[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Punjab State Civil Supplies ... vs Randhir Singh And Anr on 19 January, 2026
Author: Sudeepti Sharma
Bench: Sudeepti Sharma
RSA-415-2023 (O&M) -1-
136
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-415-2023 (O&M)
Date of decision: 19.01.2026
PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION
..Appellant
Versus
RANDHIR SINGH AND ANR
..Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Present: Mr. Sumer Singh Brar, Advocate
for the appellant.
SUDEEPTI SHARMA, J. (Oral)
The present appeal has been filed against judgment and decree
dated 16.01.2014 and 30.04.2015 with delay of 1894 days in filing the
appeal.
CM-1486-C-2023
1. The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 read with Section 151 CPC is filed for condonation of delay of 1894
days in filing the appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the delay of 1894
days in filing the present appeal is purely procedural and unintentional. It is
contended that the appeal was initially filed on 09.03.2017, but was returned
on multiple occasions due to objections raised by the registry, and was
diligently re-filed each time i.e. on 25.05.2017, 27.09.2017, and thereafter
again in the year 2018.
3. During this process, the file was inadvertently misplaced from
the objection pad, and despite bona fide and sustained efforts, it could not be
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traced for a considerable period. The delay, therefore, lacks any element of
negligence or mala fides and deserves to be condoned in the interest of
justice.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant-appellant at
length and, with his able assistance, carefully perused the whole file of this
case.
5. Before examining the merits of the present application, it is
pertinent to note the settled position that delay is not to be condoned as a
matter of generosity or benevolence; the pursuit of substantial justice cannot
come at the cost of prejudice to the opposite party.
6. It is well settled by catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality but has substantive
value, being founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 seeks to
ensure that litigants approach the Court within a reasonable period and do
not sleep over their rights. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers
the Court to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown, such
discretion is neither automatic nor to be exercised as a matter of course.
Reference at this stage can be made to judgment of Apex court in Maniben
Devraj Shah v Municipal corporation of Brigham Mumbai 2012(5) SCC
157,wherein it is held as under:
"The law of limitation is founded on public
policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with
the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to
ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their
rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the
concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain
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alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the
legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to
condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown
by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the
prescribed period of limitation."
7. Similarly, in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2011) 4 SCC 363, Hon'ble the Supreme Court reiterated that a liberal or
justice-oriented approach cannot be invoked to override the substantive law
of limitation. The Apex Court observed that expressions such as "liberal
approach" and "substantial justice" cannot be stretched to obliterate the
mandate of limitation prescribed by statute.
8. More recently, in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025
INSC 672, Hon'ble the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Satish
Chandra Sharma, reaffirmed that although Courts may lean in favour of
advancing substantial justice, such indulgence cannot be extended unless the
applicant establishes a legally sufficient and satisfactorily explained cause
for the delay. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduce as thus :
31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the
plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost
duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona-fides of
the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation rather than starting with the merits of the
main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons
given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal
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footing, the court may consider the merits of the main
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay."
9. Again, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing
Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104, Hon'ble the Supreme Court recently
reiterated that for seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the applicant must explain the delay for the entire period
commencing from the date on which the limitation begins to run until the
actual date of filing. It has been categorically held that the explanation must
cover the entirety of the delay, and not just a part thereof. The relevant
portion of the judgment is reproduce as thus :
"115. However, as is manifest from the entire
discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of
delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
delay has to be explained by establishing the existence
of "sufficient cause" for the entirety of the period from
when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In
other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and
the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then
explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days."
10. Turning to the case at hand, the applicant seeks condonation of
an inordinate delay of 1894 days. I have perused the reasons stated in the
application in light of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. However, even affording the applicant every latitude, the explanation
furnished neither establishes a "sufficient cause" nor covers the entirety of
the delay as mandated by the aforesaid precedents which would justify
condonation of such an extraordinary delay. In the face of such an
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extraordinary delay, vague assertions or generalized difficulties do not meet
the statutory threshold.
11. It is a settled principle that while Courts lean towards advancing
substantial justice, they cannot do so at the cost of defeating the law of
limitation and causing serious prejudice to the opposite party. Once it is
evident that the applicant has failed to establish sufficient cause for
condoning the delay, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the
application is devoid of merit.
12. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is
dismissed.
13. Since the application for condonation of delay in filing the
present appeal is dismissed, the main case i.e. RSA-415-2023, also stands
dismissed.
14. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of.
January 19th, 2026 (SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
Ayub/Saahil JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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