Gurjant Singh @ Janta vs State Of Punjab
2025 Latest Caselaw 4849 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Gurjant Singh @ Janta vs State Of Punjab on 7 November, 2025

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                      CHANDIGARH



       (206)                                   CRM-M-61128-2025
                                               Date of decision: 07.11.2025

Gurjant Singh @ Janta                                    ....Petitioner
                                         V/s
State of Punjab                                          ....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:       Mr.L.S.Lakhanpal, Advocate for the petitioner.

               Mr.Jaypreet Singh, DAG, Punjab.

                                        *****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL):

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail to the petitioner

in case bearing FIR No.143 dated 10.12.2023, registered for the offences

punishable under Sections 21(c), 27-A, 29, 61, 95 of the Narcotic Drugs

and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act'), at Police

Station "D" Division, Amritsar.

2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an

accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 4

Kgs of heroin and ₹9 lakhs of drug money, and the petitioner has been

nominated, in this case, on the disclosure of co-accused Rachhpal Singh.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the

petitioner was initially arrested on 13.12.2023. Learned counsel for the

petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS

Act have not been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers

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from inherent defects. Learned counsel has further iterated that sole basis

to array the petitioner as an accused is the disclosure statement of co-

accused, namely Rachhpal Singh. Learned counsel for the petitioner has

iterated that out of total 23 prosecution witnesses only three have been

examined till date. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner

has suffered incarceration for about 1 year, 10 months and 19 days. Thus,

regular bail is prayed for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by

arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in

nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.

Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is

barred by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same

ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record

custody certificate dated 06.11.2025 in Court, which is taken on record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone

through the available records of the case.

6. The petitioner was arrested on 13.12.2023 whereinafter

investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner was presented

on 10.04.2024. Total 23 prosecution witnesses have been cited and only

three have been examined till date. The petitioner has been implicated as an

accused in the FIR in question solely on the basis of disclosure statement of

co-accused Rachhpal Singh. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to

debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This

Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival

contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible

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has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner

absconding from the process of justice or interfering

with the prosecution evidence.

6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment

passed by this Court in Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab, passed in

CRM-M-65094-2024 (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying upon

the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 5592;

Smt.Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus State of

Gujrat, Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by (NCB)

Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.', 2022 (1) RCR

(Criminal) 762; and Vijay Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing Special

Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023, has held

thus:

"6.3 It is a well established principle of law that a confession made by a coaccusedunder Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co- accused. However, as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement made by a co- accused fall within the domain of the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial in accordance with

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established principles of law. However, while adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of law is not misused, abused or misdirected."

6.2. Further, this Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh alias Kala

versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-33729-2025

(2025:PHHC:089161) has held thus:

"14. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following postulates emerge:

(I) (i)A bail plea on merits; in respect of an FIR under NDPS Act of 1985 involving offence(s) under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A thereof and for offence(s) involving commercial quantity; is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act.

(ii) The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to a bail plea(s) on medical ground(s), interim bail on account of any exigency including the reason of demise of a close family relative etc.

(iii)The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act pale into oblivion when bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-applicant has suffered long undertrial custody, the trial is procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-applicant.

II. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are in addition to the conditions/parameters contained in Cr.P.C./BNSS or any other applicable extant law.

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III. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are cumulative in nature and not alternative i.e. both the conditions are required to be satisfied for a bail-plea to be successful.

IV. For consideration by bail Court of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(i) of NDPS Act i.e. "there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence":

(i) The bail Court ought to sift through all relevant material, including case-dairy, exclusively for the limited purpose of adjudicating such bail plea.

(ii) Such consideration, concerning the assessment of guilt or innocence, should not mirror the same degree of scrutiny required for an acquittal of the accused at the final adjudication & culmination of trial.

(iii) Plea(s) of defence by applicant-accused, if any, including material/documents in support thereof, may be looked into by the bail-Court while adjudicating such bail plea.

V. For consideration of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) i.e. 'he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail':

(i) The word 'likely' ought to be interpreted as requiring a demonstrable and substantial probability of re-offending by the bail-applicant, rather than a mere theoretical one, as no Court can predict future conduct of the bail-applicant.

(ii) The entire factual matrix of a given case including the antecedents of the bail-applicant, role ascribed to him, and the nature of offence are required to be delved into. However, the involvement of bail-applicant in another NDPS/other offence cannot ipso facto result in the conclusion of his propensity for committing offence in the future.

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(iii) The bail-Court may, at the time of granting bail, impose upon the applicant-accused a condition that he would submit, at such regular time period/interval as may stipulated by the Court granting bail, an affidavit before concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court/Illaqa (Jurisdictional) Judicial Magistrate/concerned Police Station, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In the facts of a given case, imposition of such condition may be considered to be sufficient for satisfaction of condition enumerated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii). VI. There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of exercise of power by a Court; while satisfying itself regarding the conditions stipulated in Section 37 of NDPS Act; shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Section 37 (ibid) as every case has its own unique facts/circumstances. Making such an attempt is nothing but a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such matter."

6.3. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37

of the NDPS Act stands diluted.

6.4. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be

saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 06.11.2025

filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered

incarceration for a period of 01 year, 10 months and 19 days & is not

shown to be involved in any other FIR. In this view of the matter, the rigor

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imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the

Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of

Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after

relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC

81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed

Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR

(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated

07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West

Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal",

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as

"Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat"; Criminal

Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @

Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:

"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a

vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive

incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying

the accusation as well as t o curtail any impairment in the

ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an

overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial.

This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and

the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's

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judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up

new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial

is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the

fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and

preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial

begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the

arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which

continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation,

inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible

prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable

delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the

criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be

averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are

sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded

Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant

pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps

the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress

and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the

sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite

period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal

justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The

guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression

and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the

prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a

reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold

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purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive

pretrial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the

anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal

charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence

will be lost or memories dimme by the passage of time, thus,

impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes

without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are

grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are

subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-

life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the

burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily

on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves

consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case

relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to

commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act,

1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving

commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the

rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985

which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only

after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied

itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence

charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any

offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of

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the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against

the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial.

The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered

nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,

particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the

accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent

reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an

inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid

down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in

its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of

the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of

special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this

Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and

systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A

Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become

complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights,

notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing

with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section

37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious

balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of

drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and

expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable

cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive

imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of

justice and equity.

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Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial

has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in

prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious

fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law

and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory

embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985

ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other

words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial

quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said

to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."

6.5. Keeping in view the entirety of facts and circumstance of the

case in hand, especially keeping in view the extended custody and pace of

trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail.

A profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this

Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of

Haryana and another; relevant whereof reads as under:

"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following

principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is

maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to

be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability

thereof.

II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is

maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as

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withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-

prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to

succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/

pertinently required to show substantial change in

circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or

ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric

expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s)

ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of

petition(s) without substantial, effective and

consequential change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down

as to what would constitute substantial change in

circumstances as every case has its own unique

facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing

but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to

the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing

with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive

regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are

pertinently required to be recorded for granting such

plea despite such a plea being second/successive

petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having

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successfully countenanced/ entertained such second/

successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly

decipherable from the said order passed."

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an

undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is

ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to

the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However,

in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial

Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following

conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.

(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.

(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.

(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.

(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail.

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In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those

which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as

directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the

State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the

petitioner.

9. Ordered accordingly.

10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression

of opinion on the merits of the case.

11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous

application, if any, shall also stands disposed of.

                                                      (SUMEET GOEL)
                                                          JUDGE
November 7, 2025
sailesh
                    Whether speaking/reasoned:        Yes/No
                    Whether reportable:               Yes/No




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