[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Smt. Raj Rani vs Hari Singh Etc. on 9 April, 2026
RSA-814-1995 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-814-1995 (O&M)
Reserved on :-25.03.2026
Date of Pronouncement:-09.04.2026
Uploaded on:-10.04.2026
Raj Rani (Since Deceased) Through His LRs and Others
... Appellants
Versus
Hari Singh (Since Deceased) Through His LRs and Another
... Respondents
****
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :-
Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Tamanna Banwala, Advocate
for appellants No.1 and 2.
Mr. Amit Jhanji, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Priyanka Kansal, Advocate
for appellant No.3.
Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Anmol Ratta S. Dhillon, Advocate and
Mr. Vishal Pundir, Advocate
for the respondents.
****
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal ("RSA" for short) has
been preferred assailing the judgment and decree dated 14.03.1995 passed
by the learned District Judge, Karnal, whereby the civil appeal instituted
by the respondents-plaintiffs was allowed, while the appeal preferred by
the appellant-defendant was dismissed. Consequently, the suit filed by the
respondents-plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement to sell
came to be decreed, albeit by modifying the judgment and decree dated
21.09.1990 passed by the learned trial Court, which had earlier confined
the relief to the alternative claim of recovery of ₹1,70,000/-.
2. The brief factual matrix, as emanating from the pleadings, is
that the plaintiffs asserted that on 11.02.1985, the appellant-defendant,
Rajrani, entered into an agreement to sell the house in question, as fully
detailed and described in the headnote of the plaint, for a total sale
consideration of ₹3,40,000/-. It was further pleaded that a sum of
₹85,000/- was paid in cash as earnest money, and the sale deed was agreed
to be executed and registered on or before 31.12.1985 upon payment of the
balance sale consideration. Possession of the property was also agreed to
be delivered on the said date.
2.1 The plaintiffs averred that they had always remained ready
and willing, and continue to remain ready and willing, to perform their
part of the contract. However, the defendant failed to execute the sale deed
in terms of the agreement, thereby compelling the plaintiffs to institute the
present suit seeking specific performance.
3. The defendant contested the suit by categorically denying the
execution of any such agreement to sell and asserted that the alleged
transaction was a sham and fictitious arrangement, never intended to be
acted upon. It was contended that the defendant's family had suffered
substantial business losses and was under financial distress, with creditors
exerting pressure for recovery and threatening liquidation of family assets.
3.1 It was further pleaded that, owing to the trust reposed in the
plaintiffs, and upon their suggestion, a nominal and sham transaction was
executed in their favour solely to ward off the creditors, without any
intention of effecting an actual transfer of the property. The defendant
denied having received any sum of ₹85,000/- as earnest money and further
disputed the plaintiffs' assertion of readiness and willingness to perform
their part of the contract.
4. Upon a comprehensive and meticulous scrutiny of the
pleadings on record, coupled with a consideration of the rival contentions
advanced by the parties, the learned trial Court deemed it appropriate to
crystallize the matters in controversy and, for the purposes of a structured
and legally coherent adjudication, proceeded to frame the following issues
for determination:-
1. Whether the parties entered into an agreement to sell the suit
property for an amount of `3,40,000/- on 11.12.1985?0PP.
2. Whether the defendant had received earnest money of `85000/- on
11.2.1985?0PP.
3. Whether the plaintiff was always and still willing to perform his
part of the contract?OPP.
4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to sue?OPD
5. Relief.
5. Upon the framing of issues, both parties were afforded full and
adequate opportunity to lead evidence in support of their respective
pleadings. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence adduced and
after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court
recorded a categorical finding that the appellant-defendant had, in fact,
executed the agreement to sell in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs after
receiving earnest money of ₹85,000/-. It was further held that the
respondents-plaintiffs had remained ready and willing, and continue to
remain ready and willing, to perform their part of the contract.
5.1 Notwithstanding the aforesaid findings, the learned trial Court
declined the relief of specific performance and instead decreed the suit for
the alternative relief of recovery of ₹1,70,000/-, inter alia, on the ground
that enforcement of specific performance would occasion undue hardship
to the appellant-defendant and that monetary compensation would
constitute an adequate and equitable relief in the facts and circumstances
of the case.
5.2 Aggrieved by the judgment and decree so passed, both parties
preferred appeals. The learned District Judge, Karnal, vide the impugned
judgment and decree, dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant-
defendant while allowing the appeal filed by the respondents-plaintiffs,
thereby granting the principal relief of specific performance of the
contract.
5.3 Being dissatisfied with the said adjudication, the appellant-
defendant has preferred the present Regular Second Appeal. The appeal
was admitted for hearing vide order dated 07.04.1995. In terms of the said
order, execution of the decree was stayed subject to the deposit of a sum of
₹1,70,000/- before the learned trial Court, which amount was duly
deposited by the appellant-defendant. Subsequently, vide order dated
16.01.1998, the learned trial Court was directed to invest the said amount
of ₹1,75,000/- in a fixed deposit with a nationalized bank. Notice was duly
served upon the respondents, who entered appearance through counsel,
and the record of the Courts below was requisitioned.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length and have bestowed anxious and thoughtful consideration upon their
respective submissions. The pleadings of the parties, the evidence brought
on record, and the concurrent as well as divergent findings returned by the
Courts below have been meticulously examined to assess the legality,
propriety, and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree.
7. As regards the scope of second appeal, it is now a settled
proposition of law that in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals preferred
are to be treated as appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act,
1918 and not under Section 100 CPC. Reference in this regard can be
made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pankajakshi
(Dead) through LRs and others V/s Chandrika and others, (2016)6 SCC
157, followed by the judgments in the case of Kirodi (since deceased)
through his LR V/s Ram Parkash and others, (2019) 11 SCC 317 and
Satender and others V/s Saroj and others, 2022(12) Scale 92. Relying
upon the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, no question of law is
required to be framed.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
has vehemently contended that both the Courts below have committed a
manifest illegality in recording findings with regard to the execution of the
agreement to sell and the readiness and willingness of the respondents-
plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract. It is submitted that such
findings are based merely on surmises and conjectures, without due
consideration of the credible evidence led by the appellant-defendant,
which clearly demonstrated that the alleged agreement was never intended
to be acted upon and was, in fact, executed only as a sham transaction to
shield the property from the claims of creditors.
8.1 It has been further contended that the Courts below have failed
to properly appreciate the evidence on record and have erroneously
disregarded material evidence adduced by the appellant. Learned counsel
submits that the respondents-plaintiffs have failed to establish their
continuous readiness and willingness to perform their obligations under
the contract, which is a sine qua non for grant of the relief of specific
performance. It is argued that mere presence before the office of the Sub-
Registrar does not, by itself, satisfy the legal requirement of readiness and
willingness, which encompasses both the financial capacity as well as the
genuine intention to perform the contract. In support of these submissions,
reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) through LRs vs. A.M.
Krishnamurthy, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 840; C.S. Venkatesh vs. A.S.C.
Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280; Gurpreet Singh vs. Gurinder Singh and
others, AIR 2017 SC 2610; and Vijay Kumar and others vs. Om Prakash,
Law Finder ID # 1255016.
8.2. Learned Senior Counsel has further argued that the alleged
agreement is inherently inequitable, inasmuch as the consideration
stipulated therein is grossly inadequate when compared with the prevailing
market value of the property at the relevant time. It is submitted that the
learned trial Court had rightly exercised its discretion in declining the
relief of specific performance and instead granting alternative relief,
having regard to the principles governing equitable relief. It is contended
that specific performance, being a discretionary remedy, ought not to be
granted where enforcement of the contract would result in undue hardship
to the defendant, which was not foreseeable at the time of execution of the
agreement. In support of these propositions, reliance has been placed upon
the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jayakantham and others
vs. Abhay Kumar, 2017 INSC 161; A.C. Arulappan vs. Smt. Ahalya
Naik, 2001(4) RCR (Civil) 109; and Basant Ram (Dead) through LRs vs.
Sukhbir Singh and others, Law Finder ID #2796960.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents-plaintiffs has contended that there is no illegality or infirmity
in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, and that the same
are based upon a proper appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on
record. It is submitted that both the Courts have rightly concluded that the
agreement to sell was duly executed between the parties and that the
appellant-defendant had received earnest money of ₹85,000/-.
9.1 It is further contended that the respondents-plaintiffs have
duly established their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the
contract. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the testimony of
PW-Prem Chand, one of the plaintiffs, whose statement regarding
readiness and willingness remained unchallenged in cross-examination,
thereby constituting a deemed admission on the part of the appellant-
defendant. It is further submitted that the respondents-plaintiffs have
placed on record cogent evidence demonstrating their presence before the
office of the Sub-Registrar on the stipulated date as well as on subsequent
dates, and have also proved their financial capacity by way of affidavits
and supporting material before the attesting authority.
9.2 Learned counsel has also contended that there was no specific
pleading by the appellant-defendant with regard to undue hardship, nor
was any issue framed in that regard. In the absence of such foundational
pleadings and issues, no finding to that effect could have been recorded by
the learned trial Court, and the said error was rightly corrected by the
learned First Appellate Court.
10. Insofar as the execution of the agreement to sell is concerned,
the pleadings of the parties assume significance. A perusal of the written
statement reveals that the appellant-defendant has not categorically denied
the execution of the agreement to sell Ex.P1; rather, a specific plea has
been taken that the agreement was not intended to be acted upon and was
merely a sham transaction devised to frustrate the claims of creditors. The
relevant extract from paragraph No.2 of the written statement reads as
under:-
"The real facts are that the defendant's family suffered huge
losses in business and the creditors were pressing hard for the
money and threatening the defendant to get her family assets
sold. The plaintiff in whom the defendant reposed confidence
suggested that she should execute a sham transaction to sell and
in this manner, the demand of the creditors will be frustrated.
Consequently, she executed this sham transaction which was
never intended to be completed. She did not receive any earnest
money as alleged. Even the house in question was not less than
worth `4,25,000/-. Since, the agreement was a sham transaction,
therefore the conditions mentioned therein were also fictitious."
10.1. In contradiction to the specific pleadings raised by the
appellant-defendant, the evidence adduced during trial was clearly beyond
the pleadings. The appellant-defendant, while stepping into the witness
box as DW-1, deposed that Parshottam Das had initially asked them to
alienate the disputed house to some other person; however, she was not
willing to sell the said house, it being her only residential accommodation.
It was further stated that Parshottam Das advised that the property be
transferred in favour of the plaintiffs, who are the brothers-in-law of
Parshottam Das, with a view to avoid sales tax recovery. According to her,
on one occasion, Parshottam Das obtained her thumb impressions on blank
papers under the pretext that the same would assist in avoiding sales tax
recovery.
10.2. The appellant-defendant further examined her sister-in-law,
namely Sheela Vanti (DW-3) and Shanti Devi (DW-4), who deposed that
they were present at the time when Parshottam Das allegedly obtained the
thumb impressions of the defendant on blank papers, representing that such
execution was necessary for saving the defendant from sales tax recovery
through execution of purported documents.
10.3. The learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court
have, however, rightly disbelieved the testimonies of the appellant-
defendant and her witnesses insofar as the manner of execution of the
agreement to sell Ex.P1 is concerned, on the ground that the said
testimonies are wholly inconsistent with the pleaded case of the appellant-
defendant in her written statement. In the written statement, the appellant-
defendant had categorically pleaded that she had reposed trust in the
plaintiffs and that, in order to avoid creditors, a sham transaction was
executed.
10.4. It is thus evident that it is not the case of the appellant-
defendant, as pleaded, that Parshottam Das had obtained her thumb
impressions on blank papers and that the agreement to sell was
subsequently fabricated thereupon. The admitted position remains that the
document was executed; however, it was asserted to be not intended for
enforcement and to be merely a sham transaction devised to avoid
creditors.
10.5 In view of the aforesaid inconsistency, the evidence led by the
appellant-defendant, being contrary to her own pleadings, was rightly
discarded by the Courts below. The agreement to sell was duly proved
through the testimony of the regular deed writer, who deposed regarding its
execution, as well as the marginal witnesses, who confirmed that the
agreement was scribed after receipt of earnest money of ₹85,000/- by the
appellant-defendant.
10.6 With regard to the contention advanced on behalf of the
appellant that the respondents-plaintiffs have failed to prove their
readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract, reliance was
placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.S. Venkatesh
vs. A.S.C. Murthy (supra), wherein in paragraph 16, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:-
"16. The words "ready and willing" imply that the plaintiff was
prepared to carry out those parts of contract to their logical end
so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a
condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the
plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To
adjust whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the
conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the
suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount
which she has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be
proved to be available. Right from the date of execution of the
contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract. The Court may
infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was
ready and was always ready to perform his contract."
11. The appellant-defendant has further placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy vs. A.M.
Krishnamurthy (supra), wherein in paragraph 34, the Hon'ble Apex Court
has delineated the distinction between "readiness" and "willingness" and
held as under:-
"34. There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to
perform the contract and both ingredients are necessary for the
relief of Specific Performance. In His Holiness Acharya Swami
Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar (1996) 4 SCC 526 cited by
Mr. Venugopal, this Court said that there was a difference
between readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While
readiness means the capacity of the Plaintiff to perform the
contract which would include his financial position, willingness
relates to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The same view was taken
by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar (2018) 3 SCC 658."
12. In Vijay Kumar and Others vs. Om Prakash (supra), on the
basis of evidence, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that 'no evidence has
been adduced on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff as to how respondent-
plaintiff was in a position to pay or make arrangements for payment of the
balance sale consideration within time'.
13. In the present case, however, there is overwhelming material
on record to establish that the respondents-plaintiffs were continuously
ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It has come in
evidence that they remained present in the office of the Sub-Registrar
along with the balance sale consideration, stamp duty, and registration
expenses. In this regard, an affidavit executed by Hari Singh was placed on
record, though the same was exhibited only as Mark 'A' and not formally
proved.
13.1 Subsequently, a notice dated 19.05.1986 was issued calling
upon the appellant-defendant to appear before the Sub-Registrar on
27.05.1986 for execution of the sale deed. Pursuant thereto, the
respondents-plaintiffs duly attended the office of the Sub-Registrar on the
said date along with the requisite balance consideration and necessary
expenses, and an affidavit evidencing the same was also executed and
exhibited as Ex.P2.
13.2 It further stands proved that even before the Notary Public, the
respondents-plaintiffs demonstrated possession of sufficient funds, as they
were shown to be carrying 2,000 currency notes of ₹100/- denomination
and 1,100 currency notes of ₹50/- denomination, thereby substantiating
their financial capacity.
13.3 Although the notice dated 27.05.1986 was not received by the
appellant-defendant, as is evident from the subsequent notice dated
04.06.1986, the appellant-defendant was again called upon to appear
before the Sub-Registrar on 17.06.1986 for execution of the sale deed. The
respondents-plaintiffs accordingly remained present on the said date as
well, and their presence is duly supported by documentary evidence on
record.
13.4 Additionally, PW-Prem Chand, while deposing in the witness
box, categorically stated that on 31.12.1985 the plaintiffs had reached the
Tehsil premises with the balance sale consideration and registration
expenses and had waited throughout the day for the appellant-defendant,
who failed to appear. Significantly, this testimony remained unchallenged
in cross-examination, and it is a settled principle of law that where material
testimony is not subjected to cross-examination, the same is deemed to be
admitted.
13.5 In cross-examination, the said witness further gave a detailed
account of the arrangement of funds, stating that ₹2,00,000/- were arranged
from a commission agent at Seema Mandi, Kaithal, ₹50,000/- from Tara
Chand, and ₹40,000/- from their uncle Tegh Ram son of Ram Kishan.
13.6 In view of the aforesaid evidence, both documentary and oral,
it stands conclusively established that the respondents-plaintiffs were not
only ready in terms of financial capacity but were also consistently willing
in their conduct to perform their contractual obligations. The findings
recorded by both the Courts below, being based on a proper appreciation of
evidence, are thus well-reasoned and call for no interference by this Court.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant has further contended
that the Courts below failed to appreciate that the agreement Ex.P1 was
inequitable, inasmuch as the sale consideration was grossly inadequate and
the appellant-defendant was under financial distress due to severe business
losses. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Jayakantham and Others vs. Abhay Kumar (supra), wherein it
was observed that in appropriate cases, equitable relief may be moulded.
14.1 However, it is pertinent to note that even in the said judgment,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that mere inadequacy of
consideration or the fact that the contract is onerous or improvident does
not, by itself, constitute an unfair advantage or hardship within the
meaning of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
14.2 In the present case, even as per the own pleadings of the
appellant-defendant, the value of the property was stated to be ₹4,25,000/-,
whereas the agreed consideration under the contract was ₹3,40,000/-. Thus,
even on the appellant's own showing, the consideration cannot be said to
be grossly inadequate so as to render the agreement inequitable or
unconscionable.
15. The appellant-defendant has also contended that enforcement
of the contract would result in undue hardship, as the property in question
constitutes her only residential house, and she and her family would be
rendered homeless due to alleged financial distress.
15.1 Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-
plaintiffs has submitted that no such plea of undue hardship was
specifically raised in the written statement, nor was any issue framed in
this regard. It is submitted that in the absence of foundational pleadings
and evidence, no finding of undue hardship could be returned.
15.2 In support of this contention, reliance has been placed
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Beemaneni Maha
Lakshmi vs. Gangumalla Appa Rao (Since Dead) by LRs, 2019 INSC
656, wherein it has been held, after relying upon A. Maria Angelena vs.
A.G. Balkis Bee, AIR 2002 SC 2385, that a plea of hardship raised for the
first time without foundational pleadings or issues cannot be entertained.
16. In Prakash Chandra versus Narayan, 2012 (3) RCR (Civil)
335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 15, has held as under:-
xxxx
The High Court in the second appeal failed to notice that
the respondent had not taken any defence of hardship and
no such issue was framed and in absence of any such
evidence on record, the first appellate court held that he
would be landless should the decree for specific
performance be granted.
17. In Kammana Sambamurthy vs. Kalipatnapu Atchutamma
and Others, 2011 AIR (SC) 103, the facts of the case demonstrate that the
plea of hardship was predicated on the contention that enforcement of the
contract would render the transaction more onerous and cause undue
hardship to the defendant-vendor. In the said context, it was urged that the
decree for specific performance would result in grave hardship to the
appellant-defendant. It was further contended that since the vendor and her
husband had passed away and their ten daughters were residing in the
property in question, such circumstances constituted hardship warranting
denial of the relief of specific performance, even qua the vendor's half
share in the property. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such
circumstances, by themselves, do not constitute hardship of such a nature
as would justify refusal of the decree for specific performance.
17.1. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the mere
fact that the appellant-defendant may lose possession of her residential
house cannot, in law, be construed as such undue hardship as would justify
denial of specific performance, particularly when such consequence was
clearly foreseeable at the time of execution of the contract. It is further
evident that no specific pleading has been raised in the written statement to
the effect that enforcement of the agreement would result in unforeseeable
hardship within the meaning of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
17.2. In the absence of any such foundational pleadings and
supporting evidence, the grant of alternative relief of refund of earnest
money along with compensation by the learned trial Court was not legally
sustainable. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parshwanth Saha vs. Bandhana Modak (Das)
and Another, 2024 INSC 1022, wherein in paragraphs 34 to 36, it has been
held as under:-
"34.The High Court seems to have overlooked the fact that the question
of hardship in terms of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act, 1963 read with
explanation (2) bears reference to hardship, which the defendant did
not foresee at the time of entering into the contract. In other words,
the issue of hardship would come into play only if it is established
by cogent evidence that Late Prabha Ranjan Das who executed the
Agreement of Sale was unable to foresee the hardship at the time of
entering into the contract.
35. The explanation elucidates the point of time at which the hardship
has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at
the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused
from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.
36. There is nothing to indicate in the pleadings or evidence that there
was a hardship of the kind which Late Prabha Ranjan Das did not
foresee at the time he executed the Agreement of Sale or that the
hardship which the defendants herein would face is the result of an
act of the plaintiff based on his supervening acts."
18. In the present case as well, there are neither pleadings nor any
evidence to establish that the alleged hardship pleaded by the appellant-
defendant was not foreseeable at the time of entering into the contract, nor
is there any material to show that the same has arisen on account of any
supervening act on the part of the respondents-plaintiffs.
19. In view of the settled legal position, and in the absence of any
specific pleadings or evidence demonstrating unforeseeable hardship at the
time of execution of the contract, the contention raised on behalf of the
appellant-defendant cannot be accepted.
20. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the
findings of the Courts below on the issues of execution of agreement,
readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs, and absence of undue hardship,
are affirmed as being based on correct appreciation of law and evidence.
21. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court finds no merit in
the present appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
21.2. The judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate
Court is hereby affirmed. The respondents-plaintiffs are held entitled to
specific performance of the contract upon payment of the balance sale
consideration of ₹2,55,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of execution of the agreement to sell till the date of
decree passed by this Court. The said direction is also intended to balance
equities and compensate the appellant-defendant for the escalation in
property prices from the date of execution of the agreement till the date of
decree. The balance consideration along with interest shall be paid within a
period of two months from the date of this decree, and the appellant-
defendant shall execute the sale deed within one month thereafter, failing
which the respondents-plaintiffs shall be entitled to seek execution of the
sale deed through the process of Court. Defendant shall be entitled to
withdraw FDR from the trial Court.
22. Consequently, upon final adjudication of the principal controversy,
all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, arising out of or connected
with the present proceedings, stand disposed of by necessary implication.
In view of the conclusions recorded herein, no separate or further orders
are required to be passed in respect of such applications, the same having
rendered infructuous and academic.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL)
09.04.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
