Ravinder Kaur And Others vs Harjot Singh
2025 Latest Caselaw 4887 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Ravinder Kaur And Others vs Harjot Singh on 7 November, 2025

           RSA-3793-2025
                    2025 (O&M)                                                                     -1-


                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                                            AT CHANDIGARH
                                                  -.-
                                                      RSA
                                                      RSA-3793-2025 (O&M)
                                                      Date of Decision : 07.11.2025

           Ravinder Kaur and Others                                               ....Appellants

                                                       VERSUS

           Harjot Singh (deceased) through LR                                     ....Respondent

           CORAM : HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU

           Present:            Mr. Sumeet Mahajan, Sr. Advocate with
                               Mr. Saksham Mahajan, Advocate
                               Ms. Radhika Deekshay, Advocate
                               Mr. Shrey Sachdeva, Advocate for the appellants
                                                                    appellants.

                  Mr. M.S.Rana, Advocate for the respondent
                                                 respondent/caveator.
                                           -.-
           MANDEEP PANNU, J.

1. The present RSA has been filed against the concurrent findings of the

Courtss below, wherein the learned Civil Judge ((Junior Division), Hoshiarpur, vide

judgment and decree dated 31.10.2019, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, and the

learned District Judge, Hoshiarpur, vide judgment and decree dated 23.09.2025,

dismissed the appeal preferred there-against.

there

Brief Facts

2. The facts in brief are that the respondent respondent-plaintiff, Harjott Singh, an

NRI, claimed to have purchased the suit property vide a registered sale deed dated

08.07.1974 from the father of Piara Singh, now deceased, being half share of

House No. 168--R, Hoshiarpur.

ur. The plaintiff alleged that he had also deposited the

property tax with the Municipal Corporation, and receipts thereof were produced in

evidence. It was the case of the plaintiff that in the year 1975, defendant No.1,

being his brother, was permitted to to reside in the suit property as a licensee for

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -2-

looking after the house and for extending love and affection to the plaintiff and his

family. Defendants No.2 to 5 were stated to be in possession as family members of

defendant No.1. The plaintiff alleged that that despite repeated requests, the defendants

failed to vacate the premises. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff's wife, Smt.

Raj Vaid, visited India in 1995 and requested the defendants to hand over vacant

possession, but they sought time on one pretext pretext or the other. The plaintiff visited

India again in 2004 and was surprised to find that the defendants had constructed

two additional storeys over the property without his consent or approval. Upon

being confronted, the defendants assured that they woul would d vacate the premises after

three years without claiming any compensation for the construction, but they failed

to do so. The plaintiff claimed that even after issuing legal notices dated

17.12.2014 terminating the licence and demanding possession, the def defendants endants

neither replied to the notices nor vacated the property. Hence, the suit for

possession and mesne profits was filed, alleging that the defendants had become

unauthorized occupants and were liable to pay ₹3000/- per month as use and

occupation charges charg till delivery of possession.

3. In their written statement, the defendants contested the maintainability

of the suit and raised several preliminary objections. It was pleaded that the

plaintiff, being a permanent resident of Canada, had not authorized any person to

institute the suit, and the counsel who filed it lacked authority from the plaintiff.

The vakalatnama and application filed on behalf of the plaintiff were without his

signatures, hence, the suit was not maintainable. It was further contended that the

suit was time-barred, barred, improperly valued for the purposes of Court fee and

jurisdiction, and that the plaintiff had concealed material facts from the Court and

had not approached with clean hands.

            RSA-3793-2025
                    2025 (O&M)                                                                  -3-

4. On merits, the defendants denied the sale deed dated 08.07.1974,

asserting that it was a forged and fabricated document. It was alleged that Piara

Singh, father of the plaintiff and defendant No.1, had never sold the suit property

to the plaintiff and that the alleged sale deed was prepared fraudulent fraudulently.

ly. It was

contended that Piara Singh remained in possession of the house till his death and

that the defendants, being his legal heirs, inherited the property thereafter. They

had been in continuous possession for more than forty years, paying all dues and an

maintaining the house as owners, not as licensees of the plaintiff.

5. The defendants further stated that the plaintiff, being permanently

settled abroad, never resided in or exercised ownership over the suit property. The

alleged promise to vacate after after three years was denied as false and concocted. The

defendants maintained that the plaintiff had created a false story to grab the

property after learning of its increased market value. They contended that if the

plaintiff truly believed himself to be the owner, he would have taken timely steps

upon visiting India in 2004 rather than remaining silent for nearly two decades.

The alleged notices and acknowledgments were denied as forged and fabricated.

6. It was finally submitted that the defendants were ne neither ither trespassers

nor licensees but were, in fact, owners in possession of the suit property, having

inherited it lawfully from Piara Singh. Accordingly, they prayed for dismissal of

the suit with costs.

7. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned ttrial Court framed the

following issues for adjudication:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of possession as

prayed for? OPP

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -4-

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of recovery as

prayed for? OPP

3. Whether the present suit is not ot maintainable? OPD

4. Whether the suit is time-barred?

barred? OPD

5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present

suit? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiff has concealed the material facts from the

Court OPD Court?

7. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes

of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD

8. Relief.

8. In order to prove his case, the plaintiff examined Ha Harjit rjit Kumar, R.C.

Clerk, as PW-1, 1, Sudesh Kumar, Registration Clerk, Teh Tehsil Office, Hoshiarpur, ur, as

PW-2, Hardeep Singh as PW-3, PW , Raj Vaid as PW PW-4, Sudesh Kumar, HRC D.C. D

Office, Hoshiarpur, as PW-5 PW and Kulwinder Singh, Clerk, Property Tax Branch,

Municipal Corporation, Hoshiarpur, as PW-6.

PW Thereafter, the learned counsel for

the plaintiff closed the the plaintiff's evidence on 03.07.2019.

9. In order to prove their case, the defendants examined Harpreet Singh

as DW-11 and Hardeep Singh as DW-2.

DW 2. After recording the statements of both

witnesses, the learned counsel for the defendants closed the defendant's evidence

on 09.10.2019.

Findings of the Learned Trial Court

10. After appreciating the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence led

by both sides, and hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the

learned trial Court held that hat the plaintiff successfully proved his ownership over

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -5-

the suit property through the registered registered sale deed dated 08.07.1974 Ex.P1 executed

by his father, late Piara Singh. The said document was found to be over thirty years

old, produced from proper custody, and thus presumed to be genuine under Section

90 of the Indian Evidence Act. The defendants, though denying Ex.P1, admitted

the execution on of a simultaneous sale deed Ex.P7 of the same date in favour of

defendant No.1 Satpal Singh, executed by the same vendor, Piara Singh. The Court

held that the defendants could not approbate and reprobate by accepting Ex.P7

while disputing Ex.P1.

11. The Court rejected the plea of adverse possession taken by the

defendants for the first time during arguments, obs observing erving that they failed to prove

exclusive, hostile, or continuous possession over the suit property to the exclusion

of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, being an NRI, had constructively retained ownership

and periodically sought possession through his wife aand nd attorney.Accordingly, the

Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the suit property.

12. The Court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of

mesne profits or use and occupation charges at the rate of ₹3,000 per month, as the

defendants' possession originated from a permissive licence extended by the

plaintiff out of family affection.

13. The he Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation, as it was

filed within twelve years from the date of alleged dispossessio dispossession.

n. The plaintiff's

visits to India and communication with the defendants established his continued

assertion of ownership. Therefore, Issue No.4 was decided in favour of the

plaintiff.

14. Learned earned trial Court decreed the suit for possession of the propert property y as

mentioned in the head note of the plaint, directing the defendants to vacate the suit

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -6-

property within three months. The claim for mesne profits was declined. The

decree was passed with costs.

Findings of the first Appellate Court

15. The learned first appellate Court,, after a comprehensive reappraisal of

the evidence and hearing both sides, upheld the findings of the trial Court and

dismissed the appeal. It observed that the plea regarding the authority of the

plaintiff to institute the the suit was without merit since the signatures and affidavits of

the plaintiff had been duly attested by the Notary Public, Ontario (Canada), and

any procedural irregularity was rectified by the trial Court's 's order dated

12.01.2016. The Court also concurred with the finding that the sale deed dated

08.07.1974 Ex.P1 executed by late Piara Singh in favour of the plaintiff was

genuine and valid, as the defendants had failed to produce any evidence of fraud. It

was further observed that the defendant Satpal Sing Singh, h, though alive during the

pendency of the suit, avoided entering the witness box, which cast an adverse

inference against him. The appellate Court held that once the defendants accepted

the contemporaneous sale deed Ex.P7 executed in their favour, they co could uld not deny

the validity of Ex.P1, since both deeds were executed by the same vendor on the

same day. The plea of adverse possession was also rejected on the ground that it

had not been pleaded in the written statement and was raised for the first time

during ring arguments. The alleged construction of two additional storeys without the

plaintiff's consent could not confer ownership rights or amount to adverse

possession.

16. On the issue of limitation, the appellate Court dealt with the matter in

detail and concurred oncurred with the trial Court's 's view that the suit was within the period

of limitation. It was observed that the suit was one for possession based on

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -7-

ownership, and such a suit can only be defeated if the defendant establishes having

perfected title by adverse adverse possession. Since the plea of adverse possession had

been rightly discarded, the suit could not be treated as time time-barred. The Court

reiterated that the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession based on title

is twelve years from the date of dispossession, and the plaintiff had filed the suit

within that period, especially considering that he was an NRI who had been

constructively asserting his ownership through visits and communications. It was

further held that mere long possession or payment payment of taxes does not constitute

hostile possession against the true owner. Consequently, the appellate Court

concluded that there was no illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence in the

trial Court's 's judgment, which was accordingly affirmed. The appeal was dismissed

with costs, and the decree of the trial Court was upheld.

17. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the

defendants-appellants appellants have preferred the present regular second appeal, which is

contested by the plaintiff-respondent/caveator.

plaintiff

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants

18. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently assailed the

concurrent findings of both the Courtss below as being illegal, perverse, and

contrary to law and evidence on record. It is argued that the Courtss below have

misconstrued the provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Article 65, in

holding that the suit was within limitation. According to the appellants, the

plaintiff himself, in paragraph 5 of the plaint, admitted that his wife visited India in

1995 and requested the defendants to vacate the house, but they failed to do so.

Hence, the cause of action to sue for possession arose in 1995, aand nd the limitation

period of twelve years commenced from that date. Since the suit was instituted

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -8-

only on 26.05.2015, it was hopelessly barred by limitation, and both Courtss erred

in law by treating it as within time. It is further contended that once the llimitation imitation

begins to run, no subsequent correspondence or request can extend or revive it, and

both Courtss have returned findings contrary to the settled principle that limitation

once started cannot be interrupted.

19. It is further submitted that the low lower appellate Court has failed to

appreciate that the defendants had been in open, peaceful, and uninterrupted

possession since 1975, and by the plaintiff's own admission, such possession

became adverse in 1995 when a demand to vacate was refused. It is urg urged ed that the

application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, filed to amend the written statement so

as to incorporate the plea of adverse possession, was erroneously dismissed by the

learned District Judge vide order dated 16.09.2021, despite the amendment being

necessary ecessary to determine the real controversy. The rejection of this application, it is

argued, has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. Similarly, the

application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for leading additional evidence,

including house-tax house receipts, ceipts, electricity and water bills, and site plans of the

construction raised over the suit property, was also dismissed without proper

consideration. Learned counsel contends that these documents were essential to

demonstrate the appellants' long standing long-standin g possession and substantial

improvements made on the property, which would have materially influenced the

finding of ownership and limitation.

20. It is further argued that both the Court Courtss have erred in accepting the

sale deed dated 08.07.1974 Ex.P1 as genuine enuine without any independent witness to

prove its execution and registration, and in presuming its validity under Section 90

of the Evidence Act. It is urged that the findings that the sale deed is over 30 years

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -9-

old and produced from proper custody cannot cannot substitute for proof of its execution.

Moreover, the Courts Courts below failed to appreciate that the defendants' father, Piara

Singh, continued to live and remain in possession of the property till his death, and

therefore, no valid transfer in favour of the plaintiff ever took effect.

21. The appellants further contend that both Courtss ignored the settled

law that raising of construction or payment of municipal and utility charges cannot

be brushed aside as mere permissive acts. The plaintiffs' conduct in re remaining maining

silent for decades and only acting in 2014, after property values had increased,

demonstrates that the suit was an afterthought. It is thus submitted that the

impugned judgments suffer from material irregularity, misreading of evidence, and

non-consideration sideration of statutory provisions, and the same are liable to be set aside.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

22. On the other hand learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent/caveator /caveator argued on the lines of the judgments and decrees passed by

the Courts below and has submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the

concurrent findings of both the Courts below. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of

the present appeal.

Findings of this Court

23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record,

this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. Both the Courtss below have

rendered concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence.

24. The primary contention of the appellants relates to limitation. The

argument that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be sustained. It is settled law

that a suit for possession based on ownership is governed by Article 65 of the

Limitation Act, under which limitation begins to run only when the possession of

RSA-3793-2025 2025 (O&M) -10-

the defendant becomes adverse to the knowledge of the true owner. In the present

case, the defendants never pleaded adverse possession in their written statement.

The plea was sought to be introduced introduced for the first time through an amendment

application filed during the pendency of the appeal, which was rightly declined.

Once such a plea was neither raised nor proved, the Courtss below were correct in

holding that limitation did not begin to run agains against the plaintiff.

25. It is also well settled that mere long possession, however extended,

does not amount to adverse possession unless accompanied by a clear and hostile

assertion of ownership to the knowledge of the true owner. In the present case, the

plaintiff laintiff had consistently asserted his ownership through the sale deed dated

08.07.1974 and through communications and visits to India. The defendants'

possession originated permissively and continued as such. The fact that the

plaintiff described the defendants defendants as trespassers or alleged that they failed to vacate

the property in 1995 does not by itself amount to an admission of adverse

possession. Adverse possession is a specific plea that must be distinctly pleaded

and proved by cogent evidence, which the defendants have utterly failed to do.

26. The plea that the suit was filed by an unauthorized person also stands

rightly rejected by the first appellate Court.. The plaintiff's signatures and affidavits

had been duly attested by the Notary Public, Ontario (Canada), and his attorney,

Smt. Raj Vaid, had competently deposed on his behalf, supported by medical

evidence explaining his inability inability to travel. The sale deed Ex.P1 was more than

thirty years old and produced from proper custody, attracting the presump presumption tion of

genuineness under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, and the defendants produced no

material to rebut this presumption.

            RSA-3793-2025
                    2025 (O&M)                                                               -11-

27. As regards the rejection of the applications under Order VI Rule 17

and Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, both were discretionary and rea reasoned soned orders that do

not suffer from any legal infirmity. The documents sought to be produced were

available during trial and did not materially affect the outcome. The amendment

sought to introduce a new and inconsistent plea at the appellate stage was ri rightly ghtly

declined.

Conclusion

28. For all these reasons, this Court finds no illegality, perversity, or

misreading of evidence in the concurrent findings of the Courtss below. The plea of

limitation is devoid of substance, the plea of adverse possession is ne neither ither pleaded

nor proved, and the findings regarding ownership and possession are based on

sound appreciation of evidence.

29. Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal stands dismissed in limine,

being devoid of any merit

30. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

           November 07, 2025                                              (MANDEEP PANNU)
           tripti                                                             JUDGE
                               Whether speaking/non-speaking
                                       speaking/non speaking : Speaking
                               Whether reportable            : Yes/No.