Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 753 P&H
Judgement Date : 13 January, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:002852
CRR-23-2025 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
117 CRR-23-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 13.01.2025
Kulwant Singh ....Petitioner
V/s
Jaspal Singh and another ....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Gurmeet Singh Saini,, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Balraj Singh Sidhu, Advocate for respondent No.1.
Mr. Yuvraj Singh, AAG Punjab for respondent No.2-State
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition has been filed impugning the judgment
dated 11.12.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Judge
Ferozepur & the judgment as also the order of sentence dated 02.03.2022
passed by Judicial J Magistrate Ist Class, Ferozepur whereby the petitioner has
been convicted and sentenced sentence for offence under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, during the
pendency of proceedings, the petitioner and the complainant have entered
into a settlement/compromise dated 03.01.2025 (copy whereof has been
appended as Annexure A-1 A 1 with the present petition). Learned counsel for
the petitioner has submitted that, since the parties have amicably settled their
dispute(s), the matter may be compounded and the petitioner be acquitted.
3. Notice of motion.
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4. At this stage, Mr. Balraj Siingh ngh Sidhu, Advocate has entered
appearance on behalf of the complainant-
complainant-respondent respondent No.1. He has filed his
Vakalatnama which is taken on record. Learned counsel appearing for the
complainant respondent complainant-respondent No.1 has ratified the factum of
compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the parties and has
further vouched the genuineness of the compromise/settlement dated
03.01.2025 2025 (copy whereof has been appended as Annexure A A-1 1 with the
instant petition). Accordingly, he has iterated that the respondent No.1- No.1
complainant has no objection in case the offence is permitted to be
compounded and the petitioner is ordered to be acquit acquitted.
5. Mr. Yuvraj Singh, AAG Punjab accepts notice on behalf of
respondent No.2-State No.2 of Punjab. He submits that he has no objection in case
the offence is permitted to be compounded by this Court and the petitioner is
ordered to be acquitted.
6. I have ve heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the available record.
7. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., AIR 2010(SC) 1907, relevant whereof reads
thus:
"15. With regard to the progression of litigation in cheque bouncing cases, the learned Attorney General has urged this Court to frame guidelines for a graded scheme off imposing costs on parties who unduly delay compounding of the offence. It was submitted that the requirement of deposit of the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed composition, since at present, free and easy compounding of offences at any stage, however wever belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the cheque to delay settling the cases for years. An application for compounding made after several years not only results in the system being burdened but the
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Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:002852
complainant is also deprived of effective jus justice.
tice. In view of this submission, we direct that the following guidelines be followed:
followed:-
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused.
(b) If thee accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% % of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revis revision ion or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque chequ amount.
Let it also be clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with these guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority operating at the level of the Court before which compounding takes place. For instance, in case of compounding ing during the pendency of proceedings before a Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, costs imposed in connection with composition before the High Court should be deposited osited with the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in connection with composition before the Supreme Court should be deposited with the National Legal Services Authority.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial endorsement of the above quoted guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-
law making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain. It must be
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Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:002852
kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the Act. We have already explained that the scheme contemplated under Section 320 of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense. In view of the legislative vacuum, we see no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section 138 of the Act. The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure,, even though the impact of the offence is largely confin confined ed to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific ific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end. Even in the past, this Court has used its power to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution to frame guidelines in relation to subject subject-matter matter where there was a legislative vacuum."
7.1. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as M/s
New Win Export & Anr.
Anr. vs. A. Subramaniam 2024 INSC 535 : 2024(3)
Law Herald (SC) 2098, relevant whereof reads as under:
"6. At this juncture, we would also like to reiterate a few words regarding the principles of compounding of offences in the context of NI Act.. It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A larg largee number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the 'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (See: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 (Para 18),, Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel (2022) 2022) 11 SCC 705 (Para 29),, Meters And Instruments
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Private Limited And Anr. v. Kancha Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 (Para 18.2)"
7.2. The statutory provision of Section 359 of BNSS, 2023 and
Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when examined alongwith
Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 in the guiding light of the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Damodar S. Prabhu case (supra) and
M/s New Win Export case (supra), lead to the unequivocal conclusion that
the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable egotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be
compounded at all levels of the stage of litigation including when the matter
has reached the High Court after being conclusively dealt with by the
Magisterial as also the Sessions Court. In other wor words, ds, such an offence can
be compromised/compounded compromise /compounded even after the petitioner petitioner-accused accused has been
convicted by the Court of learned Magistrate and his appeal against the same
has been dismissed by the learned Sessions Court.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Damodar S.
Prabhu case (supra) has also enunciated that, ordinarily, costs ought to be
imposed when the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
of 1881 is compounded at a stage when substantial pproceedings roceedings have been
undertaken by Courts so as to dissuade the unscrupulous litigant from
unduly delaying the compounding of such offences. However, discretion
has been reserved in favour of the concerned Court to reduce/waive off such
costs, in case facts/circumstances facts/circumstances of a given case so warrant.
7.3. Still further, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section ection 528 BNSS, 2023 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial
process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the disput disputee is
essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, 5 of 8
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the High igh Court ourt may intervene to quash the conviction recognizing the
continued proceedings would be non-productive non productive and unjust in the given
circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are
incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be
obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being
abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is
intrinsic trinsic to a High Court, it is its very life life-blood, blood, its very essence, its
immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form
but lack the substance. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be
construed with the widest possible amplitude.
amplitude. These inherent powers are in
consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in
fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the
process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of
jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise,
the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the
imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions
capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which
exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should
therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not
expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent inju injustice stice
or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these
plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility
of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of
administering justice, justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and
effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects
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peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever
it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the
due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay
substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
Therefore, the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent power under section
528 BNSS, SS, 2023 has the discretion to quash a conviction where the parties
have reached an amicable settlement, provided such compromise does not
impinge upon the public interest or undermine justice, as well as the
substantial justice.
8. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the concerned rival parties that an amicable settlement has been arrived at
between them and, therefore, compounding of the offence and necessary
further directions have been sought from thi thiss Court. A perusal of the
compromise/settlement (copy whereof has been appended as Annexure A-1) A
reflects that the parties have sought to resolve their dispute(s) in toto and
bury the hatchet. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court, the
factual tual matrix of the case requires that the offence(s) ought to be permitted
to be compounded and the petitioner deserves to be acquitted.
8.1. Keeping in view the entirety attending facts/circumstances of
the case; especially factum of the petitioner hav having ing suffered incarceration for
about 02 months after having been convicted by the Sessions Court, the
petitioner have faced the wrath of criminal litigation since about the year
2019,, the petitioner being a person aged 48 years saddled with the
responsibility of his family and the petitioner being pleaded to be a first time responsibility
offender and the petitioner being pleaded not to be belonging to affluent
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society; this Court does not not deem it appropriate to saddle the petitioner with
costs.
9. In view of the above,, it is directed as under:
under:-
(i) The impugned judgment dated 11.12.2024 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur & the judgment as also the
order of sentence dated 02.03.2022 passed by JMIC, Ferozepur are set set-aside aside
and the petitioner is acquitted.
a
(ii) The petitioner is directed to be released forthwith from custody
in the instant case.
(iii) No order as to costs.
(iv) Pending application(s),, if any, shall also stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
January 13,
13 2025
Ajay
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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