Punjab-Haryana High Court
Vikash Kumar vs State Of Haryana Others on 7 January, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:000301
CWP-35215-2024 1
116
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-35215-2024
Date of Decision:07.01.2025
VIKAS KUMAR AND OTHERS ......... Petitioners
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA OTHERS ..... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present : Mr. Narender K. Sharma, Advocate with
Ms. Suman Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioners.
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JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India are seeking direction to respondents
to extend them employment in view of policy decision.
2. The State of Haryana in 1984 declared a policy with respect
to acquisition of land. As per said policy, the owners/family members of
owners of the land were entitled to job in case of acquisition of their land.
A similar policy dated 07.04.1992 came to be framed by Panipat Thermal
Power Plant. As per said policy, the Power Plant had to give job to a
family member whose land is acquired. The land of forefathers of
petitioners came to be acquired by Panipat Thermal Power Plant in 1992.
As per policy, the Power Plant extended employment to many owners of
land, however, no job was offered to forefathers of the petitioners. The
petitioners, at this stage, are claiming employment on the ground that
land of their forefathers was acquired, however, they were not given job
as per policy.
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3. Mr. Narender K. Sharma, Advocate for the petitioners
submits that petitioners have made representation before the respondent
seeking employment in terms of aforesaid policy. The policy was framed
in 1992 and land was also acquired in 1992. A period of more than 32
years from the date of acquisition of land has passed away. It is not a case
of the petitioners that their forefathers were not paid compensation at the
time of acquisition of land. There may be so many reasons for not
extending job which includes denial on the part of forefathers of the
petitioners.
4. This Court, at this belated stage, especially when there is no
reasonable explanation for delay of more than three decades, cannot ask
the State or its instrumentality to consider claim of petitioners for
employment.
5. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High
Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who
moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.
Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that
the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be
condoned. Where illegality is manifest, it cannot be sustained on the sole
ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to
be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-
deliberate delay.
6. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in 'Mrinmoy
Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others' 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has
held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and
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laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who
approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his
rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary
relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court may refuse to
invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of applicant has allowed
the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the
lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of
action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal
of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the
considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-
suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been
dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An
applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other
words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of
time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be
granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This
Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity.
Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born
in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a
given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to
assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away
and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed
cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and
caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching
the writ court is explained which would appeal to the
conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be
gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come
the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad
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circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the
extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and
circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a
straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The
ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends
upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the
facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no
fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has
to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has
been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not
revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of
action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances
on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought
to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it
is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches,
the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole
ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge
in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his
own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of
fundamental right but while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to
necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on
the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court."
7. Applying the aforesaid judgment, this Court finds no
explanation for delay in the instant case. The present petition deserves to
be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and accordingly
dismissed.
( JAGMOHAN BANSAL )
JUDGE
07.01.2025
Ali
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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