Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 118 P&H
Judgement Date : 12 January, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(156)
CRM-M-70373-2025
Amarjeet Singh
....Petitioner
V/s
State of Punjab
....Respondent
Date of decision: 12.01.2026
Date of uploading: 12.01.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Kachura, Advocate for the petitioner.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS
2023, primarily seeking quashing of the order dated 26.09.2025
(Annexure P-8) passed by learned Sessions Judge, Fazilka vide which the
petitioner was ordered to be summoned through non-bailable warrants in case
pertaining to FIR No.80 dated 02.05.2022 registered for the offences
punishable under Section 379 of IPC and Section 21 of the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, at Police Station Sadar Fazilka,
District Fazilka.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was
earlier granted the concession of anticipatory bail by the concerned Sessions
Court vide order dated 07.05.2022 (Annexure P-2). Thereafter, the challan
was presented before the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial
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Magistrate, Fazilka and notice was issued to the petitioner vide order dated
30.11.2024, which was received back unserved. Then the petitioner was
summoned through bailable warrants for 05.05.2025, which were received
back unexecuted. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further argued
that thereafter vide order dated 29.07.2025 the case was committed to learned
Sessions Judge, Fazilka and he was ordered to be summoned through non-
bailable warrants for 26.09.2025. Thereafter, on 26.09.2025 on this account
the trial Court proceeded to cancel the petitioner's bail and issued non-bailable
warrants for his arrest without affording an adequate opportunity to explain
his non-appearance. Learned counsel has iterated that the non-appearance of
the petitioner before the trial Court was not willful and unintentional. Learned
counsel has contended that the procedure adopted by the learned trial Court in
directly issuing the non-bailable warrants against the petitioner is contrary to
the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is well established position
of law, as reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the Courts are
required to adhere to due process while ensuring the presence of the accused.
Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner unequivocally
undertakes to enter appearance before the trial Court as also join the
proceedings in accordance with law, the petitioner shall appear before the trial
Court on each and every date of hearing and also cooperate therein, in
accordance with law for an expeditious culmination of the trial.
3. Notice of motion.
4. Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Addl. AG, Punjab accepts notice on
behalf of the respondent-State. She has opposed the petition in hand by
arguing that the petitioner has misused the concession of bail earlier extended
to him by not appearing before the trial Court & no plausible explanation has
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been brought forth as to why the petitioner did not appear before the trial Court
on the aforesaid date.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the available record.
6. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others
vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME
COURT 429, relevant whereof reads as under:
"10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.
11. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.
12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with
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evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution."
6.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as
Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118, has held as
under:-
"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."
6.2. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled as
Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, has held as under:
"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances."
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7. A perusal of the record reveals that the learned trial Court, while
cancelling the concession of bail, straight away proceeded to issue non-
bailable warrants against the petitioner. In the considered opinion of this
Court, the cancellation of bail orders amounts to an unjustifiable restriction on
the procedural rights of the petitioner in the absence of any misconduct, lack
of bona fides, or a deliberate attempt to evade the proceedings on his behalf.
The issuance of non-bailable warrants must not be exercised in a mechanical
manner and the same must be adopted sparingly and only upon the recording
of cogent reasons reflecting the necessity of adopting such a stringent course.
8. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of
the case; especially the factum of the prime object of cancellation of bail and
forfeiture of bail bonds being securing the presence of the accused, the
petitioner-accused having come forward himself to face trial, willingness
shown by the petitioner-accused to appear before the trial Court on each and
every date in accordance with law, the petitioner having submitted that he
shall cooperate for an expeditious culmination of the trial & there being no
tangible material brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner
to interfere with the prosecution evidence; this Court is the considered opinion
that the petition in hand deserves to be allowed.
9. It is, thus, directed as follows:
(i) The impugned order dated 26.09.2025 (Annexure P-8) passed by
learned Sessions Judge, Fazilka is set-aside subject to the petitioner appearing
before the trial/concerned Court on or before 21.02.2026 & shall furnish an
undertaking that the petitioner shall continue to appear before the
trial/concerned Court on each and every date of hearing. It is clarified that the
trial/concerned Court shall be at liberty to impose such other condition(s)
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upon the petitioner, as deemed appropriate by it in the facts and circumstances
of the case.
(ii) The petitioner is directed to deposit a sum of ₹10,000/- as costs
with the High Court Lawyers Welfare Fund, Bank details whereof reads thus:
Account No.65018692589;
IFSC Code: SBIN0050306;
Branch Code: 50306;
Bank: State Bank of India, High Court Branch, Chandigarh.
It is clarified that payment of the aforesaid costs and production
of receipt/proof thereof before the trial/concerned Court shall be condition
precedent. In absence of deposit of such costs, the present petition would be
deemed to be dismissed without any further reference to the Bench.
(iii) Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE
January 12, 2026 Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No
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