Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dalip Singh vs Baljit & Ors on 3 November, 2025
RSA-1795-1992 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-1795-1992 (O&M)
Reserved on :-29.10.2025
Date of Pronouncement:-03.11.2025
Dalip Singh
... Appellant
Versus
Baljit and Others
... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :-
Mr. Sanjay Mittal, Advocate
for the appellant.
None for respondents Nos.1 to 3.
****
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.
1. The appellant/plaintiff has instituted the present Regular Second
Appeal (hereinafter referred to as "RSA") under Section 41 of the Punjab
Courts Act, 1918, assailing the judgments and decrees rendered by the
Courts below. The appeal is primarily founded on the contention that the
findings recorded by the learned Sub-Judge Ist Class, Jhajjar and the learned
Additional District Judge(I), Rohtak, are contrary to law, founded upon a
manifest misappreciation of evidence, and have occasioned substantial
prejudice to the appellant, thereby warranting the intervention of this Court
in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under the said provision.
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2. For the sake of clarity and convenience in the discussion, the
parties shall hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff and the defendants,
corresponding to their respective status before the learned Trial Court. The
salient and material facts forming the foundation of the present proceedings,
which are essential for an informed adjudication of the issues, are briefly
narrated as follows:-
"The plaintiff instituted the present suit for permanent
injunction, asserting that he is the lawful owner in possession of
the property described in paragraph 1 of the plaint. The suit land
devolved upon him through inheritance and came into his
exclusive possession pursuant to a partition with his brothers. It
is stated that the plaintiff has been utilizing the land for storing
fodder and placing kuraries. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2, in
collusion with defendant No. 3, have allegedly attempted to
interfere with his peaceful possession despite repeated requests
to refrain, thereby compelling the plaintiff to institute the
present proceedings."
3. Upon notice, the defendants appeared and filed written
statements. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 denied the plaintiff's claim of
ownership and possession, asserting that the suit land, along with adjoining
property, forms part of the Shamlat Deh used for common village purposes.
They further contended that construction of a Shiv Mandir and other public
structures was underway and that the plaintiff never possessed the land.
Objections were also raised that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction, the suit
was barred by res judicata, suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties,
and that the plaintiff had no locus standi. Defendant No. 3, in his separate
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written statement, reiterated that the land was Shamlat Deh and that the suit
was barred by res judicata.
4. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and the rival
contentions, the Court has framed the following issues for determination, so
as to ensure a focused, comprehensive, and effective adjudication of the
disputes between the parties:-
1. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
controversy involved as alleged ?OPD.
2. Relief
5. The parties were afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence
in support of their respective claims and defense. Upon the conclusion of
evidence and after hearing learned counsel at length, the learned Sub-Judge
Ist Class, Jhajjar having carefully considered the pleadings, material on
record, and submissions advanced, dismissed the suit and observed that "in
view of the finding on the preliminary issue, the Civil Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the matter; accordingly, the plaint is rejected with
parties left to bear their own costs." Aggrieved by this judgment and
decree, an appeal was filed before the learned Additional District Judge(I),
Rohtak , which was also dismissed by observing that "the judgment cited by
learned counsel for the plaintiff in Smt. Sheela Adhikari (supra) is
inapplicable, as it concerns territorial jurisdiction, whereas the present
matter pertains to the civil court's competence, which is expressly barred
under Section 13(a)(1) of the Act. Consequently, the appeal lacks merit and
is dismissed, with parties left to bear their own costs."
6. The appellant has preferred the present appeal challenging the
concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below,
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which were duly admitted for hearing. Upon admission, notices were issued
to the respondents; however, respondents No.1 and 3 failed to enter
appearance, while respondent No.2 was reported deceased. As neither party
moved any application for bringing the legal representatives of respondent
No.2 on record, the said respondent, along with the remaining respondents,
remained unrepresented. Consequently, the entire record and proceedings of
the subordinate Courts were summoned for the Court's detailed scrutiny and
judicious determination of the matter.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at considerable
length and accorded due deliberation to his submissions in the context of the
pleadings, evidentiary corpus, and the concurrent findings of the Courts
below. The record has been scrupulously examined to evaluate the rival
contentions and to ascertain 'whether the impugned judgments and decrees
are vitiated by any error of law, procedural impropriety, or manifest
perversity warranting interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction'?
8. With regard to the scope of a second appeal, it is now a well-
settled proposition of law that, in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals are to
be treated as appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and
not under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this context,
reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs and Others v. Chandrika and Others,
(2016) 6 SCC 157, followed by Kirodi (since deceased) through LR v.
Ram Parkash and Others, (2019) 11 SCC 317, and Satender and Others
v. Saroj and Others, 2022 (12) Scale 92. In view of the legal position
established by these decisions, no substantial question of law arises that
necessitates framing in the present appeal.
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9. The pivotal issue that arises for consideration before this Court
is "whether the learned Civil Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain
and adjudicate the present suit, or whether such jurisdiction stood barred
under Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')"? Both the Courts below have
concurrently held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred
in view of the provisions contained in the said Section.
9.1. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, has strenuously
argued that the Courts below have committed a manifest illegality in
recording such a finding. In support of his contention, reliance has been
placed upon the judgments rendered by this Court in Jhagru Ram v. Jagan
and Others, 2010(4) PLR 605; Ram Narayan and Another v. Dhanak
Community and Others, 2017(2) RCR (Civil) 190; and Jasmier Singh
and Others v. Dalip Singh and Another, 2022(4) PLR 570. Learned
counsel further contends that the question of jurisdiction is a mixed question
of law and fact, which cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. It is argued
that both the Courts below erred in law by treating the issue of jurisdiction
as a preliminary issue.
10. In the present case, the objection raised by the respondent
pertains to the bar of Civil Court's jurisdiction in terms of Section 13 of the
Act. Accordingly, the said issue was framed and treated as a preliminary
issue. The reliance placed by the appellant upon 'Bhag Singh v. Nek Singh,
1994(3) PLR 151', is misplaced and distinguishable, as in that case the
question of jurisdiction required adjudication upon evidence in order to
ascertain the relevant facts. Conversely, in the present matter, the bar of
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jurisdiction is apparent from the pleadings themselves specifically from the
averments made in the plaint and the written statement and no further
evidence is necessary for its determination.
10.1. As regards the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff sought a decree of
permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his
possession over the suit land, asserting himself to be the owner in possession
of the disputed property.
11. Upon notice, the respondent No.3/defendant-Gram Panchayat
denied the plaintiff's right, title, or interest in the disputed land, asserting
that the property, along with adjoining land, constitutes Shamlat Deh
reserved for common village purposes. It was further contended that the
plaintiff had never remained in possession thereof and that the suit was
barred by the principles of res judicata. Both the Courts below, after due
consideration, concluded that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred
under Section 13 of the Act.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the
instant case does not involve adjudication of ownership rights, but only a
determination as to whether an injunction should be granted or not, relying
upon the judgments cited earlier.
13. A perusal of Jhagru Ram's case (supra) reveals that the dispute
therein pertained to removal of encroachment from a public path, while in
Ram Narayan's case (supra), the controversy was limited to a village path,
and the plaintiffs therein did not lay any claim to ownership of the suit
property. It was observed in those cases that the bar under Section 13 of the
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Act is attracted only when the question of title to the land is in dispute. In
paragraph 14 of Ram Narayan's case (supra), this Court held as under:-
14. A perusal of the aforesaid Section 13 thus shows that it bars the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court with regard to entertaining any
question as to whether any land or other immovable property vests
in the Panchayat or not. Further, Section 7 empowers the Assistant
Collector to eject any person in wrongful or unauthorized possession
of land or other immovable property included in the Shamilat Deh of
the village, either by taking suo motu notice of any encroachment on
such land or on an application made to him.
Secondly, as regards the issue of whether or not the land vests in the
Panchayat, the appellant-plaintiffs were debarred from invoking the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which in fact they also did not do, the
suit being one seeking only a permanent injunction against the
defendant-respondents, including the Gram Panchayat, whose title
was never questioned, and in fact, resolutions passed by it were
relied upon."
14. In the present case, the appellant-plaintiff predicates his claim
for a decree of permanent injunction upon the assertion of ownership and
possession over the suit land, whereas the respondents-defendants have
unequivocally repudiated the appellant's title. The relief sought thus
inherently necessitates an adjudication upon the question of ownership,
which falls squarely within the ambit of title determination. Consequently,
the matter transcends the scope of a mere injunction and engages issues
exclusively triable by the competent revenue authority under Section 13 of
the Act. The judicial precedents relied upon by the appellant are clearly
distinguishable and bear no application to the factual matrix of the present
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dispute. The concurrent findings of the Courts below, holding that the Civil
Court is divested of jurisdiction in such circumstances, are legally sound and
free from any perversity or procedural irregularity. Accordingly, no
interference is warranted, and the appeal, being devoid of substance, merits
dismissal.
15. Since the principal matter has been adjudicated and finally
disposed of by this judgment, all pending miscellaneous application(s), if
any, which are ancillary or incidental to the main proceedings, stand
disposed of accordingly. No separate orders are required to be passed
thereon.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL)
03.11.2025 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
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