[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Hardeep Singh Atwal vs Bank Of India Etc on 21 January, 2026
Author: Sandeep Moudgil
Bench: Sandeep Moudgil
CWP-14246-1998 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-14246-1998
HARDEEP SINGH ATWAL
...PETITIONER
VERSUS
BANK OF INDIA ETC.
....RESPONDENTS
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 12.11.2025
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 21.01.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded 22.01.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or whether the full judgment is
pronounced
5. The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment and reason thereof.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL.
Present: Mr. H.C. Arora, Advocate with
for the petitioner.
Mr. K.P.S. Dhillon, Advocate
for respondent/Bank.
****
SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J
Prayer
1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the findings of the Inquiry
Officer vide order (Annexure P-6) and the order of punishment dated
05.07.1996 (Annexure P-8) vide which the petitioner has been dismissed from
service and the appellate order dated 13.01.1997 (Annexure P-10) by which
the said penalty has been confirmed by respondent No.3.
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The Conspectus Of Facts
2. The petitioner, a citizen of India, was working as an Assistant
Manager/Staff Officer at Bank of India, Gaggo Mahal Branch, within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. While in service, he was served
with a charge-sheet dated 21.03.1995 (Annexure P-1) containing three articles
of charge relating to alleged unauthorised transactions in Saving Bank
Account No. 5950, availing of a consumer loan in the name of another staff
member, and an alleged irregularity in availing a demand loan against bank
deposits.
3. Prior to issuance of the charge-sheet, a preliminary investigation
was conducted by Shri P.K. Kesri, Investigation Officer, who allegedly acted
in connivance with the Branch Manager. Statements were allegedly obtained
from the petitioner under coercion and various staff members were examined.
The charge-sheet was issued on the basis of the said investigation report,
though a copy of the report was never supplied to the petitioner despite
repeated demands. Parts of the investigation material were relied upon during
the enquiry, yet the Investigation Officer himself was not produced as a
witness.
4. During the departmental enquiry, only three management witnesses
were examined. The petitioner was denied production of several relevant
documents on the ground of privilege, contrary to the Bank of India Officer
Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (in short as "1976
Regulations").
5. After conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer held the
petitioner guilty of all charges. The Disciplinary Authority, ignoring the
petitioner's detailed representation and his unblemished past service record,
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imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal from service by order dated
05.07.1996 (Annexure P-8).
6. This decision was influenced by adverse observations of the Chief
Vigilance Officer, a copy of which was never supplied to the petitioner.
7. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal, which was dismissed by
order dated 13.01.1997 (Annexure P-10) without granting any opportunity of
personal hearing to the petitioner.
8. Aggrieved by the punishment order, the petitioner has approached
this Court seeking quashing of the enquiry report, dismissal order, and
appellate order, along with reinstatement in service with all consequential
benefits.
Contentions
On behalf of Petitioners
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the departmental
enquiry is vitiated due to blatant violation of principles of natural justice and
the mandatory provisions of the 1976 Regulations. The charge-sheet was
based on a preliminary investigation report which was never supplied to the
petitioner, though relied upon during the enquiry, thereby denying him a fair
opportunity of defence.
10. It is contended that statements recorded by the Investigation Officer
were exhibited and relied upon, yet the Investigation Officer himself was not
produced for cross-examination, causing serious prejudice. The petitioner was
further denied copies of examination-in-chief of management witnesses and
several material documents were wrongly declared privileged at the instance
of the Presenting Officer, in violation of Regulations 6(11) and 6(12) of the
1976 Regulations.
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11. Learned counsel argues that the Enquiry Officer violated Regulation
6(17) by not questioning the petitioner on circumstances appearing against
him and also conducted crucial proceedings in his absence despite a medical
certificate. The findings on Article-I are assailed as perverse and based on
presumptions, particularly when the alleged death of an account holder was
not proved by any death certificate and the evidence showed that the account
was not a joint account as alleged.
12. With respect to Articles II and III, it is submitted that the
documentary evidence established consent of the concerned staff member and
that the alleged omission was purely inadvertent, temporary, and caused no
loss to the Bank, and thus did not amount to misconduct.
13. It is further contended that the penalty of dismissal is grossly
disproportionate, imposed without considering the petitioner's unblemished
service record, and was influenced by adverse vigilance remarks not supplied
to the petitioner. The appellate order is challenged as mechanical and illegal,
having been passed without personal hearing and without proper consideration
of the grounds raised, contrary to Regulation 17 of 1976 Regulations.
14. Learned counsel therefore submits that the enquiry proceedings, the
dismissal order, and the appellate order are unsustainable in law and liable to
be quashed with all consequential benefits.
On behalf of Respondents
15. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the writ
petition is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed. The fraudulent
withdrawals from Saving Bank Account No. 5950 came to light in October
1994 after information regarding the death of the account holders. A detailed
investigation revealed the petitioner's involvement, and in his confessional
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statement the petitioner admitted withdrawal of Rs.20,000/- and Rs.10,000/-
from the said account.
16. It is contended that the petitioner was rightly placed under
suspension and charge-sheeted on 21.03.1995 (Annexure P-1) for serious acts
of misconduct, namely fraudulent withdrawal of funds by abuse of official
position, unauthorised credit of a staff loan amount to his own account, and
irregular availing of loan against his deposit by manipulating accounting
entries. A full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in
accordance with the applicable Rules affording the petitioner adequate
opportunity to cross-examine management witnesses and to lead evidence in
defence.
17. Learned counsel submits that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are
based on cogent documentary and oral evidence and clearly establish fraud,
dishonesty and misuse of official position by the petitioner. Non-production of
the Investigating Officer caused no prejudice, as the charges were proved
independently and the investigation report was not relied upon as substantive
evidence. Moreover, the documents claimed as privileged were rightly
withheld as internal bank correspondence.
18. It is further contended that the Disciplinary Authority passed a
reasoned order imposing the penalty of dismissal after due consideration of
the enquiry report and the petitioner's representation. The consultation with
the Chief Vigilance Officer was in accordance with the regulations and did not
vitiate the order. The Appellate Authority also passed a speaking order after
duly considering all the material on record while confirming the punishment.
19. Lastly, it is submitted that the writ petition suffers from delay and
laches, having been filed about eighteen months after dismissal of the appeal.
20. Heard counsel for both parties.
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Analysis
21. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties and perused the material placed on record, it is pertinent to discuss
the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It is well settled that the High Court does not act as an
appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own conclusions
for that of the departmental authorities. Interference is warranted only where
the enquiry is held in violation of statutory rules, principles of natural justice,
or where the findings are perverse or the punishment is shockingly
disproportionate.
22. On examination of the record, it emerges that the petitioner was
served with a detailed charge-sheet dated 21.03.1995 (Annexure P-1)
containing charges of misconduct to which he submitted his reply. A regular
departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the 1976 Regulations
and the petitioner participated in the enquiry, cross-examined management
witnesses, and was afforded a fair opportunity to build up a defence.
23. The contention that the preliminary investigation report was not
supplied to the petitioner does not advance his case. It is well settled that a
preliminary enquiry report is only meant to decide whether a regular
departmental enquiry should be initiated and does not form substantive
evidence unless specifically relied upon. In the present case, the findings of
guilt are based on documentary evidence and oral testimony led during the
regular enquiry. The investigation report was not treated as evidence, and non-
supply thereof has not caused any demonstrable prejudice to the petitioner.
Support for this view of mine, can be drawn from the judgment of the
Supreme Court passed in "State of Uttar Pradesh v. Harendra Arora, (2001)
6 SCC 392", wherein it was held that non-supply of preliminary enquiry
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report does not vitiate the proceedings unless prejudice is shown. Relevant
extract is as under:
"21. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions and
different provisions of law noticed, we hold that provision in Rule
55-A of the Rules for furnishing copy of enquiry report is
procedural one and of a mandatory character, but even then a
delinquent has to show that he has been prejudiced by its non-
observance and consequently the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in the case of ECIL, to the effect that an order passed in a
disciplinary proceeding cannot ipso facto be quashed merely
because a copy of the enquiry report has not been furnished to the
delinquent officer, but he is obliged to show that by non-furnishing
of such a report he has been prejudiced, would apply even to cases
where there is requirement of furnishing copy of enquiry report
under the statutory provisions and/or service rules."
24. Moreover, another grievance raised by the petitioner regarding non-
examination of the Investigating Officer is also without merit. The law is trite
that the Investigating Officer is not a mandatory witness in departmental
proceedings unless the case rests solely on the investigation report. In the
present case, the charges stood proved through independent evidence,
including bank records and testimony of management witnesses. The
petitioner was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
management witnesses on whose testimony his charges stood proved and thus
this stand taken by the petitioner pertaining to non-examination of the
Investigating Officer cannot sustain.
25. As regards denial of certain documents on the ground of privilege,
the record indicates that such documents were internal correspondence and not
relied upon to prove the charges. The petitioner has failed to establish how
non-supply of those documents prejudiced his defence as held in Harendra
Arora (supra).
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Interference of this Court
26. Moreover, the allegation of violation of Regulation 6(17) of the
1976 Regulations also does not merit acceptance. The same is read as under:-
6. Procedure for imposing major penalties :
(17) The Inquiring Authority may, after the officer employee closes
his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself
examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing
against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer
employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him.
The enquiry proceedings, read as a whole, demonstrate that the
petitioner was aware of the material against him and had adequate opportunity
to explain his conduct. Minor procedural deviations, if any, which do not
affect the fairness of the enquiry, cannot be a ground to set aside the
punishment. The Supreme Court in "Managing Director, ECIL vs. B.
Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727", has emphasized that interference in the
decision of a disciplinary proceedings by the Court is justified only where
procedural lapses have caused prejudice to the delinquent employee, while
observing that:
"31. Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not
furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary
proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the
report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not
already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give
the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was
prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing
the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusions that the
non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the
ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal
should not interfere with the order of punishment. The
Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of
punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting
to shortcuts."
27. Furthermore, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, as
alleged, cannot be simply termed perverse. With regard to Article I, the
conclusion is based on documentary evidence of withdrawals and the
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petitioner's own admissions recorded during the proceedings. It is trite that the
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is not open to judicial review. In "Union
of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610", the Supreme Court has
clearly circumscribed the parameters of interference and held that the High
Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or go into the correctness of findings of
fact, relevant extract of the same is as under:
13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to
note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before
the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by
the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High
Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The
High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
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(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience."
Proportionality of punishment
28. The contention that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate
is also untenable. The charges proved against the petitioner relate to fraud,
dishonesty, and misuse of official position in a banking institution, where
integrity and trust are paramount. In cases involving financial irregularities
and loss of confidence, dismissal is a recognized and justified penalty. The
Supreme Court in "Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v.
Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69", has held that no sympathy can be
shown in cases of bank officials found guilty of misconduct involving lack of
integrity while observing that,
"In the case of a Bank - for that matter, in the case of any other
organisation - every officer/employee is supposed to act within the
limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act
beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will
disappear; the functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and
unmanageable. Each Officer of the Bank cannot be allowed to carve
out his own little empire wherein he dispenses, favours and
largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a Bank can function
properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe
the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be
condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by
ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of
acting beyond authority - that too a course of conduct spread over a
sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances - is by
itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in
some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures
are not given to the employees of Banks which deal with public
funds."
29. The plea that the disciplinary authority was influenced by adverse
vigilance remarks not supplied to the petitioner is not borne out from the
record. The disciplinary order reflects independent application of mind to the
enquiry report and the petitioner's representation. Consultation with the
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vigilance machinery, as per internal procedure of the respondent bank, does
not vitiate the order unless such material is relied upon to the prejudice of the
delinquent, which could not be substantiated by the petitioner in the present
case.
30. Furthermore, this Court is of the opinion that since the Appellate
Authority considered all the grounds raised by the petitioner and passed a
reasoned order affirming the punishment granted by the Disciplinary
Authority vide order dated 05.07.1996 (Annexure P-8). Therefore, the
appellate order dated 13.01.1997 (Annexure P-10) also does not suffer from
illegality merely because the petitioner was not given an opportunity of
personal hearing.
Conclusion
31. In view of the seriousness of the misconduct proved and the concurrent
findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority, and the
Appellate Authority, this Court is of the opinion that no illegality, perversity, or
violation of the principles of natural justice exists in the findings of the Inquiry
Officer vide order (Annexure P-6), the order of punishment dated 05.07.1996
(Annexure P-8), and in the appellate order dated 13.01.1997 (Annexure P-10)
affirming the same and thus no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
is warranted herein. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed being
devoid of merit.
32. Pending application(s), if any shall be disposed off.
(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)
JUDGE
21.01.2026
Sham
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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