Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jaswant Singh vs State Of Punjab on 29 January, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:014086
CRM M-53567 of 2023 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
217 CRM M-53567 of 2023
Date of Decision: 29.01.2025
Jaswant Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab ... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S.SHEKHAWAT
Present : Mr. Brijesh Nandan, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. M.S. Bajwa, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Tejinderbir Singh, Advocate, for the complainant.
(through V.C.).
N.S.SHEKHAWAT, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Section
439 of the Cr.P.C. with a prayer to grant a regular bail in case FIR
No.245 dated 15.12.2020 registered under Section 302 of IPC at
Police Station Goraya, District Jalandhar (Rural).
2. The FIR in the present case was registered on the basis of
the statement made by Karnail Singh son of Jagat Singh and the same
has been reproduced as under:-
"Statement of Karnail Singh son of Jagat Singh resident
of Sukhchain Nagar, Phagwara, P.S. Sadar, Phagwara
District Kapurthala aged about 72 yeas mobile No.
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8699331140. Stated that I am resident of above address
and run Singh Sweet Shop at Phagwara. My daughter
Kulwinder Kaur @ Bindu was married to Bhupinder
Singh son of Gurmail Singh resident of Adampur about
16 years ago. From this marriage she had one daughter
Baljeet Kaur aged about 15 years and one son Pardeep
Singh aged about 13 years. The first husband of
Kulwinder Kaur namely Bhupinder Singh son of
Gurmail Singh resident of Adampur had died about four
years ago and Kulwinder Kaur had performed second
love marriage at High Court with Jaswant Singh son of
Charanjit Singh resident of H.No. 5501, Mohalla Gobind
Nagar, Shimlapuri, Ludhiana about 2 and a half years
ago. For last about 2 months Kulwinder Kaur had come
to house of her aunt (Massi) Satwant Kaur because
Jaswant Singh often used to quarrel with Kulwinder
Kaur on minor issues. Today I also had come to house of
my sister-in-law Satwant Kaur to meet my daughter
Kulwinder Kaur. My daughter Kulwinder Kaur came out
of the house into the street at about 3:00 PM then her
husband Jaswant Singh came from front and started
attacking my daughter Kulwinder Kaur with sword. My
nephew Paramjit Singh son of late Mahinder Singh
resident of new Market, Mohalla Guru Nanakpura,
Goraya P.S. Goraya and I came out side on hearing the
noise of Kulwinder Kaur. Jaswant Singh after hitting my
daughter with swords ran away from the spot on seeing
us. I and my nephew Paramjit Singh brought my
daughter Kulwinder Kaur in an injured conditions inside
the house and then after making arrangement for vehicle
took her to Royal Hospital, Goraya where the doctor
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checked my daughter and declared her dead. I after
leaving my wife Gurdev Kaur with my daughter was
coming to you to give information but have met you. I
have given my statement and heard the same. It is
correct sd/- Karnail Singh verified sd/- Paramjit Singh
son of late Mahinder Singh resident of new Market,
Mohalla Guru Nanakpura, Goraya attested Hardeep
Singh Insp/SHO P.S. Goraya dated 15.12.2020".
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
petitioner had solemnized the marriage with Kulwinder Kaur against
the wishes of her family members. Thereafter, the petitioner and
Kulwinder Kaur had filed a petition (Annexure P-2), praying for grant
of protection. Thereafter, vide order dated 16.05.2018, this Court had
directed the Commissioner of Police, Ludhiana, to ensure that no
harassment is caused to the petitioner at the hands of private
respondents. He further contends that due to said enmity, the
complainant has falsely involved the petitioner in the present case. He
further contends that the petitioner was arrested in the present case on
15.12.2020 and is in custody for the last more than 04 years and 01
month. Even, the material witnesses, i.e., PW1 Paramjit Singh and
PW2 Karnail Singh, complainant have also been recorded by the trial
Court. Apart from that, out of total 21 witnesses, the prosecution has
only been able to examine 09 witnesses and the conclusion of the trial
may take quite a long time.
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4. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vehemently
opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is the main and sole
accused. Thus, he may not be released on bail.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of "Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. CBI, through the Director
General, 2012(8) SCC 495; 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 880" as
follows:-
"14. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra), another
Constitution Bench considered the right to speedy trial
and opined that the delay is dependent on the
circumstances of each case, because reasons for delay
will vary. This Court held :
"84. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation
from a provision of Magna Carta. This principle
has also been incorporated into the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of United
States of America which reads, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial...". It may be pointed out,
in this connection, that there is a Federal Act of
1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set of
time-limits for carrying out the major events, e.g.,
information, indictment, arraignment, in the
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prosecution of criminal cases. [See Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th Edn. page 1400].
85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an
important safeguard to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and
concern accompanying the accusation and to limit
the possibility of impairing the ability of an
accused to defend himself but also there is a
societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This
right has been actuated in the recent past and the
courts have laid down a series of decisions
opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In
fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for
quashing of proceedings on the ground of
inordinate and undue delay stating that the
invocation of this right even need not await formal
indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article
21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under
our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins
with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and
consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry,
trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result from impermissible and
avoidable delay from the time of the commission
of the offence till it consummates into a finality,
can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is
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properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360, State of
Bihar while dealing with Article 21 of the
Constitution of India has observed thus: (SCC p.
89, para 5)
"No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be
released unconditionally freed from the charge
levelled against him on the ground that trying him
after an unduly long period of time and convicting
him after such trial would constitute violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21."
See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
(I), (2) Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar, (3) Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v.
Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, (4)
Hussainara Khatoon (VI) v. Home Secretary, State
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of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (5) Kadra Pahadia
v. State of Bihar (II), (6) T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State
of T.N., and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak.
88. Thus this Court by a line of judicial
pronouncements has emphasised and re-
emphasised that speedy trial is one of the facets of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined
in Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable,
just and fair' procedure which has a creative
connotation after the decision of this Court in
Maneka Gandhi."
The Court further observed :
"92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long
to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the
accused is called upon the show the actual
prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the
other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing
approach by taking note of the possible prejudices
and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused
by avoidable delay and to determine whether the
accused in a criminal proceeding has been
deprived of his right of having speedy trial with
unreasonable delay which could be identified by
the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the
justification for the delay, (3) the accused's
assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4)
prejudice caused to the accused by such delay.
However, the fact of delay is dependent on the
circumstances of each case because reasons for
delay will vary, such as delay in investigation on
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account of the widespread ramification of crimes
and its designed network either nationally or
internationally, the deliberate absence of witness
or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the
court etc."
7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu
and others v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429 has held as
under:-
"Bail or Jail"- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage -
largely hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge
held that personal liberty was too precious a value of
our constitutional system recognised under Article 21
that the crucial power to negate it was a great trust
exercisable not casually but judicially, with lively
concern for the cost to the individual and the community.
It was further held that deprivation of personal freedom
must be founded on the most serious considerations
relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in
the Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel
who had said that bail was not to be withheld as a
punishment and that the requirements as to bail were
merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.
According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal rule to
guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of
the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment.
After holding that it makes sense to assume that a man
on bail has a better chance to prepare and present his
case than one remanded in custody the learned Judge
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observed that if public justice is to be promoted
mechanical detention should be demoted.
8. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc Vs The State of Punjab,
AIR 1980 SC 1632, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed as
under:-
"Judges have to decide cases as they come before them,
mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out
of their decisions. The Court has also observed that in
which case bail should be granted and in which case it
should be refused is a matter of discretion. The court
found it interesting to note that as long back as in 1924 it
was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Vs.
King Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476, that the object of
bail was to secure the attendance of the accused at the
trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of
the question whether bail should be granted or refused
was whether it was probable that the party would appear
to take his trial and that it was indisputable that bail was
not to be withheld as a punishment. The Supreme Court
also referred to the observation of the Allahabad High
Court in K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1931
Allahabad 504, that Section 498 of the Old Code which
corresponds to Section 439 of the New Code, conferred
upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers
to grant bail which were not handicapped by the
restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad
High Court had also observed that there was no hard
and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the
exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and
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that the only principle which was established was that
the discretion should be exercised judiciously. The
Supreme Court referred also the decision of the
Allahabad High Court in Emperor Vs. H.L.
Hutchinson, AIR 1931 Allahabad 356, wherein it was
held that the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of bail is the rule
and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably
innocent person, the accused person is entitled to
freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case
and to establish his innocence and that an accused
person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position
to look after his case and to properly defend himself than
if he were in custody. The High Court had also held that
it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which would bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the
discretion of the Court unfettered. According to the High
Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to
time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to
make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in
particular classes bail may be granted but not in other
classes. The Supreme Court apparently approved the
above views and observations and held (vide paragraph
30) as follows :
"It is thus clear that the question whether to grant
bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety
of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which
must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single
circumstance cannot be treated as of universal
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validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or
refusal of bail."
9. At this stage, it is observed that the object of the bail is to
secure the presence of the accused at the trial only. It is also observed
that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive and
deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is
required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when
called upon. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in catena of
judgments that when a person is punished by denial of bail in respect
of any matter upon which he has not been convicted it would be
contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the
Constitution except in cases where there is reason to believe that he
may influence the witnesses. It is appropriate to say that
pre-conviction detention should not be resorted to, except in cases of
necessity to secure attendance at the trial or upon material that the
accused will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty.
10. From the allegations levelled in the present FIR, it is
apparent that serious allegations have been levelled against the
petitioner in the present case, however, the petitioner cannot be kept
behind bars for an indefinite period. The petitioner was arrested in
the present case on 15.12.2020 and it was the duty of the prosecution
to complete the prosecution evidence expeditiously. Any delay in
conducting the trial on the part of the prosecution violates the right to
life, which is guaranteed to every citizen under Article 21 of the
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Constitution of India. Even the learned State counsel has failed to
prove on record that the trial proceedings have been delayed by the
present petitioner in any manner.
11. In view of the above, without commenting any further on
the merits, the present petition is allowed and the petitioner is ordered
to be released on bail on his furnishing bail bonds/surety bonds to the
satisfaction of the learned trial Court/Duty Magistrate/CJM concerned
subject to the following conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make
any inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade
him to disclose such facts to the Court or to any other
authority.
(ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Court
on the dates fixed for hearing of the case.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself from the
Court proceedings except on the prior permission of the
Court concerned.
(iv) The petitioner shall surrender his passport, if any, (if
already not surrendered), and in case he is not holder of
the same, he shall swear an affidavit to that effect.
(v) The petitioner shall also file his affidavit before the
concerned Court, mentioning his ordinary place of
residence and number of mobile phone, which shall be
used by him during the pendency of the trial. In case of
change of place of residence/mobile number, he shall
share the details with the concerned Court/learned Trial
Court.
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(vi) In case, the petitioner gets involved in any other
criminal activity, during the pendency of the trial, it shall
be viewed seriously and the prosecution shall be at
liberty to move an appropriate application for
cancellation of bail granted to the present petitioner.
(vii) The concerned Court may insist two heavy local
surties and may also impose any other condition, in
accordance with law, while accepting the bails bonds
and surety bonds of the petitioner.
(viii) The petitioner shall report every 1st Monday in
English calander month before the concerned SHO till
the conclusion of the trial and SHO shall mark his
presence by making an entry in the Rojnamcha. In case,
he does not report on every 1st Monday before the
concerned SHO, it shall be viewed seriously and the
concession granted to him shall be liable to be
cancelled and the State of Punjab shall be at liberty to
move an appropriate application in this regard.
29.01.2025 (N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
amit rana JUDGE
Whether reasoned/speaking : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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