Punjab-Haryana High Court
Amarjit Singh vs State Of Punjab on 18 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
250
CRR-561-2020 (O&M)
Date of decision: 18.11.2025
Amarjit Singh ...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
State of Punjab ...Respondent(s)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
Present :- Mr. Rajat Malhotra, Advocate for the petitioner(s)
(through V.C.).
Mr. Mohit Kapoor, Sr. DAG Punjab.
*****
VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (Oral)
1. The instant criminal revision petition has been preferred against
the judgment and order of sentence dated 11.08.2017 passed by the
Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Dasuya, as well as the judgment dated
07.02.2020 passed by the Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur, vide which the
appeal filed by the petitioner was partly allowed and he was convicted
and sentenced as under:-
Under Section Sentence
279 I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 06 months and
fine of Rs.1000/- and in default thereof to
further undergo imprisonment for a period of
15 days.
337 I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 06 months and
fine of Rs.500/- and in default thereof to
further undergo imprisonment for a period of
15 days.
304-A I.P.C. Acquitted
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All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 29.06.2013, the
complainant, Harjit Singh, made a statement before ASI Sat Pal Singh of
Police Station Garhdiwala. He stated that he, along with his mother Balbir
Kaur and his niece, Simranjit Kaur, aged about three years, was proceeding
towards Dausarka Dhoot in his car bearing registration No. PB-02-AM-
6665. At about 9:30 a.m., when they reached near village Dhoot, a Verna car
bearing registration No. PB-03-P-8047, being driven by the accused at a
high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, approached from the Tanda
side and struck the right side of his vehicle. As a consequence, the
complainant's car veered off the road and hit nearby trees. It was further
alleged that in the said accident, his mother Balbir Kaur died at the spot,
while he and his niece Simranjit Kaur suffered multiple injuries. On the
basis of the aforesaid allegations that the accident had occurred due to the
rash and negligent driving of the accused, FIR No. 36 dated 29.06.2013
came to be registered under Sections 304-A, 279, 337, and 427 of the Indian
Penal Code at Police Station Garhdiwala.
3. On 09.07.2013, the accused was arrested and the documents of
the vehicle were taken into police possession. After completion of the
investigation, the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed in the
court for offences under Sections 279, 304-A and 337 of IPC and documents
were supplied to the accused-petitioner free of cost.
4. Finding a prima facie case having been made out, the petitioner
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was charge-sheeted for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 304-A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the
contents of the same were read over the and explained to the accused, to
which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined six
witnesses and closed the prosecution evidence:
PW-1 Harjit Singh (Complainant). He proved on record his
statements dated 29.06.2013 and 09.07.2013, Ex.PA,
PB and PC respectively.
PW-2 Satbir Singh. He went to the Civil Hospital, Dasuya
and identified the dead body of late Balbir Kaur vide
Ex. PB.
PW-3 Harmesh Singh (Asstt. DTO Office Hoshiarpur). He
was partly examined in chief but was not presented for
further examination.
PW-4 Kuldip Singh (Jr. Asstt. DTO Office Hoshiarpur) He
brought on record the driving license (Ex.PW4/A),
registration certificate (Ex.PW4/B) and copy of RC
transferred in Harjit Singh's name as (Mark-A).
PW-5 HC Darshan Singh (Investigating Officer). He proved
on record the arrest memo (Ex.PW4/A), identification
memo (Ex.PC), Search memo (Ex.PW4/C), recovery
memo of driving license of the petitioner (Ex.PW4/D)
and recovery memo of the Indica Car (Ex.PW4/E)
PW-6 Dr. Sanjay Narad proved the treatment record of
Simranjit Kaur and that the latter's facial fracture was
grievous in nature.
6. The statement of the petitioner was recorded under Section 313
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of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein all incriminating circumstances
and evidence appearing on record were put to him. The petitioner denied the
allegations in their entirety, described the prosecution case and evidence as
false and fabricated, and asserted his innocence.
7. No defence evidence/witness was produced by the accused
during the phase of his defence evidence.
8. After considering the arguments advanced, the testimonies of
witnesses, and the evidence placed on record, the Trial Court, vide judgment
dated 11.08.2017, held the petitioner guilty of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 304-A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and
sentence, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 46 dated 21.12.2018
before the Court of the Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur. Vide judgment dated
07.02.2020, the petitioner was acquitted under Section 304-A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, however, the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC was upheld. Hence, the present
revision petition.
10. After advancing arguments at some length, learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that, vide order dated 29.05.2020 passed by this Court,
the remaining sentence of the petitioner had been suspended after noticing
that he had undergone an actual custody of more than two months out of the
total sentence of six months. He contends that he would not press the present
revision petition on merits and contends that he would confine his challenge
only to the quantum of punishment that has been so awarded. The following
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mitigating circumstances are pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner.
(i) The incident in question occurred in June-2013, and more than
twelve years have since elapsed. At the time of the incident, the
petitioner was approximately 19 years old.
(ii) That the incident in question was an unfortunate and purely
accidental occurrence, having taken place without any intention
or overt act on the part of the petitioner.
(iii) The petitioner has endured the ordeal of a prolonged criminal
trial spanning over twelve years.
(iv) The petitioner is the sole bread earner in his family and his
prolonged incarceration has caused severe hardship to them.
11. State counsel, on the other hand, contends that both the Courts
have examined the evidence brought on record and concurrently recorded a
finding of conviction against the petitioner. In a revisional jurisdiction,
neither a new line of defence can be adopted nor any reappreciation of the
evidence can be undertaken. No illegality or perversity has been pointed out
by the petitioner, hence, no occasion would call for upsetting the findings
recorded or the sentence awarded and affirmed by the Courts.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the impugned judgments.
13. In the present case, there is nothing on record to reflect that the
petitioner possesses a criminal bent of mind or that his conduct poses any
threat to society. Hence, by the broader principles of criminal jurisprudence,
no adverse presumption can be drawn against him.
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14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down certain principles to
govern the Courts in the matter of sentencing. Reference in this regard may
be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State
of Punjab Vs. Prem Sagar & Ors (2008) 7 SCC 550. The relevant extract of
the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -
5. 'Whether the Court while awarding a sentence would
take recourse to the principle of deterrence or reform or
invoke the doctrine of proportionality, would no doubt
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
While doing so, however, the nature of the offence said to
have been committed by the accused plays an important
role. The offences which affect public health must be
dealt with severely. For the said purpose, the courts must
notice the object for enacting Article 47 of the
Constitution of India.
6. There are certain offences which touch our social
fabric. We must remind ourselves that even while
introducing the doctrine of plea bargaining in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, certain types of offences had been
kept out of the purview thereof. While imposing
sentences, the said principles should be borne in mind.
7. A sentence is a judgment on conviction of a crime. It is
resorted to after a person is convicted of the offence. It is
the ultimate goal of any justice-delivery system.
Parliament, however, in providing for a hearing on
sentence, as would appear from sub-section (2) of Section
235, sub-section (2) of Section 248, Section 325 as also
Sections 360 and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
has laid down certain principles. The said provisions lay
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down the principle that the court in awarding the
sentence must take into consideration a large number of
relevant factors; sociological backdrop of the accused
being one of them.
8. Although a wide discretion has been conferred upon
the court, the same must be exercised judiciously. It
would depend upon the circumstances in which the crime
has been committed and his mental state. Age of the
accused is also relevant.
9. What would be the effect of the sentencing on the
society is a question which has been left unanswered by
the legislature. The Superior Courts have come across a
large number of cases which go to show anomalies as
regards the policy of sentencing. Whereas the quantum of
punishment for commission of a similar type of offence
varies from minimum to maximum, even where same
sentence is imposed, the principles applied are found to
be different. Similar discrepancies have been noticed in
regard to imposition of fine.
10. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of W.B.
[(1994) 2 SCC 220], this Court held:
"15...Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner
in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice
against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should
impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts
reflect public abhorrence of the crime..."
11. Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and Another v. State of
A.P. [(1996) 6 SCC 241], following Dhananjoy
Chatterjee (supra), states the principles of deterrence and
retribution but the same cannot be categorized as right or
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wrong. So much depends upon the belief of the judges.
12. In a recent decision in Shailesh Jasvantbhai and
Another v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2006) 2 SCC
359], this Court opined:
"7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates
conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and
property of the people is an essential function of the
State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of
criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the new
challenges and the courts are required to mould the
sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion
of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in
ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal
proclivity must be the object of law which must be
achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore,
law as a cornerstone of the edifice of 'order' should meet
the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his
Law in Changing Society stated that: "State of criminal
law continues to be--as it should be--a decisive reflection
of social consciousness of society." Therefore, in
operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the
corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual
matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern
where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it
warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in
each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it
was planned and committed, the motive for commission
of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of
weapons used and all other attending circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area of
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consideration.
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Sevaka
Perumal v. State of T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471], this Court
furthermore held that it was the duty of every court to
award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was executed or
committed etc.
xxx
18. Don M. Gottfredson in his essay on "Sentencing
Guidelines" in "Sentencing by Hyman Gross and Andrew
von Hirsch" opines:
"It is a common claim in the literature of criminal justice
and indeed in the popular press that there is considerable
"disparity" in sentencing. The word "disparity" has
become a prerogative and the concept of "sentencing
disparity" now carries with it the connotation of biased
or insidious practices on the part of the judges. This is
unfortunate in that much otherwise valid criticism has
failed to separate justified variation from the unjustified
variation referred to as disparity. The phrase
"unwarranted disparity" may be preferred; not all
sentencing variation should be considered unwarranted
or disparate. Much of it properly reflects varying degrees
of seriousness in the offense and/or varying
characteristics of the offender. Dispositional variation
that is based upon permissible, rationally relevant and
understandably distinctive characteristics of the offender
and of the offense may be wholly justified, beneficial and
proper, so long as the variable qualities are carefully
monitored for consistency and desirability over time.
Moreover, since no two offenses or offenders are
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identical, the labeling of variation as disparity
necessarily involves a value judgment- that is, disparity
to one person may be simply justified variation to
another. It is only when such variation takes the form of
differing sentences for similar offenders committing
similar offenses that it can be considered disparate."
[Emphasis supplied]
The learned author further opines:
"In many jurisdictions, judicial discretion is nearly
unlimited as to whether or not to incarcerate an
individual; and bound only by statutory maxima, leaving
a broad range of discretion, as to the length of sentence."
19. Kevin R. Reitz in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
Second edition "Sentencing guidelines" states:
"All guideline jurisdictions have found it necessary to
create rules that identify the factual issues at sentencing
that must be resolved under the guidelines, those that are
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision, and those
viewed as forbidden considerations that may not be taken
into account by sentencing courts. One heated
controversy, addressed differently across jurisdictions, is
whether the guideline sentence should be based
exclusively on crimes for which offenders have been
convicted ("conviction offenses"), or whether a guideline
sentence should also reflect additional alleged criminal
conduct for which formal convictions have not been
obtained ("non-conviction offenses").
Another difficult issue of fact-finding at sentence for
guideline designers has been the degree to which trial
judges should be permitted to consider the personal
characteristics of offenders as mitigating factors when
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imposing sentence. For example: Is the defendant a
single parent with young children at home? Is the
defendant a drug addict but a good candidate for drug
treatment? Has the defendant struggled to overcome
conditions of economic, social or educational deprivation
prior to the offense? Was the defendant's criminal
behavior explicable in part by youth, inexperience, or an
unformed ability to resist peer pressure? Most guideline
states, once again including all jurisdictions with
voluntary guidelines, allow trial courts latitude to
sentence outside of the guideline ranges based on the
Judge's assessment of such offender characteristics. Some
states, fearing that race or class disparities might be
exacerbated by unguided consideration of such factors,
have placed limits on the list of eligible concerns.
(However, such factors may indirectly affect the sentence,
since judges are permitted to base departures on the
offender's particular 'amenability' to probation (Frase,
1997).)"
20. Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg have divided
the process of determining sentence into stages of
determining proportionality while determining a
sentence, namely:
1. What interests are violated or threatened by the
standard case of the crime- physical integrity, material
support and amenity, freedom from humiliation, privacy
and autonomy.
2. Effect of violating those interests on the living
standards of a typical victim- minimum well-being,
adequate well-being, significant enhancement
3. Culpability of the offender
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4. Remoteness of the actual harm as seen by a reasonable
man.'
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pramod Kumar
Mishra Vs. State of UP (2023) 9 SCC 810, observed that punishment must not
be viewed as an act of vengeance but as a means of reformation and
reintegration of the offender into society. It was further held that an appropriate
sentence must be determined by considering a range of factors, including the
nature and circumstances of the offence, the offender's background, age,
mental and emotional condition, potential for rehabilitation, prior criminal
record, and the deterrent needs of the community. Sentencing, the Court noted,
involves a delicate exercise of judicial discretion where multiple social,
psychological, and moral factors must be balanced to ensure that justice serves
both societal protection and individual redemption.
16. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based
upon making an accused realize the consequences of the crime committed by
him and the creation of the dent in the life of the victims and also the social
fabric. The same by itself does not oblige the Court to extend an opportunity
to a convict for reforming himself. The principles of proportionality have to
be balanced and the impact of the offence on the society as a whole and its
ramifications on the victim and the immediate collectives also has to be
examined.
17. A nine judge bench of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Dennis Councle McGautha v. State of California reported as 402 U.S. 183
(1971), observed that the criteria governing sentencing neither furnish an
exhaustive list of relevant considerations nor indicate how various
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circumstances should influence the decision-making process. In essence,
these standards merely suggest broad areas for consideration and underscore
the inherent difficulty in formulating uniform sentencing principles,
particularly in matters of grave offences. The Court further cautioned against
rigidly prescribing or mandating uniform standards for sentencing,
emphasizing that the principles governing punishment must depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each individual case, and that no straightjacket
formula can be universally applied.
18. Moreover, Italian criminologist and jurist Cesare Beccaria, in
his seminal treatise "On Crimes and Punishments," propounded the doctrine
of penal parsimony, emphasizing that the justification of any criminal justice
system rests upon its capacity to inflict the least possible evil necessary to
achieve its ends. The underlying premise is that punishment, being in itself a
necessary evil and devoid of inherent virtue, must be confined strictly within
the bounds of necessity. The imposition of suffering or restriction upon an
offender cannot extend beyond what is indispensable for the preservation of
social order.
19. The case in hand is yet another where interest of justice would
warrant a reformative approach in precedence to a punitive or retributive
approach. It is not the function of the judges to seek the transformation of
human nature itself, but rather to shape the framework within which
individuals perceive that adherence to the law aligns with their own best
interests.
20. Taking into consideration, the facts noticed above and
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considering that the petitioner has faced the rigor of criminal prosecution for
more than a decade since the registration of the FIR and as against the
substantive sentence of 6 months, he has already undergone sentence of 2
months, I deem it appropriate to partly allow the petition. While maintaining
the judgment of conviction passed by Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur, the order
of sentence so passed is modified. The sentence awarded under sections 279
and 337 of IPC, 1860, by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dasuya vide
judgment dated 11.08.2017 and upheld by Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur vide
judgment dated 07.02.2020, is modified to the period already undergone.
However, the sentence of fine awarded by the Courts below to a sum of
Rs.1000/- is increased to Rs.3000/-, failing which he shall undergo the
default punishment, as ordered.
21. The petition is accordingly partly allowed.
22. Pending criminal misc. application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
18.11.2025 JUDGE
Mangal Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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