Jagira Thr Lrs Nasib Singh And Ors vs Gurdev Singh
2025 Latest Caselaw 4970 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Jagira Thr Lrs Nasib Singh And Ors vs Gurdev Singh on 11 November, 2025

Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal

Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal

RSA-2267-1992
         1992 (O&M)              -1-

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                        AT CHANDIGARH

106                                        RSA No.
                                                No.2267 of 1992 (O&M)
                                           Date of Decision:11.11.2025


Jagira
 agira (since deceased through LRs)
                               LR and others                       ...Appellants

                                          Versus

Sh. Gurdev Singh (since deceased through LRs)
                                           s) and others           ... Respondents

2.    RSA No.218 of 1993 (O&M)

Nasib Singh and others                                             ...Appellants

                                          Versus

Karnail Singh(since deceased through LRs)
                                     L                             ... Respondents


CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL

Present:    Mr. Vikram Anand, Advocate
            for the appellants.

            Mr. G.S. Punia, Senior Advocate with
            Mr. P.S. Punia, Advocate
            Ms. Harveen Kaur, Advocate
            Ms. Mankeen Kaur, Advocate
            for respondent(s).

            ***

AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The instant appeals are being decided by a common order as they

involve common question of law and facts. For the sake of convenience, facts are

being taken from RSA-2267-1992.

2. The defendants defendant are the appellantss before this Court challenging the

judgment and decree dated 31.03.1989 passed by the learned trial Court decreeing

the suit for permanent injunction filed by respondent No.1-plaintiff plaintiff and the

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judgment dated 03.08.1992 passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court ourt vide which

the appeal preferred by him against the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by

the learned trial Court, has been dismissed.

3. For the sake of convenience, parties are being referred in terms of

their status before the learned trial Court.

Cour

4. Succinctly, the facts of the case are that on 11.06.1987, plaintiff- filed

a suit for permanent injunction in the Court of Additional Senior Sub Sub-Judge, Judge,

Dasuya, seeking to restrain the defendants defendant from interfering in his lawful and

peaceful cultivating cultivatin possession as a tenant of land measuring 30 kanals 18 marlas,

comprised in Khasra Nos. 2084/1313 min (4K (4K-4M), 1705/1313 min (1K-0M), 0M),

1906/1313 min (10K-5M), (10K 5M), 1919/1313 min (7K (7K-15),

15), Khasra Nos. 1703/1313 (6-8), (6

and 1706/1313 min (1-6M), (1 situated in village Dhadhiala, Tehsil Dasuya Dasuya.

5. Upon issuance of summons, defendants appeared through their

counsel and filed written statement wherein they raised preliminary objections with

regard to maintainability of suit, concealment of facts, cause of action, locus standi

of plaintiff to file the present suit. On merits, possession of the plaintiff was

disputed and it was stated that he got made fictitious and wrong entries in the

revenue record with the connivance of revenue officials and that he along with his

accomplices threatened to dispossess defendants forcibly from the land in dispute.

For this, the plaintiff and his accomplices were also challaned under Section 107,

151 Cr.P.C. by police officials at Police Station, Tanda and thus, prayed for

dismissal of thee suit.

6. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court had framed as many as

six issues including relief. On appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence

produced before it, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff and the

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ppeal preferred by the defendants was also dismissed by the learned 1st Appellate appeal

Court. Hence, the regular second appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants appellants-defendants contends that both the

learned Courts below have exceeded their jurisdiction by granting the relief of

possession to the plaintiff whereas the suit was simplicitor for permanent

injunction. The plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that he was in possession ssion of

the land in dispute and thus, the suit seeking relief of permanent injunction ought to

have been dismissed. The learned trial Court relied on the documents which were

not even exhibited while rendering a finding that the plaintiff was dispossessed d by

the defendants in an illegal manner. It is also contended that both the learned

Courts below have failed to appreciate that a relief which is not even pleaded

cannot be granted. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment

passed by thee Hon'ble H Supreme Court in Messers. Trojan and Co. Vs. RM. N.N.

Nagappa Chettiar AIR 1953 (SC) 235 to contend that decision of the Court must

be based on pleadings and the Court is not empowered to grant relief, which is not no

even asked for; unless the plaint is amended.

8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents

submits that on the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiff was in possession and

thus, he filed simplicitor suit for permanent injunction praying therein that his

peaceful ul possession should not be disturbed by the defendants. His possession was

even protected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 11.06.1987 whereby

while granting interim injunction, defendants were restrained from dispossessing

the plaintiff forcibly.

forcibl However, during the pendency of the suit suit, defendants in

connivance with the revenue authority had dispossessed the plaintiff and thus, in

the said eventuality, the learned trial Court had rightly decreed the suit for

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possession of land in dispute disput in favour vour of the plaintiff. It is also contended that the

right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date of filing of the suit or

institution of any legal proceedings. Later developments cannot defeat said right.

In support of his contention, reliance reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar and others Vs. JJot ot Ram and others AIR

1976 SC 49 as well as judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in

Smt. Maya Devi and others Vs. Mehria Gram Dall Mill, Balsamand Road, Hisar

and others 1987(1) PLR 591.

9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the

record with their able assistance as well as case laws cited cited,, this Court finds no

merit in the arguments raised by learned counsel for tthe appellants. The case set up

by the plaintiff was that he was in cultivating possession of the land in dispute as a

tenant for the last about 30-35 30 years and thus, apprehending his dispossession at

the hands of defendants, defendants, he filed the suit for permanen permanent injunction on 11.06.1987.

The last jamabandi of the land in dispute was for the year 1982 1982-1983, 1983, which was

exhibited as Ex.P2 wherein the plaintiff was recorded as non non-occupancy occupancy tenant on

batai under one Jagira i.e. one of the co-sharers.

co sharers. On 11.06.1987 itself, the learned

trial Court had granted interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the

defendants from dispossessing him forcibly from the suit land. Admittedly, no

proceedings for evicting the plaintiff were initiated by defendants. However,

during the pendency of the suit, revenue entries were got changed by defendants

vide Ex.D1 and D2 and the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit property on

30.10.1997. Taking into consideration the conduct of the defendants and noticing

the fact ct that defendants had dispossessed the plaintiff in an illegal manner, despite

having an interim injunction order in his favour, the learned trial Court granted

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relief of possession to the plaintiff, though the suit was filed for permanent

injunction. Thee judgment and decree of the learned trial Court has been upheld by

the learned 1st Appellate Court as well.

10. It is a settled principle of law that no one can take the law in his own

hands. Even a trespasser in settled possession cannot be disposses dispossessed sed without

recourse to law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira

Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) Thr. LR LRs (2012) 5 SCC

370 has held as under:-

under:

"79. Due process of law means that nobody ought to be condemned unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means an opportunity to the defendant to file pleadings including written statement and documents before the court of law. It doe doess not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court.

80. The High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial [(2006) 88 DRJ 545] held as under: (DRJ p. 5566, 66, para 28) "28.. The expressions 'due process of law', 'due course of law' and 'recourse to law' have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed urbed 'forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing--

thing ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, 'due process of law' or 'due course of law', here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.

Now, this 'due process' or 'due course' condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudic adjudicated ated upon by a court of

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competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the 'bare minimum' requirement of 'due process' or 'due course' of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e. for taking back something fr from om the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the 'recourse to law' stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in Puran Singh

Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 has held as under:

v. State of Punjab, under:-

12. In this case there was a concurrent finding of fact that Jamuna was in effective possession of the field on the date of occurrence and the prosecution had alleged that PWs 17 and 19 had taken possession of the property but the finding of the Court was tha thatt PWs 17 and 19 had not been put in possession by virtue of the delivery of possession given by the Court. It was against this context that the observations referred to above were made. This Court clearly pointed out that

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where a trespasser was in settled possession of the land he is not entitled to be evicted except in due course of law and he is further entitled to resist or defend his possession even against the rightful owner who tries to dispossess him. The only condition laid down by this Court was that that the possession of the trespasser must be settled possession. The Court explained that the settled possession must be extended over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. This particular expression has persuaded the High Court to hold that since the possession of the appellants' party in this case was only a month old, it cannot be deemed to be a settled possession. We, however, think that this is not what this Court meant in defining the nature of the settled possession. It is in indeed deed difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into a settled possession. But what this Court really meant was that the possession of a trespasser must be effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of of the owner or without any attempt at concealment. For instance a stray or a casual act of possession would not amount to "settled possession". There is no special charm or magic in the word settled possession nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined onfined in a straitjacket but it has been used to mean such clear and effective possession of a person, even if he is a trespasser, who gets the right under the criminal law to defend his property against attack even by the true owner. Similarly an occupat occupation ion of the property by a person as an agent or a servant at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. Thus in our opinion the nature of possession in such cases which may entitle a trespasser to exercise the right of private defence of property and person should contain the following attributes:

(i)) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;

(ii)) that the possession must be to the knowledge either express or implied of the owner or without any attempt at concealment and which implied contains an element of animus possendie ((sic possidendi). The nature

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of possession of the trespasser would however be a matter to be decided on facts and circumstances of each case; (iii

iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced in by the true owner; and

(iv)

iv)) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession, in which case the trespasser will have a right of private defence and the true owner will have no right of private defence.

defence."

12. Admittedly, in the present case, before the rights of the parties could

be adjudicated by the learned trial Court, defendants dispossessed the plaintiff

forcibly merely on the basis of revenue entries, which were got changed by them in

their names during the pendency of the suit. Thus, it cannot be stated that

defendants had adopted due course of law while ejecting the plaintiff, who was

admittedly in a long and settled possession as a tenant in cultivation on batai.

Since the plaintiff was dispossessed without following the due procedure of law

during the pendency of the civil suit and despite an interim injunction order was

passed in favour ur of the plaintiff, the learned trial Court had committed no error in

plaintiff, which was affirmed by the learned 1st restoring the possession of the plaintiff,

Appellate Court.

Court Defendants could not be allowed to take advantage of an action,

which was unlawful. Rather, they had to initiate eviction proceedings against the

plaintiff and obtain an eviction order from the court of competent jurisdiction. The

judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants in Messrs. Trojan and

Co. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The case in hand is

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not the case where some relief was in existence at the time of filing of the suit but

the same was not sought in the suit. The plaintiff, who was admittedly in

possession at the time of filing of the suit, was dispossessed by the defendants in an

illegal manner. The defendants had to initiate eviction proceedings against the

plaintiff by following the due process of law and thus, the argument raised by the

counsel for the appellants-defendants app that relief of possession ought not to have

been granted by the learned trial Court is totally misdirected and misconceived.

13. In view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Represent Representatives atives and others Vs. Chandrika

and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others

(2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan

Singh (dead) through LRs and others, questions of law are not required to be

framed amed in second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court whose

jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act,

1918.

14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not

find any ground to interfere int with the concurrent finding of fact rendered by both

the Courts below and the same is upheld. Consequently, both the appeals are

dismissed.

15. Misc. application(s) pending, if any, also stand disposed of.

(AMARINDER AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL) GREWAL JUDGE November 11, 2025 Pankaj* Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No

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