge, Faridkot, in Criminal Revision No. 26 of 05.07.2023, are hereby
set aside.
Learned Trial Court is directed to re-decide the application
under Section 143-A of the NI Act afresh, after following the mandate of
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava (supra).
Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the
learned Trial Court forthwith, for compliance.
16. This petition stands disposed of in the above terms.
(SANJAY VASHISTH)
JUDGE
January 30, 2026
Pkapoor
Whether Speaking/Reasoned: YES/NO
Whether Reportable: YES/NO
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