Rupesh And Another vs State Of Haryana And Others
2026 Latest Caselaw 818 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Rupesh And Another vs State Of Haryana And Others on 30 January, 2026

CRM-M-22764-2024


             IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                         AT CHANDIGARH

119                                      CRM-M-22764-2024
                                         Date of decision 30.01.2026


RUPESH AND ANOTHER
                                                                 ...... PETITIONERS

                    VERSUS


STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS

                                                             ...... RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA PARTAP SINGH

Present :    Mr. Sandeep Kotla, Advocate
             for the petitioners.

             Mr. Parveen Kumar Aggarwal, Addl. A.G, Haryana.

             Mr. Govind Chauhan, Advocate
             for respondent No.4.

                    *****

SURYA PARTAP SINGH. J.

1. By invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court by

virtue of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter being

referred to as "Cr.P.C.", the present petition has been filed by the petitioners for

quashing of FIR No.47 dated 02.04.2024 Police Station Machhroli, District

Jhajjar. The above-said FIR has been lodged for the offences under Sections

323/427/447/506/34 of Indian Penal Code, hereinafter being referred to as 'IPC'

only,

2. In nut-shell the facts emerging from record are that the FIR of this

case came into being at the instance of Vinod son of Dalbir Singh, hereinafter

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being referred to as 'complainant' only. It was stated by the complainant that on

02.04.2024 at about 08.00 A.M., when complainant alongwith his son Divyans

was harvesting mustard crop with the help of tractor and thrasher of Bittu

resident of Machrauli, Rupesh and Sonu (petitioners herein) came there, they

forcibly stopped the tractor and picked up its key. According to complainant,

when his son tried to make the video of incident, the above-named assailants

snatched the mobile phone and broke the same. It was also stated by the

complainant that thereafter they were assaulted by the above-named assailants

and they also destroyed mustard crop by spreading it into the fields. According

to complainant, the above named assailants had also threatened them by saying

that either they should leave the field otherwise they would be killed.

3. It is the case of the prosecution that in view of above-mentioned

complaint formal FIR of this case was lodged and the investigation taken up.

4. Heard.

5. It has been contended on behalf of petitioners that the filing of

above-mentioned prosecution against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of

process of law, and that by cooking up a false story, the petitioners have been

falsely implicated in the present case. According to learned counsel for the

petitioners in fact the petitioners are co-sharers in the land, wherein the alleged

cultivation by the complainant was taking place. As per learned counsel for the

petitioner, the complainant has got no right title or interest, whatsoever, in the

agricultural land, where the alleged incident had taken place. It has also been

contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant are

claiming themselves to be a lessee of the co-sharers of the petitioners, and

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therefore, at the most they can step into the shoes of co-sharers of the

petitioners.

6. With regard to above, the learned counsel for the petitioners has

contended that allegations in the FIR against the petitioners are with regard to

trespass but as per settled principles of law unless the partition of joint property

takes place, by meets and bounds, the plea of co-sharers with regard to trespass

against other co-sharers is not sustainable. While claiming that the litigation

between the co-shares of the land in question, with regard to partition of the

same is in progress, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that

any FIR for the commission of offence punishable under Section 447 IPC is not

maintainable against the petitioners, and therefore, the instant FIR deserves to

be quashed.

7. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners

has referred to the principles of law laid down by this Court in the cases of

'Karamjit Kaur Singh vs. State of Punjab and Others' CRM-M-2080-2013

[decided on 03.10.2013] and 'Jaspal Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and

another' CRM-M-35031-2009 [decided on 26.04.2011].

8. The above-mentioned augments have been controverted by learned

State counsel, being assisted by learned counsel for the complainant. It has been

contended by learned State counsel that in the present case the entire thrust of

the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to the fact that

petitioners are co-sharers in the land, where the incident had taken place. As per

learned State counsel in the present case, there are allegations against the

petitioners that firstly, they caused hurt on the person of complainant, which has

invoked Section 323 IPC, and secondly, damaged the property of the petitioners

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by playing mischief, which attracted Section 427 IPC, and thirdly, intimidated

the complainant, which has attracted Section 506 IPC. According to learned

State counsel simply because the petitioners claims themselves to be a co-

sharers in the disputed property, it does not mean that they were entitled to

commit the above-mentioned offence, and therefore, on the ground which has

been taken in the present petition, the FIR cannot be quashed.

9. The record has been perused carefully.

10. In the present case at the very-out, it is pertinent to mention here

that the FIR in question has been slapped against the petitioners by specifically

alleging that the petitioners had assaulted the complainant, caused simple hurt

on his person and intimidated him by extending a threat to kill.

11. In addition to above, the contents of the FIR also shows that there

are allegations against the petitioners that they had destroyed the mustard crop

of the complainant. The above-mentioned allegations are very specific and

categorical. Here it is relevant to note that the fact that the petitioners claim

themselves to be co-shares in the suit property does not exonerate them from

the commission of above-mentioned offence.

12. With regard to arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that

the above-mentioned allegations are false, it is relevant to mention here that the

above-mentioned plea can be adjudicated upon by the learned trial Court only,

by appreciation of evidence. However at this stage in the present petition for

quashing of FIR, this question cannot be determined as to whether the above-

mentioned allegations are true or not.

13. Before adverting to the merits of the case it is relevant to mention

here that the guiding principles, wherein extraordinary jurisdiction for quashing

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of FIR can be exercised, have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India in the case of 'Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra

and others' 2021 SCC Online SC 315. Those principle are as under:

"i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in

Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable

offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable

offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any

kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will

not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with

circumspection, as it has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare

cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of

death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is

sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in

the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than

an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of

the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two

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specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the

other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary,

not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in

miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should

not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an

arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims

or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must

disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.

Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress,

the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the

FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It

would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy

facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated

or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation,

if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the

application made by the complainant, the investigating officer

may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned

Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate

in accordance with the known procedure;

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xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but

conferment of wide power requires the court to be more

cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being

had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed

by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court

in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has

the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged

accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section

482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the

FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The

court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the

merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the

court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate

the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the

aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High

Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim

order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the

quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an

interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually

and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in

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progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material

is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain

itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no

coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be

relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438

Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not

and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest

and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till

the investigation is completed and/or till the final

report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while

dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the

opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim

stay of further investigation, after considering the broad

parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons

why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be

passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the

Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with

the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no

coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters,

the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive

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steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be

adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be

misunderstood and/or misapplied."

14. In addition to above, in the case of 'State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335', the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India after

reviewing large number of cases on the question of quashing of FIR has laid

down that the FIR can be quashed in the following circumstances:-

a) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report

or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value

and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute

any offence or make out a case against the accused.

b) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.

c) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out

a case against the accused.

d) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

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Section 155(2) of the Code.

e) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

f) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a

specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

g) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.

15. With regard to similar situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India in the case of 'Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 Supreme Court

Cases 303', observed that in order to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the

abuse of process of Court, inherent power can be used by this Court to quash

criminal proceedings in which a compromise has been effected. As per Hon'ble

Supreme Court, the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding

or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and

different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the

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offences under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power

is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in

accordance with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the

ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court."

16. Similarly in the case of 'Sadiq B. Hanchinmani Vs. State of

Karnataka', Criminal Appeal No.4728 of 2025, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India has ruled that police investigation should be allowed to proceed unless

exceptional circumstances warrant intervention. According to Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India the High Court should not interfere with the

investigation when allegations in FIR disclose cognizable offences.

17. In the case of 'M/s Balaji Traders Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.

2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 175', the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has ruled

that jurisdiction of quashing of FIR should be exercised sparingly in the 'rarest

of rare cases'. As per Hon'ble Supreme Court of India allegations in FIR or

complaint must be taken at face value and accepted in their entirety to assess

whether they disclose a cognizable offence.

18. In the case of 'Muskan Vs. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya)' Criminal

Appeal No.4752 of 2025, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the

Court should not conduct a mini-trial at the stage of quashing and that quashing

of FIR should be an exception and exercised sparingly in rarest of rare cases.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has further held that Courts cannot

embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made

in the FIR/complaint.

19. In view of above-mentioned facts and circumstances of this case in

my considered opinion the factual matrix of the present case being altogether

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different, the principles of laws laid down in the cases of Karamjit Kaur Singh

(supra) and Jaspal Singh (supra) are not applicable to the facts and

circumstances of the present case.

20. As a sequel to above-mentioned observations, it is hereby observed

that in the present case even if the plea of petitioners is accepted on its face

value, even then there is no ground to justify the allegations against the

petitioners with regard to commission of offence under Sections 323, 427 and

506 IPC. The plea of co-shareship at the most help the petitioners qua the

allegation for the offence under Section 447 IPC. Hence, it is hereby held that

there is no circumstance in the present case which may warrant the exercise of

extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court, with regard to quashing of FIR.

In view of above-mentioned discussion, it is hereby held that being devoid of

merit the present petition deserves dismissal. Hence the same is hereby

dismissed accordingly.

(SURYA PARTAP SINGH) JUDGE 30.01.2026 vipin Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No

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