[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Punjab And Anr. vs Tara Singh on 9 April, 2026
RSA-3361-1996 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-3361-1996 (O&M)
Reserved on :- 30.03.2026
Date of Pronouncement:-09.04.2026
Uploaded on:- 10.04.2026
State of Punjab and Another
... Appellants
Versus
Tara Singh (Since Deceased) through his LRs
... Respondents
****
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :-
Mr. I.S. Kingra, Senior DAG, State of Punjab-appellants.
Mr. Alok Jain, Advocate
for the respondents.
****
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal (here-in-after referred to
as "RSA") has been preferred by the appellant-defendant assailing the
judgment and decree dated 06.08.1996 passed by the learned District
Judge, Hoshiarpur, whereby the judgment and decree rendered by the
learned Sub Judge First Class, Balachaur, was affirmed and the suit
instituted by the respondent-plaintiff stood decreed.
2. The factual matrix, in brief, is that the respondent-plaintiff
instituted a suit for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the defendant-
State from auctioning, selling, transferring, or otherwise alienating the suit
land, fully described in the headnote of the plaint, and from forcibly
dispossessing the plaintiff therefrom.
2.1 It was averred that the suit land was originally owned by
defendant No.1 and was put to public auction on 27.07.1982. The plaintiff
emerged as the highest bidder, and his bid was duly accepted and
confirmed in his favour. Pursuant thereto, he deposited one-fourth of the
bid amount, while the balance consideration was to be paid in installments
to be fixed and communicated by defendant No.2.
2.2 It was further pleaded that, consequent upon the acceptance of
the bid, the plaintiff entered into possession of the suit land as an auction
purchaser. The land in question being Banjar in nature, the plaintiff
allegedly rendered the same cultivable by incurring an expenditure of
₹3,000/-.
2.3 The grievance of the plaintiff arose from the fact that the
defendants had allegedly threatened to re-auction the suit land and had
purportedly cancelled the auction in his favour without issuance of any
prior notice or communication of any order. It was asserted that any such
cancellation effected behind the back of the plaintiff was illegal, null, and
void, thereby necessitating the institution of the present suit.
3. The defendants contested the suit by raising, inter alia,
preliminary objections to the maintainability of the same. It was contended
that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under Section 16 of the
Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976, and that the suit was
further liable to be dismissed for want of mandatory notice under Section
80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
3.1 On merits, it was pleaded that the alleged sale in favour of the
plaintiff was expressly subject to the approval of the Sales Commissioner.
It was averred that the Sales Commissioner, vide order dated 26.10.1987,
declined to approve the sale on the ground that the auction had not been
conducted in accordance with the prevailing Government policy, and,
therefore, the said authority was competent to cancel the sale.
3.2 It was further asserted that possession of the suit land had
never been delivered to the plaintiff, as such delivery was contingent upon
formal confirmation of the sale. The defendants also alleged that the
plaintiff had manipulated entries in the revenue record to falsely reflect
possession over the suit property.
4. Upon a comprehensive and meticulous consideration of the
pleadings and the rival submissions advanced by the parties, the Court
deemed it appropriate to crystallize the issues arising for adjudication and,
accordingly, framed the following issues for determination:-
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as payed
for? OPP
2. Whether this court has got no jurisdiction to hear and try the
present suit in view 2. of Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal
Properties(Disposal)Act, 1976?DD.
3. What is the effect or non-service of notice under Section 80 CPC
upon the defendants?OPD.
4. Whether the suit is bad maintainable in the present form?OPD.
5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to rile this suit?OPD.
6. Relief.
5. Upon completion of trial, and after affording due opportunity
to the parties to adduce evidence, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree
so passed, the State of Punjab preferred an appeal, which came to be
dismissed by the learned District Judge, Hoshiarpur.
5.1 While dismissing the appeal, the learned First Appellate Court
recorded a categorical finding that the auction had taken place on
27.07.1982 and that a report was subsequently submitted in the year 1987
suggesting that Banjar Qadeem land could not be auctioned and that the
auction be cancelled. It was further observed that although such report was
placed before the Sales Commissioner, no specific order cancelling the
auction was ever passed, nor was any notice issued to the plaintiff prior to
the alleged cancellation.
5.2 The learned First Appellate Court further held that no statutory
provision had been brought to the notice of the Court to substantiate the
contention that Banjar Qadeem land could not be sold under the applicable
rules. It was also observed that even if the sale was subject to approval by
the Sales Commissioner, the inaction and silence on the part of the said
authority for a period exceeding three years would, in law, amount to
deemed acceptance of the auction. Consequently, it was held that the
plaintiff could not be expected to wait indefinitely for such approval.
5.3 Still aggrieved, the appellant-defendant has instituted the
present Regular Second Appeal. The respondents have entered appearance
through counsel and have contested the same.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length and have bestowed anxious and thoughtful consideration upon their
respective submissions, keeping in view the pleadings of the parties, the
evidence brought on record, and the concurrent findings returned by the
Courts below.
7. Insofar as the scope of the present second appeal is concerned,
it is now well-settled that, within the territorial jurisdiction of Punjab and
Haryana, second appeals are to be treated as appeals under Section 41 of
the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and not strictly under Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. Reference in this regard may be made to the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (Dead) through
LRs and others vs. Chandrika and others, (2016) 6 SCC 157; Kirodi
(since deceased) through LRs vs. Ram Parkash and others, (2019) 11
SCC 317; and Satender and others vs. Saroj and others, 2022(12) Scale
92. In view of the authoritative pronouncements in the aforesaid cases, no
substantial question of law is required to be framed for adjudication in the
present appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant-State has contended that
both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the statutory bar contained
in Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976,
and have thus erroneously assumed jurisdiction, thereby committing a
manifest illegality.
8.1 There is no dispute with regard to the proposition that the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred in terms of Section 16 of the
said Act. For ready reference, Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal
Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976 is reproduced as under:-
16. Bar of jurisdiction and finality of orders :
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by
any officer or authority under this Act shall be final and no Civil
Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding, in
respect of any matter which the State Government, or any officer or
authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this
Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any Court
or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
(2) Nothing in the; Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and
Rent Recovery) Act, 1973, shall apply to package deal property.
9. The statutory bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, as
envisaged under Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties
(Disposal) Act, 1976, would be attracted only in respect of an order validly
made by a competent officer or authority under the said Act. Both the
Courts below have, however, concurrently recorded a finding that no such
valid or legally enforceable order had been passed by any competent
authority in the present case.
9.1 In support of this position, learned counsel for the respondent-
plaintiff has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395, wherein
it has been authoritatively held that for an order to attain legal efficacy and
binding character, it must not only be passed by the competent authority
but must also be duly communicated to the person affected thereby and it
was concluded by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:-
"Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated
to the person who would be affected by that order before the State
and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is
communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to
the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over
again and therefore, till its communication the order cannot be
regarded as anything more than provisional in character."
9.2. In the present case, it stands unequivocally admitted by the
witness of the appellant-defendant that no order purportedly passed by the
Sales Commissioner was ever communicated to the respondent-plaintiff.
This admission assumes considerable significance in light of the settled
legal position governing the validity and enforceability of administrative
orders. The relevant extract from the cross-examination of the said witness is
reproduced here-in-below:-
No information was sent to the plaintiff regarding order dated
26.10.1987 as per file brought by me.
10. A careful perusal of the record reveals that what has been
brought on record by the appellant-defendant is merely a noting on the file,
exhibited as Ex.DA. Such a noting, in the absence of culmination into a
formal and operative order by the competent authority, does not attain the
character of a legally enforceable decision. It is an admitted position that
no final order, purportedly passed by the Sales Commissioner on the basis
of the said noting, was ever communicated to the respondent-plaintiff.
10.1 In view of the settled legal principle enunciated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, that an order does not become effective unless it
is duly communicated to the person affected thereby, both the Courts below
have rightly discarded the evidentiary value of the said noting Ex.DA.
Consequently, in the absence of a valid and communicated order, the bar to
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 16 of the Punjab Package
Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976 would not be attracted.
10.2 Learned State counsel has further contended that the
respondent-plaintiff had an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way
of appeal and revision under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. It is
pointed out that Section 8 provides for an appeal to the Sales
Commissioner, Section 9 provides for a further appeal to the Chief Sales
Commissioner, and Section 10 contemplates revisional jurisdiction before
the Chief Sales Commissioner.
10.3 While it is correct that the statutory framework
envisages such appellate and revisional remedies, the invocation thereof is
necessarily predicated upon the existence and communication of an order
adversely affecting the rights of the aggrieved party. In the present case, it
is an admitted and undisputed fact that no such order was ever
communicated to the respondent-plaintiff. In the absence of knowledge of
any adverse order, the respondent-plaintiff could not have been expected to
avail the remedies of appeal or revision as provided under the Act. Thus,
the plea of availability of alternative remedy is rendered untenable in the
factual matrix of the present case.
10.4 It has also been urged on behalf of the appellant-
defendant that the Sales Commissioner was vested with the authority to
cancel the auction. However, a plain reading of the provisions of the
Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976 indicates otherwise.
The statutory scheme contemplates that such power vests in the Tehsildar
(Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales), as envisaged under Section 7 of the Act.
10.5 For the sake of completeness, Section 7 of the Punjab Package
Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976 is reproduced hereunder:-
Section 7.
Power to vary or cancel leases or transfers of any package
deal property:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force but subject to any rules that may be made under
this Act, the Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales) may
cancel any transfer or terminate any lease or amend the terms of
any transfer or lease under which any package deal property is
held or occupied by a person. Provided that no transfer shall be
cancelled, lease terminated or the terms of any transfer or lease
amended unless such an action is permissible under the terms and
conditions of the instrument of transfer or lease, as the case may
be, and unless an opportunity of showing cause has been given to
the transferee or lessee, as the case may be.
(2) Where any person(a) has ceased to be entitled to the possession of
any package deal property by reason of any action taken under
subsection (1); or- (b) is, in the opinion of the Tehsildar (Sales) or
Naib Tehsildar (Sales} otherwise in unauthorized possession of
any package deal property; he shall, after he has been given a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his eviction from
such package deal property , surrender possession of the property
on demand being made in this behalf by the Tehsildar (Sales) or
Naib Tehsildar (Sales) or by any other person duly authorized by
the Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales) as the case may be.
(3) If any person fails to surrender possession of any package deal
property on demand made under sub-section (2), the Tehsildar
(Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales) may, notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in
force, eject such person and take possession of such property and
may, for such purpose, use or cause to be used such force as may
be necessary.
11. It is thus evident that the power to cancel an auction, in
terms of the statutory scheme under the Punjab Package Deal Properties
(Disposal) Act, 1976, vests with the Tehsildar (Sales) or the Naib Tehsildar
(Sales), and not with the Sales Commissioner. In fact, Section 8 of the Act
provides a statutory appeal to the Sales Commissioner against any order
passed by the Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales), thereby clearly
indicating the hierarchical framework of adjudicatory authority under the
Act.
11.1 In the present case, it is an admitted position that no
order has been passed by the Tehsildar (Sales) cancelling the public auction
which stood confirmed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. In the absence
of any such foundational order, the question of its appellate or revisional
consideration does not arise.
11.2 Learned State counsel has further contended that since
the respondent-plaintiff failed to deposit the balance sale consideration, the
auction in his favour stood automatically terminated. However, this
contention does not merit acceptance.
11.3 The procedure governing sale of land by auction is
mandatorily regulated by Rule 6 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties
(Disposal) Rules, 1976, which delineates the obligations of the auction
purchaser as well as the conditions precedent for finalisation or
cancellation of the auction process.
11.4 For the sake of clarity and completeness, Rule 6 of the
said Rules is reproduced hereunder:-
Rule 6 - Scrutiny of applications. -
(i) On receipt of an application for the transfer of land, the
Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib Tehsildar (Sales) shall scrutinise and
dispose it of [within four months from the date of receipt by
him of the application for transfer of the land under these
rules].
(ii) Where the Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib-Tehsildar (Sales) is
satisfied that the occupant is eligible for the transfer of land in
his or her possession, he shall send the case to the Sales
Commissioner for approval, after recovery of the first
instalment equivalent to an amount as may be specified by the
Govern, ment from time to time and the arrears of rent/lease or
damages, if any." These arrears shall be paid in lumpsum or in
such number of instalments as may be fixed by the Sales
Commissioner by a specific order, keeping in view the
circumstances of each case and the number of instalments so
fixed shall not exceed the number of instalments in which price
of land is to be re-covered.
(iii) The Sales Commissioner may, after scrutiny of the case
referred to him under sub-rule (2), either confirm or reject or
modify the recommendations of the Tehsildar (Sales) or Naib-
Tehsildar (Sales) [within two months from the date of receipt of
the case by him]:
Provided where a transferee is a woman or a minor, the Sales
Commissioner shall send the case to the Chief Sales
Commissioner, with his specific recommendations.
12. A plain reading of the aforesaid Rules makes it manifest
that the balance sale consideration is required to be deposited by the
highest bidder only upon receipt of intimation regarding approval of the
bid and confirmation thereof being duly communicated to the auction
purchaser. In the present case, admittedly, no such communication
intimating approval or confirmation of the bid was ever issued or conveyed
to the respondent-plaintiff. Consequently, the obligation to deposit the
balance consideration did not arise.
13. The learned First Appellate Court has, in the considered
view of this Court, rightly held that public authorities are duty-bound to act
within a reasonable period and cannot keep matters pertaining to citizens'
rights in a state of indefinite uncertainty. In the present case, the auction
was conducted on 27.07.1982, yet no decision with regard to confirmation
or rejection of the bid was taken by the Sales Commissioner up to the year
1987.
13.1 In these circumstances, the learned District Judge has
correctly interpreted the inordinate and unexplained delay as amounting to
deemed approval of the bid by the Sales Commissioner. It is a settled
principle of administrative law that public authorities cannot be permitted
to prolong decision-making processes in a manner that keeps the rights of
citizens in a perpetual state of flux. Decisions affecting civil rights are
required to be taken within a reasonable period, failing which adverse
presumptions may legitimately arise.
13.2 The learned First Appellate Court has further observed
that the appellant-State has failed to produce on record any statutory
provision or governmental policy prohibiting the auction of Banjar
Qadeem land. In the absence of any such legal embargo, the challenge
raised by the appellant lacks merit.
13.3 Accordingly, finding no infirmity in the concurrent
findings recorded by the Courts below, the appeal is dismissed and the
judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court are
hereby affirmed.
14. Consequently, upon final adjudication of the principal
controversy, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, arising out of
or connected with the present proceedings, stand disposed of by necessary
implication. In view of the conclusions recorded here-in-above, no separate
or further orders are required in respect of such applications, the same
having rendered infructuous and purely academic.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL)
09.04.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
