Punjab-Haryana High Court
Luxmi Devi vs Surender Singh & Ors on 24 January, 2025
Author: Sudeepti Sharma
Bench: Sudeepti Sharma
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
FAO-466-2006 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 24.01.2025
Smt. Luxmi Devi alias Luxmi Gupta ......Appellant
Vs.
Surender Singh and others ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Present: Mr. Arvind Bansal, Advocate,
for the appellant.
Mr. Paul S. Saini, Advocate,
for respondent No.3-Insurance Company.
****
SUDEEPTI SHARMA J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside the
award dated 10.09.2005 passed in the claim petition filed under Sections
166/163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'MV Act') by the
learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaithal (for short, 'the Tribunal'),
whereby claim petition filed by the appellant/claimant, was dismissed.
FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 09.03.2003 at about 10:30
P.M., appellant/claimant along with her husband and child was going in a
rickshaw from Rohini to Sultanpuri. When the rickshaw reached near Raj
Kamal Hotel, a tempo bearing registration No.UP-14-S-2553 being driven
by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner, came from the back side
without blowing any horn and struck against the rickshaw. As a result
thereof, the appellant/claimant sustained injuries on her right arm, left ankle,
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -2-
left foot and other parts of the body. Thereafter, she was taken to Jaipur
Golden Hospital, Delhi, where she was medico-legally examined and
treated. In this regard, FIR No.134 dated 16.03.2003 under Sections 279 and
337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was registered at Police Station
Mangolpuri.
3. Upon notice of the claim petition, the respondents appeared and
filed their separate replies denying the factum of accident/compensation.
4. Appellant/claimant did not file rejoinder to the written reply.
5. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed
the following issues:-
"1) Whether the accident resulting into injuries to
Luxmi Devi took place due to rash and negligent driving
of vehicle No.UP-14-S-2553 on the part of its driver Anil
Kumar, respondent No.2 as alleged? OPP
2) If issue No.1 is proved then what amount of
compensation is the claimant entitled to? OPP
3) Whether the driver of the offending vehicle did not
possess a valid and effective driving licence at the time of
alleged accident? OPR-3.
4) Relief."
6. After taking into consideration the pleadings and the evidence
on record, the learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition. Hence, the
present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES
7. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant contends that the
learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition on the ground that there
was a delay of 07 days in lodging the FIR.
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -3-
8. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3-Insurance
Company, however, vehemently argues on the lines of the award dated
10.09.2005 and submits that the award has rightly been dismissed by the
learned Tribunal. Therefore, he prays for dismissal of the present appeal.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
whole record of this case.
10. The relevant portion of the award reads as under:-
"8. In order to prove this issue petitioner Luxmi Devi
has appeared in the witness box as PW.1 and deposed
that on 9.3.2003, she was going from Rohini Delhi to
Sultanpuri Delhi in a rickshaw with her husband and
children. At about 10.30 P.M. when they reached in front
of Raj Kamal Hotel in the area of Mangolpuri a tempo
tanker No. HP-14S-2553 came from behind. It was being
driven rashly and negligently and it struck against the
rickshaw, as a result of which the petitioner had fallen
down on the road and sustained injuries on her hand and
leg.
Besides the above oral statement the petitioner has
placed on the file copy of FIR mark P.66. She has also
produced the treatment record. The accident in question
has taken place on 9.3.2003 at 10.30 P.M.. The FIR was
registered on 16.3.2003. Copy of the F.I.R. has been
produced as mark P.66. It gives the number of the
offending tempo trailer but does not give the name of the
driver. There is no explanation for the delay of 7 days in
the lodging of the F.I.R. As per the endorsement of the
Police officials in the FIR, he had reached Jaipur Golden
Hospital, Delhi on 10:3.2003 and learnt that the
petitioner had been discharged. So, he went to the house
of the petitioner and recorded her statement. The
concerned police officials has not been examined to show
as to why it took him six days for locating the house of
the petitioner and recording her statement. It is nowhere
the case of the petitioner that she was not in a condition
to make a statement before the Police. Rather she has
been discharged from the hospital on 10.3.2003 itself. It
has even come in the cross-examination of witness Luxmi
Devi that her first statement was recorded by the Police
in Jaipur Golden Hospital, Delhi and thereafter, her
statement was recorded at her house on 12 or 13 March.
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -4-
It has been argued from the side of the respondents that it
was a case of hit and run and the petitioner was not
aware of the particulars of the offending vehicle and so
she waited for 7 days and ultimately, vehicle of some
acquaintance was shown as the offending vehicle. The
counsel asserted that the present claim petition has been
filed in collusion with respondents no.l and 2 and i.e. why
respondents no.1 and 2 are not contesting these
proceedings. The petitioner has not offered any
explanation as to how she learnt the name of the driver of
the offending vehicle. It is also not known as to whether
any person has been challaned by the police for this
accident. The petitioner has simply tendered a copy of
F.I.R. She has not produced the copy of report under
section 173 Cr.P.C. and she has not examined any of the
concerned Police Officials, to prove the out come of the
Investigation of the concerned case.
For all the aforesaid reason the solitary statement
of Luxmi Devi cannot be considered as sufficient for
concluding that the accident took place with vehicle No.
UP-14S-2553 and for concluding that this vehicle was
being driven by respondent No.1. So, issue no.1 is
answered accordingly."
11. Upon a thorough examination of the award, it is evident that the
learned Tribunal committed a legal error in dismissing the claim petition on
the basis of a seven-day delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR).
This Court in FAO-1364-2007 titled as "Satbir Vs. Subhash and others"
decided on 10.01.2025 has already held that while the prompt lodging of an
FIR is significant in motor accident claim cases, a delay should not be
deemed fatal if the claimant provides satisfactory and cogent reasons for it.
The Court recognized that various genuine factors might contribute to such
delays, and unless the delay is inordinate and unexplained, it should not
prejudice the claimant's case. The relevant extract of the same is reproduced
as under:-
"14. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Vs.
Badrinarayan and others, 2011(4) SCC 693, has conclusively
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -5-
held that a delay in lodging the FIR cannot be deemed fatal to
motor claim proceedings, provided the claimant satisfactorily
explain the delay with cogent and reasonable grounds. The
relevant extracts of the same is reproduced as under:-
"20. It is well-settled that delay in lodging FIR cannot be
a ground to doubt the claimant's case. Knowing the
Indian conditions as they are, we cannot expect a
common man to first rush to the Police Station
immediately after an accident. Human nature and family
responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin to such
an extent that they give more importance to get the victim
treated rather than to rush to the Police Station. Under
such circumstances, they are not expected to act
mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with
the Police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the
ground to deny justice to the victim. In cases of delay, the
courts are required to examine the evidence with a closer
scrutiny and in doing so; the contents of the FIR should
also be scrutinised more carefully. If court finds that
there is no indication of fabrication or it has not been
concocted or engineered to implicate innocent persons
then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the claim
case cannot be dismissed merely on that ground.
21. The purpose of lodging the FIR in such type of cases
is primarily to intimate the police to initiate investigation
of criminal offences. Lodging of FIR certainly proves
factum of accident so that the victim is able to lodge a
case for compensation but delay in doing so cannot be
the main ground for rejecting the claim petition. In other
words, although lodging of FIR is vital in deciding motor
accident claim cases, delay in lodging the same should
not be treated as fatal for such proceedings, if claimant
has been able to demonstrate satisfactory and cogent
reasons for it. There could be variety of reasons in
genuine cases for delayed lodgment of FIR. Unless kith
and kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of
tranquility of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if,
there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such
circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much
more significance than delay in lodging thereof
supported by cogent reasons."
Therefore, the dismissal of the claim petition on this
ground is unsustainable and liable to be set aside."
12. In the present case, the claimant sustained injuries necessitating
medical attention, which plausibly accounts for the delay in filing the FIR.
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -6-
The Tribunal's failure to consider this explanation contravenes the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court, thereby rendering its reliance on the FIR's
timing as the basis for dismissal erroneous.
13. Furthermore, in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT)
proceedings, the lodging of an FIR and the subsequent challaning of the
driver of the offending vehicle serve as prima facie evidence of negligence.
In the instant case, the challan against respondent No. 1 is part of the record,
corroborating the assertion that the accident resulted from the respondent's
negligent driving. This evidence establishes the negligence on the part of
respondent No.1, which the respondent has failed to rebut.
14. Additionally, the claimant's testimony remains unchallenged
and is supported by the disability certificate (Exhibit P1), which confirms a
12% disability resulting from the accident. The Tribunal's decision to
dismiss the claim, despite this uncontroverted evidence, reflects
misapplication of the evidentiary standards governing Motor Vehicle Claims
Tribunal's proceedings.
15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Anita Sharma v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., 2021(1) SCC(Cri) 475 has held that standard of proof
in motor accident matters is one of preponderance of probabilities rather
than beyond reasonable doubt and strict principles of evidence and standards
of proof like in criminal trial are inapplicable in the MACT claim cases. The
relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
22. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High
Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of
evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are
inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The standard of proof in
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -7-
such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities,
rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful
that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidence
in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-
examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a
criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyze the
material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether
the claimant's version is more likely than not true. A somewhat
similar situation arose in Dulcina Fernandes v.Joaquim
Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC 646. wherein this Court reiterated
that:
"7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of
negligence on the part of the first respondent who was
driving the pickup van as set up by the claimants was
required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and
certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCC
530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101])
(emphasis supplied)"
16. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and the
uncontroverted evidence presented, the learned Tribunal's decision to
dismiss the claim petition is legally untenable and warrants reversal.
Accordingly, the impugned award is set aside.
17. With respect to determination of compensation, the record
contains evidence of hospital admission, the claimant's earning and expenses
incurred for medical treatment and hospitalization. After perusing the whole
record with regard to the injuries suffered by the appellant/claimant and the
expenses incurred on his treatment, this Court deems it appropriate to grant a
sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to the appellant/claimant on account of injuries
sustained by her in the motor vehicular accident.
FAO-466-2006 (O&M) -8-
18. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed. The award
dated 10.09.2005 is hereby set aside. The appellant/claimant is entitled to
compensation to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/-.
19. So far as the interest part is concerned, as held by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Dara Singh @ Dhara Banjara Vs. Shyam Singh Varma
2019 ACJ 3176 and R.Valli and Others VS. Tamil Nandu State
Transport Corporation (2022) 5 Supreme Court Cases 107, the appellant-
claimant is granted the interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount
from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of its realization.
20. The Insurance Company-respondent No.3 is directed to deposit
the amount of compensation along with interest with the Tribunal within a
period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The
Tribunal is further directed to disburse the amount of compensation along
with interest in the account of the appellant/claimant. The appellant/claimant
is directed to furnish her bank account details to the Tribunal.
21. Respondent No.3-Insurance Company is hereby directed to
disburse the current scheduled fees to Mr. Paul S. Saini, Advocate, within a
period of 20 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.
22. Disposed of accordingly.
23. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
JUDGE
24.01.2025
Virrendra
Whether speaking/non-speaking : Yes
Whether reportable : Yes/No
