Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sumit vs State Of Haryana on 4 November, 2025

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH




129                                             CRM-M-61641-2025 (O&M)
                                                  Date of decision: 04.11.2025
Sumit
                                                           ....Petitioner
                                         V/s
State of Haryana
                                                           ....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:    Ms. Garima Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.

                                        *****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS

2023, primarily seeking quashing of the order dated 28.03.2025

(Annexure P-2) passed by learned Sessions Judge, Ambala vide which the

petitioner was ordered to be summoned through non-bailable warrants in case

pertaining to FIR No.226 dated 16.04.2023 registered for the offences

punishable under Sections 473, 34, 307 of IPC and Section 25 of the Arms

Act, 1959 and Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Haryana

Amendment Bill, 2020) (Sections 186, 332, 379, 411, 353, 420 of IPC added

later on) at Police Station Ambala Cantt., District Ambala.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was

earlier granted the concession of regular bail by the competent Court vide

order dated 14.07.2023 and thereafter, was regularly appearing before the said

Court. On 28.03.2025, the petitioner was unable to appear before the trial

Court due to ill health and an application seeking exemption from personal

appearance was moved by his cancel. However, despite this bona fide reason

for his absence, the learned Trial Court had declined the application and

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proceeded to cancel the petitioner's bail while issuing non-bailable warrants

for his arrest. Learned counsel has iterated that the non-appearance of the

petitioner before the trial Court was not willful and unintentional. Learned

counsel has contended that the procedure adopted by the learned trial Court in

directly issuing the non-bailable warrants against the petitioner at the very first

instance is contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is

well established position of law, as reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

that the Courts are required to adhere to due process while ensuring the

presence of the accused. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that in

the instant case, the learned trial Court has failed to issue any notice to the

petitioner prior to resorting to the issuance of non-bailable warrants and hence

such an approach is arbitrary, untenable and contrary to the procedural

safeguard enshrined under the law. Learned counsel has further iterated that

the petitioner unequivocally undertakes to enter appearance before the trial

Court as also join the proceedings in accordance with law, the petitioner shall

appear before the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and also

cooperate therein, in accordance with law for an expeditious culmination of

the trial.

3. Notice of motion.

4. Mr. Tarun Aggarwal, Addl.AG, Haryana accepts notice on

behalf of the respondent-State. He has opposed the petition in hand by arguing

that the petitioner has misused the concession of bail earlier extended to him

by not appearing before the trial Court & no plausible explanation has been

brought forth as to why the petitioner did not appear before the trial Court on

the aforesaid date.





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5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the available record.

6. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others

vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME

COURT 429, relevant whereof reads as under:

"10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.

11. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.

12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions 3 of 6

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may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution."

6.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as

Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118, has held as

under:-

"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."

6.2. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled as

Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, has held as under:

"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances."

7. A perusal of the record reveals that the learned trial Court, while

cancelling the concession of bail, straight away proceeded to issue non-



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bailable warrants against the petitioner. In the considered opinion of this

Court, the cancellation of bail orders amounts to an unjustifiable restriction on

the procedural rights of the petitioner in the absence of any misconduct, lack

of bona fides, or a deliberate attempt to evade the proceedings on his behalf.

The issuance of non-bailable warrants must not be exercised in a mechanical

manner and the same must be adopted sparingly and only upon the recording

of cogent reasons reflecting the necessity of adopting such a stringent course.

8. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of

the case; especially the factum of the prime object of cancellation of bail and

forfeiture of bail bonds being securing the presence of the accused, the

petitioner-accused having come forward himself to face trial, willingness

shown by the petitioner-accused to appear before the trial Court on each and

every date in accordance with law, the petitioner having submitted that he

shall cooperate for an expeditious culmination of the trial & there being no

tangible material brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner

to interfere with the prosecution evidence; this Court is the considered opinion

that the petition in hand deserves to be allowed.

9. It is, thus, directed as follows:

(i) The impugned order dated 28.03.2025 (Annexure P-2) passed by

learned Sessions Judge, Ambala is set-aside subject to the petitioner appearing

before the trial/concerned Court on or before 10.11.2025 & shall furnish an

undertaking that the petitioner shall continue to appear before the

trial/concerned Court on each and every date of hearing. It is clarified that the

trial/concerned Court shall be at liberty to impose such other condition(s)

upon the petitioner, as deemed appropriate by it in the facts and circumstances

of the case.

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(ii) The petitioner is directed to deposit a sum of ₹20,000/- as costs

with the High Court Lawyers Welfare Fund, Bank details whereof reads thus:

Account No.65018692589;

IFSC Code: SBIN0050306;

Branch Code: 50306;

Bank: State Bank of India, High Court Branch, Chandigarh

It is clarified that payment of the aforesaid costs and production

of receipt/proof thereof before the trial/concerned Court shall be condition

precedent. In absence of deposit of such costs, the present petition would be

deemed to be dismissed without any further reference to the Bench.