Amarjit Singh And Anr vs Dilbagh Singh And Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 5082 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Amarjit Singh And Anr vs Dilbagh Singh And Ors on 13 November, 2025

Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal

Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal

RSA No.1999 of 1994 (O&M)                 -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

103                                        RSA No.1999 of 1994 (O&M)
                                           Date of Decision:13.11.2025

Amarjit Singh and another                                         ... Appellants

                                           Versus

Dilbagh Singh (since deceased) through LRs and others             ...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL

Present:     Mr. S.S. Swaich, Advocate
             Ms. Ishani Goyal, Advocate
             for the appellants.

             Mr. Gurdail Singh Jaswal, Advocate
             Mr. Buta Singh, Advocate
             for respondents No.1 to 3.

             Mr. Ravinder Pal Singh Rawal, AAG, Punjab.

             None for respondent No.13.

             ***
             ****

AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)

1. Defendants efendants No.7 & 8 are the appellants before this Court challenging

the judgment and decree dated 28.02.1989 passed by the learned trial Court

decreeing the suit for declaration filed by the respondents No.1 to 3-plaintiffs plaintiffs and

the judgment dated 08.04.1994 passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court vide

which the appeal preferred by them against the aforesaid judgment and decree

passed by the learned trial Court, has been dismissed.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of

their status before the learned trial court.

3. Succinctly, the facts of the case are that, the suit property originally

belonged to Muslim evacuees prior to 1947, namely Sher Mohammad and others,

who had mortgaged the land to Puran and Batna, sons of Kura, in equal shares, and

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both mortgagees had taken physical possession of the same prior to the year 1947.

After the migration of the evacuees to Pakistan, Puran and Batna continued in

possession as mortgagees, and the property, having become composite property,

was later ter put to auction on 23.05.1959 pursuant to an order dated 12.05.1958,

where Puran and Batna emerged as the highest bidders and paid the full auction

price of ₹400/--,, which stands recorded in the District Competent Officer's order

dated 23.07.1959 confirming confirming the sale in their favour. The plaintiffs being heirs of

deceased Puran and Batna had asserted exclusive possession of the suit land as

owners after the death of both Puran and Batna, alleging that Puran died without

leaving any heir and that their long and continuous possession has matured into

ownership by adverse possession. They further allege alleged that despite repeated

applications to defendants No.1 No.1 to 5 for sanction of mutation, the Competent

Revenue Officer refused on the pretext that the original fi file le containing the order

dated 23.07.1959 was untraceable, and that defendants No. 1 to 5 deliberately

withheld the file with mala fide intent to cloud the rights of Puran and Batna and

their heirs. It was was their further case that, in consequence of this fra fraudulent udulent conduct,

the Tehsildar (Sales) illegally issued a parchi allotment in favour of defendant No.

6, mutation was wrongly sanctioned in his favour, and defendant No. 6 thereafter

sold the land to defendants No.7 No.7 and 8, in whose favour mutation was also

sanctioned. Alleging fraud and illegality in the allotment made to Ujagar Singh, the

plaintiffs sought a declaration that they had become owners by way of adverse

possession, along with an alternative prayer for possession.

4. Upon notice of the suit, the the appellants appellants-defendants defendants appeared and filed

written statements taking objection that the plaintiffs had an alternative remedy to

seek enforcement of the Competent Officer's order through the State Competent

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Officer, Chandigarh, and further averring that Pu Puran ran and Batna had neither

obtained a warrant of possession nor a sale certificate and that possession of the

land remained with the Central Government until its allotment to Ujagar Singh. It

was pleaded that the plaintiffs had no concern with the payments allegedly made

by Puran and Batna, as they had not obtained any succession certificate and were

not legally recognised heirs, and that since both Puran and Batna had died without

leaving any legal heir, heir, ownership of the land vested in the Central Government Governmen

which validly allotted it to Ujagar Singh through the Tehsildar (Sales). It was

further pleaded that the plaintiffs had raised no objection at the relevant time and

were now estopped by their act and conduct nduct from instituting the suit; and that the

relevant nt allotment record was consigned to the Director, Land Reco Records, rds, Jalandhar.

Defendants No.7 No. and 8 had denied that the land was ever purchased by Puran and

Batna and asserted that it belonged to the Central Government, which was further

allotted to Ujagar Singh, Singh, and was thereafter validly sold to them for full

consideration, pursuant to which mutation was rightly sanctioned. Further it was

claimed that they were in actual cultivating possession and recorded as such in the

khasra girdawari since 1983-84.

1983 Furthermore, hermore, they denied that the land was ever

mortgaged to Puran or Batna, Batna instead alleged that the plaintiffs had slept over their

rights, and also raised objections of limitation and estoppel. Defendants No. 11 and

12 filed written statement asserting that the plaintiffs were heirs of Batna only and

not of Puran, claiming themselves to be Puran's heirs on the basis of a registered

Will dated 24.07.1970, and contending that after Puran's death, both parties were

jointly in hostile possession of of the suit land and supported the plaintiffs to the

extent of alleging that the allotment to Ujagar Singh and the subsequent sale in

favour of defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were illegal, fraudulent and without jurisdiction.

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They prayed for relief in favour of themselves themselves and the plaintiffs as heirs of Puran

and Batna. All other averments averments in the plaint were specifically denied and dismissal

of the suit was prayed for.

5. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court had framed as many as

thirteen issues including including relief. On appreciation of oral as well as documentary

evidence produced before it, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of respondents

No.1 to 3-plaintiffs plaintiffs and the appeal preferred by the appellants appellants-defendants No.7 and

8 was also dismissed by the learned le 1st Appellate Court. Hence, the regular second

appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that both the Courts

below have gravely erred in decreeing the suit of respondents No.1 to 3, which was

hopelessly time barred. It is argued that the limitation for filing the suit for

declaration under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short the Act of 1963)

is three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues, which in the present

case accrued on 23.07.1959 when the auction sale deed dated 26.05.1959 was

allegedly confirmed in favour of Puran and Batna. It is further argued that the suit

is even barred by limitation if the cause of action is taken to be accrued on

25.09.1980 when the suit land was allotted in favour of Ujaga Ujagarr Singh (defendant

No.6 before the learned trial Court) and 03.02.1981 when appellants herein

purchased the same from Ujagar Singh, as the suit was filed on 03.01.1985 i.e.

beyond the period of three years. Once the clock of limitation starts ticking, it

never stops. In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment passed by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Gupta and others Vs. Prashant and others

2025 INSC 552.

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7. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that respondents

No.1 to 3-plaintiffs plaintiffs have failed to prove that allotment to Ujagar Singh with respect

to 1 kanal and 3 marlas of land was the same property, which was allegedly sold in

auction to Puran and Batna. Puran and Batna never obtained sale certificate and

warrants of possession poss from the he competent authority nor their names were reflected

as owners of the suit property in revenue records, rather the land in dispute to the

extent of 1 kanal 3 marlas was shown to be allotted in favour of Ujagar Singh vide

mutations Nos.2025 and and 2026 on the basis of which appellants had purchased the

same being the bona fide purchasers. It is an admitted fact that allotment in favour

of Ujagar Singh with respect to 1 kanal 3 marlas of land was never challenged by

respondents No.1 to 3-plaintiffs.

3 Therefore, learned counsel for the appellants

prays for setting aside of the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts

below.

8. Per contra, learned l ned counsel for the respondents No.1 to 33-plainti plaintiffs,

contends that once the suit land was sold in aauction uction by the District Competent

Officer and the bid amount of Rs.400/-

Rs.400/ was accepted and deposited in the treasury,

the sale had completed complete and the government had no vested right or title to allot the

same subsequently and thus, any allotment thereafter was null and void in the eyes

of law. In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment passed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Arvind Kumar Vs. Government of India and others

(2007) 5 SCC 745. Without cancelling the auction sale confirmed in favour of

Puran and Batna, any parchi allotment made in favour of Ujagar Singh by the

Tehsildar, as alleged by the appellants is non est and not legally valid. It is further

argued that mutation entry entry in the revenue record does not confer title and the title is

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to be proved by producing valid document, which appellants had failed to bring on

record.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the

record with their able assistance, this his Court finds no merit in the appeal preferred

by the appellants.

10. The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants that the suit

filed by respondents No.1 to 3-plaintiffs 3 plaintiffs was barred by limitation as per Article 58

of the Act of 1963 19 is wholly misconceived and bereft of merit. Article 58 of the

Act of 1963 deals with obtaining any other declaration than the declaration sought

in Articles 56 and 57 of the Act ibid and for the same limitation period is fixed as

three years from the date date when the right to sue first accrues. However, where the

suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for

recovery of possession, it would be governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the

Act of 1963,, according to which limitation for recovery of possession based upon

title would be 12 years.

years Further, when hen in a suit for declaration of title, a further

relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would

only be an ancillary ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by

the relief that has been additionally claimed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

judgment passed in N. ThajudeenVs. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037 has held Board2024 eld as under:

under:-

"21.

21. The limitation for a suit for declaration is provided under Part III of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It is governed by Articles 56-58 56 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under all the aforesaid three Articles, the limita limitation tion for a suit for declaration is three years. The limitation provided under Articles 56 and 57 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is in respect to declaration regarding forgery of an instrument issued or registered and validity of the

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adoption deed. Article Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the limitation for decree of declaration of any other kind and therefore, the suit for declaration of title would essentially fall under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the limitation would be three years from the date when the right to sue limitation first accrues.

22. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

Act."

11. UnnissaAIR 1961 SC 808, it has In C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa

been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in a suit for declaration with a

further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for

such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property

would ould not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists.

When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a

continuing right and there would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is

that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as

Right to Property subsist.

12. In Indira v. Arumugam (1998) 1 SCC 614 614, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held as under:-

under:

"5.

5. It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse

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possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot nnot be non-

non suited....."

13. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallavva and Another

Vs. Kalsammanavara Kalamma (Since Dead) by Legal Heirs and Others 2024

SCC OnLine SC 3846 where the suit was filed for declaration of title and

possession, has held as under:-

"30.

30. The submission on the part of the appellants herein is that the suit would be governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and is liable to be dismissed being time barred whereas the submission on the part of the respondents (original plai plaintiffs) ntiffs) is that the suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and even on the date when the First Appellate Court permitted the plaint to be amended, the same was well within limitation.

31. It is well settled that when there are several reliefs claimed in a suit, the limitation period would be that of the main relief, the limitation for ancillary relief being ignored. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants herein is not sustainable in law as it proceeds on the assumptio assumption n as if old Article 142 of the earlier Limitation Act was in force wherein the plaintiff who based his case on title had to prove not only title but also possession within twelve years of the date of the suit. The said provision of law as observed aforesai aforesaidd has undergone a metaphoric sea change as we find under the Limitation Act. Article 65 reads as under:

under:-

      "Description of Suit                        Period of       Time from which period
                                             limitlimitation
                                                       ation      begins to run

      65. For possession of immovable property or Twelve          When the possession of the
      any interest therein based on title.        years           defendant becomes adverse
                                                                  to the plaintiff."

It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse

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possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-

non suited. [See : Indira v. Arumugam Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614.]"

14. In the instant case, as suit for declaration and for issuance of

permanent injunction against defendants (including appellants herein) was filed

from interfering in the plaintiffs' plaintiffs exclusive possession of land bearing Khewat

No.53, Khatauni ni No.87, Khasra Nos.12/17 and 24/1 measuring 5 kanals 11 marlas

situated in the area of village Manjgarh, Tehsil and District Hoshiarpur; and in

alternative suit for possession of the share land along with other declaratory reliefs.

Since the respondents No.1 to 3-plaintiffs plaintiffs had sought declaratory relief along with

possession, Article 65 of the Act of 1963 will come into operation and the

limitation period for the same would be 12 years and not 3 years, unless and until

the defendants prove their adverse possession against the plaintiffs. Admittedly,

defendants No.7 & 8 (appellants) had failed to prove adverse possession against

plaintiffs. First time, name of Ujagar Singh-defendant Singh defendant No.6 was as entered as allottee

in the jamabandi for the year 1980-81 1980 and the he suit was filed in the year 1985, thus,

the same was within limitation as per Article 65 of the Act of 1963. Moreover, the

judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants in Rajeev Gupta's case

(supra) does not come to rescue of the appellant appellants, as in the said case initially the

suit was filed for cancellation of the registered sale deeds with recovery of

possession. However, the same was sought to be given up to project as though the

suit was only for possession to wriggle out the clutches of limitation but the suit

was dismissed as barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Act of 1963.

Thereafter, relief of declaration was sought to be inserted by way of amendment in

the plaint in the course of first appeal to give the same a colour as thou though gh the suit

was for possession based on title, obviously to cover the limitation period under

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Article 65 of the Act of 1963, 1963, which was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as

an after-thought thought and in that eventuality, it was held that cancellation was the

primary relief in the circumstances with recovery of possession being the ancillary

relief.

15. The appellants had to prove their title based on the title of Ujagar

Singh from whom they allegedly purchased 1 kanals 3 marlas of suit land. Their

whole case was that the government had allotted land to Ujagar Singh by way of

parchi allotment but the order order of allotment had never seen light of the day. Rather,

defendants No.1 to 5 i.e. official defendants in para No.4 of their written statement

on merits had admitted the contents of para No.4 of the plaint to the extent that the

land in dispute had become composite property and the competent officer vide his

order dated 23.07.1959 had confirmed the sale but Batna and Puran etc. neither

obtained the warrant of possession nor the sale certificate. A perusal of order dated

23.07.1959 Ex.P2 passed by the District District Competent Officer, Hoshiarpur reveals

that in the said order, office was directed to put up forms F & G in two days and

issue sale certificate and warrants of possession today. Once a direction was given

to issue sale certificate and warrants of possession possession on the same day, there was no

evidence brought on record to show that sale certificates and warrants of

possession ession were issued to the Puran and Batna by post or any other means. Rather,

a bald plea was taken that they did not turn up to collect the same. Further, in para

No.7 of the written statement of defendants No.1 to 5 on merits it was stated that

since Central Government was owner in possession of the suit land,, the land was

allotted to Ujagar Singh, defendant No.6 by the Tehsildar (Mahal-cum-sales), sales),

Hoshiarpur. If it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the land in dispute

remained under ownership of the Central Government due to the fact that Puran

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and Batna did not turn up to collect the sale certificate and warrants of possession,

it is not comprehendible as to why the government did not prefer any appeal

against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court decreeing the suit

of respondents No.1 to 3-plaintiffs 3 for declaration and for alternative relief of

possession for the the share of Batna only whereas defendants No.10 to 12 along with

one Dalbir were held entitled to succeed to the estate of Puran Puran. Why y they did not

come forward to protect their title,, had at all it been their case that ownership of the

suit property remained remained with them after Puran and Batna did not come forward to

obtain the sale certificate as well as the warrants of po possession ssession is the question,

which remained unanswered,, meaning thereby, judgments and decrees passed by

both the Courts below have ha attained finality inality qua them. Therefore, in the opinion of

this Court, once the sale was confirmed, the government had no right or title over

the property to allot the same to Ujagar Singh-

Singh-defendant defendant No.6. Mere entry in the

revenue record does not confer title in the absence of any valid document of

ownership, which is conspicuously missing in the present case with respect to

Ujagar Singh-defendant defendant No.6 and as a consequence thereto, with respect to

appellants herein-defendants herein No.7 and 8.

16. In view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Chandrika

and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others

(2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan

Singh (dead) through LRs and others, questions of law are not required to be

framed in second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court whose

jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, Ac

1918.

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17. As an upshot of above discussion, this Court finds no illegality and

perversity in the concurrent finding of fact rendered by both the Courts below and

the same is upheld. The regular second appeal is dismissed.

18. Pending misc. application(s), application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

(AMARINDER AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL) GREWAL JUDGE November 13, 2025 Pankaj* Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes Whether reportable : Yes

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