Punjab-Haryana High Court
Balaour Singh vs State Of Punjab And Ors on 4 November, 2025
Author: Vikas Bahl
Bench: Vikas Bahl
RSA-634-1997 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(124)
RSA-634-1997
Date of Decision: - 04.11.2025
Balour Singh
....Appellant
Versus
Punjab State Electricity Board and another
.....Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS BAHL
Present:- Mr. Vinod Kumar Kataria, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Vardaan Seth, Advocate
for the respondents.
****
VIKAS BAHL, J. (ORAL)
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
1. Plaintiff has filed the present Regular Second Appeal under
Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
2. Challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment dated
25.02.1993 vide which the suit filed by the present appellant-plaintiff for
declaration to the effect that order No.227 dated 18.06.1990 vide which
two annual increments with future effect had been stopped without
holding any regular inquiry was illegal, null and void, had been
dismissed. Challenge is also the judgment of the 1st Appellate Court dated
22.01.1996 vide which the first appeal filed by the present appellant had
also been dismissed.
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3. Undisputed facts in the present case are that the plaintiff was
working as a Lower Division Clerk in Punjab State Electricity Board at
the relevant time and had given a departmental examination held on
22-23/06/1989 at Ferozepur and after having given the said exam, a show
cause notice dated 14.08.1989 was issued to the plaintiff under the Punjab
State Electricity Board (Employees Punishments and Appeal)
Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as "1971 Regulations").
Without holding any regular inquiry or issuance of charge-sheet, the
respondent-department passed an order dated 18.06.1990 imposing the
penalty of stoppage of two annual increments with future effect. It was
the case of the plaintiff/present appellant that the same was a major
punishment and it was incumbent upon the authorities to hold a regular
inquiry before imposing the said punishment, which was not done and
thus, the impugned order dated 18.06.1990 was required to be set aside on
the said ground alone.
4. On the other hand, it was the case of the respondents that the
penalty of stoppage of two annual increments with future effect was a
minor penalty as defined under Rule 5(iv) of the 1971 Regulations and
thus, there was no requirement to hold a regular inquiry or issue a charge-
sheet.
5. The trial Court vide order dated 21.09.1992 framed the
following issues: -
"1. Whether the order dated 18.6.90 is not legal and
valid as alleged in the plaint ? OPP.
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2. Relief."
6. After considering the documents on record, the trial Court
came to the conclusion that no regular inquiry was conducted in the
present case but since as per Section 5(iv) of the 1971 Regulations, the
punishment imposed was a minor punishment, thus, no regular inquiry
was required to be held. The trial Court thus dismissed the suit of the
plaintiff. The 1st Appellate Court reiterated the said observations of the
trial Court and further observed that since as per the relevant rules, the
stoppage of two annual increments with future effect was a minor penalty,
thus, even the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
"Kulwant Singh Gill Vs. The State of Punjab", reported as Supp 1991
(1) SCC 504, would not apply. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
plaintiff was dismissed.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the
show cause notice is dated 14.08.1989 (Ex.P1) and the impugned order
(Ex.P2) was passed on 18.06.1990, thus, the rules/regulations which were
prevalent at the time of issuance of the said notice and the passing of the
said impugned order would be relevant for consideration in the present
case. It is further submitted that as per Regulation 5(iv) of the 1971
Regulations, which were prevalent at the relevant time, provided that
withholding of increments of pay was a minor penalty, but did not specify
as to whether in a case where the increment was withheld with future
effect/cumulative effect, the same would be a minor penalty or major
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penalty. It is submitted that in the said circumstances, the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill (supra),
which dealt with similar provisions, would apply and as per the said
judgment, the penalty of stoppage of increment with cumulative
effect/future effect is a major penalty. It is argued that both the Courts had
wrongly reproduced the regulations in the judgments, as at no time, much
less, the relevant time the regulations read that the stoppage of two
increments with future effect was a minor penalty under Rule 5(iv) of the
1971 Regulations. It is further argued that in fact after the passing of the
judgment in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill (supra), specific instructions
were also issued by the department to specifically include the punishment
of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect/future effect as a major
penalty. It is submitted that on account of applying the wrong regulations,
a perverse finding has been given by the Courts. Learned counsel for the
appellant has made reference to the rules/regulations which were
applicable in the year 1990 and also the rules/regulations which are
applicable presently.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
8. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has
submitted that the stoppage of two annual increments with future effect is
a minor punishment as defined under Rule 5(iv) of the 1971 Regulations.
It is further submitted that the judgments of the trial Court as well as of
the 1st Appellate Court are in accordance with law and deserve to be
upheld.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
9. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has
gone through the paper-book as well as the record of the case and is of the
opinion that the present appeal is meritorious and deserves to be allowed
for the following reasons.
10 The substantial questions of law which arise for
consideration in the present case are as follows: -
(i) Whether stoppage of two annual increments with future
effect would amount to a minor penalty or a major
penalty in accordance with Regulation 5 of the 1971
Regulations as applicable at the time of the issuance of
show cause notice dated 14.08.1989 (Ex.P1) or order
dated 18.06.1990 (Ex.P2)?
(ii) In case the said penalty is held to be a major penalty,
then, whether it was incumbent upon the respondent
department to have conducted a regular inquiry in
accordance with the Regulations 8 and 9 of the 1971
Regulations?
(iii) Whether the judgments of the trial Court as well as of the
1st Appellate Court are perverse as the Regulations which
have been taken into consideration are not the relevant
Regulations?
11. The facts of the present case are not in dispute. It is the
admitted case of both the parties that the penalty imposed on the present
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appellant was of stoppage of two annual increments with future effect and
that no regular departmental inquiry was conducted in the present case.
The primary question which arises for consideration is as to whether the
stoppage of two annual increments with future effect would be a major
penalty or minor penalty. The 1971 Regulations, as they stand after the
amendment, leave no matter of doubt that the said penalty is a major
penalty. Regulation 5, as amended up to 2005, is reproduced herein
below: -
"5. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons,
and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on an employee, namely:-
MINOR PENALTIES
(i) censure;
(ii) withholding of his promotions;
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss
caused by him to the Board by negligence or breach of orders;
(iv) witholding of increments of pay without cumulative effect.
MAJOR PENALITIES
(v) witholding of increments of pay with cumulative effect or reduction
to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with
further directions as to whether or not the employee will earn
increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether
on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the
effect postponing the future increments of his pay ;
(vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service, which
shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of employee to the time-
scale of pay, grade, post or service, from which he was reduced, with
or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to
the grade or post or service from which the employee was reduced
and his seniority and pay on such restorations to that grade, post or
service ;
(vii) compulsory retirement ;
(viii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future
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employment under the Board ;
(ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification
for future employment under the Board."
A perusal of the above regulation would show that
withholding of increment with cumulative effect has been specifically
included under major penalties and thus, after the amendment having
been made, there is no dispute regarding the said fact.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel
for the respondent has fairly submitted that the said regulation, which has
been reproduced herein above and also in the impugned judgments, was
not the regulation which was prevalent at the time when the impugned
order dated 18.06.1990 was passed and the Regulation 5 of the 1971
Regulations, which was in force at the said time, is reproduced herein
below: -
"5. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient
reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on an employee,
namely:-
MINOR PENALTIES
(i) censure;
(ii) withholding of his promotions;
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary
loss caused by him to the Board by negligence or breach of
orders;
(iv) withholding of increments of pay ;
MAJOR PENALTIES
(v) reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a
specified period, with further directions as to whether or not
the employee will earn increments of pay during the period
of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period,
the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing
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RSA-634-1997 -8-
the future increments of his pay ;
(vi) reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service,
which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the
employee to the time scale of pay, grade, post or service, from
which he was reduced with or without further directions
regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or
service from which the employee was reduced and his seniority
and pay on such restoration to that grade, post or service ;
(vii) compulsory retirement ;
(viii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for
future employment under the Board ;
(ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a
disqualification for future employment under the Board."
A perusal of the above regulation would show that under
Regulation 5 sub-clause (iv) of the 1971 Regulations, withholding of
increment of pay is stated to be a minor penalty and there is no specific
reference as to whether stoppage of two increments with cumulative
effect/future effect would fall under minor penalty or major penalty.
13. The said issue came up for consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill (supra). The rule which
was being considered in the said case was similar to the regulation which
was applicable in the year 1990 in the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court, after considering the said provisions, came to the conclusion that
stoppage of increment with cumulative effect/future effect would be a
major penalty and would not fall under Rule 5 (iv) and would rather fall
under Rule 5 (v) of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeals)
Rules, 1970. It was further held that the punishment of stoppage of
increment with cumulative effect could only be passed after holding an
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inquiry and after following the prescribed procedure and in case the same
is not done, then, the order passed would be per se void. Even the
arguments raised on behalf of the department that issuance of show cause
notice and seeking reply on the same was sufficient compliance of the
principles of natural justice was rejected and it was observed that once it
was found that the penalty was a major penalty, then, the entire procedure
as envisaged in the rules and regulations, which included conducting of
an inquiry, opportunity of adducing evidence, examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, placing of inquiry report before the disciplinary
authority and then, following the further procedure, was necessary before
the said penalty could be imposed.
14. In the said case, after holding the impugned order to be
illegal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also taken into consideration the
fact that since sufficient time had elapsed and thus, it was not expedient to
direct a regular inquiry in accordance with the rules and thus, the decree
granted by the trial Court in the said case was upheld and the judgment
and decree of the High Court was set aside. The relevant part of the said
judgment is reproduced herein below: -
"5. Penalties - The following penalties may, for good and
sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a
government employee, namely:
MINOR PENALTIES
(i) Censure;
(ii) withholding of his promotions;
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary
loss caused by him to the government by negligence of breach of
orders;
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(iv) withholding of increments of pay;
MAJOR PENALITIES
(v) reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a
specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the
government employee will earn increments of pay during the period
of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the
reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future
increments of his pay;
(vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service
which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the government
employee to the time scale of pay, grade, post or service from which
he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding
conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which
the government employee was reduced and his seniority and pay on
such restoration that grade, post or service;
(vii) compulsory retirement;
(viii) removal from service which shall be a disqualification for
future employment under the government;
(ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification
for future employment under the government'.
xxx xxx xxx
4. ..............The insidious effect of the impugned order by
necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his
time-scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the
tenure of his service with a direction that two years' increments would
not be counted in his time-scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The
words are the skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour
or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the
problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule
5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division Bench in Sarwan
Singh v. State of Punjab, P.C. Jain, A.C.J., speaking for the Division
Bench, while considering similar question, in paragraph 8 held that
the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, by no stretch of
imagination falls within clause (v) of Rules 5 of in Rule 4.12 of
Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held that under clause (v)
of Rule 5 there has to be a reduction to a lower stage in the time scale
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of pay by the competent authority as a measure of penalty and the
period for which such a reduction is to be effective has to be stated
and on restoration it has further to be specified whether the reduction
shall operate to postpone the future increments of his pay. In such
cases withholding of the increments without cumulative effect does
not at all arise. In case where the increments are withheld with or
without cumulative effect the government employee is never reduced
to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that
clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With
respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal
interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at
that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it
would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have
arrived at. If the reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance, it
would empower the disciplinary authority to impose, under the garb
of stoppage of increments, (sic stoppage) of earning future
increments in the time scale of pay even permanently without
expressly stating so. This preposterous consequence cannot be
permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(iv) does not empower the
disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments
of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and
following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be
without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void.
Considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the
impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the
Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty
without enquiry is per se illegal.
5. The further contention of Shri Nayar that the procedure
under Rule 8 was followed by issuance of the show cause notice and
consideration of the explanation given by the appellant would meet
the test of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules is devoid of any substance.
Conducting an enquiry, de hors the rules is no enquiry in the eye of
law. It cannot be countenanced that the pretence of an enquiry
without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the
department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses, if examined, to be an enquiry
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within the meaning of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules. Those rules
admittedly envisage, on denial of the charge by the delinquent officer,
to conduct an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to the presenting
officer as well as the delinquent officer to lead evidence in support of
the charge and in rebuttal thereof, giving adequate opportunity to the
delinquent officer to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the
department and to examine witnesses if intended on his behalf and to
place his version; consideration thereof by the enquiry officer, if the
disciplinary authority himself is not the enquiry officer. A report of
the enquiry in that behalf is to be placed before the disciplinary
authority who then is to consider it in the manner prescribed and to
pass an appropriate order as for the procedure in vogue under the
Rules. The gamut of this procedure was not gone through.
Therefore, the issuance of the notice and consideration of
the explanation is not a procedure in accordance with Rules 8 and
9. Obviously, the disciplinary authority felt that the enquiry into
minor penalty is not necessary and adhering to the principles of
natural justice the show cause notice and on receipt of the reply
from the delinquent officer passed the impugned order imposing
penalty thinking it to be a minor penalty. If it is considered, as stated
earlier, that it would be only a minor penalty, the procedure followed
certainly meets the test of the principles of natural justice and it
would be a sufficient compliance with the procedure. In view of the
finding that the impugned order is a major penalty certainly then a
regular enquiry has got to be conducted and so the impugned order
is clearly illegal. The trial court rightly granted the decree. The
judgment and the decree of the High Court is vitiated by manifest
illegality. At this distance of time it is not expedient to direct an
enquiry under Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules. The appeal is accordingly
allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside
and that of the trial court is restored but in the circumstances
without costs."
15. The law laid down in the above-said judgment applies on all
fours to the case of the present appellant, as the rule which was being
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considered was also pari materia to the rule/regulation in question. The
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of "Smt. Tripta Kumari Vs.
The State of Haryana and another", reported as 2011 SCC OnLine
P&H 7772 had relied upon the above said judgment to further hold that
the stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect is a major penalty
and in the said circumstances, it was necessary for the authorities to have
conducted the inquiry in accordance with the rules and regulations and
since the same had not been done, the impugned order in the said case
was also set aside. The relevant portion of the said judgment is
reproduced herein below: -
"The short question that would arise for consideration is
whether the procedure adopted by the respondents to impose this
penalty without holding an enquiry is legal and proper. The answer
to this question would depend upon the fact whether the penalty
imposed is major or minor penalty. If the penalty of stoppage of one
increment with cumulative effect is major penalty, then respondents
were under legal obligation to hold the enquiry before imposing this
punishment.
The issue, in my view, is no more res integra. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab,
1991(2) SCT 30 (SC) 9 has held that stoppage of two increments
with cumulative effect falls within the meaning of 5(v) of the
Punishment and Appeals Rules and would amount to major penalty
and, thus, regular enquiry would be a must to impose this penalty.
Without enquiry, no punishment of stoppage of increment with
cumulative effect, as such, could be ordered. Rules 8 and 9 of the
Rules clearly envisages the procedure to conduct an enquiry into the
misconduct before ordering stoppage of increment with cumulative
effect.
In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble
supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill (supra), there is no need to go
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into this issue further. Once the punishment of stoppage of
increment with cumulative has been held to be a major penalty, the
same could not have been imposed without holding enquiry.
Concededly, this punishment was imposed on the petitioner without
holding enquiry and as such the same would be rendered illegal and
being in violation of the procedure established by law. On this short
ground, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner cannot be
sustained and is, therefore, set-aside. Consequently, the order dated
10.5.1989 rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner is also set aside.
The writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to
costs."
16. It would be relevant to note that the procedure for imposing
major penalty has been provided in Regulations 8 and 9 of the 1971
Regulations as were in force in 1990 and as per the said regulations, no
order imposing major penalty could have been passed without holding
inquiry and the punishing authority either itself or by appointing an
inquiry officer could inquire into the truth of the allegations. The
substance of the allegations, articles of charge, list of all documents and
list of witnesses etc. relied upon by the authorities were required to be
supplied and as per the requirement of Regulation 8(5)(b) of the 1971
Regulations, even if no written statement of defence is submitted by the
employee, the punishing authority has the power to itself inquire into the
articles of charge or may appoint an inquiring authority under sub-
regulation (2) for the said purpose. The subsequent procedure requires the
inquiry report to be submitted to the punishing authority, where the
punishing authority is not the inquiring authority for the purpose of
further action as detailed in Regulation 9 of the 1971 Regulations.
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17. From the said provisions, it is apparent that holding of an
inquiry is necessary in case a major penalty is to be imposed or is
proposed to be imposed and there is nothing in the regulations to show
that in case, to a show cause notice, no reply is filed by an employee,
then, holding of the regular inquiry could be done away with. The
relevant portion of Regulation 8 of the 1971 Regulations, as were
applicable in the year 1980, is reproduced herein below: -
"PART-IV Procedure for Imposing Penalties
PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING MAJOR PENALTIES
8. (1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in
clauses (v) to (ix) of Regulation 5 shall be made except after an
inquiry held, as far as may be in the manner provided in this
regulation and Regulation 9 or in the manner provided hereinafter.
(2) Whenever the punishing authority or any other
authority empowered by the Board, by general or special order, is of
the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
allegations against an employee, it may itself, inquire into or appoint
under this Regulation an authority, to inquire into the truth thereof.
Explanation
Where the punishing authority, itself holds the inquiry any
reference in sub-regulations (7) to (20) and in sub-regulation
(22) to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a
reference to the punishing authority.
(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against an employee
under this regulation and Regulation 9, the punishing authority shall
draw up or cause to be drawn up;
(i) the substance of the allegations into definite and distinct
articles of charges;
(ii) a statement of allegations in support of each article of
charge, which shall contain --
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any
admission or confession made by the employee;
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(b) a list of documents by which and list of witnesses by
whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
(4) The punishing authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered
to the employee a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of
allegations and a list of documents and witnesses by which each
article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the
employee to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written
statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in
person.
(5) (a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the
punishing authority may itself inquire into such of the
articles of charge as are not admitted or, if it considers it
necessary so to do, appoint under sub- regulation (2), an
inquiring authority for the purpose, and where all the
articles of charge have been admitted by the employee in
his written statement of defence, the punishing authority
shall record its findings on each charge after taking such
evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid
down in Regulation 9.
(b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the
employee, the punishing authority may itself inquire into
the articles of charge or may, if it considers it necessary
to do so, appoint under sub-regulation (2), inquiring
authority for the purpose.
(c) Where the punishing authority itself inquires into any
article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for
holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order
appoint an employee or a legal practitioner, to be known
as the 'Presenting Officer' to present on its behalf the
case in support of the articles of charge."
18. Thus, the questions No.(i) and (ii) of law, as have been
framed herein above, are answered in favour of the present appellant and
it is held that the stoppage of two annual increments with future effect is a
major penalty and since it is a major penalty, the detailed procedure, as
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prescribed under Regulations 8 and 9 of the 1971 Regulations, was
required to be complied with, which admittedly had not been done in the
present case.
19. A perusal of the judgments of the trial Court as well as of the
1st Appellate Court would show that the Courts had taken into
consideration the Rule 5(iv) of the 1971 Regulations which provides that
stoppage of increments with future effect is a minor punishment. No such
regulation has been produced on record. Learned counsel for the
respondents has not been able to show that any such regulation was
prevalent at the time of passing of the order dated 18.06.1990. The
regulations which have been produced by the appellant and have been
reproduced in para 12 of the present judgment and which are stated to be
relevant at the date of passing of the order dated 18.06.1990, have not
been disputed on behalf of the respondents. Thus, in the said
circumstances, it is apparent that the judgments of the trial Court as well
as of the 1st Appellate Court suffer from perversity and illegality, as the
wording of the regulations which have been considered is contrary to the
relevant regulations itself. Thus, the above said question of law No.(iii) is
also answered in favour of the present appellant.
20. Keeping in view the above-said facts and circumstances, the
order dated 18.06.1990 is illegal and deserves to be set aside.
21. The question that now remains to be considered is as to
whether at this stage the respondent authorities should be given the right
to hold a regular inquiry or not. The impugned order was passed in the
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year 1990 and the judgment of the trial Court was passed in the year 1993
and that of the 1st Appellate Court was passed in the year 1996 and the
present appeal has been filed in the year 1997 and the present appellant is
stated to have retired. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant
Singh Gill (supra) had held that on account of lapse of time, it was not
expedient to direct an inquiry. This Court also on account of the above-
said facts and circumstances and also on account of the lapse of time, is of
the view that it would not be expedient to hold the inquiry at this stage.
22. Accordingly, the present Regular Second Appeal is allowed
and the judgments of the trial Court as well as of the 1st Appellate Court
are set aside and and the impugned order dated 18.06.1990 is held to be
illegal, null and void and is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is
decreed. The appellant/plaintiff would be entitled to all consequential
benefits.
( VIKAS BAHL )
November 04, 2025 JUDGE
naresh.k
Whether reasoned/speaking? Yes
Whether reportable? No
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