Punjab-Haryana High Court
H.D.F.C Bank Ltd vs Manraj Sandhu on 3 November, 2025
CRM-A-692-2024 1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
275 CRM-A-692-2024
Date of decision: 3rd November, 2025
HDFC Bank Ltd. through its authorized power of attorney holder
Mr. Pulkit Khanna
...Applicant
Versus
Manraj Sandhu
...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA
Present: Mr. Saurabh Bhardwaj, Advocate for the applicant.
***
MANISHA BATRA, J (ORAL):-
1. The instant application has been filed under Section 378(4) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') seeking grant of
leave to file an appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 03.04.2024
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, FAridkot in Criminal
Complaint titled as HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. Manraj Sandhu, filed under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'N. I. Act'),
whereby the respondent was acquitted for commission of offence punishable
under the aforementioned Section.
2. Today, learned counsel for the applicant, while relying upon a
recent pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium
Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208, has
submitted that by directing the present application as an appeal, filed under
Sections 372 of Cr.P.C. (which is pari materia with Section 413 of Bharatiya
1 of 6
CRM-A-692-2024 2-
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the same be sent to appropriate Court for
its disposal.
3. In M/s. Celestium Financial's case (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has interpreted Sections 372 and 378(4) of Cr.P.C. and has
observed that the victim in a private complaint case has a right to file an
appeal, under Section 372 of Cr.P.C., against the order of acquittal before
the Court of Sessions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see
and can be elaborated as follows:
Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to
prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any
condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under
Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque
is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence
committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely,
the accused, whose cheque has been dishonoured.
Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on
par with the right of an accused who has suffered a
conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal
under Section 374 of the CrPC. A person convicted of a crime
has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter
of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a
victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime,
unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal.
Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit
to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without mandating any
condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence,
which expression also includes the legal representatives of a
deceased victim who can prefer an appeal. On the contrary, as
against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public
Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does
not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is
2 of 6
CRM-A-692-2024 3-
with the leave of the court. However, it is not always
necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal.
But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the
insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High
Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC would be contrary to
what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the
proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.
Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to
circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has
with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On
the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to
Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of
an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned
therein as compared to a complainant.
Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence
under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence.
This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in
the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the
CrPC and Section 143 of the Act by an express intention
incorporates the provisions of the CrPC in the matter of trial
of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence.
Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour
of cheque must be construed to be victim in terms of the
proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim under
Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C.
8. The right to prefer an appeal is no doubt a statutory
right and the right to prefer an appeal by an accused against a
conviction is not merely a statutory right but can also be
construed to be a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution. If that is so, then the right of a victim of
an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right
of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal. Hence, the
statutory rigours for filing of an appeal by the State or by a
complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be read into
the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC so as to restrict the
3 of 6
CRM-A-692-2024 4-
right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned
therein, when none exists.
9. In the circumstances, we find that Section 138 of the
Act being in the nature of a penal provision by a deeming
fiction against an accused who is said to have committed an
offence under the said 50 provision, if acquitted, can be
proceeded against by a victim of the said offence, namely, the
person who is entitled to the proceeds of a cheque which has
been dishonoured, in terms of the proviso to Section 372 of
the CrPC, as a victim. As already noted, a victim of an
offence could also be a complainant. In such a case, an appeal
can be preferred either under the proviso to Section 372 or
under Section 378 by such a victim. In the absence of the
proviso to Section 372, a victim of an offence could not have
filed an appeal as such, unless he was also a complainant, in
which event he could maintain an appeal if special leave to
appeal had been granted by the High Court and if no such
special leave was granted then his appeal would not be
maintainable at all. On the other hand, if the victim of an
offence, who may or may not be the complainant, proceeds
under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, then in our
view, such a victim need not seek special leave to appeal from
the High Court. In other words, the victim of an offence
would have the right to prefer an appeal, inter alia, against an
order of acquittal in terms of the proviso to Section 372
without seeking any special leave to appeal from the High
Court only on the grounds mentioned therein. A person who is
a complainant under Section 200 of the CrPC who complains
about the offence committed by a person who is charged as an
accused under Section 138 of the Act, thus has 51 the right to
prefer an appeal as a victim under the proviso to Section 372
of the CrPC.
10. As already noted, the proviso to Section 372 of the
CrPC was inserted in the statute book only with effect from
31.12.2009. The object and reason for such insertion must be
4 of 6
CRM-A-692-2024 5-
realised and must be given its full effect to by a court. In view
of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the victim of an
offence has the right to prefer an appeal under the proviso to
Section 372 of the CrPC, irrespective of whether he is a
complainant or not. Even if the victim of an offence is a
complainant, he can still proceed under the proviso to Section
372 and need not advert to sub-section (4) of Section 378 of
the CrPC."
4. On going through the above mentioned pronouncement of the
Apex Court, it is clear that an appeal against an order of acquittal in a
proceeding under Section 138 of the NI Act preferred by the complainant
squarely falls within the ambit of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. (which is
pari materia with Section 413 of BNSS). Similar observations have been
made by this Court in Satish Kumar vs. Jugal Kishore, CRM-A-2700-MA-
2018 and Ajmer Kundu (deceased) through LRs vs. Pardeep Sharma,
CRM-A-481-2022, vide orders dated 02.07.2025 and in Raj Kumar vs.
Rajender, CRM-A-826-2025(O&M) vide order dated 07.07.2025.
5. In view of the discussion as made above and the observations
made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium Financial's case
(supra), the appeal along with the accompanying application is ordered to be
remitted to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot with a direction to
treat the same as having been filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C.. The
learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot may entrust the appeal to herself or assign
it to some other court of competent jurisdiction for its disposal.
6. Needless to clarify that it is left open for the consideration of
the Sessions Court concerned to delve into the merits of the appeal as this
Court has not gone into the same.
5 of 6
CRM-A-692-2024 6-
7. Learned counsel for the applicant, present in Court, is directed
to inform the applicant for appearance before the Sessions Court, Faridkot.
The applicant through authorized representative or through its counsel is
also directed to appear before the learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot on
15.12.2025.
8. The Registry is directed to send the complete paper-book and
record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot forthwith.
9. Disposed of.
[MANISHA BATRA]
JUDGE
3rd November, 2025
Parveen Sharma
1. Whether speaking/ reasoned : Yes / No
2. Whether reportable : Yes / No
6 of 6
