Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sukhjit Singh And Anr vs State Of Punjab And Another on 20 February, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:026076
CRM-M No.7221 of 2025 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No.7221 of 2025 (O&M)
Pronounced on: 20.02.2025
Reserved on: 10.02.2025
Sukhjit Singh and another
....Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Sukhwinder Singh Kamboj, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Sandeep Kumar, DAG, Punjab.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners have approached this Court by way of filing
the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter 'BNSS') for quashing of the
impugned FIR bearing No.106 dated 30.05.2020 under Sections 353,
186 and 34 of IPC registered at Police Station Sadar Ahmedgarh,
District Malerkotla (Annexure P-5), as well as all subsequent
proceedings arising therefrom including final report under Section 173
Cr.P.C. and charge-sheet dated 30.08.2022.
2. The facts of the present case, tersely put, are that the
petitioners constructed an unauthorized shed within the limits of
Municipal Council Ahmedgarh without obtaining the necessary
sanction. Since the construction of the shed was illegal, therefore on
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04.09.2019, the operation to demolish the shed was initiated. However,
in an attempt to obstruct the demolition work, the petitioners declared
that if the operation continued, their entire family would die by suicide
by consuming poison, and the officials carrying out the demolition
would be held responsible. Given that official work was disrupted by
the death threats extended by the petitioners, a letter was written by the
Joint Deputy Director, Municipal Council, Ahmedgarh to the SHO, P.S.
Sadar Ahmedgarh for taking appropriate legal action against them.
Resultantly, the FIR (supra) was registered against the petitioners.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the
registration of the FIR is an abuse of the process of law, given the bar
imposed by Section 195(1) of the Cr.P.C. It was argued that the trial
court failed to recognize its lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC, as Section 195(1) of
the Cr.P.C. mandates that such cognizance can only be taken upon a
criminal complaint filed by the concerned department before the
Magistrate. Furthermore, while Section 186 of the IPC is expressly
enumerated in Section 195(1) of the Cr.P.C., Section 353 is not.
However, the bar under Section 195(1) would still apply, as per the
settled legal principle that it extends to cases where offences forming
part of the same transaction include any of the offences mentioned
therein. Learned counsel relied upon Mahendra Kumar Sonker vs. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 Cri. LR SC 958; Ram Kumar vs. The
State of Haryana, 1998 (1) CLR 633 and Ramji BhikhaKoli and Ors.
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vs. State of Gujarat 1999 Cri.L.J, in this regard. Lastly, it was asserted
that merely shouting at or threatening a person does not constitute
criminal force or assault. Consequently, the essential ingredients
required to invoke Section 353 of the IPC are absent in the present case.
4. Per contra, learned State Counsel submitted that on receipt
of reliable information from the Joint Deputy Director, Municipal
Council, Ahmedgarh, FIR (supra) was registered against the petitioners
on 30.05.2020 and after the completion of the investigation, challan
dated 26.04.2022 was presented against the petitioners before the
learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Malerkotla and subsequently
charges under Sections 183, 354 and 34 of the IPC stood framed against
them vide order dated 30.08.2022.Further, learned State counsel
submitted that the bar under Section 195(1) of Cr.P.C. is merely
directory in nature and not mandatory.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after
perusing the record with their able assistance, this Court would like to
examine the necessary ingredients constituting the offences as defined
under Sections186 and 353 of the IPC:
"Section 186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public
functions.-Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in
the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.
Section 353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant
from discharge of his duty.-Whoever assaults or uses criminal
force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his
duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that
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person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in
consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such
person to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
Further, the relevant portion of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. which
prescribes that the Magistrates can take cognizance in respect of certain
kinds of non-cognizable offences as mentioned in the said section,
which includes Section 186 of the IPC, only after a written complaint is
filed by the concerned public servant to the Magistrate, readsas follows:
"Section 195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of
public servants, for offences against public justice and for
offences relating to documents given in evidence.
(1) No Court shall take cognizance-
(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both
inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), or
(ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on
the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of
some other public servant to whom he is administratively
subordinate;
xxx xxx xxx xxx"
6. Since a bare perusal of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. clearly reveals
that Section 186 of the IPC is governed by the former, it would be
apposite to emphasize that the drill of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is
mandatory in nature. This position is supported by the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court's rendered in C. Muniappan& Others. v. State
of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567, wherein the following observations
were made:
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"20. Section 195(a)(i) Criminal Procedure Code bars
the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under
Section 188 Indian Penal Code or abetment or attempt to commit
the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public
servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of
this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of
contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant.
The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of
offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a
provision has been that an individual should not face criminal
prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons
actuated by malice, ill-will or frivolity of disposition and to save
the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless
prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception
to the general rule contained under Section 190 Criminal
Procedure Code that any person can set the law in motion by
making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking
cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has
been made by some particular authority or person. Other
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code like sections 196 and
198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only
create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with,
the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in
those Sections. (vide Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar, AIR
1971 Supreme Court 1708; Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The
State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1935; Surjit Singh
&Ors. v. Balbir Singh, 1996(3) RCR (Criminal) 240 : (1996) 3
SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr., 1998(1) RCR
(Criminal) 576 : (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C.
Palanisamy &Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 352; and Iqbal Singh Marwah
&Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., 2005(2) RCR (Criminal)
178 : 2005(1) Apex Criminal 581).
21. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance of
Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code or not, is whether the facts
disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a
complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-
ul-Haq & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 Supreme
Court 293; and Durgacharan Naik &Ors. v. State of Orissa,
AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1775, this Court held that the
provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by describing the
offence as one being punishable under some other sections of
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Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance, the offence
falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Criminal Procedure
Code Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by
mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
22. In M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana &Anr., 1999(4) RCR
(Criminal) 718 , this Court considered the matter at length and
held as under :
"....Provisions of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code
are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless
there is a complaint in writing as required under that
section." (Emphasis added)
23. In Sachida Nand Singh &Anr. v. State of Bihar &Anr.,
1998(1) RCR (Criminal) 823 : (1998) 2 SCC 493,
this Court while dealing with this issue observed as under :
"7. ..Section 190 of the Code empowers "any magistrate of
the first class" to take cognizance of "any offence" upon
receiving a complaint, or police report or information or
upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such
general powers of the magistrate, and the general right of
a person to move the court with a complaint to that extent
curtailed. It is a well- recognised canon of interpretation
that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of
the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless
the statute or the context requires otherwise."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 Supreme
Court 1206, this Court considered the nature of the provisions of
Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code In the said case,
cognizance had been taken on the police report by the Magistrate
and the appellant therein had been tried and convicted, though
the concerned public servant, the Tahsildar had not filed any
complaint. This Court held as under :
"The cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly
assumed by the court without the complaint in writing of
the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The
trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the
conviction cannot be maintained. The appeal is, therefore,
allowed and the conviction of the appellant and the
sentence passed on him are set aside."
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(Emphasis added)
25. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised to the
effect that there must be a complaint by the public servant whose
lawful order has not been complied with. The complaint must be
in writing. The provisions of Section 195 Criminal Procedure
Code are mandatory. Non-compliance of it would vitiate the
prosecution and all other consequential orders. The Court cannot
assume the cognizance of the case without such complaint. In the
absence of such a complaint, the trial and conviction will be void
ab initio being without jurisdiction."
7. Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. specifies that no court
shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to
188 of the IPC unless a written complaint is made by the concerned
public servant or another public servant to whom they are
administratively subordinate. This provision serves as an explicit bar,
stating that the court cannot take cognizance of a matter based on a
Final Report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. A complaint, as defined under
Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., excludes a Police Report or Final Report.
Thus, cognizance can only be taken on a written complaint filed in
Court under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Further, Section 21 of the IPC
defines "public servant" to include a municipal commissioner as well as
any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by
fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the
Government. As a result, from the plain language of Section 195 of the
Cr.P.C., it is clear that criminal prosecution under Sections 172 to 188 of
the IPC can only be initiated through a written complaint filed by the
concerned public servant or another public servant to whom they are
administratively subordinate. (See: Pardeep Kumar vs. State of Punjab
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and Another, passed in CRM-M No.41656 of 2023, decided on
23.08.2023; Jarnail Singh @ Rana vs. State of Punjab, passed in
CRM-M-48718-2019 decided on 17.04.2024 and Charanjit Singh @
Channi passed in CRM-M-453-2023 pronounced on 06.12.2023.
8. In the present case, the Joint Deputy Director, Municipal
Council, Ahmedgarh, being a public servant as defined under Section 21
of the IPC, was required to follow the procedure prescribed by law if he
intended to initiate proceedings against the petitioners for the offence
under Section 186 of the IPC. The proper course of action would have
been to file a written complaint before the competent jurisdictional
court. However, instead of adhering to this legal requirement, the Joint
Deputy Director merely forwarded a letter to the local police, directing
them to take appropriate legal action on the basis of the complaint,
which effectively led to the registration of the impugned FIR. Given the
mandatory nature and scope of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., such an
approach is in clear violation of its provisions. Consequently, the
resulting FIR under Section 186 of the IPC stands contrary to the
procedural safeguards enshrined in Section 195 of Cr.P.C.
9. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that the bar under Section 195(1) of Cr.P.C. would also be
applicable to Section 353 of the IPC, since it also extends to cases
where offences forming part of the same transaction include any of the
offences enumerated therein, it would be germane to specify that
Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC relate to two distinct offences , having
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disparate ingredients. On the one hand Section 353 of the IPC is a
cognizable offence, on the other hand Section 186 of the IPC is not.
Section 195 of Cr.P.C. does not bar the trial of an accused person for a
distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not
within the ambit of that section. Therefore, this averment cannot be
countenanced by this Court. The judgments relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioners i.e. Ram Kumar(supra)and Ramji
BhikhaKoli(supra)would not be of any assistance in view of the
authoritative judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Durgacharan Naik and others vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 (SC) 1775
wherein the following the opined:
"5. We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants
that the conviction of the appellants under Section 353 Indian
Penal Code is illegal because there is a contravention of
Section 195 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which requires a
complaint in writing by the process server or the A. S. I. It was
submitted that the charge under Section 353 Indian Penal Code
is based upon the same facts as the charge under
Section 186 Indian Penal Code and no cognizance could be taken
of the offence under Section 186 Indian Penal Code unless there
was a complaint in writing as required by Section 195 (1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code It was argued that the conviction under
Section 353 Indian Penal Code is tantamount, in the
circumstances of this case, to a circumvention of the requirement
of Section 195 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the
conviction of the appellants under Section 353 Indian Penal
Code by the High Court was, therefore, vitiated in law. We are
unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that most of
the allegations in this case upon which the charge under
Section 353 Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those
constituting the charge under Section 186 Indian Penal Code but
it cannot be ignored that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal
Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under
the latter section is a cognizable offence the one under the former
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section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also
distinct. Section 186 Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case
where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the
discharge of his public functions but under Section 353. Indian
Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force
while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary.
The quality of the two offences is also different.
Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing
with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while
Section 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the Offences affecting
the human body. It is well established that Section 195 of the
Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused
person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but
which is not within the ambit of that section. In Satis Chandra
Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De, 24 Cal WN 982, it was held by
Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a
single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under
Section 211 Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against
public justice, and the other an offence under Section 499,
wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence
under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the
sanction of the Court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code
has not provided for sanction of Court for taking cognizance of
that offence. It was said that the two offences being
fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken
cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from
the fact that the former is made non-compoundable, while the
latter remains compoundable; in one for the initiation of the
proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the Court
under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, while in the other,
cognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the
person defamed. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that
where upon the facts the commission of several offences is
disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is
open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which
do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount
to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of
Sections 195 to 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code The decision
of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this Court
in Basirul-Huq v. State of West Bengal, 1953 SCR 836, in which
it was held that if the allegations made in a false report disclose
two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other
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against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the
provisions of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, from
seeking redress for the offence committed against him."
This reasoning was further buttressed and approved by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankaj Aggarwal and Others vs. State of
Delhi and Another, JT 2001 (5) S.C. 233.
10. Coming to the next consideration as to whether the
ingredients of Section 353 of the IPC are satisfied in the present case, it
is pertinent to establish that the offending act qualifies either as an
assault or criminal force meant to deter public servant from discharge of
his duty. Unlike in the case of Section 186 of the IPC where voluntarily
obstructing any public servant in discharge of his official function is
sufficient to invoke the said section, in the case of offence under
Section 353 of the IPC as mentioned above, not only obstruction but
actual use of criminal force or assault on the public servant is necessary.
In the instant case, the only allegation qua the petitioners is that they
declared that if the demolition operation continued, their entire family
would die by suicide by consuming poison. Threat to die by suicide can
by no means come under the ambit of use of criminal force or assault.
As such the ingredients of offence under Section 353 of the IPC are
clearly absent in the FIR(supra).
11. In view of the discussion above, the present petition is
allowed and FIR bearing no. 106 dated 30.05.2020 under Sections 353,
186 and 34 of IPC registered at Police Station Sadar Ahmedgarh,
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District Malerkotla and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are
quashed qua the petitioners.
12. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
20.02.2025
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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