[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Major Shaveta Sharma vs Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran on 14 January, 2026
CWP-49-2026 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-49-2026 (O&M)
Major Shaveta Sharma
....Petitioner
Versus
Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran
....Respondent
1. Date when judgment was reserved 12.01.2026
2. Date of Pronouncement of 14.01.2026
judgment
3. Date of Uploading judgment 14.01.2026
4. Whether operative part or full Full
judgment is pronounced
5. Delay, if any, in pronouncing of Not Applicable
full order and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Anurag Goyal, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Nikhil Lather, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Deepak Sabherwal, Advocate
with Mr. Gurnoor S. Sandhu, Advocate
and Mr. Abhishek Bhardwaj, Advocate
for respondent/HSVP.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari for quashing of impugned order dated 30/31.12.2025
(Annexure P-12) whereby the petitioner was ordered to be reverted to
the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). Further prayer has been made for
1 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:38 :::
CWP-49-2026 2
quashing the impugned conditions of probation in the letter of
promotion dated 17/18.07.2024 (Annexure P-7).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner had joined the Indian
Army as Lieutenant in March, 2001. She was promoted to Captain in
December, 2001 and thereafter, to Major in the year 2005. The
petitioner served the Indian Army till March, 2006 after which she
applied for the post of Sub Divisional Engineer (Civil) with the Haryana
Urban Development Authority in pursuance of advertisement No.2005/2
issued in November, 2005. She participated in the selection process and
was ultimately appointed to the said post vide appointment letter dated
30.11.2006 (Annexure P-1).
3. The petitioner received a promotion to the post of Executive
Engineer (Civil) on regular basis, as indicated by order of promotion
dated 05/07.08.2015 (Annexure P-2). However, while working as
Executive Engineer(Civil), on 15.12.2020, an FIR bearing No.710 dated
15.12.2020 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7,10, 13 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 at Police Station Gurgaon Sadar was lodged against her and
some other employees on the basis of a complaint filed under Section
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 regarding non-
completion of project and enhancement of agreement of constructions.
4. Further, for some other commission and omission, the
petitioner was charge-sheeted. An Inquiry Officer was appointed whose
2 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 3
report was presented before a personnel meeting of HSVP held on
03.07.2024, which consisted of Chief Administrator, Administrator and
the representative of the Finance Department. It was concluded therein
that disciplinary action cannot be taken merely on the basis of suspicion
alone. Accordingly, the charge-sheet was ordered to be dropped. In the
same meeting, the name of the petitioner was recommended for
promotion to the post of Superintending Engineering (Civil) w.e.f. the
date her junior had been promoted notionally and w.e.f. the date she
assumes charge of the promotion actually.
5. Subsequently, the petitioner and certain other officials were
inducted in another FIR bearing No.32 dated 05.09.2025 under Sections
420, 409, 120-B IPC and Sections 7, 13(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 registered at Police Station ACB Gurugram. It was
alleged therein that technically and financially ineligible contractors
were hired for road work worth Rs.52.15 crores, whose agreement was
enhanced from Rs.9.54 crores without fixing time limit or obtaining
performance security of Rs.2.60 crores. In furtherance of the same,
internal inquiries were conducted by the Chief Vigilance Officer, HSVP,
Department of Vigilance who recommended departmental action against
the officials involved. The copy of any such reports was not provided to
the petitioner and yet impugned order dated 30/31.12.2025 was passed
against her, reverting her to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil).
3 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 4
CONTENTIONS
6. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner contended that
impugned reversion order (Annexure P-12) mentions that while the
charge-sheet was dropped against the petitioner, the issue regarding the
work concerned has been raised in the audit report. It was also
mentioned that at the time of her promotion, inquiries by Anti-
Corruption Bureau and the Chief Vigilance Officer were pending
against her. However, they failed to mention that both these aspects
were taken into account while promoting the petitioner to the post of
Superintending Engineer. In the same vein, FIR No.32 (supra) cannot
have any bearing on the fate of the promotion attained by the petitioner.
7. He further argued that the petitioner has been reverted by
invoking her promotion order (Annexure P-7) which allows for such
action if her work and conduct is found to be unsatisfactory during the
period of probation. However, it remains unclear as to how such a
conclusion was arrived at. The lodging of FIR No.32 (supra) in itself
cannot as unsatisfactory work or conduct for the purpose of reversion as
it is settled law that criminal proceedings are considered to have been
initiated when the charges are framed. Notably, the FIR No.32 (supra)
has not reached that stage till date. Further still, no charge-sheet has
been issued to the petitioner with respect to the allegations levelled in
FIR No.32(supra) by the respondent. As such, the respondent has passed
the impugned reversion order (Annexure P-12) without any concrete
reason to believe that her work and conduct has been unsatisfactory.
4 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 5
8. Learned Senior counsel also submitted that the petitioner
was ordered to be promoted notionally w.e.f. 10.11.2022 i.e. the date of
notional promotion of her junior- one Sandeep Dahiya. Thus, the
respondent cannot take shelter of the condition of probation as the
petitioner has already completed the prescribed probation period by
10.11.2024. Otherwise as well, an employee need only undergo
probation and confirmed once during her/his service. The petitioner had
successfully completed her probation when she was appointed initially
as Sub Divisional Engineer. Learned Senior counsel emphatically
contended that unless it involves shifting of groups, the employee
cannot be subjected to probation at every level of promotion. If the
charges are proved against the petitioner, appropriate action can be
taken under the Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1987 (hereinafter
'Rules'), as applicable to the respondent, however, probation cannot be
used as a ground to revert her. The impugned reversion order has been
passed in complete violation of principles of natural justice as neither a
show cause notice was served upon the petitioner nor was she given an
opportunity to be heard. Since reversion is a punishment under the
Rules, the procedure prescribed therein must necessarily be followed.
Learned Senior counsel relies upon the judgment rendered by this Court
in Hawa Singh Sangwan vs. Union of India and others in CWP
No.6156-1987 decided on 15.05.1991 and J.S. Bagga vs. The State of
Punjab etc in CWP No.12639 of 1999 decided on 11.10.1999 to
support his case.
5 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 6
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the promotion order dated 17/18.07.2024 (Annexure P-7) of the
petitioner to the post of Superintending Engineer categorically mentions
that the petitioner shall be placed on probation for a period of one year,
which can be extended up to two years. It has also been clearly
mentioned that if the work or conduct of the petitioner is found
unsatisfactory, she may be reverted to her original post without serving
any notice or assigning any reason for the same. He argued that the
petitioner did not object to this condition at the time of accepting this
promotion, thus, at this stage, she cannot dispute the same. As such,
since the petitioner was still under probation, she cannot take shelter of
the Rules and can be reverted without serving a notice or assigning
reasons and such an order would not be considered stigmatic. Learned
counsel placed reliance on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench
of this Court in Ram Narain Yadav vs. The State of Haryana and
others in CWP No.17026 of 1991 decided on 04.03.1992 and a
Coordinate Bench in Bant Singh Rahi vs. Punjab & Sind Bank and
others in CWP No.6004 of 1996 decided on 30.01.2020.
OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after
perusing the record with their able assistance, it transpires that the
petitioner was reverted to the post of Executive Engineer from
Superintending Engineer stating that her work and conduct was found to
be unsatisfactory. Pertinently, the promotion order (Annexure P-7) of
6 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 7
the petitioner categorically mentions the terms of probation, as
reproduced below:
xxx xxx xxx
The above officer will be on probation for one
year which can be extended upto two years. During
the period of probation, they can be reverted to their
original post at any time without any notice and
assigning any reason thereof, if their work and
conduct are not found satisfactory during the
probation period.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Time and again, the constitutional courts have reiterated that
public employees have a right to be considered for promotion in
accordance with Rules and without any bias, however, the same cannot
be interpreted to mean that there exists a vested right to promotion.
Reliance in this regard can be placed on the judgments rendered by a
three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravikumar
Dhansukhlal Maheta vs. High Court of Gujarat 2024 AIR SC 3256,
wherein speaking through Justice J.B. Pardiwala, the following was
opined:
"81. However, in India, no government servant can claim
promotion as their right because the Constitution does
not prescribe criteria for filling seats in promotional
posts. The Legislature or the executive may decide the
method for filling vacancies to promotional posts based on
the nature of employment and the functions that the
candidate will be expected to discharge. The courts cannot
sit in review to decide whether the policy adopted for
promotion is suited to select the `best candidates', unless
on the limited ground where it violates the principle of
equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution."
(emphasis added)
7 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 8
12. On that note, it must be noted that the practice of probation
itself serves a critical and strategic function in public employment. The
prerequisite of probation allows the employer a locus poenitentide i.e.
an opportunity to change its mind with respect to suitability and
competence of the recruit as well as his/her overall fitness for a
permanent role. As far as the employees are concerned, once they
satisfies the employer of their abilities by successfully completing the
probation period, they are awarded with a permanent position as well as
the benefits and protections that come with it. Therefore, probation,
being a determinative stage, cannot be considered as an empty
formality. The same rationale can also be applied to cases of promotion.
Upon promotion, the duties and responsibilities of an employee may
change significantly, thus, it is the prerogative of the employer to
ascertain if they are well-suited for the same.
13. A perusal of the Rules would indicate that confirmation of
service of the employees of the respondent would be subject to clearing
the probation period. The relevant rules are reproduced below:
"8.Method of recruitment
Subject to the conditions, as may be laid down under the
Act and the regulations recruitment to the various posts
under the Authority shall be made by any one or more of
the following methods:-
i) by direct appointment; or
ii) by transfer/deputation of an Government
official already in service of the Central Govt. or any
State Govt. or any Board/Corporation constituted by
the Central/State Govt.
iii) by promotion out of the existing
employees These posts shall be filled by direct
8 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 9
recruitment and otherwise in the ratio, if any, as laid
down in column 5 of the appendix B to these
regulations.
13.Probation
(1) Persons appointed to any post in the service shall
remain on probation for a period of two years, if appointed
by direct recruitment and one year, if appointed otherwise.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) If, in the opinion of the appointing authority the
work or conduct of a person during the period of
probation is not satisfactory, it may;
(a) If such a person is appointed by direct
recruitment, dispense with his services; and
(b) If such a person is appointed otherwise, than
by direct recruitment;
i) revert him to his former post; or
ii) deal with him in such other manner as
the terms and conditions of the previous
appointment permit.
(3) On the completion of the period of probation of a
person, the appointing authority may;
(a) If his work or conduct has, in its opinion, been
satisfactory:
i) confirm such person from the date of his
appointment, if appointed against a permanent
vacancy, or
ii) confirm such person from the date from
which a permanent vacancy, occurs, if
appointed against a temporary vacancy; or
iii) declare that he has completed his
probation satisfactorily, if there is no
permanent vacancy, or
(b) if his work or conduct has in its opinion, been
not satisfactory:-
(i) dispense with his services, if appointed by
direct recruitment, revert him to his former
post or deal with him in such other manner
as the terms and conditions of previous
appointment permit, if appointed otherwise,
or
9 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 10
(ii) extend his period of probation and there
after pass such order, as it could have passed
on the expiry of the first period of probation;
Provided that the total period of probation, including
extension, if any, shall not exceed three years."
(emphasis added)
13.1. Clearly, as per Rule 8, promotion is a distinct mode of
appointment in itself and Rule 13 explicitly provides for probation of 01
year if an employee is appointed in a manner other than direct
recruitment, which includes appointment by promotion. Thus, the
respondent did not commit any error in imposing a condition of
probation upon the petitioner on her promotion to the post of
Superintending Engineer, as the applicable service rules provide for the
same.
14. Further, a perusal of the Rules would also indicate that
lapse of the probation period would not automatically entitle an
employee to a permanent status. The employee would only be made
permanent once appropriate orders are passed by the appointing
authority. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment
rendered by a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School vs. J.A.J. Vasu Sena
(2019) 17 SCC 157, wherein the concept of promotional probation was
considered and speaking through Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, the
following was held:
10 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 11
35. Admittedly, the appointment letter does not stipulate
that the first respondent shall be confirmed upon the
expiry of the probationary period. Rule 105(2) stipulates
that an order of confirmation may be issued "if the work
and conduct of an employee during the period of probation
is found to be satisfactory". Rule 105(2) lays down a
condition precedent to the issuance of an order of
confirmation. It is only if the appointing authority is
satisfied with the performance of the probationer that an
order of confirmation may be issued. Rule 105(2) contains
an explicit stipulation requiring the issuance of an order of
confirmation by the appointing authority upon its
assessment that the performance of the probationer has
been satisfactory. The mere continuation of the services of
a probationer beyond the period of probation does not
lead to a deemed confirmation in service. It is only upon
the issuance of an order of confirmation by the
appointing authority that probationer is granted
substantive appointment in the post.
36. In GS Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of Police,
(1964) 6 SCR 279, a Constitution Bench of this Court
considered the promotions of Sub-Inspectors of Police
under Rule 486 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual
which stipulated that all officers who are promoted will be
on probation for a period of two years and that they may
be reverted during the aforesaid period if their work and
conduct is not found satisfactory. Noting that the Rule
stipulated that "promoted officers will be confirmed at the
end of their probationary period if they have given
satisfaction", this Court held thus:
"8... Therefore even though a probationer may have
continued to act in the post to which he is appointed
on probation for more than the initial period of
probation, he cannot become a permanent servant
merely because of efflux of time, unless the Rules
of service which govern him specifically lay down
that the probationer will be automatically
confirmed after the initial period of probation is
over...It is true that the words used in the sentence
set out above are not that promoted officers will be
eligible or qualified for promotion at the end of their
11 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 12
probationary period which are the words to be often
found in the Rules in such cases; even so, though
this part of Rule 486 says that "promoted officers
will be confirmed at the end of their probationary
period", it is qualified by the words "if they have
given satisfaction". Clearly therefore the Rule does
not contemplate automatic confirmation after the
probationary period of two years, for a promoted
officer can only be confirmed under this Rule if he
has given satisfaction. This condition of giving
satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted
officer can be confirmed under this Rule and this
condition obviously means that the authority
competent to confirm him must pass an order to the
effect that the probationary officer has given
satisfaction and is therefore confirmed."
(Emphasis supplied)
In Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3
SCC 21, the appellant was appointed to a post in the
Punjab Provincial Service Class I. The appointment letter
stipulated that the period of probation shall be six months.
The appellant continued on probation beyond the
stipulated period of six months and was eventually reverted
back to his previous post. He instituted proceedings
challenging his order of reversion. The appellant
contended that upon the expiry of the period of probation,
he was deemed to be confirmed in service. Rejecting this
contention, a three judge Bench of this Court held thus:
"9. ...The law on the point is now well settled. Where
a person is appointed as a probationer in any post
and a period of probation is specified, it does not
follow that at the end of the said specified period of
probation he obtains confirmation automatically
even if no order is passed in that behalf. Unless the
terms of appointment clearly indicate that
confirmation would automatically follow at the end
of the specified period, or there is a specific service
rule to that effect, the expiration of the
probationary period does not necessarily lead to
confirmation. At the end of the period of probation
12 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 13
an order confirming the officer is required to be
passed and if no such order is passed and he is not
reverted to his substantive post, the result merely is
that he continues in his post as a probationer... The
terms of appointment do not show that the appellant
would be automatically confirmed on the expiry of
the first six months of probation nor is any rule
brought to our notice which has the effect of
confirming him in the post after six months of
probation."
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
38. It emerges from the consistent line of precedent
of this Court that where the relevant rule or the
appointment letter stipulates a condition precedent to the
confirmation of service, there is no deemed confirmation
of service merely because the services of a probationer
are continued beyond the period of probation. It is only
upon the issuance of an order of confirmation that the
probationer is granted substantive appointment in that
post. Rule 105(2) stipulates the satisfaction of the
appointing authority as a condition precedent to the
issuance of an order of confirmation. The argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent
that there is a deemed confirmation upon the continuation
of service beyond the expiry of the period of probation is
negatived by the express language of Rule 105(2). In this
view, the continuation of services beyond the period of
probation will not entitle the probationer to a deemed
confirmation of service. The High Court has erred in
holding that there is a deemed confirmation where the
services of a probationer are continued beyond the expiry
of the probationary period."
(emphasis added)
15. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India 1958 AIR SC 38 has
conclusively held that appointment on probation is inherently transitory
13 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 14
in nature and therefore, does not bring with itself the substantive rights
associated with a permanent post. Speaking through Justice S.R. Das,
the following was held:
"11. The appointment of a Government servant to a
permanent post may be substantive or on probation or on
an officiating basis. A substantive appointment to a
permanent post in public service confers normally on the
servant so appointed a substantive right to the post and he
becomes entitled to hold a "lien" on the post. This "lien" is
defined in Fundamental Rule Section 111, ch. 11, rule 9(13)
as the title of a Government servant to hold substantively a
permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has
been appointed substantively. The Government cannot
terminate his service unless it is entitled to do so (1) by
virtue of a special term of the contract of employment, e.g.,
by giving the requisite notice provided by the contract or
(2) by the rules governing the conditions of his service,
e.g., on attainment of the age of superannuation prescribed
by the rules, or on the fulfilment of the conditions for
compulsory retirement or, subject to certain safeguards' on
the abolition of the post or on being found guilty after a
proper enquiry on notice to him, of misconduct negligence,
inefficiency or any other disqualification' An appointment
to a permanent post in Government service on probation
means, as in the case of a person appointed by a private
employer, that the servant so appointed is taken on trial.
The period of probation may in some cases be for a fixed
period, e.g., for six months or for one year or it may be
expressed simply as "on probation" without any
specification of any period. Such an employment on
probation, under the ordinary law of master and servant,
comes to an end if during or at the end of the probation
the servant so appointed on trial is found unsuitable and
his service is terminated by a notice. An appointment to
officiate in a permanent post is usually made when the
incumbent substantively holding that post is on leave or
when the permanent post is vacant and no substantive
appointment has yet been made to that post. Such an
officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of
14 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 15
the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in
the former case or on a substantive appointment being
made to that permanent post in the latter case or on the
service of a notice of termination as agreed upon or as may
be reasonable under the ordinary law. It is, therefore,
quite clear that appointment to a permanent post in a
Government service, either on probation, or on an
officiating basis, is, from the very nature of such
employment, itself of a transitory character and, in the
absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating
the conditions of the service, the implied term of such
appointment, under the ordinary law of master and
servant, is that it is terminable at any time. In short, in
the case of an appointment to a permanent post in a
Government service on probation or on an officiating
basis, the servant so appointed does not acquire any
substantive right to the post and consequently cannot
complain, any more than a private servant employed on
probation or on an officiating basis can do, if his service
is terminated at any time. Likewise an appointment to a
temporary post in a Government service may be
substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. Here
also, in the absence of any special stipulation or any
specific service rule, the servant so appointed acquires no
fight to the post and his service can be terminated at any
time except in one case, namely, when the appointment to a
temporary post is for a definite period. In such a case the
servant so appointed acquires a right to his tenure for that
period which cannot be put an end to unless there is a
special contract entitling the employer to do so on giving
the requisite notice or, the person so appointed is, on
enquiry held on due notice to the servant and after giving
him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, found
guilty of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other
disqualification and is by way of punishment dismissed or
removed from service or reduced in rank. The substantive
appointment to a temporary post, under the rules, used to
give the servant so appointed certain benefits regarding
pay and leave, but was otherwise on the same footing as
appointment to a temporary post on probation or on an
officiating basis, that is to say, terminable by notice except
15 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 16
where under the rules promulgated in 1949 to which
reference Will hereafter be made, his service had ripened
into what is called a quasi-permanent service."
16. Further still, the concept of probation cannot be read disjoint
from "pending confirmation." It is the prerogative of the respondent-
employer to establish that the petitioner would be fit for the job of
Superintending Engineer. Moreover, being a public employer, the
respondent is justified in ensuring that the taxpayer's money is spent
responsibly. Thus, an employee on promotional probation may be
reverted to his/her original post if their work and conduct is found dis-
satisfactory. Moreover, this Court in Ram Narain Yadav (supra) and
Bant Singh Rahi (supra) has made it clear that that an order of
reversion passed during probation period of an employee for
unsatisfactory work and conduct cannot be considered to be stigmatic or
discriminatory, particularly when the same is in consonance with the
applicable service rules and the terms of the appointment of the
petitioner as a Superintending Engineer. As such, this Court does not
find any force in the argument put forth by the learned Senior counsel
for the petitioner that the petitioner cannot put through a second
probation upon promotion and that the same may be deemed to have
successfully completed with the efflux of time.
17. However, admittedly, no opportunity of personal hearing
was provided to the petitioner before passing the impugned reversion
order (Annexure P-12). Reversion is a serious civil consequence that
impacts the career trajectory of an employee, which necessarily has
16 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 15-01-2026 09:45:39 :::
CWP-49-2026 17
financial and societal implications. Thus, such an action ought not to be
taken accordance with the principles of natural justice in order to serve
the cause of justice and fairness.
18. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3
SCC 545 emphasised upon the importance of the adherence to the
principles of natural justice, especially audi alteram partem. Speaking
through Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, the following was held:
"48. Any discussion of this topic would be incomplete
without reference to an important decision of this Court
in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, 1986 R.R.R. 341 : (1981) 1
SCR 746, 766 at (p. 147). In that case, the supersession of
the New Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the
ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural
justice since, no show cause notice was issued before the
order of supersession was passed. Linked with that
question was the question whether the failure to observe
the principles of natural justice matters at all, if such
observance would have made no difference, the admitted or
indisputable facts speaking for themselves. After referring
to the decisions in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 at p.
68; John v. Rees, (1970) 1 Ch 345 at p.
402; Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers' Trade Union,
(1961) 3 All England Reporter 621 at p. 625
(HL): Mangarita Fuentes ot al v. Robert L. Shevin, (1972)
32 Law ED 2d 556 at p. 574; Chintepali Agency Tulak
Arrack Sales Co-op, Society Ltd. v. Secy, (Food and
Agriculture) Govt. of A.P., (1978) 1 SCR 563 at 567, 569-
70 at pp. 2316 and 2318 and to an interesting discussion of
the subject in Jackson's Natural Justice (1980 Edn.), the
Court, speaking through one of us. Chinnappa Reddy, J.
said :
''In our view the principles of natural justice know
of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it
would have made any difference if natural justice
17 of 22
had been observed. The non-observation of natural
justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of
prejudice independently of proof of denial of
natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a
person who has denied justice that the person who
has been denied justice is not prejudiced.''
These observations sum up the true legal position
regarding the purport and implications of the right of
hearing."
(emphasis added)
19. A three-Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow Versus Commissioner of Income Tax,
Central-I and another (2008) 14 SCC 151 elaborated on the scope and
applicability of the principles of natural justice. Speaking through
Justice D.K. Jain, the following was opined:
"15. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The
phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise
definition. The underlying principle of natural justice,
evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary
exercise of power by the State or its functionaries.
Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e.
fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] the aim of
rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it
negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules
can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly
made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it.
(Also see ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC
455.
16. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1
SCC 664] R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a
three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and
scope of the concept of "natural justice". Referring to
several decisions, His Lordship observed thus: (SCC p.
666)
18 of 22
"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules.
Being means to an end and not an end in themselves,
it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of
such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of
natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii)
nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule
has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the
case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This
rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
administrative convenience or celerity. The general
principles distinguished from an absolute rule of
uniform application seems to be that where a statute
does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing
but contemplates a post-decisional hearing
amounting to a full review of the original order on
merits, then such a statute would be construed as
excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the
predecisional stage. Conversely if the statute
conferring the power is silent with regard to the
giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person
affected and the administrative decision taken by the
authority involves civil consequences of a grave
nature, and no full review or appeal on merits
against that decision is provided, courts will be
extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as
excluding the duty of affording even a minimal
hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and
dilatory features at the predecisional stage, unless,
viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the
administrative process or frustrate the need for
utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play
must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional
circumstances where compulsive necessity so
demands. The court must make every effort to
salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent
possible, with situational modifications. But, the
core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the
person affected must have reasonable opportunity
of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine
hearing and not an empty public relations
exercise."
19 of 22
17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of
natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasijudicial
proceedings and not to an administrative action. However,
in State of Orissa v. Dr.Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269 :
(1967) 2 SCR 625] the distinction between quasi-judicial
and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated
and it was held that even an administrative order or
decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be
made consistent with the rules of natural justice. Since then
the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is
invariably read into administrative actions involving civil
consequences, unless the statute, conferring power,
excludes its application by express language.
18. Recently, in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC
321 the concept, scope, history of development and
significance of principles of natural justice have been
discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the
subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural
justice are those rules which have been laid down by the
courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the
individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be
adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
authority while making an order affecting those rights, the
Court said: (SCC pp. 331-32, para 14)
"14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a
great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural
justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a
statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be
implied from the nature of the duty to be performed
under a statute. What particular rule of natural
justice should be implied and what its context should
be in a given case must depend to a great extent on
the fact and circumstances of that case, the
framework of the statute under which the enquiry is
held. The old distinction between a judicial act and
an administrative act has withered away. Even an
administrative order which involves civil
consequences must be consistent with the rules of
natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences'
encompasses infraction of not merely property or
personal rights but of civil liberties, material
20 of 22
deprivations and nonpecuniary damages. In its wide
umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in
his civil life."
19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision
either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the
application of principles of natural justice, because in that
event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate,
the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being
heard before an order is made, is generally read into the
provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has
adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The
principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power
conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative
or quasi-judicial.
20. We may, however, hasten to add that no general rule of
universal application can be laid down as to the
applicability of the principle audi alteram partem, in
addition to the language of the provision. Undoubtedly,
there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we
refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases
where the said principle should be applied. The question
whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be
considered bearing in mind the express language and the
basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the
nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which
the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of
that power. It is only upon a consideration of all these
matters that the question of application of the said
principle can be properly determined. (See Union of India
v. Col. J.N. Sinha (1970) 2 SCC 458.
21. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.
(1978) 1 SCC 405 explaining as to what is meant by
expression "civil consequence", Krishna Iyer, J., speaking
for the majority said: (SCC p. 440, para 66)
"66. ... 'Civil consequences' undoubtedly cover
infraction of not merely property or personal rights
but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-
pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive
connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his
civil life inflicts a civil consequence."
21 of 22
CONCLUSION
20. As such, the manner of passing of the impugned reversion
order (Annexure P-12) does not satisfy the objective standards of logic
and justice and deserves to be set aside while no intervention is required
with regards to the condition of probation imposed in the order of
promotion (Annexure P-7). Accordingly, the present petition is allowed
and the impugned order dated 30/31.12.2025 (Annexure P-12) is hereby
quashed. However, the respondent shall be at liberty to pass fresh
orders, if deemed necessary.
21. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
14.01.2026
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
22 of 22
