Punjab-Haryana High Court

Amit Kumar Aggarwal, Ias And Others vs Maya Devi on 7 January, 2025

Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Sudeepti Sharma

                                 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:002842-DB


CACP No. 29 of 2024 (O&M)          -1-
in COCP No. 3454 of 2024
in CWP No. 8225 of 2023




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
                   AT CHANDIGARH.

                                             CACP No. 29 of 2024 (O&M)
                                             in COCP No. 3454 of 2024
                                             in CWP No. 8225 of 2023
                                             Reserved on: 27.11.2024
                                             Pronounced on: 07.1.2025

Amit Kumar Aggarwal and others                               .....Appellants


                                    Versus

Maya Devi                                                   ....Respondent

CORAM:       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
             HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA

Argued by: Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana
           Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana,
           Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana
           Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate and
           Mr. Siddhant Arora, Advocate
           for the appellants.
             Mr. Vivek Aggarwal, Advocate
             for the respondent.
                            ****

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.

1. The instant appeal has been directed against the order dated

20.9.2024, as passed by the learned Contempt Bench of this Court in

COCP No. 3454 of 2024.

Brief facts of the case.

2. The respondent herein vide letter dated 16.6.1980, was

appointed as a Mahila Craft Teacher in the Panchayat Samiti, Assandh,

District Karnal and her services were regularized vide order dated

17.8.1995, and, on 31.10.2017, she retired from the post of Craft

Teacher from Panchayat Samiti Indri, District Karnal. The respondent

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herein instituted CWP No. 8225 of 2023 before this Court with a prayer

therein to direct the appellants to release her pension, gratuity, medical

allowances and other retiral benefits along with interest from the due

date. Vide order dated 28.5.2024, the said petition was disposed by this

Court but in terms of the order dated 7.3.2024 passed in CWP-8306-

2015. The operative part of the said order becomes extracted

hereinafter.

"Keeping in view the above, the claim of the petitioner(s) for the grant of pension is covered by the decision in Sunder Devi (supra), Hanuman (supra) as well as Daya Rani (supra).

The present petitions are disposed of in terms of Daya Rani's case (supra). The impugned orders rejecting the claim are set-aside. The petitioner(s) are held entitled to the claimed benefits keeping in view the decision in Daya Rani's case (supra).

Let the said order be complied with within a periuod of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order."

3. Since the order dated 28.5.2024 remained purportedly

uncomplied, thereby the respondent herein preferred COCP No. 3454 of

2024, before this Court, with a prayer therein to intiate contempt

proceedings against the contemnors concerned, thus on account of the

appellants herein purportedly wilfully disobeying the order (supra)

passed by this Court. It has been further alleged therein, that even after

the passing of the order dated 28.5.2024, the respondents concerned

have not complied with the directions of this Court, which amounts to

wilful disobedience on their part.

4. The learned Contempt Court concerned, vide order dated

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20.9.2024, passed the hereinafter order upon the COCP (supra).

"Considering the fact that directions to consider the claim of the petitioner was passed on 28.05.2024, a period of more than 4½ months has elapsed, thus, in case the compliance report is not filed within the aforesaid stipulated period, the officer concerned shall join the proceedings through videoconferencing and would be liable to pay litigation costs to the petitioner to the tune of Rs.50,000/- from his/her own pocket. "

5. The order (supra), passed by the learned Single Judge

(Contempt Court) has caused pain to the appellants herein and has led

them to file thereagainst the instant appeal before this Court.

6. In pursuance to the said order, the appellants filed a status

report, thus detailing thereins that against the order dated 28.5.2024,

LPA No. 2478 of 2024 has been filed which is pending adjudication.

Submissions of the learned counsels for the appellants

7. The learned counsels for the appellants have argued before

this Court that the Hon'ble Contempt Bench rather has exceeded its

jurisdiction by imposing costs of Rs. 50,000/- that too, on the first date

of hearing of the contempt petition. They further submit that the order

imposing costs of Rs. 50,000/- is incidental to and/or is inextricably

connected with an order qua the imposition of fine of Rs. 2,000/- as

mandated in Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore,

it is argued, that the said imposed fine amount, that too at the very

threshold of the contempt petition, thus tantamounts to the imposition of

punishment, upon the present appellants. Resultantly, it is argued, that

as such, the instant appeal is maintainable before this Court, and, that

the impugned order dated 20.9.2024, as passed by the learned Single

Judge, be quashed and set aside.

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8. Reiteratedly, the learned counsels contend, with much

vigour before this Court, that when as such the impugned order is

proclived towards imposing punishment upon the contemnors, and, that

too, without asking from the appellants rather a well reasoned

explanation qua therebys compliance theretos thus wanting. Therefore,

it is further argued, that since the appellants may have a permissible

valid defence rather for accounting for the delay, if any, in the making

of compliance to the order (supra), besides it is also contended that even

if the order (supra) embodied a clear obeyable mandamus, therebys too,

some opportunity may have been granted to the appellants to mete

compliance thereto. However, since neither any explanation has been

asked to be furnished by the learned Contempt Court, from the

appellants rather for the delay, if any, in the makings of compliance to

the supra order, nor when any opportunity, if required for seeking

extension of time for making compliance thereto, thus became granted.

Consequently, it is argued that in a most slipshod and arbitrary manner,

the learned Contempt Court, has proceeded to make the order (supra),

which as stated supra, is proclived towards imposing punishment, upon

the present appellants, besides therebys it intends to, without making the

requisite discernments from the records, rather create a right in the

respondent to seek enforcement of the order (supra), despite may be it

not being complyable at all.

9. In nutshell, the learned counsels for the appellants have

argued, that therebys the instant case is covered within the domain of

principle No. IV of the verdict made by Hon'ble Apex Court, in case

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titled as "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. And others V.

Chunilal Nanda and others" reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399. The said

principle is extracted hereinafter.

IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.

10. In addition, the learned counsels for the appellants have

argued, that the instant case is not covered within the domain of

principle No. V of the judgment (supra), as at the outset, the learned

Contempt Court, did not decide any issue, nor made any direction

relating to the merits of the dispute, wherebys alone the said decision

was open to a challenge in an intra-court appeal, than in an appeal filed

within the domain of principle No. IV.

11. The reason which the learned counsel for the appellants,

thus assigns for making the above submission, is grooved in the factum

that, since the pleadings were not complete at the stage of making of the

order (supra). Therefore, only when the pleadings are complete,

whereafters upon making well informed discernments of the pleadings,

thus when subsequently a well informed decision or direction becomes

passed, rather covering the merits of the dispute emerging amongst the

parties, thereupon alone the impugned directions may have been

covered within the ambit of principle No. V, as enclosed in

Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.'s case (supra). Consequently,

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the learned counsels submit, that the instant case is not covered within

the ambit of principle No. V, as enclosed in the judgment (supra)

rendered by the Apex Court, rather the instant case is covered within the

ambit of principle No. IV of the judgment (supra).

Submissions of the learned counsels for the respondent

12. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent has most vehemently contended, that the instant contempt

appeal is not maintainable before this Court. In making the said

submission, he refers to the provisions as embodied in Section 19 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of

1971') provisions whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, whereins, it

becomes mandated, that an appeal against an order passed by the

Contempt Bench concerned, is maintainable, but yet only against such

an order or a decision, as becomes made by the Contempt Bench

concerned, wherebys punishment for contempt becomes recorded.

"19. Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction "to punish for contempt"--

(a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two judges of the Court;

(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:

Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that--

(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;

(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and

(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has

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not purged his contempt.

(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).

(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed--

(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days;

(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against."

13. Furthermore, he also argues that since a reading of the

impugned order, displays that no such order, thus becomes passed by

the learned Contempt Court concerned, wherebys but punishment has

been imposed upon the contemnors. Resultantly, he argues that the

instant appeal is not maintainable before this Court.

14. Furthermore, he argues that the supra order is only

challengeable through a motion cast under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India, becoming made before the Apex Court, than

through the filing of the instant appeal before this Court.

15. In addition, he also submits that in the proceedings for

contempt, the High Court is required to be deciding whether any

contempt of Court is committed and, if so, what should be the

punishment and the matter incidental thereto. He further submits, that

the clear mandamus (supra) as embodied in the order rendered by this

Court on 28.5.2024, did evidently become intentionally disobeyed.

Therefore, he argues that through the making of the impugned operative

part (supra), the learned Contempt Bench concerned, thus has remained

within the frontiers of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, therebys there

is no justification for any interference therewith being made, by this

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Court.

Inferences of this Court

16. Before proceeding to determine the validity of the making

of the impugned order, it is necessary to initially extract the apposite

regulatory guidelines, as become underlined in the judgment rendered

by the Apex Court in case titled as Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd

and another versus Sachidanand Dass and another reported in 1995

Supp (4) Supreme Court Cases 465 The relevant paragraphs of the

judgments (supra) become extracted hereinafter.

"2. The learned single Judge of the High Court by his order dated 10.1.1992 quashed the order of termination of the services of the first respondent, by the appellants and directed his reinstatement and payment of back-salary. Appellants preferred an appeal to the Division Bench and also sought a stay, pending appeal, of the operation of the learned single Judge's order. The Division Bench did not take up the appeal for admission nor considered the prayer for interlocutory stay. In the meanwhile, on the allegation that the learned single Judge's order had not been obeyed, the first respondent moved for initiation of proceedings for contempt against the appellants pursuant to which the High Court directed the Chairman of the first appellant to appear in person so that the complaint of contempt be proceeded with.

3. Before the High Court, appellants urged that before any contempt proceedings could be initiated, it was necessary and appropriate for the Division Bench to examine the prayer for stay, or else, the appeal itself might become infructuous. This did not commend itself to the High Court which sought to proceed with the contempt first. We are afraid, the course adopted by the High Court does not commend itself as proper. If, without considering the prayer for stay, obedience to the Single Judge's order was insisted upon at the pain of committal for contempt, the appellants may find, as has now happened, the very purpose of appeal and the prayer for interlocutory stay infructuous. It is true that a mere filing of an appeal and an application for stay do not by themselves absolve the appellants from obeying the

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order under appeal and that any compliance with the learned single Judge's order would be subject to the final result of the appeal. But then the changes brought about in the interregnum in obedience of the order under appeal might themselves be a cause and source of prejudice. Wherever the order whose disobedience is complained about is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending before the Court, it will be appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint for contempt. To keep the prayer for stay stand-by and to insist upon proceeding with the complaint for contempt might in many conceivable cases, as here, cause serious prejudice, this is the view taken in State of J. and K. v. Mohammad Yaqoob Khan, (1992) 4 SCC 167.

17. It has been forthrightly stated in the verdict (supra) that the

contempt action has to be sparingly drawn, and, is to be avoided to be

drawn, as a measure to coerce the purported errant litigant to make

compliances with certain directions or orders, especially when the relief

granted by the writ Court becomes appealed against, whereupon the

outcome of the availed remedy by the purported errant litigant rather is

prima facie required to be awaited. Moreover, thereins also occurs a

trite underscoring to the effect, that the action for contempt has to

become quartered within the tritely settled contours, inasmuch as,

immense care and caution is required to be exercised by the Contempt

Court, as ultimately the objective of rearing of an able contempt

petition, thus is to ensure the maintaining of the majesty, and, dignity of

self speaking binding orders/directions passed by the Courts of law.

18. Furthermore, the Apex Court in a judgment rendered in

case titled as State of J and K versus Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and others

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reported in (1992) 4 Supreme Court Cases 167 has held as under:-

6. We do not agree. The scope of a contempt proceeding is very different from that of the pending main case yet to be heard and disposed of (in future). Besides, the respondents in a pending case are at a disadvantage if they are called upon to meet the merits of the claim in a contempt proceeding at the risk of being punished. It is, therefore, not right to suggest that it should be assumed that the initial order of stay got confirmed by the subsequent orders passed in the contempt matter.

7. We, therefore, hold that the High Court should have first taken up the stay matter without any threat to the respondents in the writ case of being punished for contempt. Only after disposing it of, the other case should have been taken up. It is further significant to note that the respondents before the High Court were raising a serious objection disputing the claim of the writ petitioner. Therefore, an order in the nature of mandatory direction could not have been justified unless the court was in a position to consider the objections and record a finding, prima facie in nature, in favour of the writ petitioner.

Besides challenging the claim on merits, the respondent was entitled to raise a plea of non-maintainability of a writ application filed for the purpose of executing a decree. It appears that at an earlier stage the decree in question was actually put in execution when the parties are said to have entered into a compromise. According to the case of the State the entire liability under the decree (read with the compromise) has already been discharged. The dispute, therefore, will be covered by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be a serious question to consider whether in these circumstances the writ petitioner was entitled to maintain his application under Article 226 of the Constitution at all. We do not want to decide any of these controversies between the parties at this stage except holding that the orders passed in the contempt proceeding were not justified, being premature, and must, therefore, be entirely ignored. The High Court should first take up the stay matter in the writ case, and dispose it of by an

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appropriate order. Only thereafter it shall proceed to consider whether the State and its authorities could be accused of being guilty of having committed contempt of court."

19. The further entwined therewith issue, which is required to

be also decided is whether the Contempt Court, can substitute itself into

an Executing Court, and, that too when an appeal against the relevant

order/direction is subjudice. In the above regard, the Apex Court in case

titled as R.N.Dey versus Bhagyabati Pramanik and others reported in

(2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 400, has held as under:-

"7. We may reiterate that weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of Court's dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemnor and the Court. It is true that in the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pending and has ordered that it should be heard along with the First Appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the coercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directed to pay the compensation amount which they are disputing by asserting that claimants were not the owners of the property in question and that decree was obtained by suppressing the material fact and by fraud. Even presuming that claimants are entitled to recover the amount of compensation as awarded by the trial Court as no stay order is granted by the High Court, at the most they are entitled to recover the same by executing the said award wherein the State can or may contend that the award is nullity. In such a situation, as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of the order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly unjustified."

20. The further entwined therewith issue, which is required to

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become also adjudicated, is that, whether the Contempt Court can grant

substantive relief, despite the same not being covered by the

order/judgment, besides espcially when the apposite order/judgment

rather evidently is the subject matter of the corrective/remedial judicial

proceedings. In the above regard, the relevant guidelines become

embodied in the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in case titled as

Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and natural

Gas Corporate Limited and others versus M. George Ravishekaran

and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 373. The

relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) becomes extracted

hereinafter

"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court

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in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 352, V.M.Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Another, (2004) 13 SCC 610, Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. v Gautam Goswami and others (2008) 3 SCC 339 and Union of India and Others v. Subedar Devassy PV 12 (2006) 1 SCC 613."

21. Therefore, the maintainability of the instant appeal against

the order (supra) made by the learned Contempt Bench, but is required

to be both delved into, besides is required to be adjudicated upon.

22. Be that as it may, this Court is also required to impart a

signification to the statutory coinage "jurisdiction to punish for

contempt" as occurs in sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1971.

Though, the meaning imparted thereto, by the learned counsel for the

respondent, is that, unless an order for imposition of punishment is

made upon the present appellants, therebys alone the instant appeal

directed against the impugned order, rather is maintainable, whereas, the

impugned order rather not imposing punishment upon the present

appellants, therebys the appeal filed thereagainst is not maintainable.

23. However, the said argument is required to be rejected, inter

alia on the following grounds:-

(a) The meaning to be imparted to the statutory coinage

(supra) is not, that the contemnor has to await the pronouncement of

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punishment upon him. Contrarily the meaning to be imparted to the

statutory coinage (supra), is that, any order or decision recorded by the

learned Single Bench of this Court, while exercising contempt

jurisdiction, rather manifesting any proclivities towards ultimately

punishing the alleged contemnor for contempt. Resultantly therebys the

apposite maneuverings (supra), as are also clearly discernible from the

making of the apposite order, thus makings the apposite appeal to be

maintainable before the Appellate Court.

(b) The coinage "to punish for contempt" which exists

subsequent to the coinage "any order or decision of the High Court" is

an expression, whose effective impact cannot be restricted to the era of

ultimate awardings of punishment, as therebys any vitiated order passed

during the pendency of the contempt proceedings, despite existence of

valid extenuating explications (supra), thus well forbidding the learned

Single Benches, from initiating contempt action, besides when for

tangible reasons, rather apposite extensions of time are accordable, thus

for making compliance(s) with the order alleged to be purportedly

disobeyed, but may yet become also ill-countenanced. Resultantly

therebys if yet this Court also overlooks the beneficent mitigating

effects of all the possible, thus permissible extenuating pleas,

thereupons the said raised possible extenuating pleas, as become earlier

arbitrarily rejected by the learned Single Bench of this Court, but would

also similarly become arbitrarily rejected even by this Court.

24. Resultantly therebys the learned Single Bench of this Court

appears to rather than, as expostulated in verdicts (supra), that contempt

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jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised or becoming potentialized only

for upholding the majesty, and, dignity of the obeyable directions or the

orders passed by the Courts of law, thus through initiating contempt

action against the persons concerned, but contrarily rather has

whimsically and arbitrarily miskewed the contempt jurisdiction.

25. Ultimately, the preponderant reason, for this Court

concluding that the above submission addressed before this Court by the

learned counsel for the respondent, as appertains to the maintainability

of the present appeal, is required to be rejected, whereas, in this Court

declaring that the instant appeal becomes maintainable, thus becomes

hinged upon the hereinafter principles, relating to the maintainability of

appeals by the Appellate Court concerned, principles whereof, become

engrafted in paragraph No.11 of the verdict made by Hon'ble Apex

Court, in case titled as "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. And

others V. Chunilal Nanda and others" reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399,

paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter.

"11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus :

I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt.

II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.

In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between

the parties.

V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).

The first point is answered accordingly."

26. Exceptions to the arguments raised (supra) by the learned

counsel for the respondent against the maintainability of the present

appeal, thus become well grooved in principle No. IV, whereins, it is

expounded that any direction or decision which is incidental to or is

inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, therebys,

the said does make the contempt appeal maintainable. Conspicuously

also when for all the reasons (supra), the learned Contempt Bench

concerned, through the making of the impugned order, has evidently

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proclived towards punishing the contemnors for contempt, wherebys

also the instant appeal is maintainable.

27. Moreover also when through the making of the impugned

order, the learned Contempt Court of this Court has prohibited the

appellants from either asking for extensions of time, if required, besides

also has untenably restrained them, thus from purveying justifiable

reasons for the order (supra) made by this Court, may be not requiring

preemptory compliance, rather may be for the reason that the directions

made thereins were not well banked upon the precedents referred to

thereins. Importantly also when an LPA had been filed against the

decision (supra) recorded by this Court, whereupon it was required by

the learned Contempt Bench to rather than at the very threshold make

the impugned order, thus await the outcome of the LPA (supra).

28. Lastly, the principles of law which are required to hereafter

become considered to be applied by the learned Contempt Court, are the

ones which are stated in the instant case and also are the ones, as

become underlined in the verdict rendered by this Court in CACP No.

20 of 2024, titled as T.V.S.N. Prasad and others versus Resham Singh.

29. Despite repeated instances being made upon the learned

Contempt Bench of this Court to comply with the supra principles, yet

the learned Contempt Bench of this Court has failed to do so.

Therefore, the learned Contempt Bench of this Court is directed to

ensure that hereafter strict compliances to the supra principles be made,

rather than in a slipshod and arbitrary manner thus orders alike the ones

which are impugned before this Court, thus becoming passed.

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30. Significantly during the pendency of the instant appeal, the

appellants have filed CM-22069-CII-2024 rather for placing on record

the order dated 3.12.2024, passed by the learned Contempt Court in

contempt petition bearing COCP No. 3454 of 2024. The said order

passed by the learned Contempt Court is extracted hereinafter.

"Learned counsel for the respondents points out that in contempt appeal bearing CACP-29-2024, titled "Amit Kumar Aggarwal, IAS and others versus Maya Devi", preferred by the respondents, the interim order dated 20.9.2024 passed in the present contempt petition, has been stayed vide order dated 21.11.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. (2) In view of the above, learned counsel for the petitioner does not press the present petition at this stage with liberty to seek revival, if required, subject to final outcome of the aforesaid contempt appeal.