Pramod Mangla vs Anubhav Sharma
2026 Latest Caselaw 1515 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Pramod Mangla vs Anubhav Sharma on 17 February, 2026

CRM-M-9112-2026 (O&M)                                       -1-


             IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
                         AT CHANDIGARH

134




                                       CRM-M-9112-2026 (O&M)
                                       Date of decision: 17.02.2026.


PRAMOD MANGLA
                                                                   ...Petitioner(s)


                                   VERSUS


ANUBHAV SHARMA
                                                                  ...Respondent(s)


CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ

Present :-    Mr. Harish Chhabra, Advocate,
              for the petitioner.

VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (Oral)

The instant petition has been filed under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for quashing of the order dated

29.05.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, in the

case titled as 'Anubhav Sharma Vs. Pramod Mangla' filed under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, bearing No. NACT/664/2024

dated 07.12.2020 registered vide CNR No.HRPK030138322024 whereby

the application of the petitioner seeking dismissal/return of the aforesaid

complaint has been dismissed, and the Trial Court has proceeded further in

the matter from the stage it was transferred to it by the Judicial Magistrate

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First Class, Chandigarh.

2 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends

that the aforesaid complaint bearing No. NACT/664-2024 was initially

instituted before the Trial Court, Chandigarh. A notice of accusation was

served upon the petitioner, in which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

Thereafter, as per the documents relied upon during the preliminary

evidence and also during the cross-examination of respondent-complainant

on 29.04.2024, he admitted that he had been operating his bank account at

Panchkula, and the cheque in question had also been presented for

encashment in Panchkula, and the same was returned dishonoured to the

Branch at Panchkula.

3 The petitioner-accused thereafter moved an application dated

17.05.2024 for return of the complaint to the Court exercising jurisdiction, to

which no reply was filed by the respondent-complainant, and only oral

arguments were advanced.

4 Vide order dated 24.05.2024, the Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Chandigarh, observed that the case was not only without jurisdiction

but also a case where the respondent-complainant tried to mislead through

willful mis-representation. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh,

directed the transfer of the said complaint to the District and Sessions Judge,

Panchkula, invoking Section 142-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

dealing with validation for transfer of pending cases. The parties were

directed to appear before the said Court on 04.07.2024.

5 He further contends that the parties thereafter appeared before

the transferee Court on the date fixed. Cognizance of the complaint was

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taken by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula. The petitioner

applied for and was permitted to visit Canada to attend to an urgent medical

situation of his daughter-in-law, who was in her family way, subject to his

depositing 5% of the cheque amount as an interim compensation to the

respondent-complainant. After having availed of the same, the petitioner

thereafter moved an application dated 24.03.2025 before the transferee Court

for dismissal/return of the complaint. The reply to same was filed by the

respondent-complainant. The said application has now been dismissed vide

order dated 29.05.2025. Hence, the present petition.

6 Counsel contends that the Trial Court at Panchkula has

committed a grave error in dismissing the said application by ignoring the

statutory provisions provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

He further referred to the law laid down by this Court in the matter of M/s

SS Diamonds Tools and Another Vs Capital First Limited, dated

27.08.2024 passed in CRM-M-55116-2022, holding that the Judicial

Magistrate First Class does not have any power to transfer the complaint

from one Court to another Court and that such power lies only with the

competent Court. He submits that despite agreeing with the said proposition,

the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, yet dismissed the application

on the premise that any such action would amount to reviewing the order of

transfer and that being a Court of co-instance, it is not in a position to review

the said decision whereby the complaint had been transferred to it. He thus

argues that the order is liable to be set aside.

7 I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have also

gone through the documents appended with the present petition as well as

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the statutory provisions.

8 The argument raised with vehemence by the counsel for the

petitioner is that the impugned order would vitiate the proceedings since the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, does not have the jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the matter and proceed further. He submits that the same

would result in hardship to the petitioner, as he is a resident of Chandigarh

and would have to travel to Panchkula to defend his interests.

9 He thus contends that the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Chandigarh, could not have directed a transfer of the complaint and instead

could have only directed the return of the complaint to be presented before

the competent Court.

10 It is not in dispute that the petitioner had himself moved an

application for transfer of the complaint to Panchkula, before the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh. Having succeeded in the same, counsel

now contends that proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Panchkula, are to his disadvantage and inconvenience. Thus, the petitioner

wanted to take benefit of the transfer itself.

11 He, however, does not dispute that in the circumstances of the

case, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, had the jurisdiction to

entertain and take cognizance of the complaint.

12 The argument of the petitioner that in view of Section 461

Cr.P.C. the cognizance could not have been taken, is prima facie based upon

misreading and misinterpretation of the provision. Vitiation of the

proceedings comes to play only when the Court is 'not empowered' in law to

take cognizance and not when the Court does not have territorial jurisdiction

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to decide. "Territorial jurisdiction" is distinct and separate from "empowered

to take cognizance." The Judicial Officer at Panchkula herein is

undisputedly empowered to take cognizance of the complaint as per the

power vested under the Punjab Courts Act.

13 The 'power to take cognizance' is distinct from the 'territorial

jurisdiction.' It may be better understood by an example that a Judicial

Magistrate may have a 'territorial jurisdiction' yet may not be 'empowered

to take cognizance of a specified class of offences or nature of proceedings.'

Hence, section 461(k) Cr.P.C. relied upon by the petitioner would not be

applicable and it does not vitiate the proceedings where the empowered

Court has taken cognizance of an offence.

14 The proposition is further supported by a reading of Section 462

Cr.P.C. which clearly prescribes that no finding, sentence or order passed by

a Criminal Court empowered to take cognizance would be set aside merely

because it was decided in a wrong Sessions Division or in a wrong local

area. Thus, the lack of territorial jurisdiction is specifically protected under

Section 462 Cr.P.C.

15 Even otherwise, it is not in dispute that the original order for

transfer of the proceedings was passed on 24.05.2024 by the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh. The petitioner opted not to impugn the

said order before any competent forum. The grievance, if any, is now being

portrayed to emanate from the date of said order, whereby the transfer of

proceedings was directed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh.

The petitioner however never challenged the said order.

16           The reasoning given by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,




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Panchkula, in her order dated 29.05.2025, would not be faulted with.

17 A perusal of the said order shows that the same has been passed

invoking Section 142-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said Section

inserted in 2015 reads thus:-

"142A. Validation for transfer of pending cases.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (Ord. 6 of 2015), shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1) and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court.

(3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (26 of 2015), more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments

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(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (Ord. 6 of 2015), before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.

18 It is evident from a perusal of the above that the reference to

Section 142-A was misplaced as the sub Section was a validating clause for

the transfer already done by virtue of the judgment. Such transfers were thus

protected by the validating Act. For invocation of validation, the transfer

ought to have been effected before the amendment. The same is thus not an

enabling provision for transfer. The reference to Section 142-A was thus

misplaced. The question which now arises is as to whether the order of

transfer, though under an erroneous invocation of power, but before the

Court vested with the jurisdiction ought to be set aside or not.

19 An emphatic argument has also been made that the power to

transfer matters from one State to another is vested solely with the Supreme

Court under Section 406 Cr.P.C.

20 I am afraid that the aforesaid argument is based upon a

misreading of the statutory provisions. Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not make

any reference to transfer from one State to another; rather, the expression

used is "from jurisdiction of one High Court to another High Court".

Significantly, on account of the peculiar circumstances, the Punjab and

Haryana High Court exercises jurisdiction not only over the State of Punjab

but also over the State of Haryana, as well as the Union Territory of

Chandigarh.

21 The power of inter State transfer can be exercised by this

Court under Section 407 Cr.P.C. There being no dispute to the effect that

under Section 142 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Judicial

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Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, would be competent to look into the issue

and the only hardship cited by the petitioner is that he would have to travel

from Chandigarh to Panchkula to defend his case. The same cannot be held

to be a miscarriage of justice. Panchkula is only a twin city to Chandigarh,

and considering that the petitioner resides in Sector 18, Chandigarh, the

District Courts, Panchkula, is almost equidistant as compared to the District

Courts, situated in Sector 43, Chandigarh.

22 The inherent powers vested in the High Court is expected to be

exercised for advancing interest of justice. Procedural laws are hand-maiden

of justice. Merely because a litigant initiates proceedings in a wrong

jurisdiction, which such irregularity has now been set aside, a technicality

would not be permitted as a tool to trample cause of justice. An act of Court

should not be deployed as a weapon by a shrewd and tactical litigant to

inflict injury on the other.

23 Considering from either perspective, I find no reason to

interfere with the order dated 29.05.2025, passed by the Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Panchkula, at this stage and in the particular circumstances of

the present case.

24 The impugned order dated 29.05.2025 is thus affirmed and

protected by this Court in view of the powers conferred upon this Court

under Section 407 Cr.P.C. read with Section 482 Cr.P.C.

25 The present petition is accordingly dismissed.

February 17, 2026.                              (VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
raj arora                                                JUDGE
          Whether speaking/reasoned             : Yes/No
          Whether reportable                    : Yes/No



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