Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kewal Singh And Another vs State Of Punjab And Another on 19 February, 2025
Author: Rajesh Bhardwaj
Bench: Rajesh Bhardwaj
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:038662
CRM-M-59218-2024 -1-
127 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-59218-2024
Decided on : 19.02.2025
Kewal Singh and another ..... Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ
Present: Mr. Pardeep Kumar Kapila, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Mr. Taun Aggarwal, Sr.DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate, for respondent No.2.
Rajesh Bhardwaj, J.
1. Prayer in the present petition is for quashing of the FIR No.23
dated 10.02.2023 registered under Section 306 IPC, at Police Station
Ajnala, District Amritsar and all the consequent proceedings arising
therefrom on the basis of the compromise (Annexure P-2).
2. Succinctly, facts of the case are that respondent No.2-
complainant has lodged the impugned FIR. Primarily the allegations made
by respondent No.2 are to the effect that she is the wife of deceased, namely
Jatinder Singh, who had purchased a plot measuring 5 Marlas in village
Chamiyari. In the year 2020, when her husband Jatinder Singh started
construction work of boundary wall, then he was restrained by Rajwinder
Kaur (petitioner No.2) and her father-in-law Kewal Singh (petitioner No.1).
Her husband tried to resolve the dispute, but both the petitioners did not
allow the construction to be raised by her husband. He was abused by both
of them and they misbehaved with him to the extent that he consumed
poison on being harassed by both of them and co-accused Harjit Singh and
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thus, committed suicide. On the registration of the FIR, the investigation
commenced. During the trial before the trial Court, the parties have entered
into a compromise and on the basis of which the present petition has been
filed for quashing of the FIR.
3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that
the complainant is the wife of the deceased who has no grievance against
the petitioners as compromise has already been arrived between them. He
submits that though offence under Section 306 IPC is not compoundable
under Section 320 Cr.P.C., however, this Court has ample power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing this FIR on the basis of the compromise
arrived at between the parties. He has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab,
2007(2) RCR (Crl.) 1052. He has submitted that when the petitioners have
entered into a compromise with respondent No.2-complainant, proceedings
in the FIR are nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and thus, in
the interest of justice, the impugned FIR deserves to be quashed.
4. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has endorsed the
submissions made by counsel for the petitioners that both the sides have
entered into compromise.
5. However, learned State counsel has opposed the submissions
made by counsel for the petitioners. He has submitted that there are specific
allegations against the petitioners and the co-accused who is neither party to
the compromise nor party in the present petition. He submits that as per law
settled, offence under Section 306 IPC falls under the heinous offence and
as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of
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Punjab and another, 2012 (10) SCC 303 and Daxaben vs. State of
Gujarat and others, 2022 AIR (Supreme Court) 3530, offence under
Section 306 IPC cannot be compounded. Hence, the present petition being
devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed.
6. The Court has heard counsel for the parties and perused the
record with their able assistance. The issue involved in the present case is
that, can this Court under its power of inherent jurisdiction as enumerated
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quash the proceedings under Section 306 IPC on
the basis of compromise arrived at between the accused and the
complainant? Evidently the complainant for the offence under Section 306
IPC has to be relative of the deceased. In the case in hand, the complainant
is the wife of the deceased. Hence, the compromise which has been relied
upon by the petitioners, is between the accused and relative of the deceased.
The role of every complainant is to put the legal machinery into motion.
There is no gainsaying that as per statutory provisions of Section 320
Cr.P.C., there are certain offences, which are compoundable with the
permission or without the permission of the Court. However, the inherent
power of this Court empowers it to quash the proceedings in certain
offences, even if the offence under consideration is non-compoundable in
nature. However, in view of the law settled, this Court is to be circumspect
while exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh's case (supra) has dealt with regard
to the powers to be exercised by the High Court exhaustively. Thereafter, in
Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466, Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
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"31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would
be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482
of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties
have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II)When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,
the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form
an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act the offences committed
by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not
to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
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quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding
factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to
accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings
whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the
High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence
based on complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement
play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in
exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie
assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally
the High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial
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court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the
offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.
Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already
recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise
between the parties would not be a ground to accept the
same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has
already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a
crime."
7. The offence in the present case, for which the FIR has been
sought to be quashed on the basis of compromise, is offence under Section
306 IPC. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daxaben's case (supra) has held as
under:-
"25. The only question in this appeal is whether the Criminal
Miscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC for abetment to commit suicide,
entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten years, could have
been quashed on the basis of a settlement between the
complainant and the accused named in the FIR. The answer to
the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to
commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of
course, the inherent power of the High Court under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to
quash criminal proceedings relating to non-compoundable
offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of
the process of Court. Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in
nature, the High Court can exercise its power under Section
482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In what
cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or
criminal proceedings upon compromise can be exercised,
would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
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proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be
circumspect and have due regard to the nature and gravity of
the offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society cannot be quashed
on the basis of a compromise between the offender and the
complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape,
burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are
neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the
society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on
compromise, when the offence is serious and grave and falls
within the ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave
and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the
complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, where
complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to
extract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially
strong offenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and
serious offences such as murder, rape, bride- burning, etc. by
buying off informants/complainants and settling with them.
This would render otiose provisions such as Section 306, 498-
A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a
specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant
is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal
complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State,
it becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The
State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in
society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of
grave and serious non- compoundable offences which impact
society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of
hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by
conviction and punishment of the offender. An informant has
no right in law to withdraw the complaint of a non-
compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous
nature, which impacts society.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding
cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because there is a
settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between the
accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the
deceased. As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls
in the category of heinous and serious offences and are to be
treated as crime against society and not against the
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individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence under
Section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An
FIR under Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed
on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant,
surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers
or anyone else. It is clarified that it was not necessary for
this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in this
case discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC,
since the High Court, in exercise of its power under Section
482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that
the disputes between the accused and the informant had
been compromised."
8. On reading the findings arrived by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
it is deciphered that quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave and
serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant, would
be violative of the law settled. It has been further observed that this would
render otiose the provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-B etc.
incorporated in the IPC. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that FIR
under Section 306 cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial
settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,
guardians, care-givers or anyone else. Hon'ble Supreme Court, thus, has
totally ruled out the quashing of the FIR for the offence under Section 306
IPC on the basis of the compromise. The offence under Section 306 IPC has
been held not to be offence in private nature, but against the society as a
whole. Accepting the compromise in such like cases would have serious
ramifications in the society.
9. Though learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that
the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daxaben's case (supra) is
distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the present case as the
offence under Section 306 IPC is not made out in the present case, however,
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the argument raised is misconceived, as the petition is filed on the basis of
compromise and not on the basis of merits.
10. Hence, the law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners
cannot be relied upon by this Court, as Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled
the issue in hand in Daxaben's case (supra). Thus, this Court does not find
any merit in the present petition and hence, the same is hereby dismissed.
11. Nothing said herein shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case. It has further been clarified that the
petitioners would be at liberty to avail their remedy for quashing of the FIR,
in case so advised, on the basis of merits of the case.
(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
19.02.2025 JUDGE
sharmila Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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