Punjab-Haryana High Court
Suraj Parkash vs State Of Haryana on 24 March, 2025
Author: Vikas Bahl
Bench: Vikas Bahl
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:039862
RSA-3114-1994 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
***
RSA-3114-1994
Date of decision : 24.03.2025
Suraj Parkash
... Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana and another
... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS BAHL
Present: Mr. Krishan Kumar, Advocate,
for the appellant.
Mr. Jagdish Manchanda, Addl. A.G. Haryana.
***
VIKAS BAHL, J.(ORAL)
INDEX
Sr.No. Paragraphs Pages
1. Challenge in the Regular Second 1 1&2
Appeal
2. Arguments on behalf of the 2&3 2&3
appellant-plaintiff
3. Arguments on behalf of the State- 4 to 6 3 to 5
defendants
4 Analysis and findings 7 to 26 5 to 18
CHALLENGE IN THE REGULAR SECOND APPEAL
1. Challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment dated
19.09.1994 passed by the Ist Appellate Court whereby the appeal filed by
the State had been allowed and the suit of the present appellant-plaintiff had
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been dismissed.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the
present case, the judgment of the Ist Appellate Court reversing the judgment
of the trial Court is illegal. It is submitted that the trial Court had rightly
observed that it was the duty of the authorities to annually review the case
of the present appellant along with all the other officers who were held up at
the efficiency bar. It is submitted that in the present case, the same was not
done annually and therefore, the order dated 28.12.1983 to the extent that
the plaintiff has been disallowed from crossing the efficiency bar w.e.f.
01.07.1976 cannot be sustained. In support of his arguments, learned
counsel for the appellant has relied upon the instructions of the government
dated 29.01.1974 issued by the Chief Secretary to Government of Haryana
to all the Deputy Commissioners and Sub Divisional Officers and others, as
per which the case of an employee at efficiency bar is required to be
reviewed after a period of one year. It is submitted that the act of the
respondents-authorities is in violation of their own instructions. Learned
counsel for the appellant has further submitted that no opportunity of
hearing had been granted to the present appellant before passing of the
impugned order dated 28.12.1983 and thus, the trial Court had rightly come
to the conclusion that the action taken against the present appellant was
violative of principles of natural justice. The third argument raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant to challenge the judgment of the Ist
Appellate court is based upon clause 6 sub clause (2) of the instructions
(Ex.D6) dated 29.01.1974, in which it has been mentioned that stoppage at
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the efficiency bar should be for general bad work and inefficiency and not
for one or two lapses only. It is submitted that in the present case, the ACR
of the present appellant stating that the integrity of the appellant is doubtful,
is only for the year 1972-73 and thus, there was only one instance and at
least there should have been two instances for stopping the present
appellant at the efficiency bar.
3. It would be relevant to note that the learned counsel for the
appellant has supplied a copy of the plaint, written statement and also the
relevant documents and the same have been taken on record as 'Mark A
(Colly.)' and the authenticity of the said documents have not been
questioned by the State counsel.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE-DEFENDANTS
4. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has opposed
the present appeal. It is submitted that the judgment of the Ist Appellate
Court is detailed and in accordance with law and deserves to be upheld. It is
argued that as per Clause 6 sub clause (7) of the instructions Ex.D6, an
employee who has earned an adverse report against integrity cannot be
allowed to cross the efficiency bar for a period of 10 years and even after 10
years it is for the competent authority to consider the same and it is open to
the competent authority to take a lenient view. It is submitted that in the
present case, it is not in dispute that the ACR of the plaintiff-appellant for
the year 1972-73 shows that his integrity was doubtful and thus, for a period
of 10 years, the plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to cross the efficiency
bar and immediately after a period of 10 years, the order dated 28.12.1983
had been passed and a lenient view was taken by granting the petitioner the
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relief of crossing the efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.1983.
5. It is submitted that the observations of the trial Court with
respect to the ACR, as per which the integrity was stated to be doubtful for
the year 1972-73, being illegal is absolutely against law, inasmuch as, no
challenge to the said ACR has been laid in the present suit. It is further
submitted that even the representation filed by the plaintiff-appellant against
the said ACR was rejected on 25.10.1975 vide Ex.D3 and even the said
order has not been challenged and thus the primary reason given by the trial
Court for allowing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant is illegal.
6. It is argued that since for a period of 10 years, the present
respondents could not have permitted the present appellant to cross the
efficiency bar, thus, it had been rightly observed by the Ist Appellate Court
that the impugned order dated 28.12.1983 was in accordance with law. It is
submitted that even the case of the appellant for allowing him to cross the
efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.1976 was rejected vide order dated 02.07.1979
(Ex.D2) and even the said order has not been challenged in the suit by the
plaintiff and that the present suit was filed on 01.06.1985 only after passing
of the order dated 28.12.1983 vide which relief of crossing the efficiency
bar w.e.f. 01.07.1983 was granted to the plaintiff. It is submitted that the
limitation period for challenging the orders of the authority as per Article
100 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is one year and since the appellant has not
laid any challenge to the order Ex.D2, thus, the appellant is barred from
claiming the relief of crossing the efficiency bar from an earlier date. It is
further submitted that neither any rule nor the instructions Ex.D6 provide
for an opportunity of hearing before passing of the order with respect to the
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efficiency bar. In support of his arguments, learned State counsel has relied
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana
Warehousing Corporation vs. Ram Avtar reported as 1996(2) SCC 98. It is
submitted that a perusal of the impugned order dated 28.12.1983 Ex.D1
would show that it is a speaking order and thus, there is sufficient
compliance of the rules/instructions. It is further argued that the appeal was
allowed by the Ist Appellate court on 19.09.1994 and the suit of the plaintiff
was dismissed and there is no interim order operating in favour of the
plaintiff-appellant for so many years and that he has already retired from
service on 31.07.2005.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
7. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has
perused the paper book and is of the opinion that the judgment of the Ist
Appellate Court dated 19.09.1994 is in accordance with law and deserves to
be upheld and the present Regular Second Appeal deserves to be dismissed
for the reasons stated hereinafter.
8. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration on
01.06.1985 to the effect that the order dated 28.12.1983 not allowing the
plaintiff to cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.1976 was illegal, null and
void. A further prayer was made that the plaintiff was entitled to arrears of
pay etc. w.e.f. 01.07.1976. It was the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff
had been appointed as a Jeep Driver on 25.05.1968 in the pay scale of
Rs.60-3-90 by the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala and that as per the new
grade, the efficiency bar of the plaintiff fell due on 01.07.1976 and he was
to cross the same by the order of the competent authorities and that the same
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was withheld on account of an adverse entry in his ACR for the year 1972-
73 which recorded that his integrity was doubtful. It was further the case of
the plaintiff-appellant that as per the instructions of the government, the
case of the present appellant for the purpose of allowing him to cross the
efficiency bar was to be seen on an yearly basis, which had not been done in
the present case.
9. Written statement was filed by defendants No.1 and 2. In the
said written statement, it was stated that in the Annual Confidential Report
of the appellant for the year 1972-73 the integrity of the appellant was
stated to be doubtful and that even a departmental inquiry was held against
the present appellant and vide order dated 30.11.1973, two increments
without cumulative effect of the present plaintiff/appellant were stopped. It
was stated that as per the instructions dated 29.01.1974 addressed to all
Heads of Departments and Deputy Commissioners, more so, sub-para 6(7),
an employee who had an adverse report regarding integrity during the
period for which the work and conduct is required to be taken into
consideration, should not be permitted to cross the efficiency bar, provided
in case the report is older than 10 years, then, the competent authority had
the power to take a lenient view. It was further averred that there was only
one efficiency bar in the pay-scale to which the present appellant was
entitled, therefore, the whole record of the plaintiff was required to be taken
into consideration for deciding his efficiency bar due from 01.07.1976 and
since the present plaintiff/appellant had earned an adverse report regarding
integrity in his Annual Confidential Report for the year 1972-73, thus, he
was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar and thereafter, vide order dated
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28.12.1983 he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.1983, as
by the said time the ACR was recorded 10 years back.
10. It was further stated that the adverse remarks with respect to
integrity being doubtful were conveyed to the appellant and were duly
received by him on 18.10.1973 and that he had made a representation
against the said remarks and the said representation had been dismissed by
the competent authority vide order dated 25.10.1975, which order was duly
conveyed to him vide endst. No.3861/EA dated 30.10.1975 through the
Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Bilaspur, where the plaintiff
was working at that time. It was further stated in the written statement that
there was no requirement under the rules or executive instructions of the
Government to give a personal hearing to the present appellant and that the
impugned order dated 28.12.1983 was passed after taking into consideration
the entire relevant record.
11. In para 9 of the written statement, it was stated that the
plaintiff/appellant was stopped at the efficiency bar vide Deputy
Commissioner's order dated 02.07.1979 which was conveyed to him
directly as well through the Block Development and Panchayat Officer,
Bilaspur, vide endst. No.4772-75/DA dated 06.07.1979, however, no
representation against the said order was made nor the said order has been
challenged in the suit.
12. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment
and decree dated 26.08.1992 and in the said judgment had observed that the
order dated 28.12.1983 not allowing the plaintiff to cross the efficiency bar
w.e.f. 01.07.1976 was illegal, null and void and to the said extent was set
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aside and plaintiff/present appellant was held entitled to all arrears and
benefits. In the said judgment, observation was made to the effect that the
adverse remark in the Annual Confidential Report of the present appellant
for the year 1972-73 was unsustainable.
13. The appeal filed by the defendants/respondents was allowed by
the 1st Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.09.1994 and the
suit filed by the plaintiff/present appellant was dismissed. While dismissing
the suit and allowing the appeal of the State, amongst other aspects, it was
observed that no prayer for declaration to the effect that the adverse entries
recorded in the ACR were wrong and baseless, were made in the present
suit, although the same were duly communicated to the appellant and even
the representation filed by him against the same was rejected. It was further
observed that the Annual Confidential Report is recorded as per the
subjective satisfaction of the concerned officer, which has been done in the
present case and the Court is not to sit as a Court of appeal with respect to
the same. Thus, the primary basis of the trial Court for allowing the suit was
held to be baseless. Even the other aspects including the aspect of limitation
and the opportunity of being heard were duly considered by the 1st
Appellate Court.
14. It is not in dispute that in the ACR for the year 1972-73, it has
been recorded by the Competent Authority that the integrity of the present
appellant was doubtful. The representation filed by the appellant against the
ACR was rejected vide order dated 25.10.1975 (Ex.D3). It is not in dispute
that no prayer was made in the present suit for declaring the said entries in
the ACR or the decision on the said representation to be illegal or void. In
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fact, the present suit was filed on 01.06.1985 after a period of 12 years from
the date of said entries in the ACR and after a period of more than 9 years
from the date of rejection of the representation i.e. dated 25.10.1975
(Ex.D3). It is also not in dispute that vide order dated 30.11.1973, a
departmental inquiry culminated into a punishment of stoppage of two
increments without cumulative effect to the plaintiff/present appellant.
15. The instructions of the government dated 29.01.1974 (Ex.D6),
which has been relied upon by both the counsel for the appellant as well as
learned counsel for the respondents and has not been challenged in the
present suit, specifically provides under Clause 6(4) that efficiency and
honesty taken together should be the guiding factor in dealing with cases of
efficiency bar and as per Clause 6(7), an employee who had earned an
adverse report regarding integrity during the period for which the work and
conduct is required to be taken into consideration, should not be allowed to
cross the efficiency bar for a period of 10 years and after the report is older
than 10 years, then, the competent authority has the right to take a lenient
view. In clause 2 of the said instruction, it has been stated that the crossing
of an efficiency bar is to be distinguished from the earning of an annual
increment, inasmuch as, in the case of annual increment onus is on the
competent authority to show as to why it should be withheld, whereas, in
the case of crossing an efficiency bar the onus is on the official to show as
to why he should cross it. It would also be relevant to note that under Clause
6(5) of the said instructions, it has been stated that in the case of first
efficiency bar the whole record of the official/officer in the grade in which
the bar is to be crossed should be taken into consideration. The relevant
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clauses of the said instructions dated 29.01.1974 are reproduced herein-
below:-
"Copy of letter No. 5474-35/73/2078 dated 29th Jan, 1974 from Chief
Secretary to Govt. Haryana, Chandigarh to all Deputy Commissioners and
Sub Divisional Officers and others.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The crossing of an efficiency bar is to be distinguished from the
earning of an annual increments. In the case of the annual increment onus
is on the competent authority to show cause why it should be withheld in
the case of crossing an efficiency bar the onus is on the official tacitly or
otherwise to show cause why he should cross it.
xxx xxx xxx
6. While Heads of Departments are required to exercise their
judgment and discretion in each case, the following should be kept in
view:-
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Efficiency and honesty taken together should be guiding factor in
dealing with the cases of efficiency bar.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) An employee who has earned an adverse report against
integrity during the period for which the work and conduct is taken into
consideration should not be allowed to cross the efficiency bar provided
that if any such report is older than 10 years the competent authority
may take a lenient view of it vide Govt. letter No.1331-35-74/26263 dated
4-11-74 (P.161)."
16. On the basis of the said instructions, it is apparent that in view
of the integrity of the present appellant having been stated to be doubtful in
the ACR for the year 1972-73, the present appellant could only have been
permitted to cross the efficiency bar on the date when he has been permitted
to cross the same vide the impugned order i.e. w.e.f. 01.07.1983.
17. The order dated 28.12.1983 (Ex.D1) duly translated, is
reproduced herein below: -
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Annexure 'C'
Order dated 15.12.83 of Deputy Commissioner, Ambala
Sh. Suraj Parkash, Driver, in old pay scale 110-4-130/5-180 was
due to cross his efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.76. Since, in his confidential
report for the year 1972- 73 there was adverse remarks regarding his
honesty, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner, vide order dated
02.07.79, did not allow him to cross the efficiency bar. As per
Government instructions issued vide notification No 5474-3-5-73/2076
dated 29.01.74, if any official has adverse remarks of doubtful integrity
in his annual confidential report, then he should not be allowed to
cross the efficiency bar; however, if the doubtful integrity remarks
become 10 years old, then keeping in view the entire service record of
the official and taking lenient view; the competent authority may allow
the official to cross the efficiency bar. Accordingly, the matter of his
crossing of efficiency bar due from 01.07.77, 01.07.78, 01.07 79, 01.07
80, 01.07.81, 01.07.82 and 01.07.83 has been considered. In the
confidential report for the year 1972-73 of the official, his integrity was
found doubtful. Therefore, as per the above instructions of the
Government, the period of 10 years, i.e. upto 01.07.82, the official
could not be allowed to cross the efficiency bar. Since, the 10 years
period from the doubtful integrity remarks dated 01.07.73 has
completed, therefore, keeping in view the entire service record, he is
allowed to cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. .01.7.83 in the aforesaid pay
scale.
Dated 28.12.83 Sd/- Deputy Commissioner, Ambala"
A perusal of the same would show that the said order has been
passed after taking into consideration the instructions dated 29.01.1974 and
also the service record of the present appellant and the same is a speaking
order, passed in accordance with law. Thus, the 1st Appellate Court has
rightly upheld the order dated 28.12.1983.
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18. The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, by
relying upon Ex.D6, to the effect that under Clause 6(2) stoppage at an
efficiency bar should be for general bad work and inefficiency and not for
one or two lapses only, is meritless and deserves to be rejected. In this
regard, it is observed that clause 6(2) of the said instructions is followed by
clause 6(7) and clause 6(7) of the said instructions specifically provides for
a situation where an employee has earned an adverse report regarding
integrity, as is in the present case, whereas clause 6(2) of the said
instructions does not deal with a case where the integrity of the employee is
doubtful. It is thus apparent that clause 6(7) of the said instructions would
apply in the present case. Moreover, the said argument on the basis of
clause 6(2) of the said instructions has been raised for the first time before
this Court.
19. With respect to the argument raised by learned counsel for the
appellant to the effect that as per the said instructions (Ex.D6), since
paragraph 4(i) states that as per note 3 below rule 4.8 of the Civil Services
Rules Vol. I, Part I, the cases must be reviewed after a period of one year,
thus, it was incumbent upon the authorities to have reviewed the case of the
present appellant every year after 1976 which has not been done and thus,
the impugned action is against law, it would be relevant to note that in para
9 of the written statement, it has been specifically stated that the plaintiff
was stopped at the efficiency bar due to him vide the order of the Deputy
Commissioner dated 02.07.1979 which was duly communicated to him,
however, no representation against the said order was given. Para 9 of the
written statement is reproduced herein below: -
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"9. Para No.9 is denied. The plaintiff was stopped at the
Efficiency Bar due to him w.e.f. 1.7.76 vide Deputy Commissioner's
order dated 2.7.79 (Annexure) which was conveyed to him direct as well
as through the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Bilaspur
where he was working at that time vide endst. No.4772-75/DA dated
6.7.79 (Annexure I). But he made no representation against that order.
As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the orders of stopping him
at Efficiency Bar should have been passed yearwise and not collectively
is concerned, it may be stated that as explained in para d(iii) above, the
plaintiff could not be allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar unless the
adverse report about the integrity in his Annual Confidential Report for
the year 1972-73 had become 10 years old. As such, there is no
justification in reviewing his case yearwise particularly when he had
made no representation against the order dated 2.7.79. As such it can not
be said that the plaintiff has been deprived of his right of appeal against
the orders of withholding him at Efficiency Bar prior to 1.7.83."
Moreover, a perusal of order dated 28.12.1983 (Ex.D1) would
also show that the earlier order dated 02.07.1979 had been passed by the
Deputy Commissioner. The said order dated 02.07.1979 has also been
exhibited as Ex.D2. As per the said Ex.D2, it has been specifically
mentioned that in view of the adverse ACR for the year 1972-73 showing
that the integrity of the appellant is doubtful, the plaintiff cannot be
permitted to cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.07.1976. The said order has
never been challenged, much less in the present suit, by the plaintiff/present
appellant and thus, the plaintiff is estopped from raising the claim of
crossing the efficiency bar from a prior date to the date on which, i.e.
01.07.1983, the competent authority has permitted the appellant to cross the
efficiency bar, vide order dated 28.12.1983 (Ex.D1).
20. Moreover, Article 100 of the Limitation Act provides that for
the purpose of altering or setting aside any order of an officer of the
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Government in his official capacity, the period of limitation is one year. In
the present case, as has been stated herein-above, the suit had been filed on
01.06.1985, much beyond the period of one year from the date of passing of
the order dated 02.07.1979 (Ex.D2) and thus, the 1st Appellate Court has
also rightly taken into consideration the fact that neither the said order
Ex.D2 had been challenged within one year nor the order vide which the
representation against the ACR for the year 1972-73 was rejected dated
25.10.1975 had been challenged within the period of limitation. In fact both
the said orders had not been specifically challenged in the suit.
21. It would be further relevant to note that once it could not be
disputed that as per the relevant instructions the present appellant, in view
of his integrity being doubtful as per the ACR for the year 1972-73, could
not have crossed the efficiency bar for a period of 10 years, then, the
appellant has not been able to show, as to what prejudice has been caused to
him, even in case his argument to the effect that the consideration for
crossing the efficiency bar should have been done every year and has not
been done in the present case, is taken on its face value. No useful purpose
could possibly have been served in passing the same order every year as the
crossing of the efficiency bar was necessarily required to be rejected in the
case of the present appellant for a period of 10 years from 1972-73.
22. Argument of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect
that the impugned order dated 28.12.1983 had been passed without
providing an opportunity of hearing to him is also baseless and has been
rightly rejected by the First Appellate Court. In this regard, it is relevant to
note that learned counsel for the appellant has fairly submitted that as per
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the relevant Rule as well as instructions Ex.D6, there is no specific
requirement of granting personal hearing to the present appellant prior to
the passing of the order with respect to efficiency bar.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana
Warehousing Corporation (Supra), had set aside the judgment of the
Hon'ble High Court which had allowed the writ petition filed by the
respondent therein on the ground that the impugned order therein stopping
the employee therein at the efficiency bar was violative of principles of
natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the High
Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that any opportunity is
required to be granted to the employee therein before adverse decision is
taken with regard to non-crossing of efficiency bar. Specific reference was
also made to the instructions dated 29.01.1974 by the Haryana Government,
which are also relevant in the present case and which provides that it is not
necessary to inform the employee in writing of the ground on which action
to stop the Government employee at efficiency bar is proposed to be taken.
Only a speaking order giving sufficient reasons is required to be passed. It
was observed that the stoppage of employee at efficiency bar is not by way
punishment and does not cause any stigma on the employee. Relevant
portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"xxx xxx
9. The main contention which has been urged on behalf of
the respondent was that the principles of natural justice were
attracted and that no opportunity had been given before
passing the orders whereby the respondent was communicated
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the decision of the appellant not to allow him to cross the
efficiency bar.
10. The High Court, in our opinion, was not right in
coming to the conclusion that any opportunity should have
been granted to the respondent before an adverse decision is
taken with regard to non-crossing of efficiency bar. Rule 4.8
of Punjab State Service Rules provides that where an efficiency
bar is prescribed in a time scale, the next increment above the
bar is not to be given to an employee without the specific
sanction of the authority empowered to withhold increments.
This provision does not contemplate any hearing being granted
to an employee before a decision is taken with regard to
permitting or non-permitting an employee to cross the
efficiency bar. Note 3 to the said Rule, on which reliance was
placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, merely
provides that the cases of all officers held up at the efficiency
bar should be reviewed annually with a view to determine
whether the quality of their work has improved and generally
whether the defects for which they were stopped at the bar
have been remedied to an extent sufficient to warrant the
removing of the bar. In the instructions dated 29.1.1974
issued by the Haryana State Government, it is stated in para 4
as follows:
"It is thus not necessary before it is decided to stop a
Government employee at an efficiency bar to inform him
in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take
such action. The order stopping an employee at an
efficiency bar should however be a speaking order and it
should give sufficient details so that, the employee can, if
he so desires, make a representation against the same. It
is desirable that every case should be scrutinised carefully
by the Departments and good reasons given in support of
an order of stoppage."
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11. The validity of the aforesaid instructions had not been
challenged and, in any case, it appears to us that the stoppage
of an employee at the efficiency bar is not by way of
punishment and does not cause any stigma on an employee.
When an efficiency bar is inserted in a time scale it only
means that at that stage annual increment is not as of right
but the bar will be removed, and an employee allowed further
increments, if the authority concerned comes to the
conclusion that such an employee is not inefficient. An
opinion to this effect has necessarily to be a subjective one
though it must be based on relevant facts. ............... The
passing of speaking order, however, does not mean that
before the authority concerned comes to the conclusion of
stopping of a person at the efficiency bar stage, an
opportunity of hearing must be given to him. Consideration of
all material before taking the decision is sufficient compliance
of the requirement.
12. A decision not to allow the crossing of efficiency bar is
required to be taken on the basis of the record of the employee
concerned. In the instant case, there was adverse entry which
was recorded for the year 1986-87 in the annual Confidential
Report of the respondent. The said adverse entry had been
communicated to him and the objections filed thereto were
considered, but were rejected. The High Court was, therefore,
not right in coming to the conclusion that the principles of
natural justice were not complied in the present case.
Xxx xxx"
24. Admittedly, the instructions which were in question in the
above said case, are the same which are applicable in the present case.
Moreover, a perusal of order dated 28.12.1983 (Ex.D1) which has been
reproduced hereinabove would show that same was a speaking order and
had been passed after taking into consideration all the relevant material and
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thus, deserves to be upheld.
25. It would also be relevant to mention that judgment of the First
Appellate Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant was passed on
19.09.1994 and the present appeal was although admitted but no interim
order was passed in favour of the present appellant and the present appellant
has retired from service on 31.07.2005.
26. Keeping in view the abovesaid facts and circumstances, the
judgment of the First Appellate Court deserves to be upheld and the present
Regular Second Appeal being meritless, deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.
(VIKAS BAHL)
JUDGE
March 24, 2025
Davinder Kumar/Naresh/Pawan
Whether speaking / reasoned Yes
Whether reportable Yes
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