Punjab-Haryana High Court
Iqbal Saini vs M/S Harjeet Singh Raghuvansh Singh And ... on 12 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
261 CRR Nos.1973, 1979
& 1984 of 2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 12.11.2025
Iqbal Saini
....Petitioner
V/s
M/s Harjeet Singh Raghuvansh Singh and another
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Deepak Kumar Bartia, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Jarnail Singh Saneta, Advocate for respondent No.1
Mr. Deepak Kumar Grewal, DAG, Haryana
for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)
1. By this common order, the aforesaid three revision petitions i.e.
CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 of 2025, are being disposed off together, as
the same involve commonality of facts and issue(s).
For the sake of convenience, the facts are being drawn out from
CRR-1973-2025 (titled as Iqbal Saini Vs. M/s Harjeet Singh Raghuvansh
Singh and another).
2. The present criminal revision petitions have been filed
impugning the judgment dated 31.05.2025 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra & the judgment and order of sentence dated
07.08.2023/10.08.2023 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kurukshetra
whereby the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced for offence under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |2
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the
pendency of proceedings, the petitioner and the complainant have entered
into a settlement/compromise dated 07.11.2025 before the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
further submitted that since the parties have amicably settled their
dispute(s), the matter may be compounded and the petitioner be acquitted.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has ratified
the factum of compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the
parties and has further vouched the genuineness of the
compromise/settlement dated 07.11.2025 stated to be arrived between the
parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
Accordingly, he has iterated that the respondent-complainant has no
objection in case the offence is permitted to be compounded and the
petitioner is ordered to be acquitted.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the available record.
6. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., AIR 2010(SC) 1907, relevant whereof reads
thus:
"15. With regard to the progression of litigation in cheque bouncing
cases, the learned Attorney General has urged this Court to frame
guidelines for a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly
delay compounding of the offence. It was submitted that the requirement
of deposit of the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed composition,
since at present, free and easy compounding of offences at any stage,
however belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the cheque to delay
settling the cases for years. An application for compounding made after
several years not only results in the system being burdened but the
complainant is also deprived of effective justice. In view of this
submission, we direct that the following guidelines be followed:-
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |3
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be
suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could
make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or
second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made,
compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any
costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding
as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made
before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be
allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required
to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition
for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such
authority as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before
the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such
compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused
pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the
Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque
amount.
Let it also be clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with these
guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority
operating at the level of the Court before which compounding takes place.
For instance, in case of compounding during the pendency of proceedings
before a Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be
deposited with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, costs
imposed in connection with composition before the High Court should be
deposited with the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in
connection with composition before the Supreme Court should be
deposited with the National Legal Services Authority.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial endorsement of
the above quoted guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-
making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain. It must be
kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on
how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the Act. We have
already explained that the scheme contemplated under Section 320 of the
CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense. In view of the legislative
vacuum, we see no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |4
have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the
composition of the offence in cases involving Section 138 of the Act. The
graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding
at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court
is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any
Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to
the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent
court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the
interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs
with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while
recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should
of course contest the proceedings to their logical end. Even in the past,
this Court has used its power to do complete justice under Article 142 of
the Constitution to frame guidelines in relation to subject-matter where
there was a legislative vacuum."
6.1. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as M/s
New Win Export &Anr. vs. A. Subramaniam 2024 INSC 535 : 2024(3)
Law Herald (SC) 2098, relevant whereof reads as under:
"6. At this juncture, we would also like to reiterate a few words
regarding the principles of compounding of offences in the context of NI
Act. It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory
offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that
the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of
cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is
a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the
'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive
aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI
Act if parties are willing to do so. (See: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed
Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 (Para 18), Gimpex Private Limited v.
Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705 (Para 29), Meters And Instruments
Private Limited And Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560(Para
18.2)"
6.2. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled
as Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S. Borcar and another = 2025 INSC 1158, has
held as under:
"38. Since a very large number of cheque bouncing cases are still
pending and interest rates have fallen in the last few years, this Court is
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |5
of the view that it is time to 'revisit and tweak the guidelines'.
Accordingly, the aforesaid guidelines of compounding are modified as
under:-
(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his
evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow
compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the
accused.
(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the
recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by
the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on
payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services
Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the Sessions
Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may compound
the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the cheque
amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before this Court, the figure
would increase to 10% of the cheque amount."
6.3. The statutory provision of Section 359 of BNSS, 2023 (Section
320 of Cr.P.C., 1973) and Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
when examined alongwith Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 in the guiding light
of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra),M/s New Win Export (supra) and Sanjabij Tari (supra),
lead to the unequivocal conclusion that the offence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be compounded at all stages of
litigation, including when the matter has reached the High Court after
having been conclusively dealt with by the Magisterial as also the Sessions
Court. In other words, such an offence can be compromised/compounded
even after the petitioner-accused has been convicted by the Court of learned
Magistrate and his appeal against the same has been dismissed by the
learned Sessions Court.
6.4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra) has also enunciated that, ordinarily, costs ought to be
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |6
imposed when the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
of 1881 is compounded at a stage when substantial proceedings have
already been undertaken by the Courts so as to dissuade the unscrupulous
litigant from unduly delaying the compounding of such offences. However,
discretion has been reserved in favour of the concerned Court to
reduce/waive such costs, in case facts/circumstances of a given case so
warrant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sanjabij Tari (supra) has
revisited the guidelines, insofar as it relates to the quantum of imposition of
costs upon the accused, but has not modified the leeway granted in the
judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) which permits reduction or waiver
of costs based on the factual milieu of a particular case albeit subject to the
recording of reasons for such variance. For the sake of clarity it is reiterated
that liberty reserved in favour of the courts to waive the imposition of costs
may be exercised by any of the courts seized of the matter--be it the High
Court, the Sessions Court or the magisterial Court conducting trial. It is,
however, imperative to bear in mind that discretion to waive the imposition
of costs is not to be invoked as a matter of ordinary course. The exercise of
such discretion must be predicated upon exceptional, compelling and
accentuating circumstances which, in the considered opinion of the
concerned Court seized of the matter, warrant deviation from the general
rule of imposition of cost. The Court, while invoking such discretion, must
record clear, cogent and reasoned findings delineating the special factors
that justify the waiver. This requirement is in consonance with the
legislative intent and the underlying purpose sought to be achieved by the
criminalization of the act of dishonor of cheque, i.e. to inculcate financial
discipline and uphold the credibility and sanctity of negotiable instruments.
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |7
6.5. Still further, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 528 BNSS, 2023is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial
process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, where the dispute is
essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached,
the High Court may intervene to quash the conviction, recognizing that
continued proceedings would be non-productive and unjust in the given
circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are incidental replete
powers, in the absence of which, the Court would be obliged to sit still and
helplessly witness the process of law being abused for the purposes of
injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to the High Court,
forming its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without
such power(s), a High Court would retain form but lack substance. These
powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest
possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the
nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested
with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts
from being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that
though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety
of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language
make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case,
which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice
in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to
deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law,
need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law
and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in
fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to
protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |8
accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other
words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless and inherent powers, of
a High Court which may be invoked whenever it is just and equitable to do
so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to
prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between
the parties and to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, the High Court, in
the exercise of its inherent power under section 528 BNSS, 2023 has the
discretion to quash a conviction where the parties have reached an amicable
settlement, provided that such compromise neither impinge upon the public
interest nor undermine the cause justice, as well as the substantial justice.
7. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the concerned rival parties that an amicable settlement has been arrived at
between them and, therefore, compounding of the offence and necessary
further directions have been sought from this Court. A perusal of the
compromise/settlement dated 07.11.2025 stated to be arrived between the
parties reflects that the parties have sought to resolve their dispute(s) in toto
and bury the hatchet. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court,
the factual matrix of the case requires that the offence(s) ought to be
permitted to be compounded and the petitioner deserves to be acquitted.
7.1. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending
facts/circumstances of the case; especially factum of the petitioner having
suffered incarceration for about 3 months & 22 days after having been
convicted by the Sessions Court, the petitioner having faced the wrath of
criminal litigation since about the year 2018, the petitioner being a person
aged 47 years of age and the petitioner being pleaded to be a first time
offender; this Court does not deem it appropriate to saddle the petitioner
with costs.
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CRR Nos.1973, 1979 & 1984 (O&M) Page |9
8. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The impugned judgment dated 31.05.2025 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra & the judgment and order
of sentence dated 07.08.2023/10.08.2023 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st
Class, Kurukshetra are set-aside and the petitioner is acquitted.
(ii) The rival parties shall remain bound by the terms of the
settlement/compromise dated 07.11.2025 entered into between the parties
before the Mediation and Conciliation Center of this Court. In case of non-
compliance thereof, the aggrieved party shall be at liberty to seek recall of
this order, albeit upon showing sufficient cause. It is clarified that in case
non-compliance is found to be shown, the erring party may be saddled with
exemplary punitive measure(s).
(iii) No order as to costs.
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.
(v) Photocopy of this order be placed on the file of other connected
case(s).
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
November 12, 2025
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: Yes
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