[Cites 16, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Happy Singh vs State Of Punjab on 16 January, 2026

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

                               CRM-
                               CRM-M-68338-
                                     68338-2025

Happy Singh
                                                                    ....Petitioner
                                                                      Petitioner
                                        versus

State of Punjab
                                                                  ....Respondent

Date of decision: January 16,
                          16, 2026
Date of Uploading: January 16,
                            16, 2026

CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:-
Present:      Mr. P.S. Sekhon, Senior Advocate with
              Ms. Shefali, Advocate for the petitioner.

              Mr. Jaypreet Singh, DAG Punjab.

                                        *****
SUMEET GOEL,
       GOEL, J. (ORAL)

Present second petition has been filed under Section 439 of the Cr.

P.C. [Section Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short

'BNSS')] for grant of regular bail to the petitioner petitioner, in case bearing FIR No.161

dated 20.09.2023, 20.09.2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 22 &

29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short

'NDPS Act'),, at Police Station Passiana (Pasyana), District Patiala.

2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an

accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving alleged

recovery of 820 loose intoxicant tablets (Tramadol Hydrochloride) from the

polythene envelope thrown by the petitioner and his co-accused, accused, namely,

Dharampal Singh, Singh when they were apprehended by the police police.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner

was initially arrested on 20.09.2023, thereafter, he was released on interim bail,

vide order dated 30.10.2023. Learned counsel has further iterated that the

petitioner surrendered on 08.08.2024 and is in continuous custody since then.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that mandatory

provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied with, and

thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel for

the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof

cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has further iterated that

the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 01½ years. Thus, regular

bail is prayed for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing

that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus,

the petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State

counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of

Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned

State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 15.01.2026, in

the Court today, which is taken on record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through

the available records of the case.

6. Concededly, the petitioner was initially arrested on 20.09.2023,

thereafter, he was released on interim bail, vide order dated 30.10.2023. The

petitioner surrendered on 08.08.2024 and is in continuous custody since then.

After culmination of investigation, challan was presented on 20.04.2024. Total

11 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which, 03 have been examined

till date. Indubitably, conclusion of the trial will take long time. The rival

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contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be

ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it

appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may

prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the

likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering

with the prosecution evidence.

6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be

saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 15.01.2026 filed

by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration

for a period of 01 year, 06 months and 19 days, & is not shown to be involved

in any other FIR(s).

6.2. State This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of

Punjab passed in CRM CRM--M-64074 64074--2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying

upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul

Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh

vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd

Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;

Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias

Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The

State of West Bengal", Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated

22.08.2022 titled as "Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of

Gujarat"; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal

Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:

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"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre- trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The

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legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."

In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of

the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of

India.

6.3. Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt by the

petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea was dismissed on

21.04.2025. However, keeping in view the entirety of the factual matrix of the

case in hand; especially, factum of the petitioner having suffered extended

incarceration for more than 08 months & pace of trial; this Court is inclined to

affirmatively consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this

CRA--S-2332 regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA 2332--2023

titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof

reads as under:

"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

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II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed."

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is

not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is

ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the

satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in

addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty

Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.

(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.

(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.

(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

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(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.

(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those

which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed

hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant

shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

9. Ordered accordingly.

10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of

opinion on the merits of the case.

11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous

application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL) GOEL) JUDGE January 16, 16, 2026

mahavir

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No