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Punjab-Haryana High Court

Anchal Mittal And Another vs State Of Haryana on 15 January, 2026

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH




(156)
CRM-M-1519-2026
Anchal Mittal and another
                                                           ....Petitioner
                                        V/s
State of Haryana
                                                           ....Respondent

Date of decision: 15.01.2026
Date of uploading: 15.01.2026


CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:     Mr. Harman Bir Singh Juneja, Advocate for the petitioners.

                          *****

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS

2023, primarily seeking quashing of the order dated 05.01.2026 (Annexure P-

9) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri

vide which the petitioners were ordered to be summoned through non-bailable

warrants in case pertaining to FIR No.0060 dated 17.10.2023 under Sections

420, 419, IPC registered at Police Station Cyber Crime, Yamuna Nagar.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that earlier the

petitioners were released on bail by the competent Court and were regularly

appearing before the concerned Court. Learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners has further submitted that since petitioner No.1 was suffering from

acute abdominal pain and petitioner No.2 was suffering from viral infection,

they could not appear before the concerned Court on the date fixed and moved

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applications for exemption from personal appearance. However, , the learned

trial Court declined the applications and proceeded to cancel the petitioners

bail and issued non-bailable warrants for their arrest without affording an

adequate opportunity to explain his non-appearance. Learned counsel has

iterated that the non-appearance of the petitioners before the trial Court was

not willful and unintentional. Learned counsel has contended that the

procedure adopted by the learned trial Court in directly issuing the non-

bailable warrants against the petitioners at the very first instance is contrary

to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is well established

position of law, as reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the Courts

are required to adhere to due process while ensuring the presence of the

accused. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that in the instant case,

the learned trial Court has failed to issue any notice to the petitioner prior to

resorting to the issuance of non-bailable warrants and hence such an approach

is arbitrary, untenable and contrary to the procedural safeguard enshrined

under the law. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner

unequivocally undertakes to enter appearance before the trial Court as also

join the proceedings in accordance with law, the petitioner shall appear before

the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and also cooperate therein,

in accordance with law for an expeditious culmination of the trial.

3. Notice of motion.

4. Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, Senior DAG, Haryana accepts

notice on behalf of the respondent-State. She has opposed the petition in hand

by arguing that the petitioners have misused the concession of bail earlier

extended to them by not appearing before the trial Court & no plausible

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explanation has been brought forth as to why the petitioners did not appear

before the trial Court on the aforesaid date.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as also learned

State counsel and have perused the available record.

6. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others

vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME

COURT 429, relevant whereof reads as under:

"10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.

11. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.

12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with 3 of 6

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evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution."

6.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as

Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118, has held as

under:-

"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."

6.2. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled as

Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, has held as under:

"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances."

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7. A perusal of the record reveals that the learned trial Court, while

cancelling the concession of bail, straight away proceeded to issue non-

bailable warrants against the petitioners. In the considered opinion of this

Court, the cancellation of bail orders amounts to an unjustifiable restriction on

the procedural rights of the petitioner in the absence of any misconduct, lack

of bona fides, or a deliberate attempt to evade the proceedings on his behalf.

The issuance of non-bailable warrants must not be exercised in a mechanical

manner and the same must be adopted sparingly and only upon the recording

of cogent reasons reflecting the necessity of adopting such a stringent course.

8. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of

the case; especially the factum of the prime object of cancellation of bail and

forfeiture of bail bonds being securing the presence of the accused, the

petitioners-accused having come forward themselves to face trial, willingness

shown by the petitioners-accused to appear before the trial Court on each and

every date in accordance with law, the petitioners having submitted that they

shall cooperate for an expeditious culmination of the trial & there being no

tangible material brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioners

to interfere with the prosecution evidence; this Court is the considered opinion

that the petition in hand deserves to be allowed.

9. It is, thus, directed as follows:

(i) The impugned order dated 05.01.2026 (Annexure P-9) passed by

learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri is set-aside

subject to the petitioners appearing before the trial/concerned Court on or

before 23.01.2026 & shall furnish an undertaking that they shall continue to

appear before the trial/concerned Court on each and every date of hearing. It

is clarified that the trial/concerned Court shall be at liberty to impose such

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other condition(s) upon the petitioners, as deemed appropriate by it in the facts

and circumstances of the case.

(ii) The petitioners are directed to deposit a sum of ₹20,000/- as costs

with the High Court Lawyers Welfare Fund, Bank details whereof reads thus:

Account No.65018692589;

IFSC Code: SBIN0050306;

Branch Code: 50306;

Bank: State Bank of India, High Court Branch, Chandigarh.

It is clarified that payment of the aforesaid costs and production

of receipt/proof thereof before the trial/concerned Court shall be condition

precedent. In absence of deposit of such costs, the present petition would be

deemed to be dismissed without any further reference to the Bench.