[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kewal Singh vs State Of Punjab on 8 April, 2026
117+238
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 08.04.2026
Date of Uploading: 08.04.2026
Kewal Singh
.....Petitioner.
Versus
State of Punjab
.....Respondent.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
*****
Present:- Mr. Jashandeep Singh Sandhu, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Gaurav Gurcharan S. Rai, Sr. DAG, Punjab.
SUMEET GOEL, J.(Oral)
Present third petition has been filed under Section 483 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (earlier Section 439 Cr.P.C.),
for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.156 dated
28.11.2024, registered for the offences punishable under Section 22(C) of
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short
'NDPS Act') [Section 27 of the NDPS Act added later-on], at Police
Station Maur, District Bathinda.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 30
syrup Onerex TM and 300 intoxicated tablets allegedly found in the
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -2-
possession of the petitioner and his co-accused.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
in custody since 28.11.2024. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and
the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel
has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more
than 01 years and 04 months. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised are serious in nature and thus the
petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State
counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 07.04.2026 in
Court, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone
through the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 28.11.2024 whereinafter,
investigation was carried out and the Challan qua him was presented on
28.05.2025. Total 17 prosecution witnesses have been cited out of which
none has been examined and 02 witnesses have been given up till date. The
rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be
ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it
appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -3-
may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to
indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of
justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. As per custody certificate dated 07.04.2026 filed by the
learned State counsel, the petitioner has suffered incarceration for a period
01 year, 04 months and 05 days. Further, as per the said custody certificate
the petitioner is stated to be involved in other cases/FIRs. However, this
factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of
regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out
for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the
facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd. Amir
Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in case of
Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this
Court in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of
Haryana, decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3)
RCR (Criminal) 191.
6.2. Indubitably, the present petition is the 3rd attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The earlier bail pleas preferred by the
petitioner were withdrawn on 16.09.2025 and 10.12.2025. Keeping in view
the entirety of the factual milieu of the case in hand, especially the pace of
the trial and extended incarceration of the petitioner, this Court is inclined
to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -4-
this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-
2332-2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another;
relevant whereof reads as under:
"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable
in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on
the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed,
the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required
to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a
mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The
metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s)
ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s)
without substantial, effective and consequential change in
circumstances.
IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue
is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court
dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required
to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a
Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such
second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly
decipherable from the said order passed."
6.3. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder Versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after
relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC
81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR
(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -5-
reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West
Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal",
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as
"Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat"; Criminal
Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @
Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to
mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as
well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to
defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest
paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly
actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-
referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series
of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The
concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty,
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to
speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time
of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice
that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal
proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The
speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of
criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the
heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the
prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal
jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However,
this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles
hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does
not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes
for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is
intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on
the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the
trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against
oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved
criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that
evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time,
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -6-
thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It
goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention
are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are
subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life,
usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden
of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the
innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case
relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to
commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985.
While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial
quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated
under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts
can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions
which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously
scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right
to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be
rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the
accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent
reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an
inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom,
in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under
the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn
Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency
that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-
bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of
an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything
contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case
governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the
Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the
accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration,
without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention
into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the
principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in
prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious
fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and,
as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo
created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be
considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of
bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground
of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985."
CRM-M-13735-2026 (O&M) -7-
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an
undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to
the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However,
in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following
conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the
trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall
not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the
trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect
that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after
being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be
involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the
present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is
mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which
plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as
directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
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9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Pending misc. application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
April 08, 2026 JUDGE
Yag Dutt
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether Reportable: Yes/No
