[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Amritpal Singh And Others vs Union Of India And Another on 25 February, 2026
Author: Archana Puri
Bench: Archana Puri
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(i) TA-1309-2025 (O&M)
Amritpal Singh and others
...Applicants
VERSUS
Union of India and another
...Respondents
(ii) TA-1312-2025 (O&M)
Amritpal Singh and others
...Applicants
VERSUS
Union of India and another
...Respondents
(iii) TA-1560-2025 (O&M)
Santosh Rani
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(iv) TA-1564-2025 (O&M)
Surjit Singh
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(v) TA-1566-2025 (O&M)
Sarabjit Singh and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
VINEET GULATI
2026.02.27 10:28
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
Chandigarh
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -2-
(vi) TA-1568-2025 (O&M)
Satnam Kaur
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(vii) TA-1571-2025 (O&M)
Jagir Singh
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(viii) TA-1577-2025 (O&M)
Surjit Singh
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(ix) TA-1588-2025 (O&M)
Jarnail Singh
...Applicant
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(x) TA-1589-2025 (O&M)
Jagdish Singh and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
VINEET GULATI
2026.02.27 10:28
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
Chandigarh
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -3-
(xi) TA-1591-2025 (O&M)
Robindeep Sandhu and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(xii) TA-1601-2025 (O&M)
Jamna Das and others
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(xiii) TA-1603-2025 (O&M)
Lakhwinder Singh alias Lakha Singh and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
(xiv) TA-1616-2025 (O&M)
Rajinder Mohan Chhina alias Rajinder Mohan Singh and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
Union of India and others
...Respondents
(xv) TA-1617-2025 (O&M)
Harbhajan Kaur since deceased through her LR
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
VINEET GULATI
2026.02.27 10:28
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
Chandigarh
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -4-
(xvi) TA-1618-2025 (O&M)
Rajinder Mohan Chhina alias Rajinder Mohan Singh and others
...Applicants
VERSUS
Union of India and others
...Respondents
(xvii) TA-1733-2025 (O&M)
Harjeet Kaur and another
...Applicants
VERSUS
National Highway Authority of India and others
...Respondents
Date of Decision: February 25, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ARCHANA PURI
Present: Mr.Prateek Sodhi, Advocate
for the applicants.
Mr.Samarth Sagar, Mr.R.S.Madaan and
Mr.Mahender Joshi, Advocates
for respondent-NHAI.
****
ARCHANA PURI, J.
These are bunch of 17 transfer applications filed by the land
owners, whose lands situated, within the jurisdiction of Amritsar were
acquired. The said land owners are seeking transfer of the petitions filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, instituted by the
respondent(s), in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Jalandhar and they seek
transfer of the same, to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Amritsar.
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -5-
For the convenience of discussion, TA-1309-2025 is taken as
lead case and the facts of the same are taken, hereinafter, as all the
applications seeking transfer of the objection petitions, have commonality of
facts, vis-a-vis, passing the Awards as well as the objections filed and
pendency thereof, and the applicable law.
The lands of the applicants situated in District Amritsar, were
notified for acquisition by issuance of notification under Section 3-A of the
National Highway Authority Act, 1956 and same were acquired. Award
No.3 dated 15.04.2021 was passed. However, being aggrieved, the
applicants questioned the adequacy of the compensation awarded and
preferred reference petitions under Section 3(g) (5) of the 1956 Act, before
the Commissioner, Jalandhar, which were partly allowed vide Award dated
03.12.2024. Still not satisfied with the extent of compensation awarded, the
applicants filed the objection petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act before learned District Judge, Amritsar. Therein, the
respondents made appearance.
During the pendency of the said objection petitions, respondents
instituted their objection petitions under the ibid Act, before the Courts at
Jalandhar.
It is in this context, the applications for seeking transfer of the
objection petitions have been filed by the land-owners.
Replies were filed.
Counsel for the parties heard.
At the very outset, learned counsel for the applicants, while
making reference to the dates of filing of the objection petitions, submitted
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -6-
that the lands, which are subject matter of the acquisition, are situated at
Amritsar. The objections filed by the applicants are earlier in time.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their objections under Section 34 of the
ibid Act and the same have been filed in gross ignorance of their own policy,
formulated during the pendency of the transfer applications, considered by
the Coordinate Bench. In fact, it is submitted that vide order dated
11.10.2021, during the pendency of bunch of transfer applications, it was
resolved by the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) that they
would file objection petition in the Civil Court, where the land was acquired
and not at the location of the arbitration proceedings. Vide this office order,
the said policy decision was taken to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and
also to facilitate the land-owners and taking into consideration the
convenience of the land-owners.
However, while ignoring their own policy and to add to the
inconvenience and financial burden upon the land-owners, the applicants are
forced to litigate in the Courts situated at Jalandhar and on this account, the
transfer of the subsequent objection petitions have been sought.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-NHAI,
while making reference to the reply, though, had not disputed about the
location of acquired land of the applicants and also about the objections filed
at Amritsar, to be earlier in time, but however, he submits that arbitral
proceedings were conducted at Jalandhar. The Central Government, vide
separate notification No.S.O.2855 dated 23.06.2022, appointed the
Divisional Commissioner, Jalandhar, to act as an Arbitrator, within the local
limits of his 'jurisdiction' for deciding references under Section 3-G of the
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -7-
Act. This jurisdiction specifically defined to cover the revenue Districts of
Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Tarn Taran and
Pathankot. In view of this notification, the arbitration proceedings,
pertaining to all the aforesaid proceedings, are required to be conducted at
Jalandhar and was accordingly done. In fact, counsel submits that all
arbitration proceedings were held at Jalandhar and they were duly attended
by the parties. The Arbitral Award was also signed and pronounced at
Jalandhar. Therefore, the seat of arbitration by operation of law and conduct
of proceedings, is Jalandhar.
While making reference to the provisions of Section 20 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which talks about the place of arbitration,
learned counsel submits that the proceedings were not founded on party
autonomy or mutual consent, but these were initiated, pursuant to the
statutory mechanism, under the ibid Act. Consequently, the issue of
territorial jurisdiction, ought to be determined, with reference to the juridical
seat i.e. the place, where the arbitration was conducted and the Award was
rendered, which is Jalandhar, in the case in hand and therefore, the Courts at
Amritsar, has no jurisdiction.
In fact, counsel submits that once the 'seat' of arbitration is
determined, the Courts at that place, alone shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control, over the arbitral proceedings and
the matters arising therefrom.
To substantiate their submissions, learned counsel placed
reliance upon BGS SGS Soma JV vs. NHPC Ltd., 2020(4) SCC 234, Inox
Renewables Limited vs. Jayesh Electrical Limited, 2021 SCC Online SC
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -8-
448 and National Highways Authority of India & another vs. Yashpreet
Singh & another, 2023(1) RCR (Civil) 636.
So far as, the policy framed vide order dated 11.10.2021, is
concerned, it is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that on
account of recent judgment delivered by this Court in Yashpreet Singh's
case (supra), wherein, it has been held that arbitration proceedings were
conducted and the Award was passed at a particular place, the Courts of that
place, alone shall have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the same, as such, is being
followed now.
In view of the submissions aforesaid, beneficial reference is
made to BGS SGS Soma's case (supra), wherein, the question as to
maintainability of the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, was raised and given the arbitration clause in these
proceedings, the question arose, whether the 'seat' of the arbitration
proceedings is New Delhi or Faridabad, consequent upon which, a petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, may be filed, dependent on,
where the seat of arbitration is located.
In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Section
20 of the Arbitration Act, which is reproduced, as herein given:-
"20. Place of arbitration (1) The parties are free to agree on
the place of arbitration.
2) Failing any agreement referred to in Sub-section (1), the
place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal
having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the
convenience of the parties. (3) Notwithstanding Sub-section (1)
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -9-
or Sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers
appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing
witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of
documents, good or other property."
Thereupon, making reference in extenso to the case law and
provisions of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, considering the place of
arbitration, the Apex Court held, as observed herein given:-
"84. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it may be
concluded that whenever there is the designation of a place of
arbitration in an arbitration clause, as being the 'venue' of the
arbitration proceedings, the expression 'arbitration
proceedings' would make it clear that the 'venue' is really the
'seat' of the arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid expression
does not include just one or more individual or particular
hearing, but the arbitration proceedings as a whole, including
the making of an award at that place. This language has to be
contrasted with language such as 'tribunals are to meet or have
witnesses, experts or the parties' where only hearings are to
take place in the 'venue', which may lead to the conclusion,
other things being equal, that the venue so stated is not the
'seat' of arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of
meeting. Further, the fact that the arbitral proceedings 'shall
be held' at a particular venue would also indicate that the
parties intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular
place, signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the
arbitral proceedings. This, coupled with there being no other
significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a
'venue' and not the 'seat' of the arbitral proceedings, would
then conclusively show that such a clause designates a 'seat' of
the arbitral proceedings..........."
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -10-
Furthermore, after referring to the recitals of the agreement
between the parties concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed, as
herein given:-
"100. However, the fact that in all the three appeals before us
the proceedings were finally held at New Delhi, and the awards
were signed in New Delhi, and not at Faridabad, would lead to
the conclusion that both parties have chosen New Delhi as the
'seat' of arbitration under Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act,
1996. This being the case, both parties have, therefore, chosen
that the Courts at New Delhi alone would have exclusive
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the fact
that a part of the cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad
would not be relevant once the 'seat' has been chosen, which
would then amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause so far as
Courts of the 'seat' are concerned.
101. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside, and the
Section 34 petition is ordered to be presented in the Courts in
New Delhi, as was held by the learned Single Judge of the
Special Commercial Court at Gurugram."
In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. vs. NHPC Ltd. &
Anr., 2020 INSC 272, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that once the
seat of arbitration is designated, such clause then becomes exclusive
jurisdiction clause, as a result of which, only Courts where seat is located,
would then have jurisdiction to exclusion of all other Courts. Therein, the
question was with regard to the chosen seat of parties to be Delhi and
whether, Faridabad had any jurisdiction. Relevant paragraphs of the
judgment, to be considered are as herein given:-
"6) Given the finding in this case that New Delhi was the
chosen seat of the parties, even if an application was first made
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -11-
to the Faridabad Court, that application would be made to a
court without jurisdiction. This being the case, the impugned
judgment is set aside following BGS SGS Soma JV (supra), as a
result of which it is the courts at New Delhi alone which would
have jurisdiction for the purposes of challenge to the Award.
7) As a result of this judgment, the Section 34 application that
has been filed at Faridabad Court will stand transferred to the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Any objections taken on the
ground that such objection filed under Section 34 is out of time
hence cannot be countenanced. The appeal is disposed of
accordingly.
TRANSFER PETITION (C) NOS. 3053/2019, 7/2020 &
10/2020:
8) On the facts of each of these cases, the finding of the courts
is that the seat has been designated as New Delhi. This being
the case and in consonance with our judgment in BGS SGS
Soma JV (supra), we transfer these Section 34 petitions to the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.
9) The transfer petitions are allowed in the afore-stated terms.
IA No. 34078/2020 in T.P. (C) No. 3053/2019 and IA No.
34079/2020 in T.P. (C) No. 10/2020:
10) Status quo as of today will operate for a period of eight
weeks from today. In the meanwhile, once the transferred cases
are properly instituted in the Delhi High Court, it will be open
for the respondents to move petitions under Section 36 of the
Arbitration Act, which will then be disposed of on their own
merits.
In BBR (India) Private Limited vs. S.P. Singla Constructions
Private Limited, 2022 INSC 591, the question which cropped up before the
Court was that in pursuance of the appointment of new Arbitrator-whether
conducting of arbitration proceedings at Delhi, owing to appointment of new
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -12-
arbitrator, would shift 'jurisdiction seat of arbitration' from Panchkula in
Haryana, place fixed by first arbitrator for arbitration proceedings? It was
held, once jurisdiction 'seat' of arbitration is fixed in terms of sub-section(2)
of Section 20 of the Act, then, without express mutual consent of parties to
arbitration, 'seat' cannot be changed-Therefore, appointment of new
arbitrator, who holds arbitration proceedings at different location would not
change jurisdictional 'seat' already fixed by earlier or first arbitrator. The
place of arbitration, in such event, should be treated as venue, where
arbitration proceedings are held.
In paragraph No.21 of the said judgment, it was observed, as herein
given:-
"21. The Court in BGS SGS Soma (supra) has also dealt with
the situation where the parties have not agreed on or have not
fixed the jurisdictional 'seat of arbitration', and has laid down
the following test to determine the 'seat of arbitration' which
would determine the location of the court that would exercise
supervisory jurisdiction. The test is simple and reads:
"61. It will thus be seen that wherever there is an
express designation of a "venue", and no designation of
any alternative place as the "seat", combined with a
supranational body of rules governing the arbitration,
and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable
conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the
juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding."
In paragraph No.31 onwards, it was further observed, as herein
given:-
"31. We have already referred to the first few sentences of the
aforementioned paragraph and explained the reasoning in the
context of the present case. The paragraph BGS SGS Soma
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -13-
(supra) also explains the non-obstante effect as incorporated in
Section 42 to hold that it is evident that the application made
under Part-I must be to a court which has a jurisdiction to
decide such application. Where 'the seat' is designated in the
agreement, the courts of 'the seat' alone will have the
jurisdiction. Thus, all applications under Part-I will be made in
the court where 'the seat' is located as that court would alone
have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all
subsequent proceedings arising out of the arbitration
proceedings. The quotation also clarifies that when either no
'seat' is designated by an agreement, or the so- called 'seat' is
only a convenient venue, then there may be several courts
where a part of the cause of action arises that may have
jurisdiction. An application under Section 9 of the Act may be
preferred before the court in which a part of cause of action
arises in the case where parties had not agreed on the 'seat of
arbitration'. This is possible in the absence of an agreement
fixing 'the seat', as an application under Section 9 may be filed
before 'the seat' is determined by the arbitral tribunal under
Section 20(2) of the Act. Consequently, in such situations, the
court where the earliest application has been made, being the
court in which a part or entire of the cause of action arises,
would then be the exclusive court under Section 42 of the Act.
Accordingly, such a court would have control over the
arbitration proceedings.[22*]
[22 We are not examining and are not required to decide
the question- whether there is a difference between the
expression 'court' and the 'Chief Justice or his nominee'
in the present case.]
32. Section 42 is to no avail as it does not help the case
propounded by the appellant, as in the present case the
arbitrator had fixed the jurisdictional 'seat' under Section
20(2) of the Act before any party had moved the court under the
Act, being a court where a part or whole of the cause of action
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -14-
had arisen. The appellant had moved the Delhi High Court
under Section 34 of the Act after the arbitral tribunal vide the
order dated 5th August 2014 had fixed the jurisdictional 'seat'
at Panchkula in Haryana. Consequently, the appellant cannot,
based on fastest finger first principle, claim that the courts in
Delhi get exclusive jurisdiction in view of Section 42 of the Act.
The reason is simple that before the application under Section
34 was filed, the jurisdictional 'seat' of arbitration had been
determined and fixed under sub-section (2) to Section 20 and
thereby, the courts having jurisdiction over Panchkula in
Haryana, have exclusive jurisdiction. The courts in Delhi would
not get jurisdiction as the jurisdictional 'seat of arbitration' is
Panchkula and not Delhi.
33. In view of the aforesaid discussion and reasons, we do not
find any merit in the present appeals, and the same are
dismissed without any order as to costs."
Proceeding further, so far as the office order dated 11.10.2021
is concerned, the policy decision was taken by NHAI to file the objection
petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, in Civil
Courts, where the land has been acquired and not at the location of
arbitration proceedings, to facilitate/convenience of the land-owners/NHAI
and avoid multiplicity of the proceedings.
However, in bunch of transfer applications, taking lead case as TA-
191-2021, titled 'Madanjit Kaur vs. National Highway Authority of India
and others' decided on 14.10.2021, wherein, transfer applications relating to
the objection petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, was under consideration, the Coordinate Bench had observed that the
aforesaid policy is prospective in nature and takes care of the objections,
which are filed subsequently to the policy decision. However, some
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -15-
effective order is required to be passed with regard to the objections, in the
matters, which are already pending on date of implementation of policy
decisions. In the bunch of cases under considerations, the objections were
transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction in the District, in which,
the acquired land was located.
In the subsequent orders passed in the transfer applications,
relating to the objection petitions, the applications were allowed and the
objection petitions were transferred to the place, where the lands were
situated.
Now, on query by the Court, counsel for the respondent has
categorically submitted that in view of the observations made in Yashpreet
Singh's case (supra), the requisite policy, as such, is not being followed.
In Yashpreet Singh's case (supra), the Coordinate Bench of
this Court had held that once the 'seat' of arbitration is fixed--it would be in
the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as to the Court, which
exercises supervisory power over the arbitration.
However, learned counsel for the applicants has referred to the order
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whereby, NHAI has challenged the
Yashpreet Singh's case (supra) decision, rendered by the Coordinate
Bench, wherein, it was observed, as herein given:-
"On hearing learned for parties, we are not inclined to
interfere with the impugned judgment except to the extent that
since the objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 2 1996 have been filed in Bhatinda and the
respondents have raised an objection about the territorial
jurisdiction, the aspect of territorial jurisdiction will not be
influenced by any observations made in the impugned
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -16-
judgment.
The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed with the
aforesaid observations.
Pending application stands disposed of."
Also, reference is made to order dated 29.04.2023 passed by
Court at Bathinda. In view of the arbitration objections, having been
transferred on the ground of jurisdiction from Bathinda to Faridkot, again,
had dealt with the same and held that the Courts at Bathinda had jurisdiction
and proceeded further.
Likewise, also reference is placed upon the order dated 06.04.2024
passed by Addl. District Judge, Bathinda, wherein, on application for
rejection of the objections, filed by the NHAI, counsel submitted that the
respondent had taken the plea that petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, is not maintainable at Bathinda, on the
basis of territorial jurisdiction as the jurisdiction for filing the said petition is
of the Civil Court, wherein, the arbitration proceedings were concluded i.e.
at Faridkot and thus, Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
objection petition and the same be returned.
However, plea was raised about both the Court having jurisdiction i.e.
the Court, within those jurisdiction, the subject matter of land is situated and
within whose jurisdiction, the seat of arbitration is located. In the requisite
order, reference was made to the case law also and on the basis thereof, it
was contended by the NHAI that the appointment of the Arbitrator by itself
does not mean that the seat of arbitration was fixed to be at Faridkot District
only or that the Courts at District Faridkot, were conferred any exclusive
jurisdiction, to deal with all the disputes, under the Act, qua the Award of
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -17-
the aforesaid arbitrator. Also, it emphasized upon the land in question,
which was acquired, was within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Civil
Court at Bathinda. The Court held about the Courts at Bathinda, being
Principal Civil Court under the Act, to be having the territorial jurisdiction
to entertain and decide the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act and accordingly, the application was dismissed.
It is contended by counsel for the applicants that the aforesaid orders
have since attained finality as these had never been challenged.
No doubt, the policy decision dated 11.10.2021 aforesaid was
followed by the Courts, while considering and deciding transfer applications,
the mention whereof has been made aforesaid and the objections were
transferred to the places, where the land was situated, but however, it be
noted that it was fallacy, on the part of the National Highways Authority to
formulate this policy, oblivious of the case law, settling the 'seat' of
arbitration and the same was never taken into consideration.
That being so, the orders of transfer to the places, where the land is
situated, as relied upon by the applicant, was purely on policy basis and not
as per law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Precisely, on this account,
the policy should not be followed and to avoid inconvenience/confusion
amongst the affected persons, appropriate steps be taken by the National
Highways Authority, vis-a-vis, recall of the same.
In Yashpreet Singh's case in the SLP, the aforesaid
observations were made and thereafter, the orders were passed by the
Courts, wherein, different stand was taken by the National Highways
Authority. No doubt, said orders have not been further challenged by the
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -18-
NHAI, but may it be so. That by itself, cannot be of much assistance to
surpass the law laid down by the Courts, more particularly, in BGS SGS
Soma's case (supra).
No doubt, the cases under consideration, in the transfer
applications in hand, relate to the statutory arbitration, whereby, by virtue of
notification issued by the Central Government, the Divisional
Commissioner, Jalandhar was appointed as Arbitrator, but counsel for the
applicants submit that even though, the notification was relied upon dated
23.06.2022 i.e. Annexure R-2/1, but the said notification never fixed the
'seat' of arbitration.
However, the submission made is bereft of merits. In pursuance of
the notification aforesaid. the arbitration proceedings were conducted at
Jalandhar and there was participation by both the sides. Furthermore, the
Award was signed and pronounced at Jalandhar. No objection to the
conducting of the proceedings, thereupon, as such, was raised at any stage.
Therefore, in such circumstances, in statutory arbitration also, the 'seat' was
fixed at Jalandhar. That being so, in view of the aforesaid case law, the
moment the 'seat' is designated, it is akin to the exclusive jurisdiction, when
no objection was raised, at any earlier stage. The parties, therefore, are
taken to have chosen the 'seat' and thus, in the light of the same, after the
pronouncement of the Award, the filing of objections at Amritsar, do not
attract provisions of Section 42 of the ibid Act.
Therefore, once the 'seat' of arbitration is designated, then it becomes
exclusive jurisdiction clause, as a result whereof, only Courts, where the
'seat' is located would then have jurisdiction. Being so, the objection
TA-1309-2025 and connected cases -19-
petition ought to proceed before the Courts at Jalandhar.
Resultantly, there is no merit in the transfer applications.
Hence, all the transfer applications, detailed in the headnote, are hereby
dismissed.
February 25, 2026 (ARCHANA PURI)
Vgulati JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether reportable Yes/No
